December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Japanese Export Restrictions
by tavik＠alias.cyberpass.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

schryver(a)radiks.net allegedly wrote: > Has any one been able to verify the anonymous posters assertion concerning > japanese crypto export restrictions? What counts as verification? I heard it straight from a crypto exporter in Japan, as the reason why the stuff they were sending me would be delayed, and by the way they needed more information for the export request. I might even be the original source of the news since I did mention it to a freind or two. (I am not the original anon poster). As to the details re: if/when/why the change was made, etc., I don't know. Is there a Japanese equivalent of the CFR wherein the government regs are published? Perhaps one of our bureau-savvy Japanese readers could check into it.

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Re: Timmy May is a jerk
by c62op27＠ibx.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok, I'm a new subscriber. I take it as a given that Timmy May is a jerk, but who is he?

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Cyberspace Law
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David Post has a comprehensive outline of the legal issues affecting cyberspace, many of which are addressed by cypherpunks, at: http://www.cli.org/cyberspace/index.html It's very much worth reading, pondering and learning from. Here are excerpts: ----- Law of Cyberspace Seminar Fall 1996 Prof. David G. Post (david.post(a)counsel.com) Introduction The emergence of the global network -- the "Internet" and its constituent networks -- and the associated "digital revolution" -- the ability to access, store, and transmit vast amounts of information in digital form (computer software, videogames, music, text, etc.) -- presents an array of new problems and opportunities for lawyers preparing to practice in the 21st Century. It is becoming increasingly evident that the process of "mapping" existing legal concepts and tools into this new domain is not going to be straightforward, and that a number of familiar legal concepts will need to be rethought before they can be efficiently applied in the new environment. The goal of this course is threefold: First, to introduce you, by means of a series of specific case studies chosen to illustrate the clash between existing legal regimes and new technologies, to a reasonably comprehensive subset of the legal problems that will need to be addressed in this new environment; Second, to help you, through fairly intensive work on your research papers, to prepare publishable quality written work; and Third, to help you become comfortable with the information-retrieval and transmission capabilities of this new medium, both because no discussion of the "law of cyberspace" can be very fruitful without some basic understanding of the special characteristics of the new domain, and because lawyers will increasingly be called upon to demonstrate some familiarity with Internet navigation as businesses (including law firms) increasingly utilize the global network as a means of delivering their services. [Big snip of bountiful thoughts and links to information sites] Appendix 3: Possible Paper Topics This list is just designed to get you started thinking about possible paper topics. It is by no means exhaustive; feel free to choose a topic not mentioned below. Protection of employee electronic mail. Are new rules required regarding online sexual harassment? Trademarks and Internet domain names -- can they be reconciled? Intermediary (system operator) liability for subscribers' copyright or trademark infringements or other "wrongful" conduct. Does Web browsing, or the caching of World Wide Web pages, constitute copyright infringement? Analysis of electronic shrinkwraps: Are online disclaimers enforceable? What procedural steps can be used to enhance enforceability? Jurisdiction and choice of law in cyberspace. Dispute resolution in cyberspace. Should true anonymity be allowed in online contexts? Who will bear the responsibilities of anonymous actions? Taxation in cyberspace (e.g., application of foreign states' sales tax laws to online transactions). Dataveillance. The use of online data profiles in marketing research. Compilation copyrights for collective online activities. Legality of online gambling. "Moral rights" in cyberspace. Analysis of legal issues regarding programs that extract information from a user's hard drive and communicate back to a central server (Windows 95, Netscape Navigator). Data authentication, the use of computer-generated evidence and computer-generated signatures in contracts. Content regulation in cyberspace: Obscenity, indecency, and false advertising Licensing and professional liability (e.g. the application of licensing schemes and other regulatory provisions to professional practice of lawyers, doctors, or others on the net). Internet self-regulation: cyber-democracy, frontier justice, and other regulatory models in cyberspace. The control of online defamation. Product liability for on-line products. Clipper, encryption and decryption. Net commerce: Digital money and other solutions. Net commerce: Copyright management systems and other schemes for charging by the byte. Do we need new rules regarding enforcement of the antitrust laws in cyberspace? ----- Thanks to David Post for this IP lift lift.

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LC-1
by Toly Tcymbal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Did anyone hear about a device called LC-1? It is a voice encryption hardware that uses IDEA. I've found info about it on a Germany server. Tried to contact two guys that developed the thing and got no answer. One of the guys' names is Kurt (khuwig(a)cs.uni-sb.de) and the other one is Marko (maba(a)stud.uni-sb.de) Any comments would be appreciated. TIA. TT.

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Negative credentials
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There has been some discussion here and on the Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) mailing list about anonymous credentials and abuse. This is something we have of course talked about many times over the years but I don't think we have ever had a specific look at Chaum's approach to the "negative credential" problem. In essence his method allows you to prove that you haven't cheated on any of your contracts, without revealing any more about yourself than that. Chaum uses what he calls "sequenced couples", which are sequences of pseudonym pairs such that credential A on one pair of the sequence can be transformed by the user into credential B on the next pair. This ties into his whole scheme, which is a bit too complicated to explain here. What I will describe is a very simplified version of what Chaum has. Chaum's description can be hard to follow but takes care of a lot more possibilities. His full paper, which BTW is my favorite crypto paper of them all, is: "Showing Credentials Without Identification: Signatures Transferred Between Unconditionally Unlinkable Pseudonyms," D. Chaum, Accepted but not Presented Auscrypt '89. The general idea is this. Every time you engage in a contractual relationship with someone it is done under the auspices of an "anonymous credential" organization. You first show your contract partner a credential from the AC org which guarantees that you have not cheated anyone so far. After you participate in your current interaction, if it completes to everyone's satisfaction, you are given a new credential by the AC org which proves that you still haven't cheated. Each credential can only be used once, so if you cheat someone you can't get a new one. There is a simple and obvious solution which satisfies these requirements. That is to use a blinded signature exactly as is done with DigiCash coins. You get your first credential on registering with the AC organization. (Here we have a bit of a bootstrapping problem, in that the AC org needs to make sure you don't register more than once. But actually since things will be blinded you can just use your SS# or other identity documents.) The credential is a blind signature, unlinkable to your identity. When you go to contract with someone, you show your credential and the AC confirms that it hasn't been used before (exactly like checking for double spending on coins!). The AC marks the credential as being in the "in use" state (putting it on its own private list of such credentials). Then when your contract completes successfully, your partner certifies this fact to the AC, and it then retires your old credential and issues you a new, freshly blinded credential. This credential is unlinkable to your earlier one or to your identity, but it proves that you haven't cheated and you can show it the next time you need to make a contract. Now, obviously this simple solution has problems: - You can transfer credentials to other people. Chaum's more elaborate solution links the credentials to your pseudonyms. - You could get cheated by your contract partner who won't authorize a new credential for you even though you completed your contract. This happens today, unfair credit rating blotches. There would have to be some kind of arbitration procedure. - There is no way of distinguishing someone who's done dozens of successful contracts from someone who's done only one. This is a feature, not a bug... But if you want you can show positive credentials from earlier participants; Chaum's method allows them to be linked to your new pseudonyms. - You can only have one contract going at once. Chaum has some solution involving time limits but I've never fully understood it. The general idea might be that when you go into the contract the AC gives you a new credential which means "he hasn't cheated anybody so far, and if he does cheat someone we'll know about it by <date>". <date> would be the date of completion of the contract. This is still a blinded credential, so the date gets encoded in the signature. Chaum shows how you can even blind the date, moving it in to some earlier date (but never out). Then you can use this credential to establish a new contract as long as the date hasn't expired. It gets complicated once you have multiple contracts with different expiration dates, though. Although this solution is somewhat simplified, hopefully it will give people a picture of how negative credentials can be dealt with while still retaining full anonymity in contract relationships. Hal

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MD5?
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So... Is MD5 essentially history? Aside from MacPGP 2.6.3, is there a pgp version which will support anything else? -- Forward complaints to : European Association of Envelope Manufactures Finger for Public Key Gutenbergstrasse 21;Postfach;CH-3001;Bern Vote Monarchist Switzerland

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Re: [DES] Criteria for Key Recovery target.
by eli+＠gs160.sp.cs.cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Russell Holt writes: >BTW, does anyone have references to statistical comparisons of key >searches in "real world" settings? Eg, random starting locations >versus random keys .. etc.. E(time) with all trial keys distinct: 1/N Sigma^N i = N/2 = 2^55. E(time) for random trials: 1/N + (N-1)/N (1 + E(time)) so E(time) = N = 2^56. Centralized keyspace handling is a clear lose, IMO. The RC4-40 project had server problems; scaling up by another 2^16 would be non-trivial. Then there are problems with malicious searchers, corrupt servers, flaky networks... all this for a factor of two? (And, admittedly, the reduction in variance.) To rain on the parade a bit, what this discussion says to me is that most applications of DES are safe from net cracking for a few years yet... -- Eli Brandt eli+(a)cs.cmu.edu

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Re: cypherpunks ftp site
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:51 PM 10/21/96 -0700, you wrote: >I am trying to get some code from <ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks>. Try http://www.csua.berkeley.edu/ ; you may need to wait till they're not busy. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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Cisco Network Encryption Services
by billstewart＠mail.att.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cisco has an interesting web page about encryption services that may be attached below :-) http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/732/Security/ncryp_tc.htm Starting with Release 11.2, they offer several kinds of encryption, including single-DES for US use and 40-bit-something for export. Key exchange is Diffie-Hellman with DSS signatures. There's a pointer to a brief white paper at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/732/Security/ncryp_wp.htm and a press release from May 96 about <a href="http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/146/298.html"> "Cisco Systems to Offer Free Reference Implementation of IETF's ISAKMP Security Framework" </a> Title: Cisco Network Encryption Services Cisco Network Encryption Services More information on Cisco IOS Software and security technologies More information on Cisco IOS Software Introduction As growing numbers of enterprises move from a centralized information-management architecture toward one that is far more distributed and open, security becomes both increasingly important and vastly more difficult to achieve. Because no single approac h to security is sufficient, the Cisco Internetwork Operating System (Cisco IOSTM) software security architecture provides numerous security services and capabilities, including: Access management, which pertains to authentication and authorization services for telecommuting Network management Route authentication Firewalls, which restrict specified types of packets from entering and crossing an organization's network As an additional element of this architecture, the Cisco IOS software also provides encryption services to ensure data privacy during transmission. This paper addresses Cisco's new encryption offerings. Specifically, it explains the particular strength s of the network-level encryption available from Cisco, comparing and contrasting it with alternative encryption methods. It also details the networking environments that can make best use of such encryption, a broad range that includes WANs, LANs, and pu blic switching services such as the Internet. Figure 1. : Security Policy Supported by the Cisco IOS Security Architecture Encryption Methods Encryption using an algorithm and a key to transform intelligible information into an unintelligible state for purposes of security can occur at three levels: application, link, and network. Application-Level Encryption Encryption that occurs at this level requires that the specific application used either innately supports such functionality or, more commonly, is modified to incorporate it. At application level, encryption functions on an "end-to-end" basis; that is, information is encrypted as it is entered into an individual workstation and decrypted as it is received at another workstation. However, this setup means that the success of application-level encryption is tied to three factors: The availability of appropriate applications that support encryption The ability to trust users to communicate all information through such applications The compatibility of encryption software of all hosts For these reasons, application-level encryption should be used in conjunction with additional security approaches that involve encryption during the process of information transmission. Link-Level Encryption This type of encryption provides a high level of security by encrypting all the traffic at a given link, including the network layer header, with address and protocol. Link-level encryption prevents unauthorized users from obtaining information about t he corporate network structure or specific data contained within particular transmissions. Link-level encryption is protocol- independent, but to accommodate link-layer variations, it must be both media- and interface-specific. For this reason, it works w ell in small, point-to-point network environments and in some bridging environments. However, because encryption and decryption must occur at each link, its utility is extremely dependent on network topology. For larger, more complex network systems, link -level encryption increases latency that degrades performance, and it is both costly and difficult to deploy. In addition, given the increasing use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), link-level encryption is simply unusable with public switched services such as the Internet. Network-Level Encryption Encryption at the network level is performed in conjunction with specific protocols rather than specific media, enabling a high degree of flexibility, while providing high performance. Network-level encryption operates on a flow-by-flow basis, encrypti ng payload traffic between specified user/application pairs or subnets while leaving network-layer headers intact. In other words, encryption support is required only at the boundaries of subnets, not at any intermediary networking devices. Because networ k-level encryption is media- and topology-independent and works well across all interfaces, it is the optimal approach for large, complex networks (especially those that involve routers) and, in general, for networks based on any WAN media, including the Internet. It is because of these advantages that Cisco chose to incorporate network-level encryption functionality into its Cisco IOS operating system. Figure 2. : Encryption Alternatives Cisco encryption services involve four basic components: Device certification and authentication Key exchange Encryption policy and connection setup Encryption methods Cisco IOS Encryption Services Device Certification and Authentication The Cisco IOS software uses the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) established in 1994 by the National Institute of Standards and Technologies for device authentication during public key exchange. (Without device authentication, any third party could eff ectively pretend to be the recipient to both communicating devices and read, modify, and delete data.) The Cisco authentication scheme enables users to determine the pairs of networks that they wish to have encrypted. Routers establish secure connections with destination routers that allow them to authenticate each other without benefit of encrypted data or predefined secret keys. A certificate hierarchy provides a guarantee for the authenticity of the routers' credentials, including public key. Key Exchange The Cisco IOS software uses the Diffie-Hellman process for the exchange of public keys. Diffie-Hellman is an algorithm allowing two parties to exchange nonsecret information, while independently calculating a third number to be used as a session key to encrypt data that passes between them. This feature allows the routers to change their session key as often as necessary without having to send that key across the network in any form. Encryption Policy Cisco software now enables users to set up subnet-to-subnet encryption services and per-user/application based on IP packets. When a packet is sent through a secured connection, it is encrypted as it leaves the source subnet and decrypted as it arrives at the destination subnet. By selectively encrypting traffic from specific users and applications, network encryption reduces the cost and increases the flexibility of ensuring secure data transmission. To meet the needs of organizations whose internetwo rks include sections running non-IP protocols, such as Novell IPX or AppleTalk, the Cisco IOS software supports generic routing encapsulation (GRE). GRE allows the encapsulation of the non-IP protocol as part of the network traffic and, as such, it is enc rypted, and a new header is appended. This approach effectively enables the non-IP protocol to "tunnel" rapidly through the IP portion of the network. When it reaches its destination, the traffic is first decrypted and then deencapsulated. This technique can also be used to hide network address and application information as encrypted payloads are transmitted across a network. Cisco plans to support other protocols in later releases of the Cisco IOS software. Encryption Methods Cisco supports the Data Encryption Standard (DES), with two key lengths. Standard DES is based on a 56-bit encryption key and is subject to U.S. State Department restrictions, as well as import/export restrictions of various countries. The second optio n supported by Cisco encryption services is based on a 40-bit key and is fully exportable. Figure 3. : Cisco IOS Encryption Implementation Cisco offers network-level encryption solutions implemented through both software and hardware. Software-Based Encryption Solutions Starting with the Cisco IOS software Version 11.2, Cisco offers users network-level encryption using DES. This feature is implemented as an extension to access lists. Cisco's software-based encryption services are available for networks running over an y media that support IP and Cisco 2500, 4XXX, 7000, and 7500 routers. Organizations that use the Cisco 7500 series or Cisco 7000 with Route/Switch Processor (RSP) series have two options: performing software-based encryption on the main RSP or offloading such encryption functions to one of the router's Versatile Interfac e Processors (VIPs) for higher performance. Hardware-Based Encryption Tools To augment the encryption support available through the Cisco IOS software, Cisco also offers a hardware accelerator for the Cisco VIP: the Encryption Port Adapter (EPA). This card, which greatly enhances the performance of Cisco's software-based encry ption services, has been jointly developed with Cylink, the company that pioneered the development of public key management systems more than a decade ago. The Cisco EPA card also meets the federal information processing standards and includes numerous security features. For example, it offers a tamper shield designed to prevent probing. In addition, the EPA has an extraction detection system that require s reauthentication if the card is removed from one router and inserted into another. Applications The following scenarios illustrate the networking applications that can benefit most from the network-level encryption now offered by the Cisco IOS software. Wide-Area Private Networking Organizations such as banks face difficulties inherent in securing information traffic between many sites, compounded by the challenges posed by their use of varied media. Link-level encryption can be difficult and costly, since its media-specific natu re would require the purchase of numerous different encryption products. In contrast, Cisco's network-level encryption, with its media-independence, provides a single, less expensive security option. Organizations can run the Cisco IOS network encryption feature in remote Cisco 2500/4XXX systems and use the Cisco 7500 and EPA to provide the higher performance required at the central site. LAN or Campus Networks Today's enterprises generally have extremely complex network environments, with multiple servers containing sensitive information dispersed throughout the network. To further complicate matters, the network often includes multiple media types, such as Ethernet, Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI), and Token Ring. In an environment with multiple paths between any two end stations, link-level encryption is unsuitable, if not impossible. Cisco's network-level encryption can offer the flexible, end-to- end approach required, allowing enterprises to choose the specific traffic they wish to encrypt within an enterprise network LAN. Public Networks/Internet Organizations that need to make a variety of information (data on stocking, ordering, and pricing, for example) available globally to their own remote sites and partners are increasingly turning to public services such as the Internet to create VPNs. F or these organizations, link-level encryption is simply not an option, because it cannot be operated across public switched networks. Since Cisco's network-level encryption can run over any media that support IP, it offers an ideal security solution for V PNs, allowing data security across a public network. Conclusion Security policies are becoming more important as enterprises make increasing use of distributed networking models. Today, to secure their network information, most enterprises must implement a broad range of approaches, including access management, fir ewalls, and host security. The Cisco IOS software security architecture addresses each of these areas. In addition, it now encompasses powerful new encryption capabilities at the network level that offer major enhancements over available link-level soluti ons and can significantly augment the security provided by any application-level encryption already in use. Posted: Mon May 6 14:03:00 PDT 1996

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Offshore Investing is Green
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From a World Bank outline on setting up "Conservation Trust Funds" to fund conservation projects. http://www-esd.worldbank.org/html/esd/env/publicat/edp/edp1107.htm "Offshore Asset Management The advantages of offshore professional asset management are many; namely, the assets can be invested in a hard currency, in a secure market, in a secure location, and in an account which is tailored to the objectives of the trust fund. Chapter 7 discusses issues of asset management. There are two mechanisms for offshore asset management. The simplest is a straightforward asset management account, opened in an OECD country or a tax haven. Most simple asset management accounts in OECD countries will be liable to pay some tax on income earned; accounts in tax havens such as the Channel Islands may therefore be more attractive. For example, an asset management agreement can be settled with an international bank in London for an account held in the bank's Channel Island subsidiary. If this method is unsuitable due to concerns of attachment, tax implications for the domestic trust, or concerns of irrevocability of the assets, a two tier system might be more appropriate. In a two-tier system, the domestic trust is a tax-exempt entity and is the sole beneficiary of the offshore trust. The offshore trust acts as the investment account and should also be tax exempt."

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