December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

ABC Newz on Dole Homepage
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ABC Newz has run the crack of the dolekemp page. However, even they have the story wrong, too! No wonder crypto stories are sometimes better off not reported. CarolAnne Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

1 0

RE: WINDOWS NT ????
by craigw＠dg.ce.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The machine CAN have a floppy...but it must NOT be bootable. If the floppy is able to be used to boot, than it is not C2 complient. Remember C2 is not out of the box. Being C2 certified means that the machine can be MADE to fulfil orange book requirements, not that it is automatically secure. A machine can have a floppy, but it must than subsequently be removed or unable to be booted before it is C2. This is not just floppies, but CD Rom drives etc as well. It must be configured to boot from ONLY the secured devices Craig > > Now. They used to claim C2 for a machine w/floppies. Now they don't. > ,'~``. \|/ ,'``~. (-o=o-) (@ @) ,(-o=o-), +--.oooO--(_)--Ooo-----oOO-(_)-OOo-------oooO--(_)--Oooo.------+ | | | Soon, we may all be staring at our computers, wondering | | whether they're staring back. | | | | [Network Admin For WPA Business Products. aka doshai >;-) ] | | .oooO http://pip.com.au/~doshai/ Oooo. | | ( ) Oooo. .oooO ( ) | +-----\ (----( )-------oooO-Oooo--------( )--- ) /---------+ \_) ) / \ ( (_/ (_/ \_) Key fingerprint = 2D F4 54 BB B4 EA F1 E7 B6 DE 48 92 FC 8D FF 49 Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key. (if I want to give it to you)

1 0

Global online intellectual property conf at American Univ
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 7 Oct 1996 21:05:09 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Global online intellectual property conf at American Univ Folks in the DC area might want to stop by this free conference on intellectual property next week at American University. I'll be giving the closing remarks; Mike Nelson from the White House will be presenting the opening statement. -Declan ---------- Forwarded message ---------- All who are interested are invited to attend a conference . . . The 1996 Conference of American University's Global Intellectual Property Project OWNERSHIP ON-LINE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE October 16, 1996 1:00-6:00 pm Husghes formal Lounge American University 4400 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, DC 20016-8071 Free and Open to the Public Opening Session: Michael R. Nelson Special Assistant for Information Technology White House Office of Science and Technology Panel 1: Where are we and how did we get here? Panel 2: Where are we going? Closing Session: Declan McCullagh, HotWired Participants Include: David Holtzman, IBM's inforMarket Theodore Henke, Atlantic Mutual Insurance Companies Adam Eisgrau, American Library Association Elizabeth Blumenfeld, America On-Line Chris Meyer, Meyer and Klipper (formerly of the Patent and Trademark Office) Carsten Fink, World Bank Edward Comor, American University James Boyle, American University Peter Jaszi, American University Edward Malloy, Department of State Manuel Gameros, Mexican Finance Ministry Organizing Committee: Erran Carmel, American University Carole Ganz-Brown, American University and National Science Foundation Renee Marlin-Bennett, American University Conference Sponsors: American University Atlantic Mutual Companies Visit our Website, under construction, but with updated information, at: http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/MOGIT/glipp96.htm or call: 202-885-1843

1 0

yellow journalism and Encryption
by Vinnie Moscaritolo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following is an example of the asswipe media's attempt to write about encryption. http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/examiner/article.cgi?year=1996&month=10&day=0… icle=BUSINESS2814.dtl Encryption controversy pits life against liberty TOM ABATE EXAMINER COLUMNIST The Clinton administration tried again last week to rally support for an encryption policy that would give the FBI the means to tap any electronic communication, without unduly infringing on civil liberties or impeding software exports. At stake in the policy battle are software exports worth millions, Fourth Amendment rights Americans have enjoyed for centuries, and innocent lives that the good guys say might be saved if they're able to keep snooping on the bad guys. And the reason all of this has become a policy jumble is simple. Computers have made it cheap and easy to create unbreakable secret codes to protect phone calls, e-mail and data files against electronic bugging. That's why this technology, called encryption, means profits in Silicon Valley, more privacy for you and me, and a problem for federal investigators. Because secret codes allow criminals to nullify the fed's favorite tool - the wiretap. "Wiretapping is the main issue," said Stewart Baker, former general counsel of the National Security Agency, the CIA's code-breaking and eavesdroping cousin. "For the administration to abandon the position it started with three years ago would be to say, "We are the administration that is going to give up the wiretap as a law enforcement tool,"" he said. That's why last week the administration tried a new variant in its 3-year-old campaign to require that code-making systems be built with a "spare key" investigators could retrieve, under court order, to crack any code. When the administration first proposed this idea in 1993, it involved a device called the "Clipper chip," which would have deposited spare keys with government agencies. Almost no one outside the FBI liked that idea, so last week the administration floated a compromise: to let U.S. firms export strong code-making products, provided they deposited the spare key with some third party. Exports are the odd piece in this policy puzzle. The U.S. government has no authority to regulate secret codes within U.S. borders. But a law passed after World War II put secret codes in the same category as munitions, products that cannot be exported without a license. The government has used this export-licensing authority to indirectly control code-making software here. Most high-tech firms are unwilling to sell two sets of encryption products, one full- and the other half-strength, so they have sold weak encryption products everywhere. In essence, the administration hopes to use export controls to change the balance of power in a new war. This time the enemy isn't the Japanese or the Germans, as during WWII, or even our Cold War adversaries, the Russians. Instead, the administration fears drug smugglers, organized criminals and terrorists will use code-making devices to evade electronic evidence-gathering techniques, notably wiretapping. "If two criminals are discussing a plot over the telephone and we have a wiretap order, the encryption would negate the wiretap," said Michael Vatis, a senior Department of Justice official. The same would happen if investigators seized the computerized bookkeeping records of a drug-smuggling ring only to find they were saved in an unbreakable code. But as frustrating as it might be to seize a mound of indecipherable evidence, it was the prospect of losing the wiretap that got Vatis most aroused. "For serious investigations involving terrorists or organized crime . . . where you're worried about hundreds of people being killed . . . the whole point is to keep the investigation secret or the whole thing blows up," he said. Having access to a spare set of code-breaking keys "is not a shift in the balance of power," Vatis said. "It's preserving the status quo." Not so, argued Daniel Weitzner, an attorney with the civil libertarian Center for Democracy and Technology inWashington, D.C. Forgetting encryption for a moment, Weitzner said, a wiretap is unlike any other tool in the investigator's arsenal. "To get documents sitting on my computer, the FBI has to come into my office with a search warrant," Weitzner said. "I have to know about it." Exactly the reverse is true for a wiretap. To be effective, the subject must be ignorant of the tap. Weitzner said this notion of a "secret search" went against a central principle of the Fourth Amendment, which protects people from unreasonable search and seizure. "When wiretapping was allowed in 1968, Congress basically said they were going to create an exception to this rule," Weitzner said. But in the three years since the Clipper debate began, the FBI has enlarged its interest beyond preserving phone taps and has asked for spare keys to the codes used to protect Internet traffic and stored computer files, Weitzner said. "If the FBI is able to transfer its wiretap authority to the Internet, it would give the bureau access to a new realm of activities," Weitzner argued. Using the spare keys to Internet transmissions could give the agency access to medical records, charge card receipts or other data stored or transmitted on the global network. Moreover, the agency might be able to tap some of this information in transit, without the knowledge of the person being investigated, whereas today agents would have to visit the doctor's office or bank, potentially alerting the target. "If all things in the digital world are open to wiretap-type scrutiny, then we have lost the protection against secret searches," Weitzner said. "What is on the way to happening is that the exception could swallow the rule." The temptation to tap wires is as old as wired communication itself, according to Clifford Fishman, law professor at Catholic University's Columbus School of Law in Washington, D.C., and author of a textbook on wiretapping. During the Civil War, both sides tapped telegraph lines to spy on troop movements. Wiretaps were common in the early days of the telephone, and Supreme Court decisions during the 1920s said this was no invasion of privacy because the tap was on a public telephone pole and not inside a home. In response, Congress made wiretaps illegal at the federal level as part of the Communication Act of 1934. But Fishman said state investigators kept right on using wiretaps, as did the feds, who sometimes used unauthorized taps on Mafia and political figures during the long reign of former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. Congress legalized federal wiretaps in 1968 at a time when Richard Nixon was campaigning against the liberal Earl Warren Supreme Court. "The mood in Congress was to defang the Republicans on law enforcement," Fishman said. "Lyndon Johnson, with palpable reluctance, signed this bill to permit federal officials to obtain a court order to do a wiretap or a bug and use this information in court." Fishman, a former New York City district attorney, considered wiretapping essential to investigating the most dangerous crimes and called the administration's latest spare-key proposal a good compromise. But civil libertarians fear that giving investigators the keys to unlock any coded phone call or electronic document will greatly expand the realm of secret searches and tempt them to abuse a power that was denied them in the days when ensuring privacy meant putting wax seals on envelopes. Much of the coverage of the encryption controversy has centered on the complaints of Silicon Valley firms that they are losing hundreds of millions of dollars in exports to foreign competitors who don't have to limit the strength of their encryption products. Though that may be the case, there's more at stake here than money or jobs. Our wired society is about to decide how easy it should be for investigators to figuratively climb up the telephone pole to put alligator clips on our secrets, whether innocent or criminal. To give investigators the keys to every code might be too much temptation and a threat to civil liberties. To deny investigators the keys may handcuff them in the fight against increasingly sophisticated and deadly forms of crime. That is the nature of the choice on encryption policy, and that is why there is no simple compromise. Tom Abate's column appears every other Sunday. You can reach him this fool mailto:tabate@examiner.com Vinnie Moscaritolo http://www.vmeng.com/vinnie/ Fingerprint: 4FA3298150E404F2782501876EA2146A ------------------------------------------------------- "...and by the way, Mr.Speaker, the Second Amendment is not for killing little ducks and leaving Huey and Dewey and Louie without an aunt and uncle. It's for hunting politicians, like in Grozny, and in the colonies in 1776, or when they take your independence away." --- Rep. Robert (B-1 Bob) Dornan (R-CA) responding to Bill Clinton's "State of the Union" address, January 25, 1994

3 2

Re: Dallas Semiconductor turns on Internet commerce at the touch of a button
by dustman＠athensnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 7 Oct 1996, Robert Hettinga wrote: > iButton users will have universal access to their World Wide Web ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > e-mail at public Internet connections (hotels, airports, kiosks) and ^^^^^^ I think that says it all.

3 2

EUB - Pay attention next time guys.
by Maryanto Tuan dan Puan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please unsubscibe lamdn(a)idola.net.id Tx Posted-Date: Mon, 7 Oct 1996 17:08:12 -0400 >Date: Mon, 7 Oct 1996 17:09:35 -0400 (EDT) >From: Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> >X-Sender: unicorn@polaris >To: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: EUB - Pay attention next time guys. >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >On Mon, 7 Oct 1996, John Young wrote: > >> 10-7-96. WaPo: >> >> "Russian Crime Finds Havens In Caribbean" >> >> Russian organized crime groups are using unregulated and >> secretive Caribbean banks to launder their illicit >> gains, according to U.S. and Caribbean law enforcement >> officials. One bank that has drawn the scrutiny of U.S. >> authorities is European Union Bank in Antigua. EUB >> describes itself as the first bank on the Internet, >> offering the chance to open accounts, wire money, order >> credit cards or write checks by computer from anywhere >> in the world, 24 hours a day. A U.S. official said, "The >> bank is being investigated for violating U.S. laws with >> open solicitations on the Net, which is at best for tax >> evasion and at worst for money laundering." >> > >Of course I'm very interested to hear exactly what laws have been broken >in this case. Last I checked offering accounts, credit cards, and checks >24 hours a day was a selling point, not a crime. This hardly surprises me >however. The money laundering and tax evasion rhetoric is dragged out >whenever there is no tangible crime being committed. > >EUB is probably in more trouble than they realize because they chose an >interesting solution to their bandwidth problem. > >For a long time their home page resolved to a U.S. access provider, and >only forwarded offshore for the secure HTTP connection. This might still >be the case. > >See below: > >European Union Bank (EUB-DOM) > PO Box 1948 > St. John's, > Antigua and Barbuda > > Domain Name: EUB.COM > > Administrative Contact: > Richards, Pete (PR374) 75057.2515(a)COMPUSERVE.COM > (809) 480-2370 > Technical Contact, Zone Contact, Billing Contact: > Kulkov, Val (VK41) val(a)GREATIS.COM > (202) 835-7489 > > Record last updated on 03-Dec-95. > Record created on 23-Jun-95. > > Domain servers in listed order: > > ELF.GREATIS.COM 205.229.28.5 > WHALE.GREATIS.COM 205.229.28.10 > > >I found this curious and called them up to ask them about it. I think, >though I don't remember exactly, that I spoke with Mr. Richards. Whoever >it was, they were very sure that their U.S. connection would not be a >problem. I think they are about to be in for a great big surprise. They >have effectively put themselves in U.S. jurisdiction and their local >access provider is likely to be in some trouble as it is the easiest thing >to reach. > >Prediction: EUB will change its structure dramatically in the next 6 >months if it still exists at all in that time. Lesson learned: Never >involve the United States directly. Clever political risk analysis would >have prevented a great deal of trouble for EUB. Future institutions take >note. > >-- >I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist >unicorn(a)schloss.li > > >

2 1

New On WWW.Infowar.Com
by Betty G. O'Hearn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We thank our sponsors: National Computer Security Association Open Source Solutions New Dimensions International - Security Training New On WWW.Infowar.Com This week. Take a look. Pass it on. * Internet plug pulled on Colombia's guerrillas. * VP Gore Statement on Encryption, Oct. 1, 1996. * Europe * UK Tries to Remove Pornography from the Net. * Data Protection and Privacy on the Internet. * "Avoiding Technologically-Induced Delusions of Grandeur: Preparing the Air Force for an Information Warfare (IW) Environment" * Michael Wilson's, "Terrorism in a New World--THE EVOLUTION IN REVOLUTION" * Cyberwar, by Campen, Dearth, and Goodden. * Issues from the C4I-Pro-Digest. * 50 Fascinating URL's. * EMP gun's to be tested by law enforcement. * Administration to ease export of encryption software. * An interesting editorial comment on the Gulf War Syndrome. * Microsoft goofs in China. * New For August and September... Check it out and see what you missed.! and More Utilities!!!!! ************************************************************* DIRECT REQUESTS to <list(a)infowar.com> with one-line, in the body NOT the subject line: leave news_from_wschwartau (to leave group) subscribe news_from_wschwartau (to join group) Infowar.com Managed by Winn Schwartau winn(a)inforwar.com http://www.infowar.com 813-393-6600 Voice 813-393-6361 Fax Comments, Content, or Sponsor Opportunities ? betty(a)infowar.com 813-367-7277 Voice 813-363-7277 Fax Betty G.O'Hearn Information Warfare and InfoSecurity Assistant to Mr. Winn Schwartau http://www.infowar.com betty(a)infowar.com 813-367-7277 Voice 813-363-7277 FAX

1 0

Re: Put up or shut up!
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:44 AM 10/7/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >The reason that no one publishes "How to" step by step instructions for >discretely expatriating your money is exactly the same reason as the reason >that nobody publishes "How to" step by step instructions for buying dope. > >For example one ever popular method of expatriating money, (or repatriating >it to preferred politicians), is by means of a friendly cattle futures >broker. I have read many descriptions of techniques to discretely expatriate one's money over the years. Some were good and many bad but they are certainly out there. Since it is actually a trivial problem until one reaches the second million or so, individuals can usually come up with fair methods for themselves. (Try to avoid the bags of $100 bills on the airplane though.) DCF

1 0

PLEASE take Mormon/LDS stuff to private mail.
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While I realize that religious arguments, in the large sense, are a well-honed skill of many of the participants of this list, the current threads concerning the LDS/Mormon church are so far off-topic that it isn't funny, just annoying. PLEASE take this stuff to private mail. Most of us have little or no interest in it, and it's creating entirely unnecessary discord and hatred (not to mention using up bandwidth). Unless a group takes a stand on encryption, lets keep them out of it. Please! Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

2 1

RE: crypto cd once more
by JR＠ROCK.CNB.UAM.ES 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>1) is there a system that can handle unix, windows and mac filenames > Yes. Use Rock Ridge extensions. That will allow for long UNIX names. If you couple it with ISO9660 youget both worlds. Caveats: Macs don't accept RR. Hell! Solution: Use level 2 (32+32) names. Problem: that's OK for VMS and perhaps Macs, but not for PC's. Solution: Use level 1 (8+3) ISO. That's easily done with the tools for Liux/Unix. I used them when I created my personal Crypto-CD a year ago. You tell the program to use Rock Ridge and convert all names to 8+3. That gives you a double directory hierarchy, one that's compatible with everything (8+3) plus one that allows long names (RR). If only Macs supported RR... ObCrypto: Have you considered the possibility of filling the unused portion of the disk with random noise from a good source? Some people could find it useful even if it is only for trial/test purposes. And, is there any possibility of making an international version of it? jr

2 1