December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

What's the deal with EUB.com?
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There are two servers that EUB.com uses. 1> That provides information and blurbs and pretty pictures. This is near D.C. 2> That provides secure connections to the bank for account information and transactions. This is in the islands. Again, this was adopted to get around expensive bandwidth uses by idle and casual browsers. I believe, though I am not sure, that I mentioned this when EUB first "went net." -- I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist unicorn(a)schloss.li

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Re: Can somebody unsubscribe cyberpromo from CP?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:43 PM 10/7/96 -0400, Simon Spero <ses(a)tipper.oit.unc.edu> wrote: >> >I think somebody subscribed that Cyberpromo organization to the Cypherpunks >> >list. It needs to be unsubscribed... >> >> "I have a solution." >[Looks through pockets] - 7 Zlotys, 1.5 DM, and 1.20 GBP says October >21st, in the library, bludgeoning to death with 20lbs of junk mail I tend to prefer 16-ton weights, myself.... "Safe!" >If I can get my key back, it's Key Recovery >If you can get my key back, it's Key Escrow If I can get my key back, it's a Spare Copy I Stashed Somewhere. If you can get my key back, it's Wimpy Encryption. If you've already got my key, it's Key Escrow. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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Re: Voice Stress Analysis of Debates? [NOISE]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As far as the technical issue, can you use digital signal processing to insert/delete the features that the VSE is looking for? Sure, if you know what the VSE product is looking for. (And you can crank up the bass while you're at it.) Doesn't matter if you call it microtremors, it's a characteristic well-defined enough that an $89.95 retail hardware device can detect, so it's a characteristic you've got a not-terribly-complex model for. If all the popular VSEs use the same algorithm, or if you know what brand the TV Networks were convinced to use, you're fine. (If you don't know, that makes it tougher, but you can experiment....) Or you can distribute a cheap software-based VSE program, with hooks that let you feed it "Truth" or "Lying" overrides :-) At 11:28 AM 10/7/96 -0800, jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote: >I think it's particularly revealing that the TV networks don't try to use >it. They're supposed to be looking for an edge, something to make the news >seem more interesting. The political establishment would see the >publicizing of this as going beyond an unwritten limitation on the media. I've never seen the TV networks use handwriting analysis to spice up their news reporting either, and the only "news" shows I've only seen mention people's astrological signs were the Entertainment-Tonight types. (I'd rate VSE as slightly more scientific than graphology, and both of them somewhat above palm-reading and astrology, and a bit below polygraphs.*) They get more market asking what kind of underwear the candidates wear. Besides, what would they do with it - subtitles "He's Lying" or "He Seems To _Believe_ This Nonsense?" or "He Doesn't Really Care What The Teleprompter's Telling Him To Say"? You'd need to leave at least one of them on during the whole Bipartisan Establishment Debate**, and you don't need any piece of hokey machinery to If they actually _wanted_ to make the shows more interesting, the networks could have reporters ask the candidates real questions. But they wouldn't get invited back next election.... And if they ask questions like "How could you possibly expect us to believe _that_, Mr. President?"***, they'd get thrown out immediately. [*VSE and Graphology have some chance of a causal basis, though polygraphs have the extra advantage that the people administering them get to intimidate the victim while doing the test, which is more likely to get results than running VSE on a speech somebody's practiced and is reading off a teleprompter, even if interpretation of both weren't pretty much subjective anyway.] [**And they'd have to interlace the subtitles with the fnords.] [***Did you ever notice how much George Bush _sneered_ when he was lying? Clinton's polite enough to smile when he's talking.] # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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Re: Put up or shut up! (fwd)
by William Knowles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 7 Oct 1996, Mr Unicorn replies to what snow wrote: > > Mr. Unicorn wrote: > > > I suggest that you just walk into a bank in Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, > > > perhaps in Switzerland and compare the experience to doing the same in the > > > United States. It may be a bother to get to a real bank, but the > > > difference in service, attitude, and skill can be substantial. > > > You get what you pay for in sweat too. > > > > Yeah, but the walk to the bank in Liechtenstein is a real bitch in > > winter. > > You get what you pay for. I thought I said that? > Many banks open accounts by mail. I tend to recommend against this > because I think it's important to face to face with your bankers. Being that I totally agree that you get what you pay for in banking, and have had the opportunity of using a small private bank for business some time ago. What would be your list of best offshore banks to do business with, Keeping in mind the ease of opening an account but still getting top notch service? Bank of Ireland??? Cheers! William Knowles erehwon(a)c2.net -- William Knowles <erehwon(a)c2.net> PGP mail welcome & prefered / KeyID 1024/2C34BCF9 PGP Fingerprint 55 0C 78 3C C9 C4 44 DE 5A 3C B4 60 9C 00 FB BD Finger for public key -- Vote Harry Browne for President -- http://www.HarryBrowne96.org

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Re: Missionaries (was: "Mormon Asshole?" re: GAK)
by craigw＠dg.ce.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > that statement is profound in more ways that in religion! why > > would any rational individual espouse ANY cause he thought was > > wrong! > > For the money. > for sex, prestige, because no matter how rational most of us have times we do not think first.... The list is endless Craig ,'~``. \|/ ,'``~. (-o=o-) (@ @) ,(-o=o-), +--.oooO--(_)--Ooo-----oOO-(_)-OOo-------oooO--(_)--Oooo.------+ | | | Soon, we may all be staring at our computers, wondering | | whether they're staring back. | | | | [Network Admin For WPA Business Products. aka doshai >;-) ] | | .oooO http://pip.com.au/~doshai/ Oooo. | | ( ) Oooo. .oooO ( ) | +-----\ (----( )-------oooO-Oooo--------( )--- ) /---------+ \_) ) / \ ( (_/ (_/ \_) Key fingerprint = 2D F4 54 BB B4 EA F1 E7 B6 DE 48 92 FC 8D FF 49 Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key. (if I want to give it to you)

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(fwd) RSA on GAK
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RSA Optimistic on User Benefits of Administration's Recent Key Recovery Initiative Announcement; Further policy change required for U.S. vendors to be competitive worldwide Source: Business Wire REDWOOD CITY, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE) via Individual Inc. -- RSA Data Security Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Security Dynamics Technologies Inc. (NASDAQ:SDTI), issued the following comments on the administration's recent announcement of a Key Recovery Initiative: The administration's proposed Key Recovery Initiative is a positive step towards meeting the needs of individuals and organizations that buy and use products which utilize encryption. However, the proposal leaves significant competitive issues unresolved for suppliers who compete overseas. Modern encryption and authentication technologies are crucial to the growth of electronic commerce and the health of the future global electronic economy. The continued leadership of American computer and software firms in the world market depends on their ability to provide competitive solutions for consumers and businesses around the world. These consumers and businesses depend increasingly on encryption and authentication technologies -- such as those developed at RSA -- to provide solutions that protect the privacy of consumer purchases, personal medical information, sensitive corporate data, and electronic commerce and funds transfers as they travel over the global Internet. U.S. government agencies, however, have long insisted that they must have potential access to all encrypted information for law enforcement purposes, and have advanced several proposals toward those ends. To date, these proposals have met with little support from the user and vendor communities due to concerns about privacy and competitiveness. This new proposal from the administration, however, is a move in the right direction for users. One positive step is that the administration has indicated, for the first time in over six years of discussion, that it will lift all key size restrictions on the export of products which utilize cryptography, provided that manufacturers provide a viable means of key recovery for legitimate government access. In addition, under the administration's proposal, industry, not government, will develop and propose the actual key recovery mechanisms. This will result in more effective solutions to managing and recovering keys. Finally, the proposal addresses the concerns of users that any third party designated to hold user keys might improperly disclose those keys, thereby compromising a user's right to privacy. The administration has agreed that under certain circumstances, organizations would be allowed to "self-escrow" their own encryption keys. RSA is confident that industry can develop and gain approval for several excellent key recovery mechanisms that would be acceptable to government concerns. In fact, RSA has been a pioneer in this field with our RSA Emergency Access technology in its award-winning RSA SecurPC product. In the case of SecurPC, companies using the product can use Emergency Access keys with RSA's unique secret-splitting technology to gain access to critical information in the event of an emergency. The recently announced Key Recovery Alliance, of which RSA is a part, is chartered to provide a flexible, workable solution for users working within the government's proposed key recovery framework. Members of the group are working on technology which will allow users to maintain the privacy of their keys while allowing legitimate business or law enforcement authorities to recover keys when appropriate. It will also address challenges that arise when a user must comply with the differing encryption policies in countries around the world. The technology could allow products to provide the flexibility a user needs to take full advantage of the maximum privacy allowed in their locality, while maintaining interoperability and information exchange with other users regardless of location. It is not clear, however, to what extent the administration's proposal provides relief to U.S. software and hardware companies who must compete with foreign suppliers. These foreign suppliers, not subject to U.S. law, can provide strong, non-key-recovery encryption in their products. Today, most major computer and software solutions firms derive significant revenues from outside the United States. The government's proposal, while satisfying the U.S. government's needs, does little to enhance the competitiveness of American products overseas. Robust encryption products are already available from many overseas suppliers, and U.S. market share in encryption-enabled products is under siege. Under this proposal, it appears that U.S. companies will still be prohibited from selling non-key-recovery encryption solutions in overseas markets, creating a significant barrier to their competitiveness. RSA looks forward to additional announcements by the administration that specifically address this issue and provide competitive relief for the U.S. computer software and hardware industries. RSA Data Security Inc. RSA Data Security Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Security Dynamics Technologies Inc. (NASDAQ:SDTI), is the world's brand name for cryptography, with more than 75 million copies of RSA encryption and authentication technologies installed and in use worldwide. RSA technologies are part of existing and proposed standards for the Internet and World Wide Web, ITU, ISO, ANSI, IEEE, and business, financial and electronic commerce networks around the globe. The company develops and markets platform-independent developer's kits and end-user products and provides comprehensive cryptographic consulting services. Founded in 1982 by the inventors of the RSA Public Key Cryptosystem, the company is headquartered in Redwood City. Note to Editors: RSA Emergency Access, RSA SecurPC, BSAFE and TIPEM are trademarks of RSA Data Security Inc. All other product and brand names are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective companies. CONTACT: For RSA Data Security Inc. | Patrick Corman, 415/326-9648 | corman(a)cerfnet.com [10-04-96 at 08:17 EDT, Business Wire] Contact: Business Wire

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ABC Newz on Dole Homepage
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ABC Newz has run the crack of the dolekemp page. However, even they have the story wrong, too! No wonder crypto stories are sometimes better off not reported. CarolAnne Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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RE: WINDOWS NT ????
by craigw＠dg.ce.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The machine CAN have a floppy...but it must NOT be bootable. If the floppy is able to be used to boot, than it is not C2 complient. Remember C2 is not out of the box. Being C2 certified means that the machine can be MADE to fulfil orange book requirements, not that it is automatically secure. A machine can have a floppy, but it must than subsequently be removed or unable to be booted before it is C2. This is not just floppies, but CD Rom drives etc as well. It must be configured to boot from ONLY the secured devices Craig > > Now. They used to claim C2 for a machine w/floppies. Now they don't. > ,'~``. \|/ ,'``~. (-o=o-) (@ @) ,(-o=o-), +--.oooO--(_)--Ooo-----oOO-(_)-OOo-------oooO--(_)--Oooo.------+ | | | Soon, we may all be staring at our computers, wondering | | whether they're staring back. | | | | [Network Admin For WPA Business Products. aka doshai >;-) ] | | .oooO http://pip.com.au/~doshai/ Oooo. | | ( ) Oooo. .oooO ( ) | +-----\ (----( )-------oooO-Oooo--------( )--- ) /---------+ \_) ) / \ ( (_/ (_/ \_) Key fingerprint = 2D F4 54 BB B4 EA F1 E7 B6 DE 48 92 FC 8D FF 49 Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key. (if I want to give it to you)

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Global online intellectual property conf at American Univ
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 7 Oct 1996 21:05:09 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Global online intellectual property conf at American Univ Folks in the DC area might want to stop by this free conference on intellectual property next week at American University. I'll be giving the closing remarks; Mike Nelson from the White House will be presenting the opening statement. -Declan ---------- Forwarded message ---------- All who are interested are invited to attend a conference . . . The 1996 Conference of American University's Global Intellectual Property Project OWNERSHIP ON-LINE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE October 16, 1996 1:00-6:00 pm Husghes formal Lounge American University 4400 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, DC 20016-8071 Free and Open to the Public Opening Session: Michael R. Nelson Special Assistant for Information Technology White House Office of Science and Technology Panel 1: Where are we and how did we get here? Panel 2: Where are we going? Closing Session: Declan McCullagh, HotWired Participants Include: David Holtzman, IBM's inforMarket Theodore Henke, Atlantic Mutual Insurance Companies Adam Eisgrau, American Library Association Elizabeth Blumenfeld, America On-Line Chris Meyer, Meyer and Klipper (formerly of the Patent and Trademark Office) Carsten Fink, World Bank Edward Comor, American University James Boyle, American University Peter Jaszi, American University Edward Malloy, Department of State Manuel Gameros, Mexican Finance Ministry Organizing Committee: Erran Carmel, American University Carole Ganz-Brown, American University and National Science Foundation Renee Marlin-Bennett, American University Conference Sponsors: American University Atlantic Mutual Companies Visit our Website, under construction, but with updated information, at: http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/MOGIT/glipp96.htm or call: 202-885-1843

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yellow journalism and Encryption
by Vinnie Moscaritolo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following is an example of the asswipe media's attempt to write about encryption. http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/examiner/article.cgi?year=1996&month=10&day=0… icle=BUSINESS2814.dtl Encryption controversy pits life against liberty TOM ABATE EXAMINER COLUMNIST The Clinton administration tried again last week to rally support for an encryption policy that would give the FBI the means to tap any electronic communication, without unduly infringing on civil liberties or impeding software exports. At stake in the policy battle are software exports worth millions, Fourth Amendment rights Americans have enjoyed for centuries, and innocent lives that the good guys say might be saved if they're able to keep snooping on the bad guys. And the reason all of this has become a policy jumble is simple. Computers have made it cheap and easy to create unbreakable secret codes to protect phone calls, e-mail and data files against electronic bugging. That's why this technology, called encryption, means profits in Silicon Valley, more privacy for you and me, and a problem for federal investigators. Because secret codes allow criminals to nullify the fed's favorite tool - the wiretap. "Wiretapping is the main issue," said Stewart Baker, former general counsel of the National Security Agency, the CIA's code-breaking and eavesdroping cousin. "For the administration to abandon the position it started with three years ago would be to say, "We are the administration that is going to give up the wiretap as a law enforcement tool,"" he said. That's why last week the administration tried a new variant in its 3-year-old campaign to require that code-making systems be built with a "spare key" investigators could retrieve, under court order, to crack any code. When the administration first proposed this idea in 1993, it involved a device called the "Clipper chip," which would have deposited spare keys with government agencies. Almost no one outside the FBI liked that idea, so last week the administration floated a compromise: to let U.S. firms export strong code-making products, provided they deposited the spare key with some third party. Exports are the odd piece in this policy puzzle. The U.S. government has no authority to regulate secret codes within U.S. borders. But a law passed after World War II put secret codes in the same category as munitions, products that cannot be exported without a license. The government has used this export-licensing authority to indirectly control code-making software here. Most high-tech firms are unwilling to sell two sets of encryption products, one full- and the other half-strength, so they have sold weak encryption products everywhere. In essence, the administration hopes to use export controls to change the balance of power in a new war. This time the enemy isn't the Japanese or the Germans, as during WWII, or even our Cold War adversaries, the Russians. Instead, the administration fears drug smugglers, organized criminals and terrorists will use code-making devices to evade electronic evidence-gathering techniques, notably wiretapping. "If two criminals are discussing a plot over the telephone and we have a wiretap order, the encryption would negate the wiretap," said Michael Vatis, a senior Department of Justice official. The same would happen if investigators seized the computerized bookkeeping records of a drug-smuggling ring only to find they were saved in an unbreakable code. But as frustrating as it might be to seize a mound of indecipherable evidence, it was the prospect of losing the wiretap that got Vatis most aroused. "For serious investigations involving terrorists or organized crime . . . where you're worried about hundreds of people being killed . . . the whole point is to keep the investigation secret or the whole thing blows up," he said. Having access to a spare set of code-breaking keys "is not a shift in the balance of power," Vatis said. "It's preserving the status quo." Not so, argued Daniel Weitzner, an attorney with the civil libertarian Center for Democracy and Technology inWashington, D.C. Forgetting encryption for a moment, Weitzner said, a wiretap is unlike any other tool in the investigator's arsenal. "To get documents sitting on my computer, the FBI has to come into my office with a search warrant," Weitzner said. "I have to know about it." Exactly the reverse is true for a wiretap. To be effective, the subject must be ignorant of the tap. Weitzner said this notion of a "secret search" went against a central principle of the Fourth Amendment, which protects people from unreasonable search and seizure. "When wiretapping was allowed in 1968, Congress basically said they were going to create an exception to this rule," Weitzner said. But in the three years since the Clipper debate began, the FBI has enlarged its interest beyond preserving phone taps and has asked for spare keys to the codes used to protect Internet traffic and stored computer files, Weitzner said. "If the FBI is able to transfer its wiretap authority to the Internet, it would give the bureau access to a new realm of activities," Weitzner argued. Using the spare keys to Internet transmissions could give the agency access to medical records, charge card receipts or other data stored or transmitted on the global network. Moreover, the agency might be able to tap some of this information in transit, without the knowledge of the person being investigated, whereas today agents would have to visit the doctor's office or bank, potentially alerting the target. "If all things in the digital world are open to wiretap-type scrutiny, then we have lost the protection against secret searches," Weitzner said. "What is on the way to happening is that the exception could swallow the rule." The temptation to tap wires is as old as wired communication itself, according to Clifford Fishman, law professor at Catholic University's Columbus School of Law in Washington, D.C., and author of a textbook on wiretapping. During the Civil War, both sides tapped telegraph lines to spy on troop movements. Wiretaps were common in the early days of the telephone, and Supreme Court decisions during the 1920s said this was no invasion of privacy because the tap was on a public telephone pole and not inside a home. In response, Congress made wiretaps illegal at the federal level as part of the Communication Act of 1934. But Fishman said state investigators kept right on using wiretaps, as did the feds, who sometimes used unauthorized taps on Mafia and political figures during the long reign of former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. Congress legalized federal wiretaps in 1968 at a time when Richard Nixon was campaigning against the liberal Earl Warren Supreme Court. "The mood in Congress was to defang the Republicans on law enforcement," Fishman said. "Lyndon Johnson, with palpable reluctance, signed this bill to permit federal officials to obtain a court order to do a wiretap or a bug and use this information in court." Fishman, a former New York City district attorney, considered wiretapping essential to investigating the most dangerous crimes and called the administration's latest spare-key proposal a good compromise. But civil libertarians fear that giving investigators the keys to unlock any coded phone call or electronic document will greatly expand the realm of secret searches and tempt them to abuse a power that was denied them in the days when ensuring privacy meant putting wax seals on envelopes. Much of the coverage of the encryption controversy has centered on the complaints of Silicon Valley firms that they are losing hundreds of millions of dollars in exports to foreign competitors who don't have to limit the strength of their encryption products. Though that may be the case, there's more at stake here than money or jobs. Our wired society is about to decide how easy it should be for investigators to figuratively climb up the telephone pole to put alligator clips on our secrets, whether innocent or criminal. To give investigators the keys to every code might be too much temptation and a threat to civil liberties. To deny investigators the keys may handcuff them in the fight against increasingly sophisticated and deadly forms of crime. That is the nature of the choice on encryption policy, and that is why there is no simple compromise. Tom Abate's column appears every other Sunday. You can reach him this fool mailto:tabate@examiner.com Vinnie Moscaritolo http://www.vmeng.com/vinnie/ Fingerprint: 4FA3298150E404F2782501876EA2146A ------------------------------------------------------- "...and by the way, Mr.Speaker, the Second Amendment is not for killing little ducks and leaving Huey and Dewey and Louie without an aunt and uncle. It's for hunting politicians, like in Grozny, and in the colonies in 1776, or when they take your independence away." --- Rep. Robert (B-1 Bob) Dornan (R-CA) responding to Bill Clinton's "State of the Union" address, January 25, 1994

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