December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: Taxation Thought Experiment
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>azur(a)netcom.com (Steve Schear) wrote: >>The crypto-relevance is via crypto anarchy: we need to undermine the tax >>system enough that _everyone_, not just us, loses faith in it. >> >>--Tim May >> > >I've posed similar questions to friends and aquaintences. The >working-class stiffs (who can't easily hide from the IRS) feel taxes are an >unwelcome but necessary burden in order to provide the blanket of >government protection they feel exists. They resent and oppose widespread >tax fraud. Self-employed tend to be more open to 'alternative' income >structuring. And in the meantime, it would seem prudent to use the existing system to maximum advantage. In Canada, you can set up a personal trust called a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (similar to an IRA?) wherein you can trade securities without tax liability until you withdraw the money into your hands. As long as you aren't trying to spend it, no taxes are owing. There is a withholding tax of 25% if you eventually leave the country, but the tax free compounding effect over a decade or two will make this virtually irrelevant. There are also tax credits for venture capital (especially if it relates to R&D) or scientific research investments. Since we are in fields that likely are related to this type of work, it seems that we would be able to take advantage of these types of credit. In Canada, they can pay 80-90% of the related payroll. Add NRC (National Research Council) grants available for R&D projects and you can run a company with a dozen people for NO money. This is not fantasy since I know at least two companies that do this. The only caveat is that you need a good idea to start with. It is also not hard to have a nominal 50+% marginal tax rate yet pay 15% net income taxes. Since I can use the Canadian tax system to advantage, I'm not sure that I want to get rid of it just yet. So, while you are waiting for that anarchy, you may want to retain a good tax accountant. Ciao, James The grass is always greener over the septic tank.

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RE: Remailer Abuse Solutions
by Mullen Patrick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sounds like another attempt to raise the cost of using the Net, nothing more. Sure, paying postage (Is $1 really necessary? Why email when snailmail's cheaper??) may reduce general spamming done by local punks, but it does nothing against corporations which already spend millions on snailmail spamming. Also, what happens when your long-lost friend comes across your addy and tries to email you? Surely you don't want to charge postage for an otherwise free service to him/er. Maintaining a list of "accepted sources" would be a hassle not many people would accept. Slight variation is to generate a list of "toll these entities." A smaller list (hopefully :-), and generally easier because then it defaults to no-bill. Or, to accomodate superstars/actors/etc, generate files like rhosts.accept rhosts.deny in UNIX. That way, the user may use either/both types of filtering. Again, the average user wouldn't want to deal with this hassle, everyone's mail software would have to be rewritten, and I basically oppose any ideas that cost me money for something I already get for free... :-) PM _______________________________________________________________________________ From: Peter Hendrickson on Wed, Nov 13, 1996 4:10 Subject: Remailer Abuse Solutions To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com What do you do if you are operating a remailer and somebody complains they are getting spammed? That's easy, you keep a list of people that you don't send mail to. What's hard is if that person wants to receive other anonymous mail. The solution is easy: charge e-cash to send mail to certain addresses and send the money to the owner of the account. Never put an address on a kill list, just raise the price of sending mail to it. This generates lots of positive publicity for your remailer. People will beg to be spammed! And, since the remailer operator handles the financial parts of the deal, the technically naive "victim" does not have to have specialized knowledge or even an e-cash account. This also eliminates the spam problem generally. If you are plagued by spam, create a list of names you will accept mail from. When a message comes in that is not on the list, return a message directing them to send you the mail through a paying remailer. This solves a problem for famous people, too. They get lots of mail but they don't have time to read it all. How to sort it? Raise the price of sending a message. (I heard that Arnold Schwarzeneggar was once paid $1 million just to read a script and look at the set of a movie with no obligation to act in it.) Okay, now lets go to mailing lists. We like to read anonymous mail on this list, but we don't like getting spammed. It's hard to filter anonymous mail for obvious reasons. The solution: don't accept anonymous mail. Only people on the "approved" list would be allowed to post. People who wish to post anonymously could then send mail through the paying remailer to people on the "approved" list and request that their message be relayed. Most people on the list would be happy to accept a dollar or two to provide this service. This would eliminate inappropriate mail while allowing anybody to post. For that matter, postings to the list itself could be priced at, say, a dollar to cut down on the noise levels. Payments, and addresses which complicate payment, make it harder to rely on the remailer network. When you send a message through a few remailers and make a faux pax on the last one, you won't know what happened. Did one of the remailers go down? Did you make a mistake? I think I know a solution to this one, too. If somebody wants to get error messages, they include a random 128 bit number with their message. This is a different number for each remailer in the chain. When an error occurs, the remailer distributes an error message with the number attached. Error message distribution is pretty easy. The remailer operator could publish a web page with the errors. Or, the messages could be bundled and made available through anonymous ftp, or mailed to an error message mailing list, or posted to a newsgroup. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com ------------------ RFC822 Header Follows ------------------ Received: by mail.ndhm.gtegsc.com with SMTP;13 Nov 1996 04:10:17 -0400 Received: from toad.com by delphi.ndhm.gtegsc.com with SMTP; Wed, 13 Nov 1996 9:06:01 GMT Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id RAA13602 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Tue, 12 Nov 1996 17:07:45 -0800 (PST) Received: from netcom19.netcom.com (root(a)netcom19.netcom.com [192.100.81.132]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA13594 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Tue, 12 Nov 1996 17:07:36 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.0.2.1] (ph(a)netcom21.netcom.com [192.100.81.135]) by netcom19.netcom.com (8.6.13/Netcom) id RAA03014; Tue, 12 Nov 1996 17:07:31 -0800 X-Sender: ph(a)netcom15.netcom.com Message-Id: <v02140b04aeaec9f1fa9b(a)[192.0.2.1]> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Tue, 12 Nov 1996 17:07:41 -0800 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) Subject: Remailer Abuse Solutions Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk

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UNSUBCRIBE CENSORSHIP
by Sheldon Andrews 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSUBCRIBE CENSORSHIP

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RE: Question on non-repudiation
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 13 Nov 1996 04:11:08 -0500 (EST) X-Sender: field(a)pop.pipeline.com Mime-Version: 1.0 To: John Lowry <jlowry(a)BBN.COM> From: "Richard L. Field" <field(a)pipeline.com> Subject: RE: Question on non-repudiation Cc: set-discuss(a)commerce.net Sender: owner-set-talk(a)commerce.NET Precedence: bulk +----------------------------------------------------+ Addressed to: set-discuss(a)commerce.net +----------------------------------------------------+ As chair of the ABA's Electronic Commerce Payment Committee and a member of the drafting team for its Digital Signature Guidelines, I suppose I am one of the people expected to "solve" the non-repudiation problem through legal means. Notwithstanding any technical or procedural proofs, there is no absolute non-repudiation, as a legal matter, unless a statute is enacted to that effect. For consumers in the U.S., there is no indication that this will happen. The applicable laws governing credit cards and the consumer use of debit cards specify that the customer can repudiate any unauthorized transaction, and that it is left to his bank/issuer to prove that the transaction was actually performed by that customer or under his authority. Even if technical means are used to ensure that the customer will always retain solitary access control to the account (by biometric means, for example), he can still claim coercion, error with respect to legal capacity, etc. Where software-based keys are used to confirm identity and/or authority to enter into a transaction, there are additional risks of error or fraud associated with initially obtaining a key and tying it to an identity, as well as the ongoing association between the key and the identity and/or authority. In these cases some third party ("trusted" CA, etc.) could step in and contractually agree to bear all risk of customer repudiation, but given the relatively low value of the average transaction that would be unlikely. Additionally, in some countries laws may shift the risk of loss absolutely to the customer or otherwise prevent him from repudiating a transaction. To some degree, this is the direction taken in the U.S. laws governing commercial wire transfers. If there are any countries contemplating the enactment of laws that would absolutely bind a person whenever his private key has been used, I would be most interested in hearing about them. - Richard Field At 11:35 AM 11/12/96 -0500, you wrote: >+----------------------------------------------------+ >Addressed to: set-discuss(a)commerce.net >+----------------------------------------------------+ > >Not to be argumentative but non-repudiation can be established >technically. The formal definition requires that through technical >and procedural proofs a party cannot repudiate a transaction. The >law may not recognize those techniques and procedures for contractual >purposes today but the ABA is working on it.... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ This message was sent by set-discuss(a)commerce.net. For a complete listing of available commands, please send mail to 'majordomo(a)commerce.net' with 'help' (no quotations) contained within the body of your message. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: So how does the crypto crackdown go?
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> > As Hal knows, but some newer members of the list may not, I discuss the > possibility of a ban on strong (unescrowed) crypto at some, ahem, length > in > > http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/clipper.htm > > Although the article is more than 18 months old, the law hasn't changed > in any material way as far as I know. > > Bottom line: they probably can't do it under the constitution, but it's a > closer call than it should be. This is a very helpful and thorough analysis. However it does not address the possibility of a ban on the sale/distribution of strong crypto, rather than a ban on its use. There are several reasons why I think the former is more likely: - PRECEDENT FROM ITARS The current bans on export of encryption software limit the distribution of the software itself, not of encrypted messages. Extending this ban to domestic distribution would imply banning distribution but not use of crypto software. - NOT A PRIVACY ISSUE The privacy issues would be much less relevant because it is no longer a matter of just what you do in the privacy of your own home. - OUT OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS The Clinton administration's original veiled warning, quoted in Michael's paper, denied that "every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product." Noting the use of "commercial" this suggests a ban on sales rather than use. - COMMERCIAL REGULATION Not being a lawyer, I can only speculate that the interstate commerce clause would give more justification for a ban on distribution than on use. - FOOT IN THE DOOR Conceivably such a ban, if successful, would provide new arguments for advancing to the second stage of a ban on usage after some time. The impact of the usage ban would be less due to the lack of access most people would have to such software, and the (arguably) demonstrated effectiveness of the government approved software almost everyone would be using by that time. - BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING We have long speculated that the government's real interest is in making mass surveillance more practical, with the stated concerns about criminals being merely a convenient cover. Commercial restrictions would be consistent with such motives since they would have more impact on the innocent many than the motivated few. A ban on sales and distribution could still be opposed on First Amendment grounds, especially if it becomes established that software is speech. Still there are many restrictions possible on commercial speech so even a favorable precedent in this area would not preclude some regulation of software distribution. We could also argue that such a ban is de facto equivalent to restrictions on use, since most people would not then have access to privacy preserving software. In that case the many excellent arguments which Michael brings forward to oppose such restrictions would be relevant. And what would be the implications for freeware crypto? Could distribution of such software be subject to regulation in the same way as commercial programs? Then there are the issues relating to speech about crypto which are currently being litigated. Presumably domestic restrictions on such speech would have to reach a much higher standard of demonstrated need than restrictions on export. For these reasons I think that domestic regulations on the sales and distribution of strong crypto would not be a sure thing for the government, but would be a lot easier for them than restricting use. This suggests that it is a likely direction for them to take after the next terrorist attack. Hal

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by FWJZ05A＠prodigy.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: pgp3 Re: pgp3
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com cc: ktk, prz(a)acm.org, colin, pgp(a)lsd.com Subject: preliminary pgp 3.0 api document Date: Sat, 11 Feb 95 17:30:55 -0800 From: Katy Kislitzin <ktk>

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