December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

WebTV Article...
by Lile Elam 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.sjmercury.com/business/today/biz/007555.htm Web browser classified as weapon New York Times SAN FRANCISCO -- American couch potatoes have become empowered -- too empowered, in the eyes of the government. A $300 television-set-top device for browsing the World Wide Web, which Sony and Philips Electronics began selling recently at chains like Sears, Roebuck and Circuit City Stores, uses computer-security technology so powerful that the government is classifying it as a weapon that will require a special export license before it can be sold overseas. Few industry experts expect such a license to be granted, meaning the companies are unlikely to begin selling current versions of the U.S.-made devices next year in Europe and Japan, as they had planned. The appliances, designed to let consumers surf the Web and transmit e-mail via a standard television set and phone line, have suddenly become the most significant challenge to the Clinton administration's attempt to restrict the export of powerful data-scrambling devices by categorizing them as ``munitions'' requiring a special export license. While the set-top boxes are intended to protect the privacy of users and permit secure on-line sales transactions, administration officials fear such technology could be used by foreign terrorists or criminals to conspire with electronic impunity. ``We're the guinea pig,'' said Steve Perlman, chairman and chief executive of Web TV Networks Inc., designer of the units, which are being manufactured in the United States by Sony Electronics and Philips. ``Can you imagine carrying one of our boxes under your arm and getting arrested at the border?'' NYT-11-07-96 2217EST Posted: Fri Nov 8 05:05:01 PST 1996

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Re: Blocking addresses by default
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 7 Nov 1996 15:25:07 -0500, Rich Graves wrote: ... > What's wrong with this scheme? Other than the fact that all remailers > would have to change their software at the exact same moment. :-) To which 04:15 PM 11/8/96 +1300, Paul Foley wrote: ... >This is not true, of course. Implement it in two stages. First >recognise and strip the disclaimer, but don't prepend one, then, when >all remailers are doing this, start prepending information. .. You could also maintain a list of remailers to suggest that DO have this feature, rig a random number generator to decide which of these the post should be sent to, up to the number specified, if the sender doesn't explicitly state which to send it to. Also, if you can strip it, and flag that it has been stripped, you can append a new one, but only to posts that you stripped them off of.

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Re: Smart Bombs
by Marshall Clow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: >Smart Use for Smart Cards > >"UBIQ announced that its software has been selected by American Express to >personalize smart cards that will be issued ... for ticketless travel on >American Airlines. ... Airline travelers with these smart card holders will be >able to proceed directly to an airport gate, insert their smart card into a gate >reader, receive seat confirmation, and board the plane without touching a single >piece of paper. > Does this mean that you can fly without showing any identification? It sounds like it. What is to prevent my company from getting a half dozen of these cards, and when someone in the company needs to travel, loading a card with the travel info and giving it to the traveller? Note that (as far as the airline or FCC is concerned) there is no person <<-->> card mapping. Other scenarios: Will travel agents be able to issue these cards? How about airport ticket agencies? Will people be able to buy cards for cash? James wrote: >Of course, not having a card may subject you to greater scrutiny at check-in >time due to the reduced tracking ability. > I think that you have this backwards. There will be less tracking ability for people flying w/o tickets. -- Marshall Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu> "We're not gonna take it/Never did and never will We're not gonna take it/Gonna break it, gonna shake it, let's forget it better still" -- The Who, "Tommy"

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A Disservice to Mr. Bell
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:32 PM 11/8/1996, jim bell wrote: >At 09:12 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >> ...His conviction was not reversed until 1983 in the court of one >> Judge Patel... > However, the fact that it took 40 years to reverse (and didn't, presumably, > reverse the convictions of others, and didn't compensate people for lost > property) is yet another reason to take a few pieces out of the hide of the > SC, as well as a few pounds of flesh nearest the heart. Many of us are guilty of a grave disservice to Mr. Bell. I'm sure that just about every reader of this list can only cringe when messages such as the one above cross our screens. ("He can't be a paid provocateur - it would be too obvious!") Not only is Mr. Bell apparently calling for the murder of a judge, he is apparently calling for the murder of every justice on the Supreme Court of the United States! Now lots of folks are afraid that Mr. Bell's messages will be cited as evidence that the Cypherpunks are a terrorist organization. This does a grave disservice to Mr. Bell. What Mr. Bell is really doing, I think, is intentionally pushing the envelope of what is considered to be free speech and nobly placing himself in the front lines of cryptoanarchy. So long as Mr. Bell can continue to threaten the lives of our officials in the most public way without molestation, it is safe to say that the rest of us are not going to FBI summercamp. (Canaries play a similar role for miners.) Not only should we applaud his courage, but Mr. Bell's brilliance in inventing and executing this strategy cannot go unnoticed. Now, many of you have had some awfully hard words for Mr. Bell. I am sure we all regret them now that we fully understand Mr. Bell's formerly puzzling actions. I am going to have to ask you all to do something very hard - apologize. I will start: Thank you Jim Bell for your brilliant and courageous contribution to the Cypherpunks list! I am sorry I ever claimed it was otherwise. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com "Stop and grieve at the tomb of the dead Kroisos, slain by wild Ares in the front rank of battle." - Attican cemetary monument, c. 540 B.C.

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Free software could not threaten purpose of ITAR ...
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It never ceases to amaze me how inconsistent the anti-crypto people are on this issue ... I just took a look at VADM McConnell's answers during a Senate hearing on May 3, 1994 ... http://csrc.nist.gov/keyrecovery/ees_q-a.txt Questions from Senator Murray: Q: In my office in the Hart building this February, I downloaded from the Internet an Austrian program that uses DES encryption. This was on a laptop computer, using a modem over a phone line. The Software Publishers' Association says there are at least 120 DES or comparable programs world wide. However, U.S. export control laws prohibit American exporters from selling comparable DES programs abroad. With at least 20 million people hooked up to the Internet, how do U.S. export controls actually prevent criminals, terrorists, or whoever from obtaining DES encryption software? A: Serious users of encryption do not entrust their security to software distributed via networks o bulletin boards. There is simply too much risk that viruses, Trojan Horses, programming errors, and other security flaws may exist in such software which could not be detected by the user. Serious users of encryption, those who depend on encryption to protect valuable data and cannot afford to take such chances, instead turn to other sources in which they can have greater confidence. Such serious users include not only entitles which may threaten U.S. national security interests, but also businesses and other major consumers of encryption products. Encryption software distribution via Internet, bulletin board, or modem does not undermine the effectiveness of encryption export controls. Why is it, then, that we don't just allow non-commercial software to be exported? 1. I don't believe, for a moment that "serious users" of cryptography cannot entrust their security to "software distributed via networks o bulletin boards". Those are precisely the mediums through which PGP became popular. 2. Phil Z was being harassed precisely because PGP is most definitely a serious threat in the trend toward undermining ITAR. 3. Phil K's export request was rejected, and MIT was harassed over the PGP source book, precisely because source code is source code. It does not matter if it came on a disk or through a network or through a bulletin board or on a book. The point is that the NSA DOES view this as a serious threat, so they are fighting this tooth and nail. Ern

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research help
by Jim Garvey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all. I'm writing a paper for a class I'm in. It has to answer the question "What evidence is there that new information technology poses a threat to out privacy?" I was wondering if anyone knew of some really good online sources I could access and use. Any help would be greatly appreciated. Thanks.

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No Subject
by brazie＠ipa.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSCRIBE

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Re: WebTV a "munition"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:12 PM 11/8/96 -0800, Rich Graves wrote: >Eric Murray wrote: >> >> Page 3 of the San Jose Mercury News has a small blurb >> about WebTV's browser/set-top box that "uses >> computer-security technology so powerful that the >> government is classifying it as a weapon >> that will require a special export license before >> it can be sold overseas".[...] >> shouldn't be too difficult. If they didn't use the "export" >> level SSL CipherTypes, then what're they up to? Are they >> fighting crypto export laws (for which they should be congratulated >> and supported) or are they just looking for free publicity? > >Based on the lack of public policy pronouncements from the WebTV folks, >I would answer C) They're clueless. I'm not sure that management even >understood, or wanted to understand, that they'd have an export problem. >See http://www.webtv.net/ However, I estimate that the "investment" of probably under $1 million, and certainly under $10 million dollars, would easily sweep away any legal obstacle to the export of these devices. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: [rant] Race
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Nov 08 21:16:34 1996 > ObCrypto: Is it true that "Kemo Sabe" is Abanake for "Horse's Ass"? The author had some fun with their names. Kemo Sabe is a play on words and actually stands for "que no sabe" which, translated from Spanish, means "he who knows nothing." Tonto in Spanish means stupid. ************************************************************ Lynne L. Harrison, Esq. | "The key to life: Poughkeepsie, New York | - Get up; lharrison(a)mhv.net | - Survive; http://www.dueprocess.com | - Go to bed." ************************************************************ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMoPpgj5A4+Z4Wnt9AQFHsgP5AVSS0pG5Sp2VqtTm+BefXkA9IcA//LvQ IXISs4RaLUrUmPjMkggFbyoMEEmIIz2TjdUr2Rjn+0+T/8cmSSXTrUqofroOu8rC G00MlCPGzLWuQ5g3iuxGfxZMszWuYWEkb7m37nP0ozdPgR3xG6sYkAeuTPiny27x ZXXPgmMbidU= =m/jZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Source blocking Vulis is futile
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: > > Please, remailers, source block Vulis for a week. > Remailer Fan > % telnet smail.based.host.edu smtp 250 Smail Ready ... ... mail from: someone(a)someplace.gov rcpt to: remailer(a)blacknet.org data Subject: Insert your favorite subject(spit) here Request-Remailing-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com :: Insert your favorite message body (fart) here .. 250 Message Accepted quit Connection closed by foreign host. %

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