December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Conservation Laws, Money, Engines, and Ontology (fwd)
by Donald E. Eastlake 3rd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Of course, as you say, security needs to be improved also. See draft-eastlake-muse-00.txt in the IETF shadow directories. Donald On Fri, 6 Sep 1996, SCN User wrote: > Date: Fri, 6 Sep 1996 10:45:57 -0700 (PDT) > From: SCN User <bf578(a)scn.org> > To: dee(a)cybercash.com > Subject: Re: Conservation Laws, Money, Engines, and Ontology (fwd) > > > > >Suggest you look at draft-eastlake-internet-payment-*.txt in the > >IETF shadow directories. I don't think any one step will solve all > >our spam problems but I wouldn't mind spending, say, 5 cents for each > >real piece of mail I sent outside my company and if end machines charged > > >5 cents per piece of ouside mail received, I think spamming would be > >crippled. (Note that with bad guy lists, you could collect the money and > >then just throw away the mail.) > Why should I pay for mail I can't control? > > Before charges like this can be implemented, protocols/security/etc > need to be improved to accurately indentify the sender. > > > -- > ------------------------------------------ > There are no facts, only interpretations. > I always wanted to be somebody, but I should have been more specific. > Food for thought is no substitute for the real thing. > ===================================================================== Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1 508-287-4877(tel) dee(a)cybercash.com 318 Acton Street +1 508-371-7148(fax) dee(a)world.std.com Carlisle, MA 01741 USA +1 703-620-4200(main office, Reston, VA) http://www.cybercash.com http://www.eff.org/blueribbon.html

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Re: electronic offshore banking
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:25 PM 9/6/96 +0300, Jüri Kaljundi wrote: > >Are there any good offshore banks that would allow you to use your account >over the Internet? > >I know European Union Bank www.eub.com is on of those available, but their >US$ 25.000 minimum deposit is too stupid. > >Jüri Kaljundi >AS Stallion >jk(a)stallion.ee > > Does Compuserve count as the Internet? It soon will be the Internet since they are dropping their proprietary software. TSB (including TSB's Jersey subsidiary) has a new net-based banking arrangement using Compuserve. See the TSB web site http://www.tsb.co.uk/pcbank.htm or Compuserve (GO TSB). TSB in Jersey (or predecessor institutions) has been there since the 1820s or so. DCF

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Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

wb8foz(a)nrk.com writes: > > So switch to Fedex. The P.O. gives lousy service anyway. Privitize. > > > > Try & mail an anonymous FedEx package. Just lie on the sender label, isn't that obvious? I know people who actually use "codeword" sender labels, in case FedEx or federales ask about a package they can tell by the sender mentioned which to disavow :) > Try and pay cash in most Fedex offices. I always do and as long as I have exact change I have never been hassled. jim

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Factory Memory
by Pete Gruber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Subject: Re: Race Bit: C
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:31 PM 9/5/96 -0600, Anonymous wrote: >> If I understand you correctly, it is OK for a government to >> institute violence against the residents of the land it claims >> dominion over, but it is not acceptable for the inhabitants of >> that piece of land to respond in self defence. > >I will say this: > >No, government initiation of violence (such as in Waco, Ruby Ridge, etc.) is not OK, >and AsPol initiation of violence is not either. This can lead into a long argument about >just _when_ violence is initiated, where opinion is more important than fact, but IMO: > >Randy Weaver was not initiating violence. >David Keresh was not initiating violence. >Pot growers and smokers are not initiating violence. No argument here... > But >Mr. Bell, if he follows through on his scheme, *will* be initiating violence. His scheme, >while it can sound tempting (especially every April 15th!) has no guarantee that it will >_only_ be used against the Lon Horiuchis of our government, Life generally doesn't come equipped with any guarantees. Some people object to private ownership of guns, on a similar theory that "there is no guarantee they won't be used against innocent people." Others (most of us?), particularly libertarians challenge this, pointing out that it is the abuse of a right which should be punished, rather than curtailing a right simply because a small minority abuse it. To the extent we believe the latter argument, we are accepting the idea that a "guarantee" is not necessary. AP, ultimately, is a tool that can be used well or used badly. I advocate using it well. >in fact, it may be said it >is not guaranteed to not be used against Mr. Bell himself, as many have joked. Check out what I wrote at the end of AP part 7: "Terror, too, because this system may just change almost EVERYTHING how we think about our current society, and even more for myself personally, the knowledge that there may some day be a large body of wealthy people who are thrown off their current positions of control of the world's governments, and the very-real possibility that they may look for a "villain" to blame for their downfall. They will find one, in me, and at that time they will have the money and (thanks to me, at least partially) the means to see their revenge. But I would not have published this essay if I had been unwilling to accept the risk." Long before I started publicizing AP, I had made my decision. > There are two roads to take in life, convincing and coercing others. > I think that the former is still possible, Mr. Bell and many others disagree. In a quote attributed to Al Capone, he said something like, "You can get more with a kind word and a gun, than you can with a kind word alone." Capone was probably talking about offense, but the principle is even more applicable to _defense_: If you have a gun, you can prevent somebody else from coercing you, and ensure that they have to CONVINCE you! AP is like a gun which can be aimed at the agents of the majority, to prevent them from violating the rights of the minority. > I worry that abuse of the very young >and weak (for now) anonymity system for the purpose of initiating, rather than exposing, >violence will lead to more government violence than we already have. First, AP only "initiates" if it is used against people who have not, themselves, initiated force or fraud. I contend that while this is not impossible, it is improbable. If you choose a target that "everyone" else agrees has initiated force, you'll only have to cough up a dollar, or a quarter, or even a dime and you'll all get your wish. Randomly select a guiltless individual and you'll be the only one paying, not to mention the fact that you might have trouble finding an AP organization that'll take your malicious donation. This translates into: "They'll exist, but due to lack of competition they'll be able to insist on taking a healthy cut of their own." In addition, if you attempt to use AP against somebody who already knows it's probably you (say, an ex business partner you just ripped off?), its anonymity won't be much use. > Perhaps I am >wrong and there is no hope; but if so, that means another revolution. Revolutions are >very romantic sounding, to those who have not been in a war. The whole point of crypto-anarchy is that revolutions are CHANGING. Think of a revolution like an earthquake: It's the sudden release of stress built up over years or decades. In an earthquake, if that release could be spread out from the seconds or minute it normally takes, to hours or even days (or better yet, continuously) the amplitude would be far smaller and you probably wouldn't even notice it. Likewise, politically, the only reason you get revolutions is because political leadership gets entrenched and resists change. Even in democracy, which is supposed to facilitate changes, eventually the politicians learn to play one group off another, leading to the same kind of social stratification problems that even dictatorships have. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Reputations
by Martin Janzen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TCM> I strongly disagree. It's quite possible for Person A to quickly convert TCM> his reputation to Person B to a _negative_ value. Real quick, in fact. GB>I don't see how there can be such a thing as negative reputation GB>capital. Wouldn't that mean B believes the opposite of what A says? B wouldn't necessarily believe the _opposite_, but if R(A,B) is negative, then B would treat whatever A says with greater skepticism. ("Consider the source.") Alternatively, R(A,B) << 0 might mean that B has decided that A's posts tend not to be worth even the time it takes to read them, and has set his killfile accordingly. (Think of someone who makes unsupported assertions: this is not a reason to believe the _opposite_ of what he says, but to ignore him.) GA>If you anti-believed someone in a consistent manner, couldn't they exploit GA>that? Sure; see any number of Cold War spy novels for examples. One point that I think deserves mention, but that I haven't seen yet in this thread, is that R(A,B) is contextual; it should be R(A,B,subject). To accept the word of an authority outside his area of expertise is a common logical fallacy. (Think of political endorsements by famous actors.) Conversely, so is dismissing something just because its proponent has a negative reputation in another context. (At the risk of flirting with Godwin's law, an example might be that just because a certain well-known evil person liked Karl May novels and music by Wagner, this does not in itself make these things bad.) GB>For instance, when a certain infamously-low-reputation (deservedly so) GB>individual recently joined the cypherpunk lists, others who had endured GB>him in the past tried to relay their impressions of him. It proved very GB>difficult to convey, and they were somewhat attacked for their efforts GB>and not entirely believed. GB> GB>In other words, he *could not* spend down to 0, despite years of GB>unflagging effort. I'd interpret this situation a bit differently. In the eyes of many list members, this individual _did_ spend down to 0 -- and below, I'd argue, based on the number of people who announced changes to their killfiles. But this was because of his actions on the list; it was _not_ because of the impressions of others. Most of the regulars on this list are, IMHO, logical enough thinkers, and of sufficiently independent mind (to put it mildly), to wait and see for themselves. Results in other, more conformist or authoritarian groups may vary... In other words, it would appear that "reputation capital" is difficult to create or destroy based only on the word of others; it has to be earned. (Hmm, is it easier to destroy than to create -- are we more likely to adjust our R(A,me) score downward based on what others say about A?) TCM?> But TCM?> what if the American Heart Association publishes a detailed study on the TCM?> fat levels of MacDonald's products and declares it to "Dangerous." The TCM?> effect will probably be greater, as R (AHA, many people) = high, and by the TCM?> kind of Dempster-Shafer belief calculus I discussed a few months ago, the TCM?> rep of the AHA propagates semi-transitively to the rep of MacDonald's. TCM?> TCM?> (This all happened recently, with the famous studies of fat levels of movie TCM?> theater food...sales dropped almost overnight, and now the fat levels of TCM?> popcorn, etc., have been changed for the better.) I agree with the first paragraph; however, I'm not sure that the second paragraph gives an example of this. The high levels of saturated fats in movie popcorn were (as I recall) publicized by the previously little- known "Center for Science in the Public Interest", a group with nowhere near the reputation capital of the AHA. Their claims were taken seriously, not because the group itself was particularly reputable, but because the results were dramatic and easily verified. A better example might be that of Surgeon-General Koop vs. the tobacco companies. GB>I've already made the points I wanted to make, so I may not have further GB>comments. TCM>Nor me. Well, I've probably said enough, then, especially considering that no one is paying attention any longer. Wouldn't want excess verbiage to lower what little reputation capital I may have here... :-) -- Martin Janzen janzen(a)idacom.hp.com

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Global Alert -- Hysteria in the U.K. threatens Net
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[For more details and background, check out http://www.eff.org/~declan/global/ and http://www.hotwired.com/netizen/96/36/index4a.html for my U.K. cyberporn fearstorm piece. --Declan] September 6, 1996 *** GLOBAL ACTION ALERT *** FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE - Please redistribute this document widely with this banner intact - Redistribute only in appropriate places & only until 30 September 1996 Global Alert: Hysteria in the UK Threatens Free Speech on the Net The Sunday, August 25 issue of the London Observer splashed across its front page a sensationalized account of child pornography on the Internet, falsely accusing two Internet Service Providers, Clive Feather of Demon UK (a full service site) and Johan Helsingius of anon.penet.fi (an anonymous remailer) of involvement in the distribution of child pornography. Why were these accusations made? Demon UK had refused to remove a broad range of sexually-oriented newsgroups identified by UK authorities as possible sources of child pornography, and anon.penet.fi was identified without substantiation as a source for `90% of child pornography on the Internet.' In fact, Demon UK was simply acknowledging that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) cannot police the data that traverses their systems, or assume responsibility for it, any more than the post office can assume responsiblity for content that is sent through traditional mail. And Helsingius, contrary to allegations in the London Observer, had long before restricted the size of files that could be transferred through anon.penet.fi, effectively eliminating the possibility that binary files containing pictures could be exchanged. This story was extreme, but not without precedent: much has been written associating the Internet with those who make and distribute child porn, and there have been many attempts to hold ISPs responsible for objectionable or illegal content. ISPs are not content providers; they channel content provided by their users. It is outside the scope of the ISP to monitor, evaluate, and attempt to remove objectionable content. In fact, any attempt by an ISP to block particular kinds of content will ultimately be fruitless, as providers of that content will simply find alternate channels of distribution. Moreover, it is wrong to assume that the Internet has no rules, and is friendly to the exchange of objectionable materials. In fact the Internet is a `virtual community' of users with a distinct culture incorporating diverse views but finding consensus in opposition to censorship and access control. There is also strong opposition to the exploitation of children; in fact, many Internet users have cooperated in attempts to identify those who create and distribute child pornography. Summary: The physical abuse and exploitation of children is a very real problem demanding a proactive response, however we vigorously oppose attempts to stifle the free and open exchange of information over the Internet in the mistaken belief that overbroad restrictions on the flow of information will protect children from abuse. We support Demon UK and anon.penet.fi (which Helsingius has shut down), and deplore the Observer's lurid attempt to make respectable Internet providers the "cause" of a problem for which they have no responsibility. The Observer story is not the first of its kind: it represents an ongoing confusion about a complex new medium. Unfortunately this misunderstanding has become a global problem, represented in proposed or enacted restrictive legislation as well as negative press. Consider these possible analogies to the Internet: - The Internet is a vast mail system, like a post office. Would you favor a law that required postal authorities to open each piece of mail and evaluate its acceptability? - The Internet is a huge library system. Would you favor a law that would restrict information a library can provide? - The Internet is a collection of virtual communities. Would you favor a law that required routine searches of your community? Our position: These measures constrain everyone because of the misdeeds of a few. It is more sensible to find and deal with the sources of child pornography than to impede the flow of data over the Internet. The imposition of censorship and additional constraints applied to ISPs will not solve the existing problem, but will create a new problem, a barrier to the free and democratic exchange of ideas. For background on global privacy and liberty issues: http://www.eff.org/~declan/global/ For press contacts, and for more information about the Internet, see homepages for the signatories to this message: ALCEI - Electronic Frontiers Italy * http://www.nexus.it/alcei.html CITADEL - Electronic Frontier France * pforsans(a)in-net.inba.fr CommUnity (UK) * http://www.community.org.uk EFF (USA) * http://www.eff.org EFF-Austin (USA) * http://www.eff-austin.org Electronic Frontier Canada * http://www.efc.ca/ Electronic Frontiers Australia * http://www.efa.org.au/ Electronic Frontiers Houston (USA) * http://www.efh.org Elektronisk Forpost Norge (Electronic Frontier Norway) * http://www.sn.no/~efn Fronteras Electronicas Espan~a (Electronic Frontiers Spain) * http://www.lander.es/~jlmartin/ HotWired * http://www.hotwired.com/ ###

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Public briefing on the NRC cryptography policy report at...
by CRYPTO 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Public briefing on the NRC cryptography policy report at MIT on Sept 11 Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society A Public Briefing in Cambridge, Massachusetts Wednesday, September 11, 1996, 3:00-4:00 pm There will be a public briefing in Cambridge, Massachusetts by the National Research Council on this report. The briefing will be held at the Laboratory of Computer Science, MIT, Room NE43-518, 545 Technology Square, in Cambridge (off Main Street). Dr. Herbert Lin, study director for this report and senior staff officer of CSTB, will conduct the briefing. For further information, please contact Ron Rivest at (617) 253-6098 or rivest(a)theory.Ics.mit.edu. Pls post.

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No Subject
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 5 Sep 96 at 14:31, Anonymous wrote: > This can lead into a long argument about just _when_ violence is > initiated, where opinion is more important than fact, but IMO: Agreed, if you live in a world of fantassy.... > Mr. Bell, if he follows through on his scheme, *will* be initiating > violence. You urge us not to get into the argument about "just_when_violence is initiated" and proceed to state the "Mr. Bell... ...*will* be initiating violence". What is that english word? Dogmatic? Nahhh, there must be a more precise one. Please help me here... > There are two roads to take in life, convincing and coercing > others. Looters of all persuasions have always counted on that and it worked for them for thousands of years. > I worry that abuse of the very young and weak (for > now) anonymity system for the purpose of initiating, rather than > exposing, violence will lead to more government violence than we > already have. You could worry all you want, but your only way to assess wether or not it will happens is not through your feelings but trhough the use of your rational mind. Stop "feeling" and start thinking. > Perhaps I am wrong and there is no hope; but if so, > that means another revolution. Revolutions are very romantic > sounding, to those who have not been in a war. I suppose that this refers to AP. If so, go RTFM because you conclusions and the workings of AP are not compatible. AP would not lead to a war, per se. Neither a civil war. > I urge everyone to > read "Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men" by Jeffrey Rogers > Hummel for a look at what our last revolution got us (hint: it was > *not* less government). I urge you to have a look at what is at the root of the growth of govt. It is not things but ideas, basic premises about life and the interaction between individuals. Ultimately, basic premises about the nature of Man is what brought us more govt. To understand govt excess, you've got to understand what is into the brain of the govt peoples. jfa "One of theses centuries, the brutes, private or public, who believe that they can rule their betters by force, will learn the lesson of what happens when brute force encounters mind and force." - Ragnar Danneskjold :) Jean-Francois Avon DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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DC lock and key, from HotWired
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.hotwired.com/muckraker/ Muckraker By Brock Meeks More DC Lock and Key The Clinton administration will unveil new encryption legislation, dubbed the Key Recovery Initiative, as early as 9 September, Muckraker has learned. The bill's title is an exercise in Orwellian redirection - nothing more than an attempt to make the threadbare "key escrow" encryption concept, which was spawned via the infamous Clipper Chip, more vanilla-sounding. The Key Recovery Initiative is political hardball, calculated to split an industry currently reluctant to bow to pressure from the FBI and the National Security Agency to voluntarily adopt the key escrow encryption scheme. In making its pitch, the White House is "offering some sweetheart deals to a number of companies," says an industry source familiar with the administration proposal. Those "sweetheart deals" involve relaxing export controls on encryption software only for certain industries - finance, insurance, and health care, industry sources say. Such a move essentially leaves companies such as Netscape isolated. It's a classic divide-and-conquer strategy. In return for relaxing the export controls, the White House will ask companies in the targeted industries to provide concrete assurances that they will endorse a government-devised system of "key recovery encryption" in which the decoding keys to any scrambled data are turned over to a "trusted third party." Those third parties, of course, must first be verified and approved by the government via as yet undefined criteria. The decoding keys made available under this plan would be accessible to any law enforcement agency that could prove to a judge that it needed them to carry out an investigation. If that ambiguous level of "proof" can be provided, your keys are handed over without debate or recourse on your part. The administration's legislation will propose a "framework" based on "a global key management infrastructure," according to a little-publicized statement released by the White House on 12 July. A spokesperson from the vice president's office confirmed that the legislation will be drawn from this outline. The bill is an attempt to forge alliances with US trading partners so that data can be accessed and decoded across international borders. The legislation's blueprint includes: - Liberalizing export controls for encryption products dealing with financial, insurance, and health-care data. - A standards-setting procedure for "key recovery systems and products" that will be "eligible for general export licenses," and standards for products that the government will buy. - Transfer of export control oversight from the State Department, which currently maintains that encryption technology is a "munition," to the Commerce Department. [...]

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