December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Binding cryptography - much work, little point ?
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric_Verheul writes: > In our scheme any third party, which is probably never a TRP, can check > equality of the sessionkeys send to the primary recipient (the TRP) and > the second recipient (the real adressee), i.e. *without* needing secret So could anyone anyway by asking the TRP. The TRP returns a Yes/No answer, withou disclosing the session key. Is your binding scheme motivated mainly by avoiding that workload on the TRP ? Or by the fact that everybody might prefer a different TRP ? I suspect the scheme is incomplete anyway. After skimming the web page I see that the aim is to show the same session key has been encrypted under different ElGamal pubkeys. Now who's to say those pubkeys belong to anyone ? Or is this what is meant by "such as Margaret's identity" ? You'd list the ids of the TRPs and also prove that the pubkeys used were theirs .... ? Now to the politics... E__Allen_Smith writes: > Quite simply, you've invented a system that makes censorship more > possible. As a scientist, I try to avoid areas that have such negative > effects The usual Big Problems for GAK 1) What's in it for the user ? 2) What happens when the Feds recover meaningless data ? 2 does not seem to be addressed except by proposing restrictions which Eric dismisses as follows: Adam Back: >system because their stated aims are untrue: they *do* want to outlaw >non-escrowed encryption for domestic US traffic, and they *do* want to Eric Verheul: > Who is they, governments as a whole? If you simplify discussions in this > way, I might as well say: "you guys only want to help criminals". I understand > your fears, but don't exaggerate. -- Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk

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Kantor on GAK
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, October 11, 1996, p. A38. Clinton's Encryption Plan Fits Law and Market To the Editor: "A Flawed Encryption Policy" (editorial, Oct. 4) mischaracterizes the Clinton Administration's recent proposal on data-scrambling software, the proposal's impact and the results of a study by the National Research Council. This Administration has never proposed that United States citizens be limited in the type of encryption products they choose to use domestically. The current plan relates only to exports of encryption products that are, for all practical purposes, unbreakable in the commercial environment. Unbreakable encryption generates the need for "key" management among personal and business users of encryption products. Users may need a "spare key" to recover information that is lost or otherwise inaccessible, in much the same way that we give a trusted neighbor a spare key to our house. President Clinton's plan insures that the United States -- and not other countries -- will develop such a system, which both protects and is based on the rule of law, not the whim of governments or trade barriers masquerading as import restrictions. You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery products, but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the import of stronger and stronger encryption products that do not take law enforcement into account. The number of companies that have expressed a willingness to work with the Administration to balance commercial and law enforcement issues belies your pronouncement that our proposal is unworkable. In fact, the number of companies that stand ready now to market such products will soon prove that there Is a market for encryption products that provide safeguards for both the owner and for society. The National Research Council did not say that we should allow the export of all encryption. It supported some export controls, while allowing the export of encryption up to the strength of 56 bits. Our plan allows the export of encryption up to 56 bits, but does so in a way that will encourage the production and marketing of products that both protect privacy and prevent crime. The United States is the world leader in information technology. Under the Administration's plan, we will remain so through a market-driven key-recovery system that both promotes the export of encryption products and protects our national security and the public safety. Mickey Kantor U.S. Secretary of Commerce Washington, Oct., 9, 1996

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JoC Nox GAK
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Journal of Commerce, October 10, 1996. Editorial/ Encryption Technology Policy Oct. 10 -- SECRET CODES: Let's say you're selling your house and, after months of searching, you've found a potential buyer. But there's a problem: The local sheriff wants a spare set of keys in case the house is used for unlawful purposes. Your buyer, a solid citizen, doesn't want his privacy invaded. He decides to look in another neighborhood, with a less intrusive sheriff. This improbable scenario describes, more or less, Washington's policy toward U.S. exports of encryption technology -- devices that scramble computerized data. Under a revised policy, the Clinton administration says that, following a partial two-year grace period, it will require exporters of sophisticated encryption devices to keep a spare set of "keys" -- the formulas that turn encrypted data back into plain text -- in a place accessible to the government. That may seem like a sensible precaution, but it is likely to hurt exporters while doing little for law enforcement. The government's effort to control encryption goes to the heart of the information networks that are becoming a bigger part of people's lives almost by the day. Individuals and companies leave behind them an ever-broadening wake of electronic records -- on everything from video rentals and catalog sales to car registrations and health records. As hackers get better at breaking into these files, it becomes more urgent to use encryption to protect them. The government, however, has other ideas. It says encryption sold overseas poses a threat because law enforcement officials may not be able to decode the secret communications of terrorists and drug dealers. To ease its access to such files, the government essentially is building a trap door into billions of records stored in computers overseas. Of course, there are caveats and loopholes. The policy applies only to foreign sales; U.S. law forbids government prying into domestic computer files. Also, the policy grants exporters a two-year period in which they can sell encryption up to a moderate level of sophistication -- 56 bits in key length -- without restriction. After that, a key-access requirement would take effect. The government-access rule will force U.S. exporters to do some fancy sales footwork. Foreign buyers, after all, may not be thrilled to know Uncle Sam can gain access to their private files. They may worry that if Washington has keys, their own governments may demand the same, and that the strangers holding the keys may not guard them carefully, no matter what the rules say. Terrorists, meanwhile, will have plenty of ways to circumvent the U.S. rules. They have a choice of 179 foreign-made encryption devices of at least 56-bit strength that are not burdened by key-access requirements. Terrorists also could make their own scrambling devices -- there are books available on how to write encryption codes -- or buy them in the United States, which has no domestic sales restrictions, and carry them out of the country. Why, then, is Washington bothering with export controls? In part, it's an attempt at back-door control of the domestic market. If companies are forced to limit the sophistication of encryption destined for export markets they may do the same for domestic products, to cut production costs. That would make life easier for law enforcement officials, who worry increasingly about impenetrable barriers to suspected criminals' computerized information.Those agencies indeed have a problem. Technology has given the world's bad actors a better cover of secrecy than ever before. But trying to control exports and limit domestic technology is not the solution. As a practical matter, the encryption horse has long since departed the law enforcement barn. Absent an agreement among all nations on a key access system -- an impossible goal and not a very desirable one, given different countries' views on protecting privacy -- unilateral restrictions will be futile. They will serve mainly to scare customers away from U.S. manufacturers. Rather than try to restrict the encryption industry, the administration should promote it, and find other ways to improve criminal surveillance. ----- On the Internet: Visit The Journal of Commerce on the World Wide Web. Point your browser to: http://www.joc.com/ -----

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Scientific Discoveries Minimize Aging (DHEA)
by health＠moneyworld.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: "Drift net fishing," GAK, FBI, and NSA
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>A clarification regarding something I wrote a few days ago: > >dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) writes: >> Another possibility is to issue a charge card (payable in full at the end of >> the month, getting revenue from the annual fee), rather than a credit card, s >> it could claim not to be subject to certain Federal Reserve's regulations tha >> have to do with credit card disputes. But then it probably can't be Visa/MC a >> can't use their clearginhouses. > >A charge card (like the original AmEx, not like Optima) is not the same as >a debit card. I have a debit card, tied to my checking account, and using >mastercard's clearinghouse. To issue a debit card, the organization needs >to keep checking accounts. Even if it doesn't pay interest, doesn't make >commercial loans, etc, it still would be subject to weird Fed regulations >and probably couldn't maintain anonimity. > >But the lack of a dispite resolution mechanism is really the killer. > How about companies that issue credit cards, but don't extend credit? The kind customers must maintain a postive balance at all times in order to charge against their account. -- Steve

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Dimitri & Roberto Alamar
by Marc J. Wohler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

KTOM is rude crude & lude. His insane rants have a damaging effect on this list. Any donations in his behalf should be given for therapy. List members should give him the Roberto Alamar treatment. mjw

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RE: legality of wiretapping: a "key" distinction
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:17 AM 10/11/96 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >Yep, seems right to me. While I share some part of your position on the >undesirability of wiretapping, Uni's remarks about it being "firmly >entrenched" in the minds of L.E. and Capitol Hill are quite on-target. > >Few here in DC believe in an absolute right to privacy. In actual fact, most public officials profess (if not practice) a belief in an 'absolute right to privacy.' That is, they profess opposition to torture. They believe that coercion for testimony should be limited to two years imprisonment (or less). There is no *official* pro-torture lobby in America (though in practice torture does occur). We've already established that they believe in an absolute right to privacy, we're just arguing over how far beyond the brain that extends. And since we control our brains and we control our i/o we can probably expand that zone of privacy in practice. My "Brain Tennis with Dorothy" post of a few weeks ago expands on this argument. DCF "You don't have to be nice to nation states you meet on the way up if you're not coming back down."

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Re: Why Workers Should Uphold Right Not To Talk To FBI
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: perun!news2.panix.com!panix!feed1.news.erols.com!arclight.uoregon.edu!news.bc.net!berlin.infomatch.com!not-for-mail From: bghauk(a)berlin.infomatch.com (Brian Hauk) Newsgroups: nyc.general,ny.general,ny.politics Subject: Why Workers Should Uphold Right Not To Talk To FBI Message-ID: <53k4ot$efp(a)berlin.infomatch.com> Date: 11 Oct 1996 00:35:41 GMT Organization: InfoMatch Internet - Vancouver BC Lines: 160 NNTP-Posting-Host: berlin.infomatch.com X-Newsreader: TIN [UNIX 1.3 950824BETA PL0] Why Workers Should Uphold Right Not To Talk To FBI ************************************************************************ from the Militant, vol.60/no.36 October 14, 1996 The article below is reprinted without changes from the May 16, 1986, Militant. It appeared in that issue with the same headline and accompanying graphic. It is relevant to efforts by opponents of U.S. policy toward Cuba today to protest harassment by federal agents and defend democratic rights. Author Jeff Jones is now a member of the International Association of Machinists in Minneapolis. Sam Manuel is a member of the United Transportation Union in Washington, D.C. BY JEFF JONES AND SAM MANUEL SAN JOSE - Last November Don Bechler was hauled in by plant security at Westinghouse to face interrogation by an FBI agent. The agent said he was being investigated for in-plant "sabotage." He was grilled for 40 minutes without a lawyer present, which is his legal right. He also did not have his shop steward with him. Bechler is active in the anti-apartheid movement and the fight against U.S. intervention in Central America. He is also a union activist and a member of the Socialist Workers Party. This questioning by the FBI was not only a violation of Bechler's democratic fights, but the rights of everyone who has a dissenting point of view, as well as an attack on the union. Charges of "sabotage" against workers in plants that make military hardware are part of the employers' and government's sustained offensive against democratic fights. This is why it is useful to look at what happened at Westinghouse and the lessons of that experience. Westinghouse is a major producer of military hardware. The plant is in Sunnyvale, California. The production workers are represented by International Association of Machinists Local 565. Bechler is a bench grinder. The FBI agent had Bechler's personal notebook, which Bechler thought he had lost. The agent said that plant security had given it to him. After Bechler agreed to talk with the FBI, the agent asked a number of questions about the notebook. It had notes about work, shopping lists, and information on various political activities Bechler is involved in. The FBI agent told Bechler that he thought potential saboteurs in the plant included unionists who opposed concessions to the company in the recent contract negotiations. Some workers may have been frustrated that there wasn't a strike, the agent said, and therefore decided to commit sabotage. After the grilling, the FBI agent refused to return Bechler's notebook - implying that he remained under investigation. At a union meeting 11 days later, it was reported that another worker had been subjected to a similar interrogation by the FBI. Union leaders stressed that members should always demand a shop steward when meeting with the company. Under pressure from the union, the FBI has since returned Bechler's notebook. This harassment by the FBI represents a serious attack on the democratic rights of Bechler, the union, and all working people. The FBI has no legal right to walk into a plant, roam around, and begin interrogating workers. And workers, as well as others, are under no legal obligation to voluntarily submit to such questioning. The FBI, like all other cop agencies in this country, serves and protects big business and its government. When they enter Westinghouse or other plants it is on the side of the company. This attack on democratic rights occurs in the context of the employers' antilabor offensive and drive toward war in Central America. Such assaults go hand in hand. As the government gears up for war abroad, it must erode democratic rights at home. The aim is to get workers to accept as normal such things as growing restrictions on security clearances, denying the rights of accused persons to be released on bail, having more cops in the plants questioning workers, and developing an atmosphere of suspicion against workers who buy socialist publications or travel to Nicaragua. It is part of the government's concerted effort to change workers' perception of what's "normal." Each blow to democratic rights weakens the ability of the labor movement to defend itself against austerity and fight U.S. intervention abroad. In the last period the government has concocted a series of highly publicized trials of accused "spies" - the greatest number of espionage cases at any one time in the history of the country. These "spy" trials and charges of industrial sabotage are aimed at dividing and intimidating workers. While initial targets tend to be politically active workers, the ultimate victims are all workers and working farmers. The aim is to sharply limit democratic rights and limit political discussion and debate in order to dragoon workers into war. One aspect of the employers' anti-democratic drive is seeking to establish the "right" of the FBI and other cop agencies to enter workplaces and interrogate workers. Among the ways in which the FBI and cops justify their intrusion is the alleged need to defend "national security" by stopping "saboteurs" and cracking down on "drug use." By agreeing to talk to an agent, a worker falls into the trap that has been set: the act of talking itself is a form of collaboration with the agent. This is true regardless of whether a shop steward is present or not. Although Bechler denied the charges of sabotage, the fact that he talked to the agent had already caused damage to workers' rights. The content of what a worker says in such a situation is not the key problem. The agreement to cooperate - talk - when not legally compelled to, means the cops scored a victory. The goal of the FBI in these circumstances is not to get a worker to say something "damaging" - that's just a bonus for them when that happens - but to get the worker to accept and help establish their "right" to engage in such interrogations. This reinforces the lie that cops stand above struggles between workers and bosses and in that sense are neutral. It helps reinforce one of the most elementary forms of class collaboration: actions based on the illusion that the cops are neutral, that they are simply enforcing the law without fear or favor. Moreover, it breaks down trust between workers. A precedent is set that it is okay to talk to the FBI and their finks when instead workers should have nothing to do with them. Bechler had no legal obligation to talk to the FBI. He in essence gave up his, rights by doing so. And, whatever he did say is now potential material to be used against him, the union, and others regardless of his intentions. There is no such thing as an off-the-record talk with cops. Under the Constitution and Bill of Rights, no one is ever obligated to voluntarily speak to a cop - FBI, CIA, immigration, city, state, customs. The accompanying reprint of a 1950s statement issued by the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee explains one's rights in relation to the FBI: "The FBI, unlike courts and grand juries, does not have the power of subpoena of compulsory examination. You may decline an invitation to visit FBI agents or to receive them in your home or office.... The use of investigative power by governmental agencies to intimidate or threaten is expressly forbidden by law." In other words, one is never legally obligated to voluntarily engage in conversation with the FBI and other cop bodies. Looking back on what happened to him and the union, Bechler commented: "Once I started talking to them, they had me. I let them establish their `right' to even hold such conversations. "The fact that the union stood up for me and forced the FBI to return my notebook was a victory. It showed that it is possible to resist FBI violations of democratic rights. "The basic lesson to draw from this experience, however, is: never, under any circumstance voluntarily talk to the FBI or any other cop." Jeff Jones is a member of International Association of Machinists Local 565. Sam Manuel is the organizer of the San Francisco branch of the Socialist Workers Party. To get an introductory 12-week subscription to the Militant in the U.S., send $10 US to: The Militant, 410 West Street, New York, NY 10014. For subscription rates to other countries, send e-mail to themilitant(a)igc.apc.org or write to the above address.

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EUB Caution
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Times [Of London] October 11, 1996 Investors cautioned over bank on Internet By Robert Miller The Bank of England has issued a blunt warning to UK investors to "think carefully" before handing over their money to an offshore bank that is advertising for depositors on the Internet. European Union Bank (EUB) is a tiny institution backed by American investors and based in Antigua. Until last month it was chaired by Lord Mancroft, 39, an Old Etonian. Lord Mancroft, who confirmed that he had met Michael Foot, the Bank's director of supervision, yesterday about EUB, said: "I understand their concerns." He added that his contract as chairman of EUB had expired last month. The sharp warning to UK investors from one of the Bank's most senior directors reflects the concerns of City watchdogs about the possible proliferation of financial services being offered on the Internet and which fall outside their regulatory scope. If any such firm failed investors would not be covered by the UK compensation schemes. The Bank said of EUB: "This bank is not authorised in the UK and has not sought authorisation. As with other offshore deposits we would advise intending depositors to carry out appropriate due diligence." [End]

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Clinternet?
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hoo boy. I had the most amazing whiff of paranoia from the morning news. Clinton wants to buy the internet back for $500 million so he can watch us better? Nawwww, 'course not... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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