December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: ideal secure personal computer system
by tom bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> = ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) wrote: >> = tom bryce wrote: >> (2) Partition the hard drive into two partitions: >> install the system folder on one and a copy of CryptDisk >> make this the startup partition and make it READ ONLY with aliases to >> folders you want to be modiyfable (such as Eudora Folder in the sys >>folder) >> place these folders on the encrypted partition > >I don't think you will be able to do this. I have heard that too many >things modify files in the system folder for this to work. It wouldn't >surprise me if the OS modifies its own boot file from time to time. > >I'm not expert. If you get this working I would appreciate it if you >were to post it to the list or let me know directly. -and- >Watch out for the clipboard which appears to be stored as a file in >the system folder. Unfortunately, it has to be a real file - aliases >not allowed. This makes it harder to have a read only system folder >and, of course, every time you cut and paste something you leave a >ghost on the disk for an undefined length of time. It's hard to >work on the Mac without using the clipboard. The fact that you can start up and run your system from a CD rom proves that you can lock your startup disk. Grab a DISK TOOLS disk from your most recent system installer disks (mine is 7.5) and flip the write protect tab, then start up from it. Clipboard works, too. I haven't worked with such a system extensively enough to see if there are any glitches (such as copying large amounts of stuff to the clipboard, etc.) but it should get the job done for the truly paranoid. I have a few items in the system folder presently aliased out onto other disks - my Eudora Folder is on an encrypted partition, and there's no reason one couldn't do this with the whole preferences folder and other stuff. >> If locking the startup volume turns out to be too much of a pain, one could >> install trashguard from Highware software and set it to triple overwrite >> deleted files, and otherwise not lock the startup partition. > >I'm guessing you already know this, but once you've written something >to the disk you might as well assume it's there forever. Triple overwrite >of files will defeat Norton Utilities, but may not stop a determined >opponent. Right. I'm proposing this as a compromise if you wish to trade security for convenience. >Commercial data recovery services claim to be able to recover data >after nine formats of the disk. It is difficult to say for certain >what the technical limits of this technology are. For instance, maybe Colin Plumb gave me estimates of what you needed to wipe a disk clean once, which he researched for SFS. It depends on whether the erasure pattern is custom designed for the data to wipe. It was something vaguely like (don't quote me) 15 passes if custom designed, and 25 if not. This refers, as I recall, to data freshly written to the disk. Data that hangs out for a while 'leaks' deeper into the disk, with adjacent molecules becoming aligned further between tracks and deeper into the disk and is harder to erase. A dejanews search under colin's name should yield his extensive posts on this topic. Tom

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Rarity: Crypto question enclosed
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sun Nov 10 15:03:35 1996 Sorry that this message doesn't include any flames, "outings", denigrations, or other stuff...... My simple question is regarding key/certificate distribution: Is there any particular reason that such can't be accomplished via on-line lists, and made available via a service on a port, using standard (textual) commands, like mail and such are now? The things that come to mind are a 'client' request for a key, a 'client' submission of a key, an external host requesting a key exchange, and the host itself requesting a key exchange with another system (only new/changed keys being swapped). The way I see it working is similar to (but not as slow as, or requiring the human intervention) of the key servers already existing. Granted that the first few such servers might carry a higher load, but I'd think that would taper off as the (presumably free) software became available, similar to the growth of remailer software (which would seem to be a fairly reasonable relationship....). Hooks into existing PGP-fluent software shouldn't be difficult with a standardized protocol, and I wouldn't think that the servers would be that difficult to code and implement on a 'standard' (consistently used, that is) port. I'm willing to have a try at the first server, if the parameters can be defined. Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMoV+S8VrTvyYOzAZAQHlMQP/eU3F2JyaQcU6tQ+J5iCdAdPKiBNORJGT chgNauyaH/dHwj+DzcKZzhmjabsICGZjPbJvH+DIvnbGx3eGF1Y2HUAHvt5ab4ww gfPJ7xfjwNUJPyrTQtp7lXVdB5BVfSw/I2lHzSg1ssRvTo4iF+gIoAQypOT1Z617 Fo/c1h77KgA= =pkk/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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hahaha
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

test

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Re: a retort + a comment + a question = [RANT]
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:45 PM 11/10/1996, SUCRUM22_at_INDY-ADP(a)smtp-gw.cv62.navy.mil wrote: > ...and you've got a foreign soldier waving a .45 around... Ummm.... just a .45? Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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No Subject
by Mark Neely 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>PLEASE TAKE ME OFF YOUR MAILING >LIST!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! I'm sorry Jayme, but you didn't include the requisite number of !'s, so we cannot process your request. Mark Neely - accessnt(a)ozemail.com.au Lawyer, Internet Consultant, Professional Cynic & Author BizWeb: For Serious Intrepreneurs - www.maximedia.com.au/bizweb

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Re: WIPO Treaty: Worse than CDA- Deadline 22 Nov 96
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:22 AM 11/11/96 +0000, attila(a)primenet.com wrote: > WIPO Treaty: Worse than CDA > Deadline 22 Nov 96 for comment to Congress > WIPO was introduced this spring to Congress. It is not > understood by either the Clinton administration or the Congress and > few of the public are aware of the problem! [snip] > I am deleting the bulk of the report for brevity, including only > the definition of the "database" as it applies to WIPO. > >.WHAT IS A DATABASE? WHAT ISN'T A DATABASE? >.The treaty would protect "any database that represents a >.substantial investment in the collection, assembly, verification, >.organization or presentation of the contents of the database." >. >.This term should be understood "to include collections of >.literary, musical or audiovisual works or any other kind of >.works, or collections of other materials such as texts, sounds, >.images, numbers, facts, or data representing any other matter or >.substance" and "may contain collections of expressions of >.folklore." The "protection shall be granted to databases >.irrespective of the form or medium in which they are embodied. Somebody must have said, once, that the winner in an argument is the one who gets to define the terms. Notice how the term "protect" and "protection" are misused above. (not by Attila, of course; but by whomever he's quoting.) However, the term "protect" has long been misused by lawyers in just such a way. "Monopolize" would be a more appropriate word under the circumstances. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: a retort + a comment + a question = [RANT]
by Murray Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 10 Nov 96 21:45:56 EST, SUCRUM22_at_INDY-ADP(a)smtp-gw.cv62.navy.mil wrote: >---------------------------------------------------------------------- >dave kinchlea wrote: >>As said in "Hair" (the movie), "Don't do it for me man, 'cause >>if the shoe was on the other foot, I wouldn't do it for you!" > >>It's a lie anyway, you do it for yourself. > >That's an _easy_ judgment to make (and i definitely have to stop >adding anecdotes from my life in these things!), but you missed the >point - the freedoms the Cpunks diligently try to preserve (or seem to >want to create...) are protected _by_ the military. who was it that >said: "law, without force, is impotent" -? The military's sole purpose is to destroy things and kill people. Freedom is protected by the poeple for the people some of which are in the military. The force is not nessasary to enforce laws in most circumstances. How many gun battles erupt at speed traps? Granted, there are instances where some force is required in arresting violent individuals, but it is still illeagal for the police to use ecessive force. > >keep in mind that even "bad" laws have to be enforced. you can scream >all you want about "good, strong" cryptostuffs, but if the phone lines >are slashed, the satellite links are down, the elcerticity is off and >you've got a foreign soldier waving a .45 around - just how are you >going to boot up that pretty little computer and make it encode >information for you, much less get it anywhere? anarchy implies >ruthlessness - you going to practice cryptostuffs from a prison cell? You are wrong about bad laws being enforced. Many laws are not enforeced by the police. Have you never been "let off" or "givin a warning" by the police? How many times have you seen people j walk in front of the police who did nothing? Computers are not nessasary to encode data, they just make it a lot eaiser and faster. Where did I put that secret decoder ring???? mhayes(a)infomatch.com It's better for us if you don't understand It's better for me if you don't understand -Tragically Hip

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Re: Pyramid schemes and cryptoanarchy
by Clay Olbon II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:39 PM 11/10/96 -0500, Rabid Wombat wrote: >On Sun, 10 Nov 1996, Clay Olbon II wrote: > >> Pyramid schemes could be a growth market in a crypto-anarchic world. It is >> yet another market such as gambling, or the lottery, that could be conducted >> with anonymity. And it appears to be much more widespread on the internet > >How is it like gambling? If I get a pyramid letter instructing me to send >money to five people on the list, add my name to the bottom, send to 5 >people, or whatever, there's nothing stopping me from removing all the >names, adding my name and those of four friends, and passing the letter >along. With an anonymous system, I could easily be all five people, >without even the bother of getting five different post office boxes. I was not saying that chain letters are like gambling. My point was that they could be conducted with anonymity - like gambling and the lottery. Your other point is well made. Anyone have ideas on a protocol to prevent this problem? > >There's no gambling involved; only blantant stupidity. Agreed. Although I think gambling and the lottery are pretty stupid as well ("The lottery is a tax on people who are bad a math" - from a friend's .sig). >The "airplane" game was an interesting slant, though. Because of the >in-person "airplane" parties, people were able to make contacts and >network while participating. It was still the same old trick, but some >may have found the ability to "buy" (and "sell") face time worth the price >of admission (Some of the "airplane" games going around were to the tune >of $2500, rather than the usual $5). Your anonymous slant on >this removes the only economically viable excuse for participating, >though - I don't even get to meet the head of the umptysquat dept. in >return for getting fleeced. > >The "airplane game" was big around Washington about a year ago, and >involved a number of highly placed people who aught to have been able to >recognize a Ponzi scheme when it bit them in the ass. Makes me wonder how >many people are stupid enough to "play" these games. I'm not familiar with the airplane game. Sounds like a DNC fundraiser to me ;-) And yes, I think there are a lot of stupid people out there (ex. I started a new job recently and noticed that a warning about the "Good Times Virus" was posted on the bulletin board). I'm not sure that the game would even have to be close to fair for plenty of people to participate - especially if it involves digital cash and email, which may be much easier than snail-mailing letters. Clay ******************************************************* Clay Olbon clay.olbon(a)dynetics.com engineer, programmer, statistitian, etc. Dynetics, Inc. **********************************************tanstaafl

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 11 Nov 96 6:49:56 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ******** *** 14:49 99.77% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -.--__..--- 17:21:56 99.28% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com * **+**- *** 7:35 99.23% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net + +*-- +** 39:50 99.18% replay remailer(a)replay.com +++* --- *** 22:22 98.78% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com - -- - -+ 1:18:14 98.56% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ++#. + - *** 47:04 98.24% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de +----+-- +++ 2:15:31 97.94% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com +----- - 2:51:34 94.38% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu - +++-- +++ 42:54 93.75% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++ +++-- + + 56:13 89.49% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++-- -+ 1:10:46 84.64% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ++# + - 10:34 43.55% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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FUCK ME HARD
by Igor Chudov ＠ home 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FUCK NME HARD

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