December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Binding cryptography - a fraud-detectible alternative to key-esc
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I haven't seen the technical papers behind the postings you've made to the net, but the overall approach sounds very similar to "Clipper II", the Software Key Encryption work that the TIS people (Steve Walker?) and Dorothy Denning were touting a year or so ago. It wasn't in your references, and it's clearly close enough to be worth your attention. The design was interesting - it chose a set of public and symmetric key encryption that allows the recipient to validate the sessionkey-encrypted-to-key-copy-holder*. A not-highly-technical description of the TIS CKE Commercial Key Escrow system is at http://www.tis.com/docs/products/cke/present.html, particularly present9b.html. It's worth reading for the appalling graphics alone :-) I don't seem to have a copy of the technical description anywhere. <IMG href="http://www.tis.com/docs/products/cke/pres7a.gif"> A major capability that was missing from Walker's SKE work is the ability to split the copied* key into two or more parts, all of which are need to recover the session key, while making it possible to validate that the pieces do add up to the session key. (This was also missing from the Clipper chip in hardware, which pretended to do it in the master key setting process.) Can you extend the approaches you're using to allow an outside party, or at least the recipient, to validate that the two parts of the copied key contain the complete session key? [* I'm using the terms "copied key" and "Key copy holder" to refer to the copy of the key that you're giving to some third party and the third party. The term "escrow" is generally not applicable to the applications that transmit a copy of the key to some third party, and the technologies involved don't specify, communicate, or enforce conditions for access. TIS's CKE does at least cart around a 32-bit user-defined string for specifying recovery conditions, but there's not technical enforcement. ] # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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Production of ALPHACIPHER for Windows 95 and DOS Cancelled!
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may have already been posted, but I found it interesting... from: http://www.aa.net/cyber-survival-hq/ Development of the ALPHACIPHER product line has been voluntarily cancelled due to the possibility of non-compliance of users of ALPHACIPHER with the new key escrow law. Every key created by a user that would encrypt messages for international correspondence would have to be registered with the US Government. Cyber-Survival-HQ cannot insure that the users of ALPHACIPHER would voluntarily comply with this new law, and so ALPHACIPHER is hereby withdrawn from the marketplace. ALPHACIPHER currently has no built-in key generation function, and the proposed release of an ALPHACIPHER key generator has been terminated. All purchasers of ALPHACIPHER are entitled to a complete refund, and this has already been done. The New ADFGVX cipher is still offered for sale, as it is a breakable cipher, at least in theory.

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Re: DES cracker.
by Geoffrey C. Grabow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 16:30 10/17/96 +0100, Adam Back wrote: > >[added cc cypherpunks also] > >Sameer Parekh <sameer(a)c2.org> writes: >> Peter Trei <trei(a)process.com> writes: >> > Ideally, this should be a DEMO case of a real world encrypted >> > application, in which we have a cryptotext, and a known plaintext, >> > each at least one 8-byte block long. >> >> I'd like to get in touch with a bank who can provide us some >> sample ciphertext for an ATM transaction or something like that. I >> initially thought we should hit SWIFT, but that would be very >> illegal. =) > >If someone can dig up a selection of banking protocols (some of these >things must be standardised), perhaps we can simulate the same thing >without the legal implications. > >Of course you'd need the person constructing the challenge to be >trustworthy to the tune of $10k, or whatever the prize fund pans out >to be. For that matter the NSA, or anyone else with a hardware >breaker would be able to cheat, but then they help our cause, which is >to demonstrate how weak DES is :-) > Tell me what you need. A large part of my job is providing hardware security modules to banks to secure (among other things) their ATM networks (Automated Teller MAchines, not Async Transfer Mode). Do you need PIN encryption formats, transmission message protocols, or what? Just LMK. G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | Great people talk about ideas. | | Oyster Bay, New York | Average people talk about things. | | gcg(a)pb.net | Small people talk about people. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP 2.6.2 public key available at http://www.pb.net/~wizard | | and on a plethora of key servers around the world. | | Key ID = 0E818EC1 | | Fingerprint = A6 7B 67 D7 E9 96 37 7D E7 16 BD 5E F4 5A B2 E4 | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | That which does not kill us, makes us stranger. - Trevor Goodchild | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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[NOISE] About piracy & key recovery / hacked pages & Clinton-Gore
by scrappo.reverb＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hmmm... let's see... At about the same time I see people talking about major software/hardware companies going into the key recovery biz and piracy sites _not_ getting taken off of servers (SPA). Piracy. Software companies. Don't they have a common bond somewhere? Wouldn't it be ironic if a rash of piracy occurred with said companies products being pirated? I also noticed two other parallels: Hacked web pages and (although not here) the Clinton/Gore re-election. Hmm... Didn't somebody say something about the real Dole page getting a lot of hits? Maybe the Clinton page gets a lot of hits too. Wouldn't that be a hoot if somebody hacked their page and changed it to something more meaningful, say, how they are pushing the terribly dangerous key-recovery project. Even a subtle hack, such as putting a link to national and international sites carrying PGP, would have an effect. In the true spirit of the subject, I am not responsible. err... I am not responsible if this happens. Food for thought/no need to reply.

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Re: Production of ALPHACIPHER Snake Oil Cancelled!
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: From: Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)got.net> : At 9:11 PM -0700 10/17/96, ! Drive wrote: : >This may have already been posted, but I found it interesting... : > : >from: http://www.aa.net/cyber-survival-hq/ : > : > Development of the ALPHACIPHER product line has been voluntarily : >cancelled : >due to the possibility of : > non-compliance of users of ALPHACIPHER with the new key : >escrow : >law. : : : And just which _law_ might that be? Care to name an Act? Or even a Bill? I don't know, I'm only affiliated by the ISP, goto the page and find a mailto link and ask the owner. : : Come to think of it, just what the hell is "Alphacipher," and why should we : care? : : : > ALPHACIPHER currently has no built-in key generation function, and the : >proposed release of an : > ALPHACIPHER key generator has been terminated. All purchasers of ALPHACIPHER : >are entitled to a complete : > refund, and this has already been done. : : Were there any actual purchasers? : : > The New ADFGVX cipher is still offered for sale, as it is a breakable : >cipher, at least in theory. Why would one want to purchase something advertised as breakable? 'course advertising that its not breakable would would keep me away also. : : Ah, yes, now I understand. Sounds like just a new marketing ploy for the : same old snake oil. : : --Tim May

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Writing A Remailer
by William Davidheiser 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all. I want to try to write a re-mailer that will run on my ISP's UNIX shell account. I am familiar with Windows socket programming (C/C++) but have never done anything in the UNIX environment. Any pointers on where I should start? Thx a bunch --- billd

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Re: More threats from FOTM (Friends of Timmy May)
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 15 Oct 1996 21:54:20 -0700 (PDT), Sandy Sandfort wrote: >Does anyone remember the Russian word for "uncultured"? It was >in one or two of Tom Clancy's books. nekulturny? # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: Microsoft Millionaires and Billionaires
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 16 Oct 1996 07:54:06 -0700 (PDT), Brad Shantz wrote: >You obviously don't know as many developers at Microsoft as I do. They >treat alot of their developers like farm animals. I just had an interview >at Microsoft last week. Very few if any of the people I met with were >millionaires. I've heard a lot of people say that the 5+ year Microsquishies are leaving in droves because 'it's not a fun place to work anymore'. The pain of success, I guess. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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Re: Comments on binding cryptography (1)
by Bert-Jaap Koops 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> wrote: [many things, including] > So where in > the U.S. are you gonna get TRP's who will not *ever* "leak" your files > to an interested agency without proper warrant? [and] > They sure as hell don't trust us, now do they? This indicates exactly our difference of opinion, which I noticed already in my posting. We have different views on governments, so be it. > cypherpunks are not merely paranoid (paranoia as a Way Of Knowing), > they're very adept at telling you exactly how the criminals and > terrorists will get around this hokum, and you're in denial about it. If you can tell me exactly how criminals can get around the cryptographic protocol in the way the proposal tries to prevent (unilateral fraud), I very much would like to hear so. If you mean criminals can agree to use superencryption (or PGP for that matter), I don't deny that, as you might have noticed. Bert-Jaap

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Re: "Stopping Crime" Necessarily Means Invasiveness
by Bert-Jaap Koops 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: > The recent talk about "catching criminals" misses this point, that > governments typically use surveillance powers to control citizens. (Note: I > would think Dutch residents should be especially sensitive to this concern, > given what happened to them in WW II, when the arriving Nazis used > telephone records to locate Jews for extermination. Until recently, Holland > had a tendency to carefully think about such issues---I believe phone calls > were billed in such a way as to not keep such records, for example). I suppose this remark is targeted at me and Eric. Yes, I am sensitive to the issue, but no, I don't think the threat of an American invasion particularly realistic. At present, I worry more about the threat of (organized) crime than about the threat of government abuse, call it Dutch naivete if you want. So much for politics. Can we get back to crypto? Bert-Jaap

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