December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Injunction Against Spammers
by Otto Matic 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today Concentric Network Corp. won an injunction [15] against Cyber Pro- motions, Inc. -- the outfit against which AOL lost a court fight to keep its subscribers free of email spam -- see TBTF for 9/8/96 [16]. Cyber Promotions, it seems, was forging a Concentric Network return address in their spams, so thousands of outraged Netizens bombarded the ISP daily with demands that Concentric stop supporting an activity that is, in fact, forbidden by their terms of service and of which Concentric was entirely innocent. The wording of the promise that Cyber Promotions was compelled to sign forbids them specifically from thus abusing Concentric in the future. It seems to me that the spammer will be free to choose another ISP "goat," or to forge a nonexistent return address on their future spams, without penalty. This timely news just arrived on Glen McCready's <glen(a)qnx.com> "0xdeadbeef" mailing list. [15] <http://home.concentric.net/press/spam.html> [16] <http://www.tbtf.com/archive/09-08-96.html> otto =-=-=-=-=- Otto Matic "Fuckin' A, Miller!" Bud, Repo Man --------------------------------------------------------- Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com ---------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Re: Government Denial of Service Attacks
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:33 AM 10/9/96 +1000, Julian Assange wrote: >I will not coment on the correctness of the U.S government's funding >allocations, however the above statement is clearly designed to be >deceptive. Given the GDP of the U.S as a whole during fiscal 1996 was >greater than that of any other country at any other time, including the >U.S in previous years (the U.S like most other countries has postive >growth), of course the absolute value of taxes collected will be larger. I make the point only because this very important fact never occurs to anyone. Our rulers like to say that they can't make do with a cent less of the vast sums they collect from us and, in fact, all of them say that they will need more. Just pointing out that with all they have, they can probably stand to cut back a little. The Fortune 500 did. DCF

1 0

RE: legality of wiretapping: a "key" distinction
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Black Unicorn [in reply to Vlad the Conqueror] I understand that it's difficult for you to grasp how firmly entrenched the concept of wiretapping is in law enforcement, courts and the legislature, and that your novel new approach has been tried before. .................................................................. This should help him understand it. I won't say who this quote is from, but he was a very respected French author: "Both the English and the Americans have kept the law of precedents; that is to say, they still derive their opinions in legal matters and the judgements they should pronounce from the opinions and legal judgements of their fathers. [...] The English or American lawyer who thus, in a sense, denies his own reasoning powers in order to return to those of his fathers, maintaining his thought in a kind of servitude, must contract more timid habits and conservative inclinations than his opposite number in France. Our written laws are often hard to understand, but everyone can read them, whereas nothing could be more obscure, and out of reach of the common man, than a law founded on precedent. Where lawyers are absolutely needed, as in England and the United States, and their professional knowledge is held in high esteem, they become increasingly separated from the people, forming a class apart. A French lawyer is just a man of learning, but an English or an American one is somewhat like the Egyptian priests, being, as they were, the only interpreter of an occult science. [...] Thus it is England, above all that supplies the most striking portrait of the type of lawyer I am trying to depict; the English lawyer values laws not because they are good but because they are old; and if he is reduced to modifying them in some respect, to adapt them to the changes which time brings to any society, he has recourse to the most incredible subtleties in order to persuade himself that in adding something to the work of his fathers he has only developed their thought and completed their work. Do not hope to make him recognize that he is an innovator; he will be prepared to go to absurd lengths rather than to admit himself guilty of so great a crime. It is in England that this legal spirit was born, which seems indifferent to the substance of things, paying attention only to the letter, and which would rather part company with reason and humanity than with the law." .. Blanc

1 0

Binding cryptography - a fraud-detectible alternative to key-esc
by Bert-Jaap Koops 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In this message, we introduce binding cryptography, a new proposal for establishing an information security infrastructure that does not hamper law enforcement. We present an alternative that can give law-enforcement agencies access to session keys, without users having to deposit private keys. Unilateral fraud in this scheme is easily detectible. We outline the proposal below, and announce two articles which will describe the proposal in more detail and which will provide the legal and the technical context. The text is also available at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/binding.htm. 9 October 1996 Eric Verheul, everheul(a)ngi.nl Bert-Jaap Koops, koops(a)kub.nl Henk van Tilborg, henkvt(a)win.tue.nl ------------------------------------------- (c) 1996 Eric Verheul, Bert-Jaap Koops, Henk van Tilborg This message may only be redistributed in its entirety and with inclusion of the copyright notice. Credit if quoting. _Binding Cryptography, a fraud-detectible alternative to key-escrow proposals_ _1. Introduction_ Information security, and so cryptography, is essential in today's information society. A robust (information) security infrastructure must be set up, including a Key Management Infrastructure. However, the unconditional use of encryption by criminals poses a threat to law enforcement, a problem that is hard to solve. Consequently, governments have two tasks. The first is stimulating the establishment of a security structure that protects their citizens, but which does not aid criminals. The second task is coping with the use of encryption by criminals outside of this framework. We think that encryption outside of the framework (e.g., PGP) should not be outlawed - but it need not be mainstream either. It is crucial that any such established security structure is widely accepted and trusted, as this will lower the demand for encryption outside of this framework, and so will make the second goal easier to achieve (or, at least, not more difficult). The establishment of such a widely accepted and trusted security structure is now the challenge that (US) IT businesses face if they want to participate in the recent CLIPPER IV initiative. _2. Binding cryptography_ In a series of two articles, we address the establishment of an information security infrastructure. Several proposals have been made by governments and others to establish such an infrastructure, but a satisfactory overall solution remains yet to be found. In the non-technical article [VKT], we review several technical proposals and a few government initiatives, focusing on key-escrow proposals. We present a series of criteria that acceptable solutions should meet, and note that all proposals so far fail to meet many of these criteria. We argued that the establishment of a worldwide security infrastructure can not be achieved without strong cooperation of governments. In fact, governments themselves should take up the challenge of establishing a security infrastructure, based on public-key encryption, which does not hamper law enforcement. We offer a new solution to achieve this: "binding data", which also improves upon current proposals. It has the advantage that it helps the establishment of a strong security infrastructure which discourages abuse for criminal or subversive purposes by making unilateral abuse easily detectible. It allows a straightforward monitoring of compliance with law-enforcement regulations, without users having to deposit ("escrow") keys beforehand. Thus, an information security infrastructure can be established, which does not worsen the crypto problem for law enforcement. Metaphorically speaking, our solution consists of equipping public-key encryption systems used for confidentiality with a (car) governor (a speed-limiting device). The specifications of this governor are rather general, and so many systems can probably be equipped with them. It is inspired by the proposal of Bellare and Rivest [BR], in which users' encrypted messages consist of three components: 1. the (actual) message encrypted with any symmetric system, using a random session key; 2. the session key encrypted with the public key(s) of the addressee(s); 3. the session key encrypted with the public key of a Trusted Retrieval Party (TRP). In effect, the TRP is treated as a virtual addressee, although the message is not sent to it. When a law-enforcement agency is conducting a lawful intercept and strikes upon an enciphered message, they take the third information component to the TRP. If shown an appropriate warrant, the TRP decrypts the information component and hands over the session key, so that the law-enforcement agency has access to the message. Observe that users are not obliged to escrow their (master) keys, they only give access to the (temporary) session keys used in the communication. The concept of "virtual escrow" has been the base of several escrow products (AT&T Crypto, RSA Secure, TIS Commercial Key Escrow). The main drawback of this concept is that it offers no possibility, at least for others than the TRP, to check whether the third component actually contains the (right) session key; moreover, the TRP will only discover fraud after a lawful wiretap. This renders the solution almost entirely unenforceable. Therefore, we propose a binding alternative, which adds a fourth component to the encrypted message: 4. binding data. The idea is that any third party, e.g., a network or service provider, who has access to components 2, 3 and 4 (but not to any additional secret information) can: a. check whether the session keys in components 2 and 3 coincide; b. not determine any information on the actual session key. In this way, fraud is easily detectible: a sender that attempts to virtually address a session key to the TRP (component 3) that is different from the real one he uses on the message (or just nonsense) will be discovered by anyone checking the binding data. If such checking happens regularly, fraud can be properly discouraged and punished. The binding concept supports the virtual addressing of session keys to several TRPs (or none for that matter), for instance, one to a TRP in the country of the sender and one in the country of the addressee. The solution therefore offers the same advantage for worldwide usability as the Royal Holloway [Holl] concept. We also remark that the concept supports the use of controllable key splitting in the sense of Micali [Mica] as well: a sender can split the session key and virtually address all the shares separately to the addressee and various TRPs using the binding concept. Moreover, the number of shares and the TRPs can - in principle - be chosen freely by each user. Finally we remark that the time-boundedness conditon (the enforceability of the timelimits of a warrant) can be fulfilled by additionally demanding that encrypted information (or all components) be timestamped and signed by the sender; a condition that can be publicly verified by any third party (e.g., monitor) as well. A PKI that incorporates binding data hence has the following four players: - Users, i.e., governments, businesses, and citizens, - TTPs offering trusted services (e.g., time-stamping and certification of public keys), - TRPs aiding law-enforcement agencies with decrypting legally intercepted messages, - Monitors, monitoring communications encrypted via the PKI on compliance with binding regulations. For instance, these could be network operators or (Internet) service providers. In [VKT], we explain how we envision the framework in which the binding concept could present a security tool in the information society. We think the concept is flexible enough (e.g., in the choice of TRPs) to be incorporated into almost any national crypto policy, on both the domestic and foreign use of cryptography. In a mathematical paper [VT], Verheul and Van Tilborg propose a technical construction for binding data for an important public-key encryption system: ElGamal. This construction is compatible with Desmedt's [DESM] traceable variant of ElGamal. The construction is based on the techniques used in zero knowledge proofs. We expect that these constructions can be improved and that various other public-key encryption systems can be equipped with binding data. We present this as a challenge to the cryptographic research community. An outline of the mathematical construction of binding ElGamal can be found at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bindtech.htm. _3. References_ [BR] M. Bellare, R.L. Rivest, "Translucent Cryptography. An Alternative to Key Escrow, and its Implementation via Fractional Oblivious Transfer", see http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest [Desm] Y. Desmedt, "Securing Traceability of Ciphertexts - Towards a Secure Key Escrow System", Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1995, pp.147-157. [Holl] N. Jefferies, C. Mitchell, M. Walker, "A Proposed Architecture for Trusted Third Party Services", Royal Holloway, University of London, see http://platon.cs.rhbnc.ac.uk [Mica] S. Micali, "Fair Public-key Cryptosystems'", Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '92 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1993, pp. 113-138. [VKT] E. Verheul, B.J. Koops, H.C.A. van Tilborg, "Binding Cryptography. A fraud-detectible alternative to key-escrow solutions", Computer Law and Security Report, January-February 1997, to appear. [*] [VT] E. Verheul, H.C.A. van Tilborg, "Binding ElGamal. A fraud-detectible alternative to key-escrow solutions", will be submitted to Eurocrypt97. [*] For the Computer Law and Security Report, send subscription enquiries, orders and payments to: Pam Purvey The Oxford Fulfilment Centre PO Box 800, Kidlington Oxford 0X5 1DX UK Tel: +44 1865 843373 Fax: +44 1865 843940 For the United States: Elsevier Advanced Technology Fulfilment (enquiries) 660 White Plains Road, Tarrytown New York, NY 10591-5153 USA Tel: 914 333 2458 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Center for Law, Administration and facs +31 13 466 8149 Informatization, Tilburg University e-mail E.J.Koops(a)kub.nl -------------------------------------------------- Postbus 90153 | This world's just mad enough to have been made | 5000 LE Tilburg | by the Being his beings into being prayed. | The Netherlands | (Howard Nemerov) | --------------------------------------------------------------------- http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm ---------------------------------------------------------------------

2 1

Netscape does the right thing
by Paul Robichaux 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----BY SAFEMAIL----- When you buy Que's current Netscape book (_Special Edition, Using Netscape 3_), the included CD has the US-only, 128-bit, non-export version of Navigator on it. It's a licensed copy, even! (Of course, the book also has a small yellow "NOT FOR EXPORT" tag on the back cover, but who's counting?) For $49, getting a licensed copy of the 128-bit Navigator 3.0 plus a 1000+ page book is a pretty good deal. My hat's off to Netscape for choosing to put the 128-bit version on the CD, and to Macmillan/Que for bothering to get the software in the first place. I really do believe that Netscape wants to get secure software out as widely as possible. (Disclaimer: I wrote chapter 29 (the intro to JavaScript chapter) for _Special Edition, Using Netscape 2_. Que reused it, but I don't get paid any extra. It's a comprehensive book, and the CD has lots of cool stuff on it too.) - -Paul -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----BY SAFEMAIL----- Version: 1.0b3 iQEVAwUBMlvuQkp5FfADoAyJAQGpqQgAmkLHxKaVxdghoQy84ChCegj8FKBhXpvs eHFefwTBydaf1VD8ixDGdygy1Ch2Na0//y0hC8xF3gHg+/uTxbTh5Z+V+/0ISlu9 qsyoZMfda8AnMlEDF/PdNgONp2/E/+BguYcp9044RgPCVIVEH8cN9ff97QzUIOk1 VjR0hYnG98UYDmvEop/509VUDPvokbFLHG4iXl//3uTtY2sOuNG8zWNAV9SApGBM 6aOBS8+gW9DTGzlOTUlR5ncFSji9a4jJv2XkXsIin/v1MTjxooYn5ISrC+/jo2iT vmDtlk7y5k1SzzWkP0JtSM0ZbjV5xMyb4wNyRQfH7LIpUJ9uqpdKdg== =p0Ej -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Paul Robichaux LJL Enterprises, Inc. paul(a)ljl.com Be a cryptography user. Ask me how.

4 3

Key Exchange Request
by Mike Babcock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 1280/FA4C5DB1 1996/06/13 Michael T. Babcock <mbabcock(a)tyenet.com> Michael T. Babcock <mbabcock(a)cyberbeach.net> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3i Comment: http://www.cyberbeach.net/~mbabcock/PGP/ mQCtAzHAhC8AAAEFAMG+C+yN8q7KDT5TUSdyQNZlDDlTGuF4vUzPEq52lrqx7NAA YwJuj0dtOnnU2GAAonNutYF7nbbsS5yjWWgENioKOzIdjgDpq+YBZDkX4kFTD/+5 PM5EZhS1kT54zDpbjlZHtu9ViL3xUD/vp5zmp7Mlxqdd5SbkM0bpIBlBIqfpij59 hOVgc837YtAMmAbuRzwzy06/5ne221MLA/pMXbEABRG0KE1pY2hhZWwgVC4gQmFi Y29jayA8bWJhYmNvY2tAdHllbmV0LmNvbT6JAJUDBRAx2dcPTeL4zy9PtLMBAZ0+ A/9T8thIB2MW/0X0H4HTPNQ5TJlXM/56wxEtWNrr0Veku+lJvMdm6JvCDHqIfNC8 lTsWCg1Hot7EyNWhtXPp29A2fgLK/8hVJiFDs55ClWk9E4x3ug2mLZESid3qJO6U 3AnnzbI1ZuAelcX6tzJAYtJlbUz3t2y0pUloDUz7Uj4oGIkAlQMFEDHAhI2lZOCu UMiZpQEBcr0EAJP1lU3gJCidTwyHNlc16kybaTfECQz/TV7W+OqOcdH3mD3HKxUk J5KHRqTL4mS/tiiTmFEuFnwJaa36f+8ARkjq2EgmUX74ItfpcdplU3Sxe04om7Oy 7XNrgqWWpt+dEqQQqOLEVCTfuwNQck96GLLu1hZUXfrgDkpBT0rsl6cMiQC1AwUQ McCEMNtTCwP6TF2xAQGj3AT/VMMu5yZZTychDeLMfxsMse/xQ1/Ioi2UzApBdyiQ 7EVXWWHG0q5GGwGMiIsPeIFcbvF39DwSBX2BsBcnQh90wERdRsCo2BkG7Sw9Pk5a 13FDiXv+5eUDRsc0Z7z874vvpurzV1afuL+LKCAgOlxJhinikKqbR89AVLx4xRzl /BAyE4OBUfZZNIpshmtJdhSO/027WEAd6jXEHu3IkIl4+LQsTWljaGFlbCBULiBC YWJjb2NrIDxtYmFiY29ja0BjeWJlcmJlYWNoLm5ldD6JAJUDBRAxwIpqpWTgrlDI maUBAXnqA/0X+RTykzFUl0IMVVfJeb1JPMTBlq4vMwAdsipYTtHPMNfWNfp7hsUO Sk4/v1IzX0pEysHvQhD/Q56s0MYDd+gxMV17v0JnBI36wTgIEjOITMKUKShlHyWx RGCs0KmCt8NJ958IwRErbCw9EIdObX9JChzXTvGA91kpXYxOwpr6XokAtQMFEDHA ij/bUwsD+kxdsQEBtc4E+wUYFsgqjThhUxpBFBdRc0k1oXKzbVl+itKUtdfqOH1d Wc99PMkdttqVi3ME0xLNOfVLYg0lROyZqR8xZKLfKCGLoFWUE8kOFoL+VuZQ/Nuz VS0bArNMk8+ghbSiC82IFScQkFcvISkuDgMOyaDviNPbeb2QMhjkhP20NDLaX5tW UNSXfjUMJLCp33yNaM9/fwGAs6V21qeViJh9IFxUh04= =OAVt - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- This message was sent by Pronto Secure Mail. Above is my public key. Please send your public key by return mail. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMmOzQyoZzwIn1bdtAQFCUQF9E1ggA7yYJ/mwRD98YF5ZFh+5yUz5YJy4 qCA7f+rprv4llxArrYTlZU/fAOwHmQ64 =OFUM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

RE: PLEDGES
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Sandy Sandfort Wah whoo! This, plus some other new pledges puts us over the $1000 mark. Now all we need is some show of intestinal fortitude from Dimitri. ........................................................ Well, hey - if Dimitri is feeling kinda weak & puny, I'll take his place. Youall can pay my airfare & hotel charge, and I'll think of something to talk about with you guys. How about: Imaginative, Non-Crypto-Related Ways to Avoid the Government. (Uni? I'd be delighted to discuss this in person). $1000 makes for a fine party! .. Blanc

1 0

RE: Re: extortion via digital cash
by scottb＠aca.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- >From: azur >Subject: Re: extortion via digital cash >Date: Tuesday, October 15, 1996 2:18PM > <SNIP> >Although Digicash's ecash offers anonymity to the payor it does not to the >payee. The reasons have to do with the way coins are blinded. So LE >could, with the bank's cooperation, easily associate the two sides of a >transaction. This was intentional on Chaum's part, either for moral or >practical political considerations. Its probably only a relatively minor >patch to allow one ecash purse (the kidnapper's) to generate the blind >token values so that another (similarly patched) purse (the vicitim's) can >submit them to the mint and return the minted coins to the kidnapper (e.g., >by posting on a popular Usenet group). In this scenario the only >reasonable way left to track the money is via linkage (the size and timing >of deposits and withdrawls in the kidnapper's account). I would tend to think that if you held on to the money long enough, you would thwart them tracking it via linkage-especially once it becomes more commonplace to do electronic transactions on the Net. Actually, if you wait long enough, you likely will run the risk of there being a crackdown on nym servers, remailers, etc, and maybe even specialy designed cancel-bots on usenet. /sb

1 0

extortion via digital cash (fwd)
by gimonca＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: scottb(a)aca.ca > Date: Tue, 15 Oct 1996 11:44:25 -0400 > Subject: extortion via digital cash > > Both ideas are bad, in that you stand a good chance at getting caught. > > I was wondering, what if you demanded payment via Ecash, through nym > servers, aliases, etc. From what I understand, it is just like cash, ie: no > record of transaction, but you get the added bonus of not having to meet the > other party-like a fund transfer. Once you have your 1,000,000 Ecash, you > could dump it on a disk, and close your internet account (unless you really > really trust your privacy technology). And I also think that you would have > the option to cash this into real funds at either the Mark Twain bank, or > likely somewhere in the Caymen Islands (maybe through those online gambling > houses). > The Digicash product only has one-way anonymity. Their own pages are a good place to start: http://www.digicash.nl/ecash/about.html --CG

1 0

Re: Service pays users (sort of) to read commercial e-mail
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:50 PM 10/14/96 -0700, Greg Broiles <gbroiles(a)netbox.com> wrote: >>From time to time we've discussed the economics of paying per-message costs >for E-mail, and/or systems where advertisers pay users to read their >messages. Someone seems to have set up a system like that. It's at ><http://www.aristotle.org>. They seem to be using voter registration as an >is-a-real-person credential. (Their idea seems to be that they'll charge Aristotle.org is run by John Aristotle Phillips. If you remember back in the 70s when a student at Princeton designed an atomic bomb as his junior physics project, that was him (he wasn't brilliant; he just needed a really good paper to bring up his low physics grades.) He's since gone into political consulting. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

1 0