December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: support for "crack DES"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:26 PM 10/3/96 +0000, Omegaman wrote: >Considering the situation -- considering that RSA has even signed on >to this scheme -- I'd have to say that I don't give a rat's ass what >Bill Gates claims. If Micro$oft bucks the system, I'll gladly >applaud their stand. > >The situation is not good at all. > >Cracking DES (whether distributed or through a hardware crack, or >both!) seems critical at this point. Just remember that it would be far better to make the crack look easy, than to make it look hard. quantity 9000+, $1,000 Pentiums for a year (plus maybe $500,000 in electricity) looks "hard." 1000 dedicated chips (whether they be FPGA or custom or...) for 1.5 months or so looks "easy." The latter crack looks far more likely to be repeated. The former is OBVIOUSLY a stunt. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: [FACTS] Mountain Meadows Massacre
by Deana Holmes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 3 Oct 96 at 14:42, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: > "Deana Holmes" <mirele(a)xmission.com> writes: > > <snip mor(m)on propaganda> > > > > <snip Dmitri Vulis nonsense> > > No wonder the criminal cult doesn't want its foul deeds subjected to > public scrutiny by "dead-agenting" its critics. Is Timmy May a > paid cult apologist? Sheesh. You know you're doing good when both Dmitri Vulis and Attila both badmouth you. (For the record, Attila's badmouthing consisted of stating via private email that I was "the same air head pseudo-intellectual who has poisoned her own life with hatred and ignorance in so many other venues.") Some people are just terribly threatened, I guess. Deana Deana M. Holmes April 1996 poster child for clueless $cientology litigiousness alt.religion.scientology archivist since 2/95 mirele(a)xmission.com

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Re: Fw: Re: ITAR satellite provision
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:05 PM 10/3/96 -0400, Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law wrote: >Alas, a common fallacy. > >You have committed a prohibited export when the stuff lands outside the >USA....It's not illegal when it goes up ("by reason of the launching" and, >e.g. *stays up* in orbit) but it is illegal when it comes down abroad. Sure about that? The regulation said something like "launch vehicle" or "launch," apparently indicating that a "launch vehicle" could actually be exported, THEN launched, etc, without violating ITAR. And since the regulation does not go into any detail about the "launch", other than it is a "launch" (and does not explicitly prohibit landing subsequent to launch) the implication is that there is no prohibition. I still think the regulation was just written sloppily. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Key recovery/RSA/Bidzos/WTF?!?
by Walt Armour 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What's up with some of these press releases? Can anyone clear up the confusion with RSA/Bidzos/Key recovery? Here are some quotes: ================= >From NYT:CyberTimes (2 Oct) "Clinton Encryption Plan Is Generating Resistance" Executives of the International Business Machines Corp. said late Tuesday that they were still lining up the final list of companies in the alliance. Those involved will include Digital Equipment and smaller data-security companies including RSA Data, Cylink and Trusted Information Systems. ================= >From NYT:CyberTimes (2 Oct) "Clinton Encryption Plan Is Generating Resistance" "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos, chief executive of RSA Data Security, one of the country's leading developers of data-scrambling software. "We warned IBM that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." ================= >From BusinessWire (2 Oct) "JOINT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT/ HIGH-TECH LEADERS JOIN FORCES TO ENABLE INTERNATIONAL STRONG ENCRYPTION" "Export controls are a fact of life," said Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security. "The key recovery alliance's approach will allow companies to use cryptography with differing levels of security in an interoperable way. When the alliance implements this technology it will give the user a new level of flexibility that did not exist before. In an imperfect world this technique will at least allow you to take advantage of what governments around the world will allow." ================= So is RSA part of this or not? Is the middle quote above mis-attributed? walt

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Margaret Milner Richardson loses her breakfast...
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the Wall Street Journal Wednesday October 2, Page 1: Use of the internet to attract tax-dodgers rings alarm bells at the IRS. The rapidly expanding new worlds of the internet and electronic money are stirring deep concern at the IRS. "We know that some foriegn banks are now using the internet to solicit new customers with promises of complete anonymity and a haven from all taxes," IRS commissioner Margaret Milner Richardson said. She said this issue is being "carefully monitored" by tax administrators around the world. Ms. Richardson, in a recent speech, cited a world-wide-web advertisement offering a "one-of-a-kind book" covering topics such as, "Banking in Silence" and offering information on setting up an offshore trust that "could include protection from a large IRS assessment." Ms. Richardson's reaction: "I almost take that personally." Another ad touts "excellent interest rates, offered in a stable, tax-free environment...Clients communicate with the bank any time from anywhere via the internet." Ms. Richardson said: "How would you like to be responsible for administering tax laws and have to read these ads over breakfast?" Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: ITAR satellite provision
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 3 Oct 1996, jim bell wrote: > The wording was > clearly intended to be an exception to a rule. What the wording doesn't > include is the "exception to the exception," most likely because they > weren't thinking in too great a detail when they wrote the regulations. Yow. The "if we put it in a rocket it's exportable" interpretation made me think twice before posting the text of that definition, because it's seductive and wrong. I posted it because it's amusing to think about and because we all had a good laugh about it at the Mac crypto conference; but I'd feel like a jerk if someone got themselves in a lot of trouble with an enthusiastic misreading of that sentence out of pages and pages of regulations (plus quite a few more pages of opinions interpreting those regulations). > It appears that the government left a loophole so large that you could > drive a truck...er...shoot a rocket through it. If you think you've found an enormous loophole in a regulation which has been around for 15-20 years, you should double-check your research and get a good nights' sleep. Law is like science this way - if you think you have found room-temperature fusion you should stop and check your work. It's much more likely that you're not reading carefully or you've missed something. -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

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RSA's position on espionage-enabled crypto.
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RSA has put up a 'position statement' on clipper 4 at their home page at www.rsa.com. They're not rejecting it, but are clearly not wildly pro-GAK either. It's clearly early days yet. Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Pager security
by Dave Emery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lest anyone doubt this, pagers in the US have the same exact vulnerability as those in the UK. No current paging systems use any kind of serious encryption and all can be intercepted by using a scanner, a very simple data detector consisting of one IC and an ordinary PC running appropriate software. I wrote a USENET article about decoding POCSAG paging back in 1993, and am aware of at least four different individuals who have implemented programs based in part on my description of the protocol - three of whom have sold the product to the hobbiest market. Dave Emery N1PRE die(a)die.com

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RE: gack vs. key escrow vs. key recovery
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Vladimir Z. Nuri, [who still doesn't get it] what is the precise difference between gack, key escrow, and key recovery? [and] I'll be watching the debate closely, as the true extremists incapable of compromise (and thereby living in a fantasy world) show their colors.... ............................................................................... The precise difference is: who is in control. In order to understand this critical point you must understood the idea of having personal authority as a standard for living. But you would expect that everyone should accept being subject to inspection by default, as if governments owned everyone within the national boundaries and keeping personal things away from them were a sin. The more that governments obliterate the lines of division between what is exclusively one's own to manage and what they have "the right" to share in (including holding your extra keys) or to demand (access to private communication), the less defined the concept of individuality becomes (as compared to being a "borg" of the State) and the more difficult it becomes intellectually to uphold one's separateness from it, since it all seems to be the same, undifferentiated control over things in general ("we are all One - how could you object?"). It is right to resist any attempts by the State to assimilate everyone into its fold by blurring the boundaries of authority (in its favor). It is a better thing to strengthen each individual's ability to maintain their own, than to put them in a situation where they *must* use the assistance of (become dependent upon) the (supposed) benevolence and rational judgement of an overwhelming overseer. It is better to reserve the right of authority over who & when anyone may keep one's software keys in escrow. It is better than to forfeit the right to make that decision on one's own good time and according to one's own plan, which would otherwise weaken that authority. .. Blanc [If 51% of the true extremist voters would elect Harry Browne, GAK would not be a problem.]

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Re: ADJ_ust
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 1 Oct 1996 10:26:12 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >Personally, I think there's a lot of hype about this whole "infowar" thing. >Sure, security measures and vulnerabilities always need to be looked at, >but a lot of the rhetoric is being driven by journalists looking for lead >stories. This is certainly the case with 99% of the computer industry press! I certainly have no problem believing that a group of well-supplied professionals could, with enough time and [political] support, take down a single target. For instance, if the CIA,FBI and NSA wanted to hose the 1st Bank of China, I have a feeling that they would - eventually. I have strong doubts that someone would come up with a non-nuke that could destroy stuff indiscriminately within a useably large area. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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