December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

HP's crypto technology
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was poking about on the hp web server, trying to get some more hints about the technology they are pushing: <URL: http://www-dmo.external.hp.com/gsy/press/sevcik.html> > Date: 7/11/96 > > Rich Sevcik, vice president and general manager of the Systems > Technology Group, testified to a U.S. Senate subcommittee June 12 on > the importance of cryptography to Hewlett-Packard's ability to compete > in the international marketplace and to the nation's high-technology > competitiveness. > > [...] > > In conclusion, he introduced HP's technology called the International > Cryptography Framework (ICF). Products based on ICF would contain a > suite of cryptography capabilities of various strengths and types, > all non-functional. A customer then could enable the desired types and > strengths of cryptography in conformance with export and host government > regulations by obtaining a stamp-size smart card (known as a "policy > card"), programmed to turn on the particular cryptography capability > allowed. This would protect the right of each nation to establish an > independent policy governing cryptography in digital communication and > storage. Sevcik showed the subcommittee members a prototype cryptography > unit and several policy cards. He said HP plans to have an initial > ICF product available later this year as part of a total smart card > system solution offered due to an alliance with Informix and GEMPLUS, > with other ICF-based products planned for next year. > > U.S. export license authorities are finishing their review of this > first-phase implementation of ICF. "We have been extremely pleased with > the responsiveness and cooperation of these agencies in the review of > our technology," Sevcik said. "We have every reason to believe that > the cryptographic unit and host systems will be granted liberal export > authorization consistent with our expectations for ICF." <URL: http://www.hp.com/csopress/95sep26.html> > Press Release > > HP Announces Alliance with Gemplus and Informix to Deliver Personal > Information Cards for Consumers > > U.S. Government Reviewing Industry-backed HP International Cryptography > Framework > > September 26, 1995 > > PALO ALTO, Calif., Sept. 26, 1995 -- Hewlett-Packard Company, Gemplus > and Informix today announced the formation of an alliance to develop a > secure infrastructure that will enable corporations to speed new services > to consumers via a credit-card-sized personal information card. > > These cards will carry several thousand times the amount of data carried > by currently available smart cards. Additionally, the data on these cards > will be fully encrypted for secure international communication, so the > card will be able to be used anywhere in the world. HP believes that > the U.S. government will authorize the export to commercial enterprises > of products in Phase I(1) of HP's international cryptography framework > standard -- one of the underlying technologies in the infrastructure > that will enable the international use of personal information cards. The > framework is based on HP's open cryptographic structure. > > [...]

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. nym.alias.net is back up. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 18 Nov 96 6:48:35 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca * ********** 14:29 99.94% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com - ********** 5:32 99.81% replay remailer(a)replay.com - **++****** 9:22 99.69% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net - ***#***--# 24:20 99.57% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net - +**+ ++** 37:22 99.46% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++-++- 2:11:49 99.16% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com - -.- * +-- 1:53:39 98.71% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++++++++* 35:42 98.50% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de - ++--+-++ 2:19:11 98.29% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net +*-- 1:16:19 98.24% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com - + ++++++++ 42:33 98.05% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com - -+..+++++- 2:00:45 96.31% nym config(a)nym.alias.net #* *#*# :42 95.87% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com .--------- 9:21:36 92.07% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com - -++-- 3:39:00 69.30% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ## 7:06:33 41.67% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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No Subject
by Piotr Kunio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsunscribe

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No Subject
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>While I don't believe many people in government are "evil" or have "bad >intentions," I'm a strong believer that _systemic_ or _institutional_ evil >is possible. Thus, the wide opposition to mandatory key escrow, just as >civil libertarians of all stripes would oppose mandatory tatooing of >national I.D. barcodes on arms, or the mandatory retro-fitting of all homes >with special curtains containing a police-accessible "transparency mode." And the vision of 1984 looms ever closer. Pity you guys guessed....your activites have put us 12 years behind schedule to date, and we're not happy about that. --NSA

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Re: The Utility of Privacy
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:03 PM 11/17/1996, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Sun, 17 Nov 1996, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: >> Are there similar sources of information calculating privacy risk? I >> don't think so. > >Ah, so let's ignore the risks, on the grounds that we have no idea what >they might be, or their magnitude. That's clever. I like that. The risks are not being ignored. What is there to fear? >> Informally, I don't know anybody who has suffered due to a loss of >> privacy. > >Your circle of associations must be limited. Examples? >> My question remains unanswered, probably because privacy isn't worth >> the effort. > >And no one can answer that question but you. Privacy is a personal >decision. I'm sure there are many out there who will suffer no harm even >if their SSN is published in the Wall Street Journal. The experience of others has value. >Why, however, fail to take out insurance when the cost is so low? Really >it doesn't take much in the way of effort or money to assure one's >privacy. (Hint: It's getting cheaper every day in some ways). > >Answer: Nearly all of the cost of privacy is concentrated in set up cost. >Maintaince costs are minimal once set up has been made. Yet getting over >that first hurdle is the biggest leap. Good. We are getting somewhere.

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Re: Does John Gilmore...
by George A. Stathis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:04 ìì 17/11/1996 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >> Given that the free market rule is "he who has the money makes the >> rules", please explain how anything less than "subsidized speech" (as >> you put it) is anything close to free speech? >> >> [For those who's assumptions rule their perception: I am *not* arguing >> that all speech should be subsidized. I am merely pointing out that >> the organization that is spending the money to broadcast is >> controlling the speech, hence it is *not* free speech in terms of >> freedom or cost.] >Again, you confuse free speech with free broadcast. Well, I propose a solution to this problem: I don't mind paying fees in fact, if the prices are reasonable. For instance THIS text was _paid_ for, since I pay my Internet provider a certain amount of money every month. It would be unthinkable, however, that my Internet Provider would mess around with THIS text, or with ANY opinion of mine (I am sure you agree). Now, a mailing list has _some_ similarities to the services of an Internet provider, except (usually) the _cost_. I am sure Mr. Gilmore would be more than happy to be _paid_ for the (faulty) services he provides (to his list-members), since e.g. 1900 members times $1 per 2 months (shall we say) would earn him (shall we say) 950 dollars a month; Not much perhaps in some countries, but enough in most places as compensation for the services he provides. The problem with Mr. Gilmore (apart from being an asshole) is really that he is rather a thick-minded proponent of censorship of his list's 'eccentric' members, that such subtleties don't even cross his mind. >Forward complaints to : European Association of Envelope Manufactures >Finger for Public Key Gutenbergstrasse 21;Postfach;CH-3001;Bern >Vote Monarchist Switzerland "Heaven is a place policed by the English, cheered-up by the the Greeks, and organized by the Germans. Hell is a place organized by the Greeks, policed by the Germans, and cheered-up by the English." ...And what have the noble Swiss got to with this shit? They are the bankers for both! :-) Regards George

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No Subject
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The report estimated no such thing..its an urban myth. Give me a citation for the statistic from the report. On Sun, 17 Nov 1996, blanc wrote: > From: Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM [cut] > dv: I don't think John Gilmore's sexual practices are *that* bizarre. > The Kinsey report estimates that 10% of the population shares his > practices. > > bw: I guess you think you're talking to someone who gives a flip.

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Re: [Fwd: National Emergency]
by Bob Faw 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:15 PM 11/17/96 -0700, you wrote: >This information may be of interest to you. Forwarded with permission. > >--RJ Dawnne Gee Why Dawnne, this is only logical--considering that the new "WEB-access TV" set announced this week has been declared a "weapon" for export purposes by our government. When our leaders consider public information to be a threat to national security, we're in a whole lot more trouble than most folks realize. bob faw p.s. Go to bed, dude, it's getting late. ;-) bob ----------------------------------|------------------------------------- B. D. "Bob" Faw |NewMedia Editor, Columnist, Webmaster Poet, Scholar, WordSmith, Engineer|"American Wine on the Web" http://www.eee.org/bobfaw/ | (a complete Internet wine magazine) bob_faw(a)eee.org | http://www.2way.com/food/wine/ bfaw(a)cello.gina.calstate.edu| newbie(a)pobox.com author(a)pobox.com |Senior Writer, "Faultline" TV Series ----------------------------------|------------------------------------- Webmaster, "The Journal of International Information Management" (JIIM) http://bpa1.aic.csusb.edu/pages/students/info479/bfaw/jiim/ ----------------------------------|-------------------------------------

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BayLISA: Randal Schwartz, Just Another Convicted Perl Hacker (fwd)
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This should be QUITE entertaining. -rich ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: 17 Nov 1996 19:03:17 -0500 From: Laura de Leon <deleon(a)cat.hpl.hp.com> Newsgroups: ba.announce Subject: BayLISA: Randal Schwartz, Just Another Convicted Perl Hacker The BayLISA group meets monthly to discuss topics of interest to systems and network administrators. The meetings are free and open to the public. BayLISA holds monthly meetings on the third Thursday of each month at 7:30 PM PST. We meet at Cisco building J in San Jose, on Tasman Drive near First street. (This is across the street from the room we met in at Cisco last month). See www.baylisa.org for more information. The meetings are also broadcast via MBONE. NOTE: AS OF OCTOBER, WE HAVE MOVED TO CISCO. This is a new location. Thanks very much to Synopsys for hosting us. Schedule -------- November 21 Randal Schwartz: Just Another Convicted Perl Hacker This talk will describe how the speaker became a felon in the process of doing his job as a systems administrator in the well-publicized Oregon v. Schwartz case (victim: Intel). It will include some points about Oregon's current law and the implications of this case on the computer community. There will be a special focus on how to make sure this doesn't happen to you. There will be copies of Randal's new PERL book available if you would like to get one signed. BayLISA Board Elections & member meeting before the regular meeting At 7:00, Elections for the BayLISA board will be held. We encourage all members to vote. If you aren't a member, this is a good time to join (see our Web site) December 19 Our Holiday meeting-- Join us to share goodies and computer horror stories, as well as descriptions of stupid computer tricks. There will be a prize for best story. This is a very informal meeting, and will not be broadcast on the MBONE. January 16 Brent Chapman, Containment Zones (firewalls to keep people in) February 20 Standards efforts and how they will effect you March 20 Paul Vixie [Schedule subject to change] For further information on BayLISA, check out our web site: http://www.baylisa.org/ To get further information on the meeting location, you can also ftp it from ftp.baylisa.org:/location For any other information, please send email to: info(a)baylisa.org If you have any questions, please contact me or the info alias listed above.

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FC97 Final Call for Papers
by R.Hirschfeld＠cwi.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Financial Cryptography '97 February 24-28 1997, Anguilla, BWI FINAL CALL FOR PAPERS General Information: Financial Cryptography '97 (FC97) is a new conference on the security of digital financial transactions. The first meeting will be held on the island of Anguilla in the British West Indies on February 24-28, 1997. FC97 aims to bring together persons involved in both the financial and data security fields to foster cooperation and exchange of ideas. Original papers are solicited on all aspects of financial data security and digital commerce in general, including Anonymous Payments Fungibility Authentication Home Banking Communication Security Identification Conditional Access Implementations Copyright Protection Loss Tolerance Credit/Debit Cards Loyalty Mechanisms Currency Exchange Legal Aspects Digital Cash Micropayments Digital Receipts Network Payments Digital Signatures Privacy Issues Economic Implications Regulatory Issues Electronic Funds Transfer Smart Cards Electronic Purses Standards Electronic Voting Tamper Resistance Electronic Wallets Transferability Instructions for Authors: Send a cover letter and 9 copies of an extended abstract to be received by November 29, 1996 to the Program Chair at the address given below. The extended abstract should start with the title and an abstract followed by a succinct statement appropriate for a non-specialist reader specifying the subject addressed, its background, the main achievements, and their significance to financial data security. Submissions are limited to 15 single-spaced pages of 12pt type. Notification of acceptance or rejection will be sent to authors no later than January 17, 1997. Authors of accepted papers must guarantee that their paper will be presented at the conference. Proceedings: Proceedings of the conference will be published online in the Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce. Instructions and deadlines for submission of final papers will be sent along with notification of acceptance. Stipends: A very limited number of stipends may be available to those unable to obtain funding to attend the conference. Students whose papers are accepted and who will present the paper themselves are encouraged to apply if such assistance is needed. Requests for stipends should be addressed to one of the General Chairs. Registration: Conference registration and information on travel, hotels, and Anguilla itself is available at URL http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/. Workshop: A workshop, intended for anyone with commercial software development experience who wants hands-on familiarity with the issues and technology of financial cryptography, is planned in conjunction with FC97, to be held during the week preceding the conference. For further information, please contact one of the General Chairs. Send Submissions to: Rafael Hirschfeld FC97 Program Chair CWI Kruislaan 413 1098 SJ Amsterdam The Netherlands email: ray(a)cwi.nl phone: +31 20 592 4169 fax: +31 20 592 4199 Program Committee: Matthew Franklin, AT&T Laboratories--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA Michael Froomkin, U. Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL, USA Rafael Hirschfeld, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Arjen Lenstra, Citibank, New York, NY, USA Mark Manasse, Digital Equipment Corporation, Palo Alto, CA, USA Kevin McCurley, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA Charles Merrill, McCarter & English, Newark, NJ, USA Clifford Neuman, Information Sciences Institute, Marina del Rey, CA, USA Sholom Rosen, Citibank, New York, NY, USA Israel Sendrovic, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY, USA General Chairs: Robert Hettinga, Shipwright, Boston, MA, USA email: rah(a)shipwright.com Vincent Cate, Offshore Information Services, Anguilla, BWI email: vince(a)offshore.com.ai Conference, Exhibits, and Sponsorship Manager: Julie Rackliffe, Boston, MA, USA email: rackliffe(a)tcm.org Workshop Leader: Ian Goldberg, Berkeley, CA, USA email: iang(a)cs.berkeley.edu Financial Cryptography '97 is held in cooperation with the International Association for Cryptologic Research. Those interested in becoming a sponsor of FC97 or in purchasing exhibit space, please contact the Exhibits and Sponsorship Manager. A copy of this call for papers as well as other information about the conference will be available at URL http://www.cwi.nl/conferences/FC97.

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