December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RRE: fingerscanning
by E. Allen Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 19-SEP-1996 22:33:45.99 To: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" CC: Subj: fingerscanning X-URL: http://communication.ucsd.edu/pagre/rre.html X-Mailing-List: <rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu> archive/latest/1308 [For those of you who are just joining us, RRE has been following a controversy in Ontario about the use of biometric encryption to identify welfare applicants in Toronto for purposes of fraud prevention. Critics assert that welfare applicants are being criminalized under the cover of combatting a fraud problem that doesn't really exist; supporters assert that the new scheme would be less cumbersome for everyone involved than the existing identification methods, and that, unlike most biometric identification schemes, this encrypted scheme does not require the applicant's fingerprint to be captured in a form that could be used for law enforcement or other purposes. The case is important because biometric encryption is a leading example of the "privacy-enhancing technologies" that will become increasingly important as a technical means to reconcile functionality and privacy in technical systems. I honestly do not know which side is right, and I have friends among both supporters and critics of such systems.] =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Mon, 16 Sep 1996 23:49:23 -0400 (EDT) From: Sarah Vance <svance(a)uoguelph.ca> Subject: fingerscanning article this an article about fingerscanning that I wrote for University of Guelph's student newspaper, the "Ontarion", with lots of help from Orenda Davis and Jennifer Kohm. It's not as comprehensive as the info doc, but maybe a tad more readable. sooooo please. forward. reprint. etc. Solidarity, Sarah ______ A new threat to the privacy and autonomy of all Canadians received government's stamp of approval over the summer when Metro Toronto Council approved a plan to fingerscan area welfare recipients. Politicians claim that this will cut costs by reducing welfare fraud, which is estimated at under 3% of Social Service expenditures. Social Justice advocates question the fairness and fiscal responsibility of paying a consortium led by three large corporations, the Royal Bank, Great West Life Assurance Co., and Unisys Canada, millions of dollars to develop the program when welfare fraud is such an insignificant problem. The decision seems particularly questionable since New Zealand recently abandoned a similar system, having found that its costs far outweighed its benefits. A key reason for implementing the program, explains Metro's Human Services Committee report, is to make municipal Social Services compatible with provincial government plans to use biometric identification to "cover a range of programs". In Spain biometrics have been used for Unemployment benefits, and in the United States a bill was recently discussed that would have used it for a host of programs, including health care and immigration. Technology companies, such as Mytec, are promoting fingerscanning for these services in Canada as well. Fingerscanning is often confused with fingerprinting, although there are substantial differences. In fingerscanning, a machine takes your fingerprint pattern and converts it into a unique set of numbers and letters. A central computer database holds these codes, which can be accessed by authorized groups. For Metro's plan, the system would be designed to catch people trying to receive extra benefits by applying for welfare under different aliases. The proposition raises the specter of corporate control over the welfare system by threatening to bring in private sponsorship. Metro Committee documents emphasize "the further exploration of the feasibility of C.I.B.S. [the fingerscanning plan] applications to other corporate initiatives." The Committee's suggestions for the future of the welfare system include "obtaining credits for our customers from various suppliers - supermarket chains, drug chains, educational institutions, dental clinics, property management companies, clothing stores.." Although this may sound fairly innocuous, it erodes the privacy and freedom of choice of people struggling below the poverty line. Presently, program benefits like dental care only cover certain services, and are available to limited cash amounts. The Committee's report suggests that corporate credits, such as those from grocery or clothing stores, would be handled in the same way: the government would control both the type of goods individuals purchase and the amount they spend on food, education, and other necessities. It makes it possible for politicians to decide things like whether or not it is acceptable for poor people to buy cigarettes or junk food. It is not inconceivable that in the future this power could deny low income people freedom over choices as personal as buying birth control. As well, those reliant on benefits would have to buy from corporate sponsors. It would be irrelevant if their prices were relatively expensive, their location inconvenient, or their policies in conflict with an individual's cultural or political values. Currently, the government records the location, time, and details of dental benefit transactions. It is likely that credits from drug stores and other corporate sponsors would be monitored in the same way. In spite of this, Metro Councilors are so enamored with the fingerscanning proposal that they are prepared to recommend it for nationwide use. Toronto's Department of Social Services even hopes to make some revenue off its expansion by selling the scheme to other jurisdictions. The spread of biometric identification happened similarly in the United States. In recent years, its use on welfare recipients has become increasingly prevalent. As the idea of biometrically identifying the public has become more socially accepted, federal politicians have started considering its usefulness for a myriad of services and personal information. In February, Congress discussed a bill that would have used fingerscanning to develop a centralized database containing personal information on every adult in the country. This data was to be made available to a variety of government and corporate interests. Even those claiming to be potential employers would have had access to an individual's immigration, welfare, and health records. In Toronto, assistance recipients can be seen as the test case for widespread use of fingerscanning in Canada--the beginning of a slippery slope. The Royal Bank's involvement in fingerscanning Metro welfare recipients is particularly problematic. If the plan is implemented, all 31 200 of Toronto assistance recipients who do not currently have bank accounts will be forced to access their benefits from an account set up for Social Services by the Royal Bank. The only way they will be able to do this will be through bank machines: The Royal Bank is not interested in investing the time and resources necessary to personally service these "clients". Instead, they have agreed to provide a training session in which these people will be shown how to use bank machines. However, unless this session 1) trains people not to have mental illness 2) dismantles the cultural barriers to using bank machines and 3) teaches people to read and write English or French, many of these 31 200 people and their families will have great difficulty accessing their assistance funds. There is also a question of who will pay for Royal Bank user fees. Brett Fleming, a Bank executive involved in the negotiations, has stated that "we'll all have to bear some of the pain". They have kindly offered to forfeit the profits for at least two user charges per month. Fleming claims that Metro Social Services will likely cover 5 more Interac charges per month for each of these recipients. At current rates, this would cost taxpayers $2 340 000 a year... Fortunately for Brett, it seems that the Royal Bank's "pain" will be minimal. Activists in the United States, are finding it difficult to eliminate the practice of fingerscanning, as it has quickly become entrenched in American public policy. In Canada, biometric identification is new enough that it can be challenged more easily. Legal and social justice groups are already mounting campaigns to put an end to Metro's plans before the deal is finalized. A group based in Guelph has formed with the goal of forcing the Royal Bank to withdraw from the consortium, making it difficult for the program to proceed. The campaign's strategy is to use a boycott to draw negative attention to the Royal Bank, forcing them to question whether they are willing to risk their reputation for the fingerscanning plan. The campaign is urging people across the province to withdraw their student loans, accounts, and RRSPs from the Bank. If you are interested in getting more information on Metro's fingerscanning plans, or in joining the fight against it, contact Orenda Davis @ (519)763-5292 <odavis(a)uoguelph.ca>, or Sarah Vance @ (519)763-6726 <svance(a)uoguelph.ca>. ____________________________________________________________________________ FIGHT FINGERSCANNING! (it IS possible) Join the province-wide campaign against fingerscanning, based right here in Guelph Make funds and support available for people on welfare who risk not to be scanned Donate resources.... photocopying, faxing, use of phones, artistic talent, your TIME, your skills BOYCOTT THE ROYAL BANK. Put pressure on them to withdraw from the consortium. People have already pulled their student loans, accounts, and RRSPs from the Bank Contact: Orenda Davis (519)763-5292 <odavis(a)uoguelph.ca>, or Sarah Vance (519)763-6726 <svance(a)uoguelph.ca>. Date: Mon, 16 Sep 1996 23:22:19 -0400 (EDT) From: Sarah Vance <svance(a)uoguelph.ca> Subject: at last... the fingerscanning info doc. (fwd) [...] METRO TORONTO AND THE FINGERSCANNING SCHEME: SOME OF THE FACTS THEY AREN'T TELLING US For the last few years some of the people from Metro social services have been working with large corporations to develop a program for fingerscanning people on welfare. On June 19, 1996 Metro Toronto Council passed a decision recommending that this program be implemented as soon as possible, probably starting at the beginning of 1997. The program is complicated, and full of very serious problems that have not been discussed in the mainstream media. Soooo... I've tried to use plain english to explain what's going on, and how fingerscanning will effect people on welfare, and society in general if it is implemented. If parts of this "report" aren't clear, or if it is missing any important info please contact me (sarah) so I can revise it. (my number and email are listed at the end) PART I: THE BASICS... WHAT IS IT AND HOW WOULD IT WORK? What is biometric identification? -the use of someone's body to identify them, whether it's by fingerscanning, retinal scans etc.. What happens to someone when they get fingerscanned? -when you apply for welfare you would put a couple of your fingers into the scanning machine. That machine takes your fingerprint pattern and converts into a unique set of numbers and letters, a "bioscrypt". It's kind of like having your fingerprint turned into a bar code that is held in the computer's database. Who has access to the fingerscans? The bar code is, at least according to the information I've been able to find, accessible to anyone. It is just stored in the computer, so that the computer won't accept your fingerprint (or bar code) if you try to apply for welfare again. Metro council is recommending that the bar codes be destroyed three months after someone goes off of social assistance. According to them, the only person who could access these numbers would be the person responsible for maintaining the system. This person only accesses the system periodically to make sure that bioscrypts have been destroyed at the appropriate time. How often will people on welfare have to be fingerscanned? -although Metro officials say that people will only be fingerscanned when they register for welfare, Metro Committee documents imply that biometric id will be used more often than that... Human Services Committee Report #8, pg.11, (A) improving customer identification says.."CIBS will address...ongoing confirmation of identity" (I underlined that) "Biometric technologies give customers a fast, non-intrusive and very reliable way to provide indisputable proof of identity - even if they have no other identification." but, since other id like a driver's licence etc.. will still have to be used for enrollment, the only way this statement can be true is if Metro is planning on fingerscanning people on welfare at other times as well. ("CIBS" is what they're calling the program, it stands for "Client Identification and Benefit System") Who is getting paid to develop this program? -the Royal Bank, Great West Life Assurance, and Unisys Canada are heading the group (or "consortium") that has won this contract What is the Royal Bank's role in fingerscanning? -they are providing a Metro Social Services Royal Bank account that anyone on welfare who doesn't currently have a bank account will get their money from What is Great West Life Assurance's role? -they are developing a benefits card that welfare recipients will use at the dentist's etc. instead of vouchers What is Unisys' role? -right now Unisys wants to provide the computer administrative backup for the program. They also have biometric identification technology which they hope to sell to Metro social services. Who is providing the biometric technology for this project? -they haven't finalized which particular type of biometric id they will use yet (it will almost certainly be fingerscanning) once they do decide, THEN they will start negotiating contracts with people that sell the technology...among these corporations are Unisys Canada and Mytec. How would the system change the way people get access to their money? -people who already have bank accounts will get their money direct deposited into their accounts (for many the way they access their money won't change) -people who don't have bank accounts get Royal Bank cards that they'll take to Royal Bank machines to withdraw their money. As of yet, there are no provisions for people to get their money any way other than by using a Royal Bank machine--they won't be allowed to go to tellers to take out their money. No one is sure about what provisions will be made for bank user fees--i.e. Interac charges. Where else is this happening? -In several places across the US (eg. Los Angeles and Alameda Counties, in California, Ohio etc..) -In Spain fingerscanning is being used on the unemployed How soon is Metro Toronto hoping to implement it? -They hope to finish their negotiations and start implementing fingerscanning as early as January of 1997. Would fingerscanning be mandatory? -no. at first it would only be coerced (see the section on risks of refusal, under part 7). But Metro council recommended making it mandatory in the future. Right now their lawyers are advising them that they will run into serious human rights battles if they try to make fingerscanning mandatory right away. PART 2: SPEAKING THEIR LANGUAGE...THE MONEY ARGUMENT How much fraud is there in the welfare system?? -between 0.5% and 3% of welfare cases are fraudulent (ie "double-dippers --meaning that they are receiving cheques from more than one office). This figure has been confirmed by Liberal and NDP studies, it and includes administrative errors. -one Metro councillor has stated that fraud is actually no more than 0.5% -of the 10 000 calls received by Metro's fraud line, only 0.7% were confirmed as double-dippers (globe, June 20) most of the people that were reported weren't even on welfare -when discussing the amount of fraud in the welfare system it is essential to ask why people on social assistance commit fraud. This requires ackowledging that in 1993 (before the 21.6% cut to assistance cheques) maximum welfare payments were still well below Stats Canada's poverty line How much of taxpayer's money will it cost to install the system? -$4-8 million to install for Metro (globe and mail, june 20) -the cost is of installation is still being negotiated -as far as I know, no one involved in the planning of the project has released estimates of the cost of training social service workers to use the system, of changing the computer filing system, of maintaining the new system etc... but these costs are sure to be substantial Will taxpayer's money be used to pay for the royal bank for user fees so that social assistance recipients can get bank accounts (even though that's not what many of them want)? yep. If people get bank accounts, won't they get service charges as well? -"We'll all have to bear some of the pain", says Bank executive Brett Fleming. He claims that the Royal Bank will probably pay for at least two uses of Interac per month per recipient, and that social services will probably pay for 5 more. So... if, as Brett Fleming estimates, Metro pays for recipients to get 5 free uses of Interac per month, how much will that cost? -there are 104 000 social assistance cases in Metro, 30% of them don't presently have bank accounts and therefore will have pseudo accounts set up at the Royal. That means that 31 200 new accounts will be set up at the royal for welfare recipients. FOR ONE MONTH 31 200 accounts x $6.25 5 interac charges @ $1.25/each $195 000 per month in cost to taxpayers -> additional Bank profit FOR ONE YEAR $195 000 /month x 12 months $2 340 000 per year in cost to taxpayers--> additional Bank profit FOR FIVE YEARS $2 340 000 /year x 5 years $11 700 000 in five years in cost to taxpayers-->additional Bank profit*** ***note: this calculation is made under the assumption that Interac charges will not increase in the next five years, and that welfare rolls will remain the same size But can't these costs be avoided by encouraging assistance recipients to use Royal Bank branches rather than bank machines? no. Assistance recipients who are provided with pseudo Royal Bank accounts will not be allowed to use bank branches, they will only be allowed to use bank machines. What is vendor fraud and will the system help to decrease it? -vendor fraud is fraud committed by professionals who provide government paid benefits to people on welfare (eg. dentists). Although the Royal Bank has stated that the thrust of the whole program is to decrease vendor fraud little proof has been provided so far that this will actually happen. -they argue that the paper vouchers that used to be used by welfare recipients to pay for dental repairs, for instance, can fairly easily be reproduced making it easy for vendors to charge the government for more services than they actually provide. These paper vouchers are to be replaced by electronic cards so that the problem of duplication will be eliminated. It is possible that the benefit card could deter vendor fraud to some extent; However vendor fraud can easily occur in other ways (eg. By overcharging for services, or by charging for services that aren't neccessary.... -Also, and most importantly, detering vendor fraud has nothing to do with biometrically identifying welfare recipients. If Metro Toronto wishes to use the benefit card to deter fraud (although the merits of this system are dubious) this could more inexpensively be done, and more sensibly be done, with out being attached to biometrical identification of the poor. Will fingerscanning save money in the longrun? -This is questionable: New Zealand instituted this system, but ended up abandoning it because its costs of implementation and maintenance far outweighed the amount saved from reduced fraud. PART 3: STIGMATIZATION -Metro argues that they aim to decrease stigmatization of welfare recipients by replacing cheques with bank cards, but at the same time they are thinking about using this system to start forcing poor people to use welfare benefit cards instead of cash for food, clothing, tuition and other basic needs. How does this criminalize welfare recipients? -some people argue that the only reason fingerscanning is seen as criminalizing is because it is confused with fingerprinting. It is true that fingerscanning technology is quite different from actual fingerprinting, but this does not erase the common element shared by both techniques: When a person is fingerprinted by the police it is because they are suspected of a crime, they are considered suspicious and are therefore scrutinized. When a person is fingerscanned for welfare it is also because they are suspected of a crime. The crime is fraud, and by virtue of being poor and dependant on state funds you are automatically considered suspicious and therefore scrutinized. -by spending millions on this system the government is helping to perpetuate the myth that our economic problems are caused by the poor. PART 4: ISSUES OF ACCESS Will fingerscanning make it easier for people who don't have "proper" identification to register for benefits? -NO. Even though this argument is often put forward, you will still have to have exactly the same types of identification to apply for welfare. Metro Human Services Committee report reads, "Conventional forms of identification (e.g. driver's licence, birth certificate) will continue to be required to establish initial eligibility for social assistance." (p.11, (A) Improving Customer Identification) If welfare recipients are only allowed to withdraw money from bank machines, how will people who have mental illnesses; do not read english or french; or have cultural or personal reasons for not using bank machines; be able to get their money? -the Royal Bank says that they will provide one training session in which people will be shown how to use bank machines. However, unless this session 1) trains people not to have mental illness 2) dismantles the cultural barriers to using bank machines and 3) teaches people to read and write english or french, many of the 31 200 people and their families who don't currently have bank accounts will not have access to their assistance funds. PART 5: ISSUES OF CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL How could the project bring more corporate control to the welfare system? -The idea of bringing in corporate sponsorship is brought up again and again in Metro Committee documents... pg.3, recommendation #2 that "the Corporate Administration Committee approve the continued participation of Metro Corporate and Human Resources in the systems and financial development of C.I.B.S. and the further exploration of the feasibility of C.I.B.S. applications to other corporate initiatives" the future of the welfare system??? pg.15, (B) (II) "the delivery foundation established by CIBS will give the Division unprecedented flexibility in the administration of program benefits. One advantage could be to use this flexibility to optimize customer purchasing power by obtaining credits for our customers from various suppliers - supermarket chains, drug chains, educational institutions, dental clinics, property management companies, clothing stores." -This statement very strongly urges corporate sponsorship. Right now program benefits like dental care only cover certain services (eg fillings), and are only available to certain cash amounts. The insinuation is that any corporate benefit credits from grocery stores, clothing stores,etc. would be handled in the same way. ie. you would only be able to spend a certain amount on food, clothing, education etc. You would only be able to buy certain items, you would only be able to live in certain places. It makes it possible for the government to do things like make it impossible for you to buy cigarettes and junk food with your food credit. It makes it possible for governements of the future to control whether or not you are allowed to buy birth control and what typesof birth control you are allowed to buy. Whatever companies sponsored the program would be the only ones that you could buy from, even if their prices are higher than other stores, even if they aren't located near your home, even if you have cultural/personal/political reasons for not wanting to shop at these large corporations. It means that poor people would no longer be entitled to basic freedoms of choice. And like with dental benefits now, the location, time and details of your purchases would be recorded. The kind of underwear you buy, what you buy at the grocery store, what type of drugs you purchase, would all be recorded by the government. It opens the door for a frightening amount of government and corporate control and surveillance. PART 6: A SYSTEM DESIGNED FOR EXPANSION-- WELFARE RECIPIENTS AS GUINEA PIGS. Could fingerscanning of welfare recipients expand beyond Metro Toronto in the future? -yes, Metro council recommended that they consider making it nationwide in the future. "By working with its private sector partners to build an integrated customer identification and disbursement system that meets the operational and business needs of a large income support program, Metro will gain valuable experience and expertise that can be applied to other jurisdictions." (pg.7 (II) ) -they are also talking about selling this program to other areas, pg.7, (II) "There is also the potential for future revenues related to the sale of specific applications developed for Metro to other jurisdictions. There is clear interest in the approach the Division is taking, and the results that will be achieved. Could fingerscanning be used for other government programs? -Metro Human Services Committee report (#8) explains that, "recently, the Provincial government has announced it is assessing the development of an identification card that could cover a range of programs.... C.I.B.S. employs technologies that will very likely be compatible, and can be incorporated, with prospective provincial applications." (p.7, comments and discussion Part I (c). The report goes on to clearly explain that one of the reasons for developing biometric id for welfare recipients is because they want to be prepared for when the province starts using fingerscanning for other areas. -Mytec, one of the companies competing to supply the biometric technology also hopes to apply it to (among other things) Canadian immigration and healthcare. -The spread of biometric identification has worked similarly in the US...It's use on welfare recipients has gradually become more and more widespread. The acceptance of its use for this purpose has made it possible for the country to move in the direction of using biometric id for a wide variety of services. In Febuary, Congress discussed a bill that called for fingerscanning every resident of the US over the age of 16 in order to develop a centralized database of information that would have been made available to a wide variety of government and corporate interests, including anyone who claims to be a potential employer. Now that fingerscanning for government services has become entrenched in the United States it is extremely difficult for people to fight against its use. People on welfare in Toronto can be seen as the test case for widespread use of fingerscanning in Canada, the beginning of a slippery slope. PART 7: FIGHTING BACK Legal Battles -Several groups in Toronto are confronting this issue as a human rights violation. Their strategy is to use the courts in order to have fingerscanning struck down. What can people on welfare do to fight against this? -Gather and publicize information about this issue (eg. through leafletting, press releases, demonstrations, stickering, civil disobedience, street theatre...) -Join the Toronto coalition being formed by the Toronto-based group "Low Income Families Together" -Speak to one of the legal groups interested in pursuing fingerscanning as a human rights issue (contact Elinor Mahoney at Parkdale Legal Services, for instance) -Refuse to be fingerscanned. (So far you are legally entitled to do this, however there are risks involved that you may or may not be able to take). Some of these risks are.... Getting your cheque later than otherwise, (which could make it difficult to pay bills on time), being treated as suspicious by social service workers, being harrassed What can anyone do if they're concerned about fingerscanning? -Make funds and support available for people on welfare who choose not to be scanned -Join the Toronto Coalition against fingerscanning being formed by Low Income Families Together -Join the province-wide campaign against fingerscanning by talking with any of the contacts listed below -Gather and publicize info about this issue (eg through leafletting, demonstrations, press releases, stickering, civil disobedience, street theatre...) *the campaign against fingerscanning can provide you with leaflets, posters, info, contacts in your area... -voice your concerns LOUDLY to Metro Council -Donate resources.... photocopying, faxing, use of phones, artistic talent, your TIME, your skills (eg. with dealing with media, with strategizing, with caring for children so people who often don't get a chance to participate in political activities can get involved..), your computer, your legal advice/representation.... -Boycott the Royal Bank to put pressure on them to withdraw from the consortium (this is the thrust of the Campaign against Fingerscanning's strategy...people have already withdrawn their student loans, accounts, and RRSPs from the Bank) Who can I get more information from? Contact.... Guelph: Orenda Davis (519)763-5292, or Sarah Vance (519)763-6726 Toronto: Kirsten at Low Income Families Together (416)597-9400 or fax: (416)597-2128 or email <odavis(a)uoguelph.ca> or <svance(a)uoguelph.ca>

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job testing SSL
by mrm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We're looking for someone who can test an SSL implementation in Java. If you're interested send a resume or a URL either to me or to the group. My email is mrm(a)eng.sun.com, the group gets resumes at jeeves-jobs(a)goa.eng.sun.com. If you're interested in the context, see http://java.sun.com/products/jeeves. If you're Perry and you want to flame me send email to mrm(a)eng.sun.com :-) Marianne http://java.sun.com/people/mrm/

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RE: A daily warning regarding Tim C[ocksucker] Maya, the ...
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: RE: A daily warning regarding Tim C[ocksucker] Maya, the lying s nobody(a)cypherpunks.ca (John Anonymous MacDonald) wrote: >Tim C Maya studied yoga back-streching exercises for > five years so he could blow himself. Tim! Is the course still offered! Where do I sign up! James Q: Why does a dog lick itself?

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C2NET AND UK WEB OFFER UNCRIPPLED SECURITY SOFTWARE TO WEB USERS IN ALL COUNTRIES
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For Release Sept. 20, 1996 C2Net: Sandy Sandfort +1 510-986-8770 UK Web: Dave Williams +44 0113 222 0046 C2NET AND UK WEB OFFER UNCRIPPLED SECURITY SOFTWARE TO WEB USERS IN ALL COUNTRIES LEEDS - Today, UK Web Ltd. and C2Net (Community ConneXion, Inc.) announced the worldwide availability of Stronghold security software for the World Wide Web. Stronghold is a commercial version of Apache, a powerful and popular server software package for the Internet. Stronghold uses "Secure Sockets Layer" (SSL), a cryptographically strong protocol to protect credit card numbers and other sensitive information from Internet eavesdroppers. Stronghold also comes with a full range of "certificate authority" tools, documentation, easy installation, and technical support. Export versions of other Web servers, such as the Netscape Enterprise and Microsoft Internet Information Server have intentionally crippled encryption security. Stronghold uses uncompromised strong encryption world-wide. This is possible because it was written using software developed outside the US. Stronghold uses the full power of 128-bit symmetric encryption for maximum security. (Competing servers exported from the US use only 40-bit, low-level security). Stronghold is fully compatible with all secure browsers, including Netscape Navigator and Microsoft and Internet Explorer. "Stronghold is based on the most powerful Web server and the most secure Internet encryption," says Mark Cox, Stronghold product manager. "Users of Stronghold can be sure that their commercial transactions are completely private and secure." Dave Williams, Managing Director of UK Web, adds "Stronghold has already proved very popular in the US and Canada, where it has been available nearly a year. UK Web will now be selling Stronghold exclusively outside the US and Canada, giving the rest of the world the first opportunity to buy this top-rated product. We think it will be very popular." UK Web is a leading authority on the Apache web server. They are committed to information-sharing and openness. They also offers commercial support for Apache. UK Web publishes a weekly newsletter called "Apache Week" which is available free of charge on the Internet. The Apache Week Web site can be found at http://www.apacheweek.com/. "In the past year the demand for an international version of Stronghold has been steadily increasing," said Sameer Parekh, President of C2Net, "but we've never been willing to give our customers a false sense of security by shipping a defective product. We're very glad UK Web can satisfy the need for an international version of Stronghold."" International Stronghold costs 329 pounds, which includes free minor upgrades. It is free for non-commercial use by educational and not-for-profit organisations. Full server source code is provided as well as the pre-compiled server. It is available the most commonly used Unix platforms, including Linux, SunOS 4, Solaris 2, IRIX and AIX. The server is based on the popular Apache module API, which gives access to a wide range of third-party server add-on "modules", most available for free. Within the United States and Canada Stronghold is available from C2Net. (See http://stronghold.c2.net/) Full details of International Stronghold are available on the UK Web's web site, at http://stronghold.ukweb.com/. The software is available for free download and evaluation. UK Web Limited is a leading Internet services company specialising in server technology, Internet security, business solutions and effective site design. C2Net (also known as Community ConneXion, Inc.) is the leading provider of uncompromising security on the Internet. C2Net provides a wide array of Internet privacy services and powerful network security software. Portions of Stronghold were developed by the Apache Group, and were taken with permission from the Apache Server http://www.apache.org/. This product includes software developed by Ben Laurie for use in the Apache-SSL HTTP server project. This product includes software developed by Eric Young (eay(a)mincom.oz.au) Netscape Navigator and Netscape Enterprise are trademarks of Netscape Communications Corporation. Microsoft Internet Explorer and Microsoft Internet Information Server are trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. Stronghold is a trademark of Community ConneXion, Inc.

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How's the list?
by Phil Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought I'd ask how the list is going... it seems to have gone downhill; there are now totally gratoitous insults to tcmay that don't seem to serve any purpose besides making sure the archive (if there is one) isn't fit for family viewing. Hey, at least when I was insensitive, I put effort into it. And I didn't use an automatic daemon. Anyway, I thought I'd catch up on current events with the following questions: * I take it SSL still hasn't been strengthened? * I'm now working part of the time at a company that has a lot of mail-order sales; are any of you aware of how much credit card fraud is going on out there right now? Might some of this actually be from unsecure SSL transactions? * Did anyone come up with any interesting embellishments (or maybe precedents?) to my bidirectional Dining Cryptographers idea? I can't believe I'm the first to come up with this... I guess it's public domain now, since I missed the one-year deadline for patenting it. Well, I gotta run... Phil Fraering "And the moral of the story is, pgf(a)acadian.net *never count your boobies until they 318/261-9649 are hatched*." - James Thurber, "The Unicorn in the Garden"

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"This way to the egress"
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

P.T. Barnum also said something about suckers, too... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- First Data, First USA Paymentech, GE Capital Invest in First Virtual Holdings Wednesday 96.09.18 - San Diego, CA USA - First Virtual Holdings, Inc., developer of Internet transaction systems, announced today that First Data Corp. and First USA Paymentech, Inc., two of the nation's largest credit card processing companies, and GE Capital have invested a total of $12.5 million in First Virtual Holdings, Inc. "This strategic alliance reinforces our belief that electronic commerce is coming of age on the Internet," said Lee Stein, chairman and chief executive officer of First Virtual. "It creates a powerful new combination between First Virtual, with its proven on-line transaction system, and leading credit card acquiring and processing companies. This represents a tremendous vote of confidence in our system by three industry leaders." In addition, the companies are discussing joint marketing agreements based on the concept of giving more than 200 million card holders automatic buying power on the Internet using the secure VirtualPIN(TM) identifier from First Virtual. "We expect that this partnership will enable First Virtual to significantly broaden its global marketing," Stein said. "Our secure e-mail based system is proven, easy to use and doesn't require specialized technologies. The VirtualPIN(TM) serves as the only identifier an individual needs for conducting business in cyberspace. It enables sellers and buyers on the Internet to link securely to any currency, payment system or standard verification system. With First Data, First USA Paymentech and GE Capital as partners, we anticipate more rapid acceptance of the Internet as an important distribution channel for businesses of all sizes." Stein said First Virtual created its VirtualPIN and Internet payment system to be part of a more complex transactional e-mail system for future marketing, customer service, communications and transaction applications. "The VirtualPIN provides the single identifier that can tie together all parts of the marketing and distribution chain: initial information, outbound offer, purchase order, confirmation, credit verification, transaction settlement and fulfilment of the order," said Stein. "The VirtualPIN serves as a convenient and secure alias for an individual's identity, including e- mail address and personal, demographic, shipping and financial information. This gives new power and privacy to the individual and puts him or her at the center of the electronic marketing universe." Stein said Pamela Patsley, chief executive officer of First USA Paymentech, Inc., and John McKinley, chief technology officer of GE Capital, have been elected to the First Virtual board of directors. ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: A daily warning regarding Timothy C. May
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Thu Sep 19 23:39:14 1996 Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) via UUCP; Fri, 20 Sep 96 01:23:58 EDT for paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Received: from disperse.demon.co.uk by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; id AA02597 for dvl(a)bwalk.dm.com; Thu, 19 Sep 96 23:39:14 -0400 Received: from post.demon.co.uk ([(null)]) by relay-2.mail.demon.net id ah16490; 19 Sep 96 17:22 BST Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk ([158.152.120.223]) by relay-3.mail.demon.net id aa18174; 19 Sep 96 17:06 BST Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk by fatmans.demon.co.uk with SMTP id AA843059897 ; Wed, 18 Sep 96 15:18:17 +0000 Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk To: dvl(a)bwalk.dm.com Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 15:18:16 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: A daily warning regarding Timothy C. May Priority: normal X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.31) Message-Id: <843149202.18174.0(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> > Timothy C. May is a lying sack of shit. Look, that is enough, I`m going to move to have you removed from the list if you keep this up... get a life fuckhead, if you are going to flame at least do it from your real address so people can killfile you, or maybe you believe censorship is better? Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3ia mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az6JAJUDBRAy NwfvNkCBjDT0xHEBATQPA/9TORmN/UjNecj03q4anpvdyCLiez5sKuNbnYK50RiP Jj4QpWWvST3smyQ0A86DrZY/re056MXwQmARESx0rFZxdnD0oORICl5r8dJLIy3b j8rbA5olXwZwKz73/X5s13v/pvHYX4cIsbVK8NHXqh5llSKt6TBAuGgkIGF29z5k C4kAlQMFEDI3B9mdtf/umVkv7QEBcRYD/1FBteLqsUmr81euxqqnnrpLlyHb58B/ 9sdATuua4uSjX46hXDZ264YozspNrzSB4NEdrmXOWVX3fiE0ga6XkSSkIeF23V90 En37Z0BdbFzgF00FRYTFyTq8eezQrdg/+rBPUsZUmG5wpq3e12FKHQsX01i+1mB2 YmqqwCV5e95eiQCVAgUQMh8uSb5OPIRbv66xAQEqJwP/fxQyiCasjFcbDpsFfsYp put5cCC/9pOx6X3DlbKShPMpUOS+A9HsTEmJQN8Iawv1nSwPdtc2cR/GhW6ilVjW LSloGdMVLabm9pGpZZMkRaZlXFUkOv7VhfgsUiL+vIDryBCAwUZCzQiWycjt/cPi mUqFH41Z7NkyO8ZFdi5GGX0= =CMZA -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: CIA hacked
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DMiskell(a)envirolink.org (Daniel Christopher Miskell) writes: > > > >Who created you? You tub of shit? > > > Dude, why do you even bother? It is simply not constructive to keep insulting > and stabbing at people. You gripe about the non-crypto-relevent stuff, then > you go and create it repeatedly. If you don't like what people have to say, > take your potty mouth to another list. You are confused. The above question was e-mailed to me by one of Timmy May's friends. I just forward their e-mail to this mailing list. I don't read it. If you have any comments about Timmy May's friends not knowing English, trying to insult people, and posting non-crypto-relevant political rants, address them to Timmy May and his friends. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: CIA hacked
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From koontz(a)netapp.com Fri Sep 20 09:16:24 1996 Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) via UUCP; Fri, 20 Sep 96 11:08:54 EDT for dlv Received: from weaver-gw.netapp.com by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; id AA10139 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Fri, 20 Sep 96 09:16:24 -0400 Received: from netapp.com ([192.9.200.1]) by weaver.netapp.com with SMTP id <15867-119>; Fri, 20 Sep 1996 06:17:39 +0100 Received: from elgreco.netapp.com by netapp.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA19140; Fri, 20 Sep 96 06:16:19 PDT Received: by elgreco.netapp.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA04474; Fri, 20 Sep 96 06:21:50 PDT Date: Fri, 20 Sep 96 06:21:50 PDT From: koontz(a)netapp.com (Dave Koontz) Message-Id: <9609201321.AA04474(a)elgreco.netapp.com> To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com Subject: Re: CIA hacked >Who created you? You tub of shit? Actually, english being my native language, and having paid attention in school, that should be: Who created you, you tub of shit?

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RE: Fuckhead
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Congradulations dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com!!!! You have won an one way trip into my TWIT filter for your repeated FUCKHEAD post. Goodbye and good riddance, -- ----------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting WebExplorer & Java Enhanced!!! Merlin Beta Test Site - WarpServer SMP Test Site Author of PGPMR2 - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice Look for MR/2 Tips & Rexx Scripts Get Work Place Shell for Windows!! PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. Finger whgiii(a)amaranth.com for PGP Key and other info ----------------------------------------------------------- MR/2 Tag->The best way to accelerate Windows is at escape velocity.

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