December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RSA breaking
by [0m [5m Toth 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

First i want to apologize: I'm french, my english is pretty good, but if there's some things you don't understand, don't hesitate to ask me further explanations. I'm studying computing. I've studied the RSA encription system, i know that PGP is based on RSA and o know that you give full confiance to PGP. As i and another student, have calculated, an RSA public key of a hundred numbers can't be broken with a software by the force method.(You all know that, sorry to say evidences :) ) But, cause there is a but, it can be broken by an hardware system. Gimme the money, i'll break it, a simple algorithm can be "hardwarly programmed" and with very high-tech components, the speed it can have is enough to break an RSA key. It's for me an evidence that your government has already done it, and that your dreams of privacy are maybe a good joke for some bureaucratists of the pentagon. Of course it (would) take a little time, but as soon as they have your key, it's real time for them to decrypt. One constant thing in the RSA code is that it is always faster to find a key than to break it, that's why i suggest that you find a system of russian dolls encryption with PGP that would crypt a message a lot of times. For studying computing, i know that is time to decrypt a message with the key is so small, that even if i am wrong, it won't be a loss to use a multiple encryption. I hope i don't look like a rooky for you, this letter is humblously written. Greetings, salutations.... No one is more vulnerable than the one who thinks he is, and who's wrong.

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INteresting tidbit
by JOlson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following text is an e-mail I picked up from a firewall listserver. Return-Path: <jolson3(a)netbox.com> Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 10:03:11 -0700 X-Sender: bstout(a)osc.hidata.com To: Firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM, Return requested <firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM> From: Bill Stout <bill.stout(a)hidata.com> Subject: Re: Encryption Technology Sender: firewalls-owner(a)GreatCircle.COM Real-To: Bill Stout <bill.stout(a)hidata.com> At 09:05 PM 5/22/96 -0700, Michael Dillon wrote: >... >RTFM ><SNIP - Other literary content deleted> On the Encryption note, and I swear not along the lines of the 'DOJ' and 'FBI Snooping' Big-Brother events, I heard another story recently. # begin story A person working on the MBONE project did an unannounced experiment across the internet using Triple-DES for MBONE, and the very next day, 'ATF' agents knocked on his door and warned him against exporting munitions. The experimentor was shaken by the fact that agents approached him so quickly after the experiment. # end story Extrapolations of fact: 1. Internet traffic is monitored. 2. The ability to snoop for encrypted traffic is present 3. The ability to identify encryption levels is present (How else can they differentiate DES-1 from DES-3?) 4. The ability to crack DES-1 in near real-time mode is present. (See above). 5. If above=true, then Feds dropping the Zimmerman PGP case probably also points to it also being crackable in a similar manner. 6. Using encryption only flags traffic for capture and decryption, using strong encryption makes you all that more interesting. Sorry, couldn't resist. I'll try not to start a threads about electro-plasma propulsion craft at Area 51, metallic-ceramic skin and pulse-jets on the Aurora spy plane, heat-imaging video cameras on satellites and planes that can watch you through your houses' roof, etc. :) Bill

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Statistical analysis of anonymous databases
by Clay.Olbon＠dynetics.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I ran across an interesting problem on the STAT-L mailing list. I came up with an initial solution, but it didn't fully solve the problem. I will summarize: In medical research (this particular application - there are others I am sure) it is desirable to have a large database of individual medical histories available to search for correlations, risk factors, etc. The problem, of course, is that many individuals want their medical histories kept private. It is therefore necessary to maintain a database that is not traceable back to individuals. An additional requirement is that people must be able to add additional information to their records as it becomes available. The researcher who initially posed the question suggested adding random data to "encrypt anonymity". My first cut solution was to hash the individual's name (perhaps including some other info or random info to thwart dictionary attacks) and send the records in under the hashed name. If done correctly, this should protect the anonymity of the record. The problem with this is that with the volume of data available in a medical record, it is very probable that a person could be tied to that record. Does anyone have any insights into this problem? <disclaimer> This is of purely academic interest to me, I don't know the person who asked the intial question (other than through email). It just sounds like a neat problem. </disclaimer> Clay --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Clay Olbon II | Clay.Olbon(a)dynetics.com Systems Engineer | ph: (810) 589-9930 fax 9934 Dynetics, Inc., Ste 302 | http://www.msen.com/~olbon/olbon.html 550 Stephenson Hwy | PGP262 public key: on web page Troy, MI 48083-1109 | pgp print: B97397AD50233C77523FD058BD1BB7C0 TANSTAAFL ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Re: RSA breaking
by [0m [5m Toth 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Yes, RSA can be "broken" if enough computer power is thrown at a small key, > but what you wrote is not proof that PGP is "broken". PGP is completely based on RSA, break RSA, it's breaking PGP at the same time. >What size of key are you talking about? I said a hundred numbers key, but it can be applied on more, course a thousand, even 200 or 300 seems quite impossible in matter of time. >How much hardware? Difficult to evaluate, as long as it is not really my way(it's programming), but it's kite simple to make hardware from algorithms, just with an optimized eratosten crible(it's the name in french, i don't know the translation, but you'll certainly understand). >How much cost? Hard to evaluate, an infinite amount of money(i mean in matter of research) would be enough, sure that only a big lab, or a government can support this, but as soon as built, the breaking box is of no price. >Please back it up with some numbers. For the cost, i can't evaluate, for the time, i'll calculate tonight, and will send results tomorrow. Sincerely yours, Eric PS: Hope not everyone will take my mail as bad as you think to take it, a thousands pardon if i misunderstood(or you), but it's quite hard for me to follow in English, and to explain with full subtility.

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Quantum Logic Gates
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As complement to the ONE_two article on the NIST team's latest work on quantum logic gates, we note that Malcolm Browne also reported last August on parallel work at MIT. We have put that article (keyed then as CAT_tal) at our rickety Web site: http://pwp/usa.pipeline.com/~jya/cattal.txt Also, Signal magazine reported on this area of research in its April 1996 issue at: http://www.us.net/signal/CurrentIssue/April/ Quantum-apr.html

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Re: Re: RSA breaking
by [0m [5m Toth 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> System of Russian dolls? What would you suggest? My idea(it is not me that found that) is that tou could have many public keys, when someone want to send you something, he just mail you his(or her) keys, and then you encrypt with the first key, then with the second, etc... This system is used by some anonymous remailers: Each one has a key, you encript your text with the key of the last remailer, then you put your text, the adress of the people tou want the letter to be sent, then encrypt it with the key of the before the last remailer, and put the adress to be sent of the last remailer, etc So your letter is decripted by the first remailer, then sent to the adress found, then the second remailer decrypts it, etc, like an onion. The fact is that you can obtain a very good privacy if you have some keymaker programm. Let suppose you want to send me a crypted text(don't, it's forbidden to crypt in france), you mail to my remailer, that choose 1000(arbitrary number) keys, that send it to you, crypted with your key, you crypt your text the necessary number of times. This way, the message will be maybe uncrypted by someone, but if the key change for each message, someone can't find your key, i insist on this danger, having one key is useless as soon as someone found it. >What kind of system do you think would be needed to crack RSA coded messages? As i said, it is impossible to break an RSA code with softwares, the best attempt was 25 days with ten Crays linked for a key of only 50 numbers. But this can be done as i said before with a simple eratosten crible "translated" into hardware. Sorry electronic is not my way, but for the exemples i saw in class, it is really to the ability of a basic electronician, and they were more complicated than what i am talking about. The best components you have, the faster you'll go, so a governement or a bog private lab can afford this kind of prices.

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WSJ on "IRS-bashing"
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to WSJ, Leslie B. Samuels, "Treasury's top tax-policy official" says that "IRS-bashing is 'counterproductive and harmful'" -- and that "destructive rhetoric ... hurts the tax system and society" [elisions are the WSJ's] What if a the CDA grew little by little by little until it covered statements deemed "destructive rhetoric" .... hmmm. I mean after all, if it harms society....! Let's see ... Treasury: BATF. Key Escrow. GAK, anyone? ;) keep up the good work.

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Re: Clipper III analysis
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:57 AM 5/30/96, jonathon wrote: .... > It is a specialty within the QDE Field, but there are a few > QDE's that are _currently_ doing that. << Printed hard copy, > not electronic copy, but that is the _only_ difference. >> > >> I would be very interested to hear how a "Questioned Document Examiner" can > > It is at the point where statistics, textual analysis, grammar > and lingustics converge. > >> possibly determine that a digital signature was not applied by a particular >> person. > > I don't remember the minimum number of characters that are needed > to establish that a document was written by a specific individual. > Roughly fifteen pages of text that both sides admit as being > authentic is required for the undisputed exemplars. Ah, but the issue of who _signs_ a document is fundamentally and importantly different from the issue of who _wrote_ the document. If I have allegedly _signed_ a contract, who cares if exhaustive analysis reveals it to have been _written_ with 77.93% probability by Irving J. Shlublutz, CPA for State Farm Insurance Compance? The issue with digital signatures is who _signed_ a document, not who _wrote_ a document. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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UNV_eil
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

21+C, Scanning the Future (UK), February, 1996: "Dataveillance." A global trend is emerging toward citizen surveillance. While authorities speak of the need for data regulation and people become digital shadows, watchdogs are doing some monitoring of their won. With interviews of Phil Agre, Roger Clarke and Simon Davies on invasive and privacy technology. These technologies face an uphill public relations battle. Digital cash has already been widely accused of providing money launderers, drug barons and other criminals with the perfect means of continuing their activities. It's the same argument that was used in the Clipper Chip debate, in which the US government proposed a central encryption software, and it will no doubt be directed towards pseudonymous techniques as they emerge. Simon Davies is familiar with this type of argument. He says there has been a change of political winds in recent years. Where once privacy was used to protect individual freedoms it is now officially deemed by governments and corporations to be an aid to criminals and a barrier to administrative efficiency. "In a generation, we now have privacy as almost like an ancient forgotten wisdom," he says. Then he adds: "The point that needs to be made very clear is that technology has been misused. It always did have the capacity, the capability to be a friend to people. Instead, it has become a potential tool of enslavement. And it has rendered society vulnerable on a scale that has never been seen before. It is technologists and politicians and financiers who have misused the technology and should be brought to account for it." UNV_eil

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Re: Clipper III analysis
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:54 AM 5/29/96, jonathon wrote: > A good Questioned Document Examiner will be able to demonstrate > that the signed document in question was not authored by Joe > Blow, even if it contains his digital signature. I was of course talking about digital signatures, not handwritten signatures. I would be very interested to hear how a "Questioned Document Examiner" can possibly determine that a digital signature was not applied by a particular person. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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