December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[Repost] PipeNet
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Below is a repost of the original PipeNet article from February, 1995. The author is Wei Dai. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A week ago I made a suggestion for a new protocol for untracibility, but only got one response. I'll try again, this time more forcefully. I'm not trying to convince anyone to implement this (though of course you're welcome to!), but just to think about it and give me feedback. Why is another protocol needed? Right now we have only two, each of which has its own set of tradeoffs. To summarize: Mix-Net (i.e., remailer-net): high latency, moderate bandwidth costs, and low complexity DC-Net: moderate latency, high bandwidth costs, and high complexity While the DC-Net will probably never be widely used, the remailer-net has a fair chance of one day providing a way for many people to send e-mail that not even governments can trace. However, I don't think this is enough. Efficient social and business relationships require that people be able to converse to each other in real time. Cryptoanarchy will not come about if people cannot do this anonymously. How well can two pseudonymous agents negotiate a contract if each message they send must be delayed several hours? The protocol I sugguested would have low latency, moderate bandwidth costs, and moderate complexity. It would be well suited for people to interact anonymously in a textual environment. This is what I wrote: > Imagine a server that allows you to open a > low bandwidth (let's say around 100 cps, in order to reduce costs) > link-encrypted telnet session with it, and provides you with a number > of services, for example a link-encrypted talk session with another > user. You'll need to maintain the link 24 hours a day to defend > against statistical analysis, and of course you can chain a number of > these servers together in a way similiar to chaining remailers. Lance pointed out the chain cannot be built quickly. This is not a problem if servers connect to each other with relatively wide link-encrypted pipes and multiplex your connection into these pipes. In this system, latency would never be more than a few seconds, bandwidth cost is N*100 cps (point to point), N being the number of links in your chain. Implementation would probably be harder than remailers, but much easier than DC-Nets. The protocol would also provide both sender and receiver untracibility without any need for broadcasting. Wei Dai P.S. I never gave a name for the protocol... let's call it Pipe-net. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLzgewDl0sXKgdnV5AQGzvAQAgFaOxOzFPgS031z4jZRYUJp/+3BS5Con Kza7WsvZPvxzaNLh9ecD3aCx5dtf4muaiUKjC2HIItaLKEdZZPdzUGFd4wg1cY8G k8mvYNzDImr3ZtQ0HiqQ59PWhznad0GuhjQajB7RtpI+K/Z4uBaUEZGVoZZT+LHN MSjOl/k/yfg= =jgq6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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cryptlib 2.00 free encryption library released
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Version 2.00 of cryptlib is now available from ftp://garbo.uwasa.fi/pc/crypt/crypl200.zip and also from ftp://ftp.franken.de/pub/crypt/misc/cryptl200.zip. The library provides an easy-to-use interface which allows even inexperienced crypto programmers to easily add strong encryption and authentication services to their software. The library contains DES, triple DES, IDEA, MDC/SHS, RC2, RC4, RC5, SAFER, SAFER-SK, Blowfish, and Blowfish-SK conventional encryption, MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD-160 and SHA hash algorithms, and Diffie-Hellman, DSA, and RSA public-key encryption, as well as a comprehensive high-level interface with functions such as cryptCreateSignature() and cryptExportKey(). The library is supplied as source code for Unix (shared or static libraries), DOS, Windows (16- and 32-bit DLL's), and the Amiga. The library provides a standardised interface to a number of popular encryption algorithms, as well as providing a high-level interface which hides most of the implementation details and provides an operating-system-independant encoding method which makes it easy to transfer encrypted data from one system to another. Although use of the the high-level interface is recommended, experienced programmers can directly access the lower-level encryption routines for implementing custom encryption protocols or methods not provided by the library. The library API serves as an interface to a range of plug-in encryption modules which allow encryption algorithms to be added in a fairly transparent manner. The standardised API allows any of the algorithms and modes supported by the library to be used with a minimum of coding effort. As such the main function of the library is to provide a standard, portable, easy-to-use interface between the underlying encryption routines and the user software. In addition the easy-to-use high-level routines allow for the exchange of encrypted session keys and the creation and checking of digital signatures with a minimum of programming overhead. The library has been written to be as idiot-proof as possible. On initialization it performs extensive self-testing against test data from encryption standards documents, and the API's check each parameter and function call for errors before any actions are performed, with error reporting down to the level of individual parameters. The library implements a security perimeter around the encryption functions, with encryption contexts consisting of an arbitrary handle referring to (hidden) data held within the library. No outside access to state variables or keying information is possible, provided the underlying OS provides some form of memory protection. If the OS supports it, all sensitive information used by the library will be page-locked to ensure it is never swapped to disk. There is one small bug I found about an hour after it was released (sigh), you can't use CRYPT_USE_DEFAULT as a parameter to cryptCreateContext() due to missing parentheses in crypt.c. Incidentally, if someone in Europe with a high-bandwidth link to the rest of the world could provide a permanent site for cryptlib betas that'd be useful, since the current beta distribution system is rather ad hoc. Peter.

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Royalties
by pclow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear C'punks I understand from a previous post that if I were to commercialised PGP in a package, I have to pay some royalties(?) to the owners(?) of IDEA. My apologies to the list for repeating the question which is, who do I pay to and how much. Thanks.

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Sameer should sue the SPA
by Matthew Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Let's see, what can Sameer sue the SPA for... 1) Filing a frivilous lawsuit, of course. 2) Extortion. "Sign this or we'll sue." 3) Libel and Defamation. "SPA's false statements about Mr. Parekh have harmed his reputation as a software publisher, and cost him profits..." 4) Conspiracy to violate the ECPA by demanding logs and records which may contain private/confidential information. (Dunno about this one, but it's worth a shot.) 5) Anything else? How much $ in damages do you think he can get? Also, SPA is going after C2 because one of their customers allegedly had a link to a pirate site - but they have (apparently) not gone after the pirate site itself! Could someone explain to me how there can be a finding of contributory copyright infringement, when there is no direct copyright infringement? Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction is an often-cited case here. In this case, a lawsuit was brought against the swap meet operators only after action had been taken against the vendors of the illegally copied material. It does not seem logical that c2 could be liable for contributory infringement when no actual infringement has (yet) been shown to exist.

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Re: COMMUNITY CONNEXION SUED IN FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:03 PM 10/14/96 -0700, Steven L Baur <steve(a)miranova.com> wrote: > http://www.spa.org/piracy/CODE.htm > ... > 8. Do not sponsor, endorse, or advertise access to infringing > software. I wonder how a "Hack Netscape" or "Hack Microsoft" contest fits in with this, to name two major public services run by C2...... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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Oregon DMV database online once again...
by Cerridwyn Llewyellyn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Oregon DMV database will once again be searchable on the web, in a few days, at http://www.notek.com/or-dmv. Suggestions on what sorts of privacy-related propaganda should be on the page are welcome (and encouraged: currently there's really nothing there...) Also, looking for a volunteer to write a quick press release we can send to Oregon media, regarding the reasons behind the page, etc. (I suck at such things, and would prefer if someone else with a talent for writing on cypherpunk-type topics would do it.) A few details, for those who want to know: the actual databases are stored on a 486DX/33 (the only machine I could spare for the task..) running linux 2.0.13 with 8 megs o' RAM. The search isn't quite as speedy as Genocide2600's (the previous home of the Web-Searchable dmv database), but it's reasonably fast. The license database is indexed on last name, the plates database is currently indexed on plate number, but when I can find more harddrive space, it will also be indexed (and thus searchable) by last name, which is a bit of an expansion on Genocide 2600. Anyway, all that's really left is a few hours of work tidying up the cgi/database server code and finishing the actual web page, which I should get to tomorrow or possibly the next day. I'll post a notice when the page is officially up, but in the meantime, please let me know what type of privacy propaganda/tools/info (if any) would be appropriate. Thanks... //cerridwyn//

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AS2805.65 standard?
by Min-Ming Chin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, there, Anyone heard of the Australian security standard AS2805.65? Beats me...

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GAK Naive or Shrewd?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ern Hua's letter is ultimate. ----- The New York Times, October 15, 1996. Is Clinton's Encryption Policy Naive or Shrewd? To the Editor: There is something strange going on with the Clinton Administration's policy on data-scrambling software and Secretary of Commerce Mickey Kantor's defense of it (letter, Oct. 11). If the Administration really wanted to prevent encryption software from falling into hostile hands, it would try to pass a law limiting the type of encryption that can be sold domestically, not just exported. The cumbersome system the Administration proposes may be a measure of its computer naivete. People who are familiar with computer encryption know that strong encryption can be readily had here in the United States over the Internet or telephone lines from dial-up computer bulletin boards. Not long ago I downloaded a copy "Pretty Good Privacy," a system similar to the Rivest-Shamir-Adelman "strong" public-key method. Anyone with a computer, a modem and a phone line could do the same. Or the Government may not be naive at all but merely Machiavelian. Suppose the code breakers at the National Security Agency had managed to develop efficient solutions to "strong" methods. Would it be in the Government's interest to keep that fact a secret and to create a distracting furor by pushing another, weaker (and exportable) encryption system it knows has not a chance being adopted? Then encryption usrs would be lulled into using compromised systems while the National Security Agency decrypts their mail. Warren Wetmore,Hazel Crest, Ill., Oct. 11,1996 ----- To the Editor: Mickey Kantor's Oct. 11 letter is unconvincing. Instead of trying to prohibit strong cryptography, governments should encourage its use. It is the best tool for defending our privacy on the information highway. Jeffrey Shallit, Kitchener, Canada, Oct. 11,1996 The writer is an associate professor of computer science at the University of Waterloo. ----- To the Editor: Mickey Kantor (letter, Oct. 11) says that your Oct. 4 editorial ignores the trend -- especially in Europe -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the import of stronger encryption products. This ignores that no one wants mandated key recovery. Some important uses of encryption, like secure telephone conversations, do not need key recovery for any reason other than law enforcement intercepts. Mr. Kantor's point on other nations' barring imports is absurd. Since when do we tailor our export limits to the import limits of other nations? The "trend" Mr. Kantor refers to is artificially created by the United States through lobbying efforts. Mr. Kantor uses the word "trend" as if other nations were independently pursuing the key-recovery path, when, in fact, only a few are considering such a move. Some, like Japan, have opposed such a direction. Others, like Sweden, have considered such a move secretly because such a policy cannot withstand democratic scrutiny. Mr. Kantor's letter is a blatant attempt by the Administration to get what it wants for law enforcement and national security agencies without any concern for the nature of the technology or the economic effect of such policies. Ernest Hua, Sunnyvale, Calif., Oct. 11, 1996 The writer is a software engineer. -----

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PINmail in the SCMP
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: somebody Date: Tue, 15 Oct 1996 15:13:07 +0800 To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: PINmail in the SCMP MIME-version: 1.0 (Created by TFS) Front page of the Technology Post section of the 15/10/96 edition of the South China Morning Post, next to a cheesy photo of the two men quoted in the article looking (peering?) through venetian blinds. Headline: Anonymous e-mail site launched. Byline: Keala Francis Highlights: "Hong Kong advertising agency Momentum has created an anonymous e-mail service for Internet users around the world." penet closed down "because it was perceived to be condoning child pornography. [Director] Tobin said PINmail (http://www.PINmail.com) was designed as an offshore address only for legitimate businesses, but the compay could not necessarily control its users." Tobin: "If there is proof of illegal activities, I would give up a name." "Momentum created and owns shares in AsiaFocus International, which owns PINmail." Access via Netscape 3.0. IExplorer due before December. (Uses CGI and Javascript in a way that is incompatible with IE3.0.) Daley (Momentum GM): "There are really no disadvantages to having your e-mail sit on a server rather than your PC." "PINmail can also allow you to maintain an anonymous address." "Momentum has set up three server sites in Hong Kong, California and Amsterdam to enable easier and more efficient access." PINmail = USD19.95/yr. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Camelot PRNG
by inssdl＠dstn21.dct.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the UK, the National Lottery is run by a company called Camelot (in case anyone didn't know) A while back, they introduced a new option, in that if you checked a certain box on your ticket, 6 numbers would be 'chosen' for you, presumably 'randomly' Does anyone have any info on how this system works? i.e. The PRNG used? Whether the PRNG is in the shop terminal or at the central computer @ Camelot? et cetera. (I am looking at the problems of PRSG for my Masters dissertation - hence the interest) Please reply either to the cypherpunks list or to my e-mail address if you think this doesn't have any crypto-relevance. Thanks in advance... ********************************************************************** David Lucas PGDip Software Engineering @@ BEng(Hons) Civil Engineering Postgraduate Software Engineer, University of Abertay Dundee, SCOTLAND @ E-mail: inssdl(a)dstn21.dct.ac.uk @ 2+2 = 5 for large values of two @ If you're not living on the edge, then you're taking up too much space Organisations can't have opinions, only people can and these are mine. Dave's Doorstep is back!!! - http://river.tay.ac.uk/~inssdl/index.html **********************************************************************

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