December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

USPS electronic postmark
by Jonathan Litt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today I was at the Internet Expo in Boston and I sent myself a postmarked email from the USPS booth. It is enclosed below for all to scrutinize. Here is an excerpt from the literature they had: "The United States Postal Service has entered into a limited market test phase for the Electronic Postmark, Archival, and Authentication Services. This is a fee for service test. The Electronic Postmark applies a time and date stamp to an electronic document, hashes it, and digitally signs the document with a Postal Service private key. ... The Electronic Postmark Processor time and date stamps the message, hashes it using the SHA hashing algorithm and digitally signs this with the Postal Service DSA 1024-bit private key. For the market trial we will use CCITT X.500 Section X.509 V3 certificate public/private key technology with the federal standard Digital Signature Algorithm." I will also paraphrase something that was said by one of the people at the booth: "We always send the message itself as an attachment. The message that you see at first shows the postmark, and warns you not to open the attachment if you are not the intended recipient. Just as with normal mail, it is a federal crime to double click on the attachment to view the contents of the message if the message is not for you." Further BS of this nature can be found at: http://www.aegisstar.com/uspsepm.html My favorite line from that web page is: Postal ECS plans on regularly changing the Postal Service private key as recommended by cryptography experts, which will only require the redistribution of the VERIFY.DLL file to Mail Reader users. Wow, it _only_ requires distributing a new public key to all users! As stated above, here is the message in its entirety, exactly as it arrived in my mailbox. Below that is the base64 decoded for your convenience. -jon ------- Forwarded Message Received: from PACIFIC-CARRIER-ANNEX.MIT.EDU by po9.MIT.EDU (5.61/4.7) id AA03633; Wed, 16 Oct 96 13:34:14 EDT Received: from corpmail.aegisstar.com by MIT.EDU with SMTP id AA26235; Wed, 16 Oct 96 13:34:13 EDT Received: from router1.fac1.aegisstar.com by aegisstar.com (SMI-8.6/SMI-SVR4) id KAA03398; Wed, 16 Oct 1996 10:33:24 -0700 From: demo3(a)hypersurf.com Received: by router1.fac1.aegisstar.com (SMI-8.6/AegisRouter) id RAA10130; Wed, 16 Oct 1996 17:33:40 GMT >X-Special-Header: Wed Oct 16 17:33:19 GMT 1996 Message-Id: <0.0.0.0.21828.1996.Oct.16.17.33.19(a)4.1.aegisstar.com> Date: Wed Oct 16 17:33:19 GMT 1996 Reply-To: demo3(a)hypersurf.com Errors-To: demo3(a)hypersurf.com Subject: test postmark To: littlitt(a)MIT.EDU Mime-Version: 1.0 (Aegis Star MIME v1.0) Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="PART.BOUNDARY.0.0.0.0.21828.1996.Oct.16.17.33.19(a)4.1.aegisstar.com" - --PART.BOUNDARY.0.0.0.0.21828.1996.Oct.16.17.33.19(a)4.1.aegisstar.com Content-type: text/plain Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: read1st.txt Content-Name: read1st.txt ***************************************************************************** ******* U.S. Postal Service Electronically Postmarked Mail ******* Date & time: 1996/10/16 17:33:10 GMT ******* ECTPID: 00000119961016173310,3317 ******* Postmarked in Palo Alto, California ***************************************************************************** NOTICE: The Postal Service preserves the security of all electronically postmarked messages in its custody from unauthorized interception, inspection or reading of contents, or tampering, delay or other unauthorized acts. The attached message has been sent to you Electronically Postmarked by the United States Postal Service. The contents have been digitally signed and can be authenticated using the U.S. Postal Service Mail Reader (you can receive a free copy from http://www.aegisstar.com or e-mail us at support(a)aegisstar.com) If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any viewing, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is prohibited. Only littlitt(a)mit.edu may view the enclosed message. - --PART.BOUNDARY.0.0.0.0.21828.1996.Oct.16.17.33.19(a)4.1.aegisstar.com Content-type: application/x-USPSpostmarked; name=P0010CF5.msg Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=P0010CF5.msg Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Description: U.S. Postal Service Mail Content-Name: P0010CF5.msg RnJvbSBkZW1vM0BoeXBlcnN1cmYuY29tICBXZWQgT2N0IDE2IDE3OjMzOjAzIDE5OTYNClgt QUVUWVBFOiBFUE0NClgtSUQ6IDMzMTcNClgtVVNQUy1OT1RJQ0U6ICBUaGlzIGRvY3VtZW50 IGhhcyBiZWVuIGVsZWN0cm9uaWNhbGx5IHBvc3RtYXJrZWQgYnkgdGhlIFVuaXRlZCBTdGF0 ZXMgUG9zdGFsIFNlcnZpY2UNClgtVElNRVNUQU1QOiAgMTk5Ni8xMC8xNiAxNzozMzoxMCBH TVQNClgtUE9TVEFHRTogIDIyLCA1OTMsIDENClgtU046ICA5ODYNClgtRE46ICBjPVVTQG89 VVNQUy1BZWdpcyBTdGFyIFBpbG90QGNuPVVTUFMsIEFFR0lTDQpYLVVTUFMtTk9USUNFOiAg RWxlY3Ryb25pYyBQb3N0bWFya2luZyBQaWxvdCBTeXN0ZW0NClgtVVNQUy1QT1NUTUFSSzog IEVDVFBJRCAgMDAwMDAxMTk5NjEwMTYxNzMzMTAsMzMxNw0KWC1SOiAgOThBNjhGOUY2MTE0 ODRCRUQ5NzI5M0ZBQkVBRkFCQUQyNjMyREZDMA0KWC1TOiAgQUE5QTIwN0Y2OTcwMTlCMjhD RDI0N0Q0QTkwRkU2OTVFMDZCODQ4Rg0KWC1ERVNUOiBsaXR0bGl0dEBtaXQuZWR1DQo+RnJv bSBkZW1vM0BoeXBlcnN1cmYuY29tICBXZWQgT2N0IDE2IDE3OjMzOjAzIDE5OTYNCk1lc3Nh Z2UtSWQ6IDwxOTk2MTAxNjE3MzkuS0FBMjIzNDRAbWVyY3VyeS5oeXBlcnN1cmYuY29tPg0K RnJvbTogIlVTUFMgRGVtbzMiIDxkZW1vM0BoeXBlcnN1cmYuY29tPg0KVG86IChwb3N0bWFy a2luZyBzeXN0ZW0pDQpTdWJqZWN0OiB0ZXN0IHBvc3RtYXJrDQpEYXRlOiBXZWQsIDE2IE9j dCAxOTk2IDEzOjM0OjIyIC0wNDAwDQpYLU1TTWFpbC1Qcmlvcml0eTogTm9ybWFsDQpYLVBy aW9yaXR5OiAzDQpYLU1haWxlcjogTWljcm9zb2Z0IEludGVybmV0IE1haWwgNC43MC4xMTU1 DQpNSU1FLVZlcnNpb246IDEuMA0KQ29udGVudC1UeXBlOiB0ZXh0L3BsYWluOyBjaGFyc2V0 PUlTTy04ODU5LTENCkNvbnRlbnQtVHJhbnNmZXItRW5jb2Rpbmc6IDdiaXQNCg0KdXNwb3N0 OmxpdHRsaXR0QG1pdC5lZHUKCnRlc3QgbWVzc2FnZQpoaQoKVGhpcyBpcyBvbmUgb2YgdGhl IGZpcnN0IFVTUFMgRUNTIGVsZWN0cm9uaWMgcG9zdG1hcmtzLiAgS2VlcCBpdCBmb3IgZnV0 dXJlCnBoaWxhdGVsaWMgdmFsdWUhCgo= - --PART.BOUNDARY.0.0.0.0.21828.1996.Oct.16.17.33.19(a)4.1.aegisstar.com-- ------- End of Forwarded Message base64 decoded: >From demo3(a)hypersurf.com Wed Oct 16 17:33:03 1996 X-AETYPE: EPM X-ID: 3317 X-USPS-NOTICE: This document has been electronically postmarked by the United States Postal Service X-TIMESTAMP: 1996/10/16 17:33:10 GMT X-POSTAGE: 22, 593, 1 X-SN: 986 X-DN: c=US@o=USPS-Aegis Star Pilot@cn=USPS, AEGIS X-USPS-NOTICE: Electronic Postmarking Pilot System X-USPS-POSTMARK: ECTPID 00000119961016173310,3317 X-R: 98A68F9F611484BED97293FABEAFABAD2632DFC0 X-S: AA9A207F697019B28CD247D4A90FE695E06B848F X-DEST: littlitt(a)mit.edu >From demo3(a)hypersurf.com Wed Oct 16 17:33:03 1996 Message-Id: <199610161739.KAA22344(a)mercury.hypersurf.com> From: "USPS Demo3" <demo3(a)hypersurf.com> To: (postmarking system) Subject: test postmark Date: Wed, 16 Oct 1996 13:34:22 -0400 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Priority: 3 X-Mailer: Microsoft Internet Mail 4.70.1155 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit uspost:littlitt@mit.edu test message hi This is one of the first USPS ECS electronic postmarks. Keep it for future philatelic value!

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Solution to the Dimitri Problem
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Boy, it seems that our resident KOTM is now just posting for the hell of it - just get a kick out of seeing his own messages on this list. Therefore, I have a solution to this. Since he likes to see his own words so much, why don't we start sending him multiple copies of all of his words of wisdom? The following recipe for Procmail does the trick just fine. :0 * ^(From|Sender).*dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com ! dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com This recipe could also be modified to mail him multiple copies of his messages or anything you feel that he should see. Have fun with it! If enough people do this, we just might be able to get him to leave us alone for a while.

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Re: DES cracker.
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[added cc cypherpunks also] Sameer Parekh <sameer(a)c2.org> writes: > Peter Trei <trei(a)process.com> writes: > > Ideally, this should be a DEMO case of a real world encrypted > > application, in which we have a cryptotext, and a known plaintext, > > each at least one 8-byte block long. > > I'd like to get in touch with a bank who can provide us some > sample ciphertext for an ATM transaction or something like that. I > initially thought we should hit SWIFT, but that would be very > illegal. =) If someone can dig up a selection of banking protocols (some of these things must be standardised), perhaps we can simulate the same thing without the legal implications. Of course you'd need the person constructing the challenge to be trustworthy to the tune of $10k, or whatever the prize fund pans out to be. For that matter the NSA, or anyone else with a hardware breaker would be able to cheat, but then they help our cause, which is to demonstrate how weak DES is :-) So start digging for banking protocols! Personal contacts, web searches, obtaining standard documents, dumpster diving, whatever it takes. Adam -- print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Re: Comment on binding cryptography (2)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:41 PM 10/16/96 MET, Bert-Jaap Koops wrote: > I haven't yet made up my mind how the crypto problems for law > enforcement are to be addressed. It's my Ph.D. subject, and all I can > say at present is that the issue is complex. Before addressing the problems of crypto, how about addressing the problems of opaque envelopes in snail mail. Opaque envelopes not only facilitate criminal conspiracies in the same way that crypto does, it also makes possible such things as letter bombs, which have no crypto equivalent. The solution: Mandatory tranparent envelopes. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Comments on binding cryptography (1)
by Bert-Jaap Koops 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Miller <jim(a)suite.suite.com> wrote: > Feeling any cognitive dissonance, Mr Koops? Ever heard of fuzzy logic, Mr. Miller? BJ

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Re: AW: Binding cryptography - a fraud-detectible alternative to key-escrow
by douzzer＠MIT.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

i'm neither nearsighted nor a fool. don't presume. i can accept the tracking of fossil fuels, bleach, fertilizer, sulphuric-acid-based drain cleaner, essentially any non-edible or psychoactive chemical. clearly purchase of non-edible chemicals below a threshhold quantity does not present a credible threat, so there's no reason to invade the privacy of someone who's simply unstopping a toilet, cleaning laundry, or getting a fillup. schedule the threshholds so that it is not feasible to drive around to different stores to collect enough of a chemical to make a threshhold-sized bomb, for example. the only other way to know if someone has assembled the ingredients of a bomb is through massive and insidious surveillance, which is far more objectionable. the tracking is implemented by recording the purchase in the database via a point-of-sale unit. i don't like it, you don't like it, but it's a good compromise. would you prefer a simple prohibition on the sale of the more sensitive types of chemicals? of course not. am i proposing that the above, or any other scheme or combination of schemes, comprises a foolproof solution? of course not. i think you misunderstood what i meant by "tracking of all automobiles." don't track where they are (that would be draconian), track who owns them, and what model and color they are. as far as tracking deadly weapons: if there were a unified database containing the ballistic profile of every gun barrel sold, and relating with each a physically tamper-resistant serial number and current owner, and if every transfer of weapon ownership required a cryptographically authenticated exchange with a unified clearinghouse to assure that no gun is ever transferred to or kept by a convicted violent criminal, i put to you that a huge reduction in crimes with firearms will follow. moreover, legitimate ownership and use of guns is not in any way curtailed by such a system. "by saying MEAN THINGS, you are hurting people, and that is wrong." that's total hogwash. your ideas of "mean," "hurt," and "wrong" are not the same as mine, and that's exactly why i reiterate that restrictions on what i can think, who i can speak to, what i can say, and how i say it, are unacceptable. i am often offended and contemptuous, and i expect to offend and inspire resentment just as often, and that's fundamental to the human condition. it would be a disaster of unrivalled proportions if a day were to arrive when all of humanity is of one mind; fortunately that can never happen. you got sillier at this point, but i'll finish up. the government will not protect me, because the government is not there when i am mugged, carjacked, etc. i know this as something real, not as something abstract, but through a simple thought exercise it is not hard to see that this is inevitable. _prohibition_ and _tracking_ are completely different. the murder, rape, and robbery of members of the community are prohibited in our society, as in most (all?) human societies with written laws. a law which forbids conduct which directly violates the physical or organic rights of others is a legitimate prohibition. regulation, e.g. by tracking, is not the same at all. i have already explained what i mean by tracking: it is simply the concentration of data regarding the transfer of (and therefore, responsibility for) substances and machinery that when abused has a dire impact on the rights of other individuals. now on "the torture thing": i wasn't trying to be imaginative, to be honest i just jumped at a chance to construct a trite paragraph like that. it was fun for me; i hope you enjoyed it. as far as what i have already been through in my life, i have no comments to offer. as far as the susceptibility of others to have their wills bent by torture, i have no doubt they are far more vulnerable on average than i am. "just make it unnecessary to carry out terrorist acts." it's clear to me now that you didn't take enough time thinking out your flammage. "just make it unnecessary" is exactly what i am saying here; if victimless crimes were abolished (and if the income tax were abolished, which i didn't happen to mention), we'd be a lot closer to removing the impetus for terrorist acts (and for any sort of insurrection against the state). however, terrorism will never disappear completely, because there will always be ethically impoverished people who adopt agendas that are predicated on domination and enslavement, and who manipulate weak people with ideological psychobabble to get their way. that's why someone has to track chemicals and killing machines regardless of the configuration of laws. what does cryptography have to do with all this toxic waste? i am willing to forego a certain amount of privacy regarding the weapons i own, the chemicals i buy, and the vehicles i drive, so that i can have complete privacy regarding the information i store and the conversations i have. of course, more obviously, i am willing to forego a certain amount of privacy about my guns, cars, and drugs, so that i can have and use my guns, cars, and drugs. -douzzer p.s. note that i am not on this list - i will not see a reply if you don't send it to me.

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Re: [NOISE] I never knew that Dimitri Vulis was a net.loon
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: dougr(a)skypoint-gw.globelle.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com Date: Thu Oct 17 05:34:16 1996 [This post has nothing I can think of to do with cryptography, but it is high time to take some of the heat off Tim from this loon. Hey Dmitri, I've got a couple of cats, too!] Doug wrote: > On Wed, 16 Oct 1996, Mark O. Aldrich wrote: ... > > Check it out for yourself at > > http://www.math.uiuc.edu/~tskirvin/home/legends/legends3.html > > > > The above is very good, but there's not nearly as much on Vulis in it. > For anyone else who may have missed it, here is the original link again: > > http://www.math.harvard.edu/~verbit/scs/cranks/from-Shlomo.html#vulis > > This one absolutely_boggles_my_mind. But check them both out. These do shed some light on this guy, and he is an incredible source of noise. I've killfiled the loon long ago, but Doug alerted me to his rant about me, so I dug his posts out of the trash. I had no idea he was his own sysadmin, though I suppose doing that is one way to get away with being as annoying as he is. IMO it's obvious to all that the recent messages with relevant-looking subjects bashing Tim and coming through the remailers are from him, and I finally got annoyed. The resume he posted is old, and the address and phone number, plus some of the other information, has changed or is inaccurate. I am in the process of redoing my home page, but it's taking a while. Also, the Florida Bar has very little sway over me these days since: 1. My life seems to be going in a different direction. 2. I've started saying what I think about political influence in the Florida judiciary, following a particularly-smelly ruling in a political ballot access case. (I decided that the Florida Supreme Court was "in play" until November 5.) The facts were featured in the Miami Herald and then here in "DUO_pol" [thanks JYA]. From what I hear, my "Castro should look at doing this" suggestion and my opinion of their blinkered reading of the state & federal Constitution(s) has gotten back to them and (just as I had hoped) has not been received too well. That's life. Maybe next time I'll be nicer, or maybe next time they'll rule differently (i e fairly) and avoid my sarcasm. If Dmitri (or anyone else) wants to complain about me anyway (not that it is likely to change my behavior) the Florida Bar hotline is at (800) 235-8619. I don't know if this is a Florida-only or national 800 number, but you are welcome to try it and see, Dmitri. Have fun, but give it a rest on Tim and start hollering about me. I agree with Tim on lots of stuff anyway, and (despite my killfiling you long ago) I regularly see your ranting about him in others' messages responding to your trash. I consider myself a friend of Tim May's (though I have never met him) so rant about me (and _these_ cats) for a while. JMR One of the "legitimate concerns of law enforcement" seems to be that I was born innocent until proven guilty and not the other way around. -- me Defeat the Duopoly! Vote Harry & Jo http://www.HarryBrowne96.org/ ___________________________________________________________________ PGP id.E9BD6D35 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 I will generate a new (and bigger) PGP key-pair on election night. <mailto:jmr@shopmiami.com> http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray ___________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMmX9oW1lp8bpvW01AQG3RwP/Qne8Y1A+ECf2/FIIJu9OpCQtt6CqPsXH 3jhHURblftCSQUyuJqob/LXAFoamTmbT7QnSqvbX/VlrRp96WBAmViULzeQckGy+ CHFjo0Umnb14PGCaKwbwQb1kgFXxbinbvjDBZjJAAaDGfTUAgDCnekfgXZ+eMBtC oczNcbs1/cs= =eVYp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Bidzos clarifies RSA's position on Clipper IV
by Mixmaster 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a presentation at CommerceNet'96 in California, Jim Bidzos, CEO of RSA, clarified RSA's position on Clipper IV. RSA supported IBM's efforts to establish a *commercial* key escrow system. For reasons that aren't clear to me, this commercial key escrow system turned into Clipper IV. RSA does not like or support the use of this system for GAK and will create a webpage explaining RSA's position on their site.

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Re: Goodbye
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:04 PM 10/16/96 -0700, you wrote: >Thus the glory days of cypherpunks, an insider club of the best >and brightest, far superior to the common herd, where we planned and >organized for a world where the ignorant masses can no longer >rob and harass their superiors, a world where the elite can >live the good life in freedom and comfort and abandon the >useless worthless masses to wander blindly into ruin, despair, >and slavery, lost in a world they cannot understand, and will >no longer have the power to smash. Why, James, this reads very much like Robert McNamara's best and brightest in the Nam glory days, cheerleading the B&B gang's gory battles slaughtering the worthless masses for vain comfort of the elite Pentagon planners. I presume you are not a savagely scarred vet, wrecked by over-heated ambition of the B&B elite, just another rightly ignored McNamara crybaby aged-Whiz Kid. Take R&R for a long while, you need it. Go to your nearest VA Hospital and wipe-up bed pans. Then come back to c'punks and earn your rank, not just flaunt the vanity plates.

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A home for stego in source code ?
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The monarchist lightning-hater has been cracking the whip again. > Where is highly sophisticated stego? Adam Back suggested several areas for investigation, including English text. Some weeks ago somebody suggested using synonyms in natural language to express stegodata. A synonym for a word in the message would be chosen from a defined set, and the choice that was made would express a bit or several. This seems related to the clever "alternate dictionary" idea in RFC-1938. But a lack of true synonyms (or programs that understand natural language) make it look pretty hopeless as a practical proposition. SOURCE CODE A POSSIBLE CHANNEL Even small programs often have several hundred symbols. The names given to these are mostly arbitrary, and they can be replaced (consistently) by other names by a program. In fact there "shrouded" source code is sometimes released to make it less clear to the human reader than the original source. In this application the names would be chosen randomly from a set of words and syllables (perhaps with some rules about which are plausible together). There is also a choice of StyleWithCaps and style_with_underscores. If the symbols (in order of first appearance) all have a CRC calculated on them I'd guess you could get 4 bits each without difficulty. There are also comments. These might be natural language, debugging code and never-really-got-this-working code. Maybe a CRC on each comment is worth 8 bits. Comments of the form /* Thanks to P.McNicholas, M.Davies and WorpleSword for advising on the next section **/ could be added with random names quite well (although the user might have to mark the complicated code fragments suitable for receiving such attributions). Names used could be lifted from a list of known helpful programmers ... And then there is layout. The kind of thing that is standardised with indent(1). This would be anti-standard in layout, choosing spacing and linebreaks and spaces with the stegomessage in mind. And some code constructions are capable of rewriting to add info to the message. 0==x , x==0 x>y , x<y i++ , ++i (sometimes) for , while if , switch (sometimes) Or variables could be added to hold intermediate values, and lengthen the source as our desired effect. There may be more scope for plausible stego in code that doesn't have to work. Next time you see a load of verbose mistyped rubbish called "Help me with my program!!!" it could be someone who got this idea ahead of me. I've been dipping into "Understanding and Writing Compilers" (Bornat, 1979). (free, withdrawn from library) It seems the early phases of a compiler build the symbol table as a tree and do various bits of analysis on the source. A good starting point for a program might be a compiler - rip out the translation and optimisation phases and add the stegoreader and stegogenerator. KEYED V. UNKEYED STEGO Assuming that the data hidden in stegofiles is random (keys or cyphertext) the enemy is supposed to be unable to tell whether there is really a message there. An example of unkeyed stego is the use of LSB of each byte in an image or audio file. In contrast, the subliminal channel mechanisms written about by Schneier use a key known to the intended reader. In this application keyed stego would seem to have an advantage over unkeyed in that the source could be made to keep to a house style while retaining some stego capacity. The seeds for the CRCs and style info (resembling ./indent.pro ~/indent.pro) could be user-defined. I'd still wouldn't want to hide plaintext under it, but it would give more flexibilty for the users. Would anyone like to write a version ? Then we could test my guesses about how many bits can be hidden. It probably won't be close to 1 in 8, but I think 1 in 30 should be within reach. -- Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk

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