December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: "Just call the police"...yeah, right
by Scott J. Schryvers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >The name of the informal logical fallacy Tim May has *not* >made is 'argumentum ad hominem' (literally, 'an argument >to the man'; attacking one's opponent rather than dealing >with the subject under discussion; aka name calling). > >Having said that, while Tim May has not committed a logical >fallacy, neither has he advanced a logical argument. He >has merely stated his conclusory opinion of the other >person's comment. By itself, it adds little or nothing of >substance to the argument. > >Logos out > Uh logos... Deal with it. If I needed some one to walk me through a mailing list when it concerns constructive arguements I'd be requesting a moderated list and since I find moderated news groups to be nonproductive affairs I tend to find this mailing list perfect for my needs. As for judging if Tim has advanced the arguement or not that is for each person to decide not you. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMqXvk/+hzPlzwZAdAQF5Lgf/e3/99SUkd9aADGeS8UjYYcSxTuH8LxE5 AdvIRgLmv11BdTgcyK+q03MYV1gGjmZmtWtEuCiPN/O39gtMM4RYcz2/c5f7bMMA h8QwKP9h4RNA1dWgDDF54PQuKElMr9SBJJwLdyYwPddkjjVEs0tjFRoJv2MsEkmB nK3REFH75U6F7q0NZB8IHxBbYNDYbTejRcx5yfP+W1lg2cLK2lonis/G4X6Kj7gu BdNLn3PLS6qr1YgTB1gWQD5JzCN6FJ7Gw0snjALLFbG0QbiMLJd7TT/bWc8ExDoo HUg+U4OKZ/oPLzNMiZqvzn9gMjGKWz0+hQbi8kR1f8OT/5+bJ4CFjw== =xM3k -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by Lurker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone tell me where I can find a text file of *all* usenet newsgroups?

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Re: The Rise and Fall of Cypherpunks WAS [Re: the Dennings]
by Dave Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SANDY SANDFORT wrote: > On Tue, 3 Dec 1996, Dave Hayes wrote: > > The very existance of the "profane" keeps the "sacred" in > > existance as well. If you cannot see that, then John Grubor's > > lesson is wasted on you. > If this bit of verbal legerdemain makes any sense at all > (Logos?), then Grubor must be personally responsible for the > existance of every saint on the Catholic calendar...not. Now there's an example of properly used logic...not. Why didn't you be honest and just say "I don't understand this, please explain"? This could be because you *want* to be hostile, and you *want* to produce meaningless flames. ------ Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave(a)jetcafe.org Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet "A terrorist is someone who has a bomb and doesn't have an air force." --some letter-writer in the Manchester Guardian, some years ago

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Confirmation for subscribe cryptography
by Majordomo＠c2.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Someone (possibly you) has requested that your email address be added to or deleted from the mailing list "cryptography(a)c2.net". If you really want this action to be taken, please send the following commands (exactly as shown) back to "Majordomo(a)c2.net": auth 727e8b91 subscribe cryptography cypherpunks(a)toad.com If you do not want to this action taken, just ignore this message and no action will be taken. If you have any questions about the policy of the list owner, please contact "cryptography-approval(a)c2.net". Thanks! Majordomo(a)c2.net

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No Subject
by Jose Luis Delgado 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsuscribe cypherpunks

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RE: Anyone considered adding crypto into Microsoft Outlook?
by Robert Barnes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have downloaded, and strongly recommend, Jon S. Whalen's Microsoft Exchange Client PGP Command Extension. It adds PGP functionality to Exchange Client in a very neat and clean way. Rob -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.63ui iQCVAwUBMqYkarl39AMaT2JtAQHmtQP/Yu8rh5OkkMC1GVEnz4hY6xFczeDM0Y3U 7toMIDZLVnDwRXuoo9+10sUMnB289mkjoi54fuAhbkjDKYejXVIFilJoSFq+s5FZ K0Rdcaj8qv6VkJwL63gXMdXsFlxHIyQ/oK9/3r7tBgFyzab3tcjVXUGRy/NE5sLD osrJm4WzfVU= =+ffh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Suggestion for "the serious encryption customers" to end ITAR battle
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think we can all agree that the level of confidence in software-only approaches to security is clearly lower than combination software plus hardware approaches. It is clear that what is available over the Internet is software. (It is much harder to distribute "hardware" as you can only really distribute design information. The closest analogy could be a FPGA program, a Verilog description or some other ASIC net list.) How about the following as an approach to resolving the dispute over encryption exports: 1. Allow arbitrary exports of software-only encryption. This means that PGP is exportable as is DES crypt libraries. 2. Restrict exports of hardware-only or hardware/software encryption. This means that smart cards, HP's crypto policy cards, crypto processors with tamper-resistant casing, etc ... are restricted. Why does this make sense? 1. Reality check on export control of software: Software is just too transportable to be restricted, no matter WHAT the software does. Any restriction on WHERE software may be or may go is just not feasible, and it's not going to get any easier in the foreseeable future. 2. Take John Deutch at his word: Deutch has claimed that "serious users of cryptography" would not trust software downloaded over the Internet. We clearly do not agree with him on this aspect, but if he truly believes it (and is not just making PR spin statements for the NSA), then he must believe that allowing software exports will not significantly increase the user base (and therefore, harm CIA's or NSA's intelligence capabilities), but it will shut up the software companies' complaints. 3. Give the NSA what it wants: Software tends to standardize. Encryption is only a small part of the chain of security measures. Other weaknesses are surely part of the NSA's target for intercepts (no self-respecting codebreaking agency should stick to exploiting only one class of failures; if it is, we should question the value we are getting out of the billions of dollars we blindly give to the NSA). If the NSA stops whining about what is too hard to break, then protocol weakness and other non-encryption problems could easily creep into standards, and the NSA would surely have an analytical advantage over anyone else. Since the NSA is happily bragging that it does not even need to crack the code to break in, it should be able to live with hardware-only export restriction. The fact that the NSA is no longer drawing any lines anywhere for software will leave the bad guys guessing as to what it can really decode. In addition, hardware manufacturers will probably have a tougher overturning export restrictions on hardware-enhanced solutions after that because software companies will probably not care. It is clear that the NSA only trusts hardware implementations, as it required Clipper to be manufactured in tamper-resistant cases. All constructive replies welcome. Ern

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Re: Strong-crypto smart cards in Singapore and Germany
by um＠c2.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Gutmann writes: >The standardisation committee of the German banks have also produced >an electronic wallet which should have 25 million (yes, 25M) users by >January of next year. Again, this is a pure electronic wallet, with >2-key triple DES and 768-bit (to become 1024-bit) RSA encryption. >[...] This looks like a very nice system, and unlike Mondex doesn't >rely entirely on the hope that criminals can't get at the data on the >card. For 'security reasons', all transactions are logged in what is called 'shadow accounts'. Not what I would call a very nice system.

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RE: Microsoft & Key Escrow
by Tom Albertson (LCA) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

These issues are also addressed at somewhat greater length than in the FAQ in "Microsoft Policy on Export Controls on Encryption" at http://www.microsoft.com/intdev/security/export/expcont1.htm (updated since the recent Administration announcements). rgds tom >-----Original Message----- >From: Blake Coverett [SMTP:blake@bcdev.com] >Sent: Wednesday, December 04, 1996 6:12 PM >To: 'cypherpunks(a)toad.com' >Subject: Microsoft & Key Escrow > >Following are some of the relevent snippets from >http://www.microsoft.com/intdev/security/export/exporfaq-f.htm. >The comments in square brackets are mine. > >---cut here--- >What is Microsoft's position on supporting key escrow? > >Key escrow encryption is not a market-driven solution and it raises serious >privacy concerns for many customers. It is also new, undeveloped, untested, >and uncosted, and it will take a long time to be worked out. Additionally, >customers have expressed hesitation about mandatory key escrow, especially if >they have to give the keys to the government or a government-selected third >party. Therefore, we are not actively adding support for key escrow in our >products and technologies. > >[About as good as we can ask for. I would, however, like that last sentence > better if the word 'actively' was missing.] > >Shouldn't the U.S. government be able to access information that could >prevent terrorist acts and crime? > >Strong non-key escrow encryption is already available from retail outlets, >foreign companies, and off the Internet. Thus the U.S. government is already >having--and will continue to have--a harder time in the future accessing >plain text regardless of U.S. export restrictions. > >[I suppose it would be too much to expect a third sentence > reading. 'This is a good thing.'] > >What is key recovery? How does it relate to key escrow? > >Market-driven data recovery refers to a product feature that allows users to >maintain a spare private encryption key in a safe place. Generally, a data >recovery system escrows a copy of the session key with the message or file >and the user (or perhaps his employer) controls the decision whether to >utilize this feature. With key escrow the U.S. government holds or has access >to a user's private encryption key. > >It is not yet clear whether such systems are exportable. In the October 1 >announcement, the U.S. government referred to "key recovery" without defining >it; in all likelihood, however, they still have in mind government key >escrow, and not market-driven data recovery. > >[Hmm... it's just possible that Microsoft's spin doctors are > better than those of the US government. Perhaps they can > sell the world on their definition of 'key recovery' instead of > the one we know the TLAs intended.] >---cut here--- > >regards, >-Blake >

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Chippen@Dale
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:37 AM 12/4/96 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: : :If you, Sandy, and the other offenders *really* want to keep the noise :down, then next time ask John directly for a reply, and if none is :forthcoming, say to the list *once*, "John will not answer up", etc., :and let the subscribers draw their own conclusions from the silence, :instead of from your inane "defenses". : Dale, John has no obligation to say anything. In all fairness, no conclusions should be drawn based on any individual's saying nothing. Such thinking is from the Dark Ages. Lighten up, and let go of it.

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