December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

The Impact of Cybercommunications on Traditional Financial Services
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.ctr.columbia.edu/citi/cybercom.html http://www.ctr.columbia.edu/citi/cybcompap/ravi.htm Abstract: This paper presents a framework that provides a conceptual understanding of electronic commerce-based financial services. The paper then discusses some of the research issues that need to be addressed in this emerging area. Systematic research o n online financial services is virtually non-existent. Most of the early work consists of anecdotal evidence from individual companies, usually in the form of trade journal articles which have no empirical basis. Clearly there is a need for industry-acade mia collaboration to understand the online financial services area better. There is also a need to develop methods and tools for measuring the effectiveness of these services. Traditional effectiveness measuring methods will be of limited use in cyberspac e as banks enter an era in which financial products are treated as information commodities and banks are in competition with non-banks to serve customers with the best bundle of information _______________________ Regards, An oral contract isn't worth the paper it's written on. -? Joseph Reagle http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

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Sen. Leahy's Statement on Clipper 3.1.1
by jseiger＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEAHY ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEW ENCRYPTION INITIATIVE October 1, 1996 The timing of the Administration's announcement on encryption, within hours of the Congress' likely adjournment, is unfortunate. The Administration needs to work with Congress to develop a consensus on a national encryption policy that takes account of the privacy, law enforcement and competitiveness concerns of our Nation's citizens and businesses. Taking unilateral steps will not resolve this issue, but instead could delay building the consensus we so urgently need. This issue simply cannot by resolved by Executive fiat. While technology should not dictate policy, particularly when our public safety and national security interests are at issue, any policy we adopt must protect our privacy. As the Administration and industry rush to find an alternative to unbreakable encryption, they should take heed that any solution which fails to protect the Fourth Amendment and privacy rights of our citizens will be unacceptable. That is why, with bipartisan support, Senator Burns and I introduced legislation in March that set out privacy safeguards to protect the decoding keys to encrypted communications and stringent legal procedures for law enforcement agencies to get access to those keys. In this plan, the Administration is directing the resources of our high-tech industry to develop breakable, rather than unbreakable, encryption. But no one is yet clear about who will be legally allowed to break into encrypted messages, and under what circumstances. These are questions that have to be answered not only with our own government but also with foreign governments. The weakest link in a key recovery system may be the country with the weakest privacy protections. Internet users, who can send messages around the globe seamlessly, do not want the privacy of their encrypted communications to be at the mercy of a country that ignores the Fourth Amendment principles we enjoy here. These are significant privacy and security concerns not answered by the Administration's plan. Even without reading the fine print, the general outline of the Administration's plan smacks of the government trying to control the marketplace for high-tech products. Only those companies that agree to turn over their business plans to the government and show that they are developing key recovery systems, will be rewarded with permission to sell abroad products with DES encryption, which is the global encryption standard. Conditioning foreign sales of products with DES on development of key recovery systems puts enormous pressure on our computer industry to move forward with key recovery, whether their customers want it or not. Internet users themselves -- not the FBI, not the NSA, not any government regulator -- should decide what encryption method best serves their needs. Then the marketplace will be able to respond. The Administration is putting the proverbial cart before the horse, by putting law enforcement interests ahead of every one elses. But that is not the only catch in the Administration's plan. Permission to export DES will end in two years. Allowing American companies to sell DES overseas is a step long overdue. Given the fact that a Japanese company is already selling "triple DES", one might say this step is too little, too late. Threatening to pull the plug on DES in two years, when this genie is already out of the bottle, does not promote our high-tech industries overseas. Does this mean that U.S. companies selling sophisticated computer systems with DES encryption overseas must warn their customers that the supply may end in two years? Customers both here and abroad want stable suppliers, not those jerked around by their government. The most effective way to protect the privacy and security of our on-line communications is to use encryption technology. Every American should be concerned about our country's policy on encryption since the resolution of this debate will affect privacy, jobs and the competitiveness of our high-tech industries.

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White House Statement on Clipper 3.11
by abd＠cdt.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Included below for your viewing pleasure is the Administration's latest encryption proposal, released at a White House briefing this afternoon. This statement, and more information including CDT's forthcoming analysis of the proposal, are available at: http://www.cdt.org/crypto http://www.crypto.com Alan Davidson, Staff Counsel 202.637.9800 (v) Center for Democracy and Technology 202.637.0968 (f) 1634 Eye St. NW, Suite 1100 <abd(a)cdt.org> Washington, DC 20006 PGP key via finger ---------------- THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Vice President FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: 456-7035 TUESDAY, October 1, 1996 STATEMENT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT President Clinton and I are committed to promoting the growth of electronic commerce and robust, secure communications worldwide while protecting the public safety and national security. To that end, this Administration is consulting with Congress, the information technology industry, state and local law enforcement officials, and foreign governments on a major initiative to liberalize export controls for commercial encryption products. The Administration's initiative will make it easier for Americans to use stronger encryption products -- whether at home or abroad -- to protect their privacy, intellectual property and other valuable information. It will support the growth of electronic commerce, increase the security of the global information, and sustain the economic competitiveness of U.S. encryption product manufacturers during the transition to a key management infrastructure. Under this initiative, the export of 56-bit key length encryption products will be permitted under a general license after one-time review, and contingent upon industry commitments to build and market future products that support key recovery. This policy will apply to hardware and software products. The relaxation of controls will last up to two years. The Administration's initiative recognizes that an industry-led technology strategy will expedite market acceptance of key recovery, and that the ultimate solution must be market-driven. Exporters of 56-bit DES or equivalent encryption products would make commitments to develop and sell products that support the key recovery system that I announced in July. That vision presumes that a trusted party (in some cases internal to the user's organization) would recover the user's confidentiality key for the user or for law enforcement officials acting under proper authority. Access to keys would be provided in accordance with destination country policies and bilateral understandings. No key length limits or algorithm restrictions will apply to exported key recovery products. Domestic use of key recovery will be voluntary, and any American will remain free to use any encryption system domestically. The temporary relaxation of controls is one part of a broader encryption policy initiative designed to promote electronic information security and public safety. For export control purposes, commercial encryption products will no longer be treated as munitions. After consultation with Congress, jurisdiction for commercial encryption controls will be transferred from the State Department to the Commerce Department. The Administration also will seek legislation to facilitate commercial key recovery, including providing penalties for improper release of keys, and protecting key recovery agents against liability when they properly release a key. As I announced in July, the Administration will continue to expand the purchase of key recovery products for U.S. government use, promote key recovery arrangements in bilateral and multilateral discussions, develop federal cryptographic and key recovery standards, and stimulate the development of innovative key recovery products and services. Under the relaxation, six-month general export licenses will be issued after one-time review, contingent on commitments from exporters to explicit benchmarks and milestones for developing and incorporating key recovery features into their products and services, and for building the supporting infrastructure internationally. Initial approval will be contingent on firms providing a plan for implementing key recovery. The plan will explain in detail the steps the applicant will take to develop, produce, distribute, and/or market encryption products with key recovery features. The specific commitments will depend on the applicant's line of business. The government will renew the licenses for additional six-month periods if milestones are met. Two years from now, the export of 56-bit products that do not support key recovery will no longer be permitted. Currently exportable 40-bit mass market software products will continue to be exportable. We will continue to support financial institutions in their efforts to assure the recovery of encrypted financial information. Longer key lengths will continue to be approved for products dedicated to the support of financial applications. The Administration will use a formal mechanism to provide industry, users, state and local law enforcement, and other private sector representatives with the opportunity to advise on the future of key recovery. Topics will include: evaluating the developing global key recovery architecture assessing lessons-learned from key recovery implementation advising on technical confidence issues vis-a-vis access to and release of keys addressing interoperability and standards issues identifying other technical, policy, and program issues for governmental action. The Administration's initiative is broadly consistent with the recent recommendations of the National Research Council. It also addresses many of the objectives of pending Congressional legislation.

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Re: How might new GAK be enforced?
by Rick Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May asks: : Any other ideas on how the government plans to enforce GAK, to make GAK the : overwhelmingly-preferred solution? The problem seems somewhat analogous to the software copy protection problem and maybe the enfocement will be similar: make "examples" of a few high profile offenders who are exchanging blatantly un-GAKed traffic with foreigners. This assumes they fine tune the law to make such behavior illegal without having to prove you yourself exported the stuff to them. Wonder what the Supremes will say to that. But that's not the end of the story. If there is lots of GAK encrypted traffic flowing about, then encrypted traffic in general is no longer noteworthy. So as long as your traffic looks like GAK, you won't be hassled until they try to read your traffic. So it's possible that products will appear that use pseudo-GAK protocols -- they look just like their GAKed cousins but the GAK fields contain plausiable garbage instead of keys. It could even turn out to be a vendor "quality control" thing -- oops, the GAK was supposed to work but... You couldn't do that with Clipper (except via Matt Blaze's brute forcing of the LEAF checksum) because the crypto wouldn't decrypt a packet with an invalid LEAF checksum. Since it was a sealed hardware module, implementers had no choice but to play by those rules. There's no such enforcable limitation on commercial software implementations. Rick.

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Re: Export laws don't just affect crypto
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:32 PM 10/1/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > >Lucky Green writes: >> > Umm, so are you violating ITAR if you *use* these GPS-guided missiles >> >> No you aren't. A little known provision in the ITAR excempts exports >> by missile. Seriously. > >Well, not quite -- it exempts exports by space launch, but I think >thats intended for things like satelite launchings and not for things >like missile attacks against other countries... If ITAR exempts exports by missile, does that mean that we merely have to make a model rocket, put a floppy containing PGP in the payload compartment, and shoot the thing over the wall into Mexico, or into Canada? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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[SPAM] Timmy May has no life
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I suppose one of the reasons why Americans are so stupid is that so many of them are of English origin. How does one donate to the IRA anyway? >Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk >To: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> >Date: Mon, 30 Sep 1996 17:40:49 +0000 >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT >Subject: Re: [SPAM] More "fuckhead" fan mail from Timmy "peteur" May >Priority: normal >X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.31) >Message-Id: <844193577.12916.0(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> > > >> berserk >> Timmy May has gone . Has he been eating speed? >> bananas > >What? speak English motherfucker. > >> >> What has Timmy been smoking? > >I assume you are referring to me here, my name is Paul Bradley and >you can go fuck a kokonut dude. > >> >> ]From paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Sun Sep 29 19:03:40 1996 >> >> ]Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) >> >> ] via UUCP; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:14:06 EDT >> >> ] for dlv >> >> ]Received: from disperse.demon.co.uk by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; >> >> ] id AA25790 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Sun, 29 Sep 96 19:03:40 -0400 >> >> ]Received: from post.demon.co.uk ([(null)]) by relay-2.mail.demon.net id ac16129; >> >> ] 29 Sep 96 15:59 BST >> >> ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk ([158.152.120.223]) by relay-3.mail.demon.net >> >> ] id aa09441; 29 Sep 96 15:54 BST >> >> ]Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk by fatmans.demon.co.uk with SMTP >> >> ] id AA843903697 ; Sat, 28 Sep 96 09:41:37 +0000 >> >> ]Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> >> >> ]From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk > >As you can see my sending is authenticated and the reply path is to >my host (fatmans.demon.co.uk) the message has passed through >post.demon.co.uk/disperse.demon.co.uk and on to psi.net, Tim May is >at got.net. > >> >> ]I am not Tim May, Check out the return path if you don`t believe me, >> >> ]if you still don`t here`s my PGP public key signed by the EFF, they >> >> ]don`t sign keys here and there without checking ID`s... > >>Fuckhead. > >Fraid not dude, this thread is getting distinctly boring, cut the >shit, if you have something to say say it, don`t keep spewing shit >without warning, but really it`s only to be expected from you. > > > > Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security > Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk > Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org > Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ > Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 > "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Press Release
by Peter D. Junger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Press Release Plaintiff Seeks Summary Judgment in Cleveland Case Challenging Licensing of ``Exports'' of Cryptographic Information Government Argues That Law Professor Cannot Challenge Regulation Requiring Him to Get Permission Before Teaching and Publishing Because He Did Not Apply for That Permission Oral Argument in Junger v. Christopher Set for Wednesday, November 20 Cleveland, Ohio, Tuesday, October 1, 1996 For Immediate Release For More Information Contact: Raymond Vasvari (216) 522-1925 Gino Scarselli (216) 291-8601 Or see URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu/comp_law/jvc/ Cleveland, Ohio, Oct. 1 -- Lawyers for Professor Peter D. Junger today filed a brief and a motion for summary judgment in Junger v. Christopher, the case challenging the licensing of the communication of ``cryptograhic software'' that is pending before Judge Donald C. Nugent in the Federal District Court here. Junger seeks an injunction against the enforcement of provisions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations that require him to get the permission of the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (the "ODTC") before he can communicate information about cryptographic software to foreign persons, ``whether in the United States or abroad.'' The penalty for failing to get such permission before disclosing the information can be as great as a fine of one million dollars and imprisonment for ten years. These provisions effectively prevent Junger from admitting foreign students to the course that he teaches about Computers and the Law at Case Western Reserve Law School in Cleveland, Ohio, and keep him from publishing his course materials and articles containing cryptographic software, or explaining what it does, how and where to get it, and how to use it. The challenged licensing scheme threatens the long-run viability of the United States software industry and, according to a blue-ribbon panel of the National Research Council, already costs that industry at least ``a few hundred million dollars per year ..., and all indications are that this figure will only grow in the future.'' The regulations have been extensively criticized by industry and bills to repeal or limit them are now pending in Congress. Junger's legal challenge is not based, however, on the economic damage that the ITAR's cryptographic licensing scheme imposes on the software industry and the nation's economy, but rather on the unconstitutional restraints that it imposes on anyone who wants to speak or write publically about any computer program that has, in the words of the ITAR, the ``capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems.'' Junger does not challenge the constitutionality of requiring one to get a license before exporting a physical cryptographic device: ``It isn't unconstitutional for the Office of Defense Trade Controls to damage the computer industry and our economy by requiring export licenses for cryptographic hardware, but information about cryptographic software is, as the National Research Council has pointed out, `pure knowledge that can be transported over national borders inside the heads of people or via letter.' Requiring the permission of the government before one can communicate knowledge is unconstitutional. Such a prior restraint is, in fact, the paradigmatic example of a violation of the First Amendment.'' THE GOVERNMENT ARGUES THAT PLAINTIFF MUST APPLY FOR PERMISSION TO SPEAK BEFORE HE CAN CHALLENGE THE REQUIREMENT THAT HE APPLY FOR SUCH PERMISSION In motions and briefs submitted August 21st, the government has asked the court to dismiss the lawsuit, or in the alternative, to grant the government judgment prior to trial. The government makes the initial argument that Junger lacks standing to claim that the provisions of the ITAR requiring him to get a formal license or other permission from the ODTC before he publically communicates information about cryptographic software, including the contents of the software itself, are unconstitutional. And it also argues that that claim is neither ``ripe'' nor ``colorable'', because Junger has not applied to the ODTC for such permission. Junger takes the position that as a law teacher who venerates the First Amendment it would be as improper for him to request the federal censors for permission to speak and publish as it would be for him openly violate the law. As he puts it: ``My duty is to challenge these unconstitutional regulations, not to give in to them nor to violate them in an act of civil disobedience.'' His lawyers point out in their briefs that few propositions of constitutional law are better established than the rule that a plaintiff does not have to submit to an unconstitutional restraint on speech and on the press before challenging it in court. ``Those arguments by the government are rather strange,'' says Gino J. Scarselli, one of Junger's lawyers, ``they seem to be based on their argument that cryptographic software is actually hardware because it is functional.'' And then he adds, ``Of course, that argument is also rather strange.'' THE GOVERNMENT ARGUES THAT SOME OF THE MATERIAL AT ISSUE IS EXEMPT UNDER THE ITAR The government also contends that some of the information at issue may be exempt from the ITAR's licensing requirements as technical data that is in the ``public domain'' because it is available to the public through ``fundamental research in science and engineering'' or through ``sales at newsstands and bookstores.'' ``That hardly is a defense,'' says Scarselli, ``since it is quite clear that the government will not concede that all of the information that Professor Junger wants to be able publish and discuss is in the public domain. And to make matters worse, the only way that Professor Junger can actually find out whether the government will treat particular information as being exempt from the formal licensing requirements is to apply to the ODTC for it calls a Commodity Jurisdiction Determination, which in reality is just another form of license.'' ``It is not as if I am engaged in fundamental research in science and engineering.'' Junger adds. ``What I want to publish and discuss has to do with the political and legal issues that are raised by computer technology, including, of course, cryptography. ``For just one example, since lawyers have a legal and ethical duty to protect the confidences of their clients, I am convinced that lawyers who use electronic mail or other computer technologies to communicate with their clients, or to store information supplied by their clients, are in some circumstances ethically, and perhaps even legally, required to use cryptography to maintain the confidentiality of that information. And yet I cannot publically explain to law students and lawyers--and lawyers cannot publically explain to their clients--how to obtain and use effective cryptographic software without first getting the government's permission to disclose that information. And, of course, if the cryptographic software really is effective, then there is little or no chance that the government will permit its disclosure.'' THE GOVERNMENT ARGUES THAT CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOFTWARE IS NOT PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IS FUNCTIONAL There is no law in the United States that forbids or regulates the use of cryptography. Yet the government argues that the information in texts containing cryptographic software, including recipes for creating such software, can be used in a computer to preserve secrecy and confidentiality, and concludes that cryptographic software is ``conduct'' and ``functional'' and is thus not a text that is constitutionally protected as speech. Junger's lawyers, on the other hand, say that his claims do not relate to the conduct of running a cryptographic program on a computer--conduct that is not regulated by the ITAR, after all--and that he only challenges the restraints that the ITAR impose on the communication of information about how to carry on such legal conduct. ``Expressive conduct is exactly what is protected by the First Amendment,'' says Raymond Vasvari, another of Junger's lawyers. ``And if that expression were not functional, if it were not effective, there would be no need to protect it. The government's argument turns two hundred years of First Amendment jurisprudence on its head.'' ``The government's arguments about software being conduct and functional are striking examples of the sort of confusion that pervades the whole area of Computers and the Law,'' Junger says. ``Trying to clear up such confusion is my major goal in my course in Computers and the Law. In fact, when I started teaching that course in 1993, I wrote some cryptographic software to assist my students in grasping the distinction between software as a text that can be communicated, and that is protected by copyright law and the First Amendment, and software as a process that runs in a computer's central processor that can be protected by patents, but not by copyrights. If it weren't so frustrating, it would almost be funny that I cannot publish that software because of the prior restraints imposed by the defendants' interpretation of the ITAR, even though it is perfectly legal for me, or for any one else, including `foreign persons,' to actually run such software on a computer. The government's confusion is so extensive that an agent of the ODTC has actually told me that software, cryptographic software, is actually hardware.'' ``It is quite clear to me,'' Junger adds, ``that the State Department and the National Security Agency and other elements in the executive branch of the government are attempting to restrain the communication of information about cryptographic software not only abroad, but also within the United States, because they do not want us actually to be able to use cryptography to preserve the privacy of our thoughts and our communications. It is as if the government required one to get a license before explaining how to make or use an envelope, even though it did not forbid the use of envelopes themselves. After all, all that cryptographic software is is a way of making electronic envelopes.'' ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED Junger v. Christopher has been placed on a fast track by Judge Nugent. On September 5 he established a briefing schedule: the plaintiff's brief was due and was filed today and the government's response is due on Friday, October 18. Oral argument is scheduled for Wednesday, November 20. Judge Nugent's decision is expected before the first of the year. BACKGROUND ON THE LITIGATION Litigation is expensive. Professor Junger and his volunteer lawyers were only able to bring the suit because of a generous gift by an anonymous donor of $5,000 that was used to create the ITAR Legal Attack Fund. Additional donations by Professor Junger and others have increased that fund to more than seven thousand dollars. Scarselli and Vasvari are lawyers in private practice in Cleveland who have dedicated much of their professional lives to the protection of First Amendment freedoms. The third lawyer on the team is Kevin O'Neill, a law professor at Cleveland State University and the former legal director of the Ohio Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union. --30-- -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH Internet: junger(a)pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu junger(a)samsara.law.cwru.edu URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu

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SYN_not
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

10-1-96: "Check Point to Provide Safeguard Against TCP SYN Flooding." The new module, now available free of charge on Check Point's Web site (http://www.checkpoint.com) provides protection against this denial of service attack, which has crippled several ISPs in recent weeks. "Certicom Introduces Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem Instruction To Its Security Classroom." It has launched new information about its Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem on the Information Security Classroom section of its web site (www.certicom.ca) "IBM to herd cave-in cats for rat encryption." IBM will be joined by Digital, TIS but few others. An executive at TIS declined to comment on whether it is involved in the IBM cave-in. The company is in a quiet period before making an IPO based on government bribery. "Battle brewing over gov.crypto bribery." Last week, the DARPA announced it has awarded Trusted Information Systems, Inc. a two-year, $1.5 million contract to develop what it calls security wrappers for a Java Prototype System as well as one for the Unix operating system. ----- http://jya.com/synnot.txt (15 kb for 4) ftp://jya.com/pub/incoming/synnot.txt SYN_not

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Re: Clipper III on the table
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:44 PM 10/1/96 -0400, Perry wrote: >We really have to work on cracking DES at least once -- it would >substantially reduce the wind in the Administration's sails. 56 bits + GAK does generally mean DES/GAK, though RC4/56/GAK is also possible. One "56-bit" protocol that might be allowable under the new rules is "something strong with all but 56 key bits revealed", e.g. RC4/128 with 72 bits salt revealed (like the RC4/128 with 88 bits salt revealed that Netscape uses, or 3-DES with 112 bits salt revealed), which would be substantially stronger against cracking than raw 56-bit DES. A big advantage is that it makes pre-computation of lists less useful, since two cyphertexts with the same 56-bit key might be different in the top N-56 bits of key, and the key schedules are less reusable. The 3DES version, for instance, also gains because some of the big DES hooks that let you scrounge a few bits don't work. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com America's Open Presidential Debate - Beyond Dole and Clinton! <A href="http://gate.net/~bdcollar/bbe/media.htm">Tuesday, Oct. 8th 8:00 PM EDT</a>

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ITAR satellite provision
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone on the list have the exact ITAR reg. text relating to the exemption for space-launched crypto? -- Steve

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