December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: cypherpunks vs hacker
by pjn＠nworks.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It is interesting to note that while both groups have opposite > objectives (Hackers want all information free, where cypherpunks want > everbody to be able to have privacy), and yet in there own ways, they > are both right. In> I don't entirely agree with this. I think both groups want In> information to be free, but also want people to be able to have In> privacy. Most hackers (used in the sense of people who break into In> computers) attack computers owned by such companies as TRW and the In> phone companies. Both of these systems have little regard for privacy. In> Most non-malicious hackers promote system security, but at the same In> time, don't like government-controlled monopolies and agencies to be In> able to keep secret information that should be free. A very In> interesting paper by Dorothy Denning (she used to be regarded very In> highly by the hacker community before she started to support Clipper) In> expresses some of the concerns and morals of hackers. It's called In> "Concerning Hackers Who Break Into Computer Systems" and is in Phrack In> issue 32. > I have read the file (I have all Phracks from the beginning. Crypt is good too, but they dont have the same level of information as Phrack) and I though that it was very inciteful (sp). > I think what we need to define is the diffrence between hackers and > crackers. A hacker breaks into a computer like a cracker (but the > similarities end there). The hacker just want to look and learn, > possably "map out" the system just to see how everything works with > everything else. Crackers break into computers for the sake of > destroying or stealing information or the system itself. In> That's debatable. I think many people incorrectly consider these In> terms to be mutually exclusive. There are many hackers (used in the In> sense defined in the Jargon File) who also break into systems and could In> therefore be considered crackers also. Most hackers definitely have In> the knowledge to break into computer systems, but many crackers aren't In> very well versed in programming and learn how to break into computers In> by using canned programs and G-files. I am saying that hackers do break into computers, but crackers are more malicious in their intent. And yes, pathetic hackers rely on programs. I have respect for hackers who do all the work themselfs. > > Both cypherpunks and hackers think that the government is wrong > in many things that they do. In> Agreed. P.J. pjn(a)nworks.com ... Sorry, the dog ate my Blue Wave packet. ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 [NR]

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Re: A Libertine Question
by Seth I. Rich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>My opinions are just that, MINE but here's a question .. You mean "libertarian" -- not "libertine". Got me all hopeful for something juicy and fun. Seth --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Seth I. Rich - seth(a)hygnet.com "Info-Puritan elitist crapola!!" Systems Administrator / Webmaster, HYGNet (pbeilard(a)direct.ca) Rabbits on walls, no problem.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 alpha) (flame replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 29 Jul 96 6:47:32 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nymrod nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com ######*-**-+ 13:54 100.00% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *####*#*##+* 2:27 100.00% replay remailer(a)replay.com *+********** 4:59 100.00% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ---+----+--+ 1:46:21 99.98% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ####*#####+# 1:44 99.97% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org -+*++++*++++ 1:43:56 99.94% c2 remail(a)c2.org -+++*+++++++ 1:53:47 99.89% winsock winsock(a)c2.org --..-- 7:27:06 99.89% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net -+---++-+--- 3:36:15 99.85% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com *#*#***-*#-* 18:48 99.84% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++++++ + 38:33 99.61% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ----------- 9:09:35 99.57% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +##+#+*###+* 3:57 99.38% ncognito ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -.-_...--. 16:44:18 99.15% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ---++---- - 3:24:07 98.92% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com + +++++++++ 44:40 97.98% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com *******+**** 30:09 97.48% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---------- 9:40:29 93.46% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ***** *** 18:42 76.47% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net 4:18:14 4.27% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Secure drive?
by Geoffrey C. Grabow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings all, Does anyone know if the 1.4a version works correctly with Win95? If not, is there an updated version? If not, will there be one anytime soon? If not, will PGPLIB (aka PGP3.0) provide a similar function? If not... heck! G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | Great people talk about ideas. | | Oyster Bay, New York | Average people talk about things. | | gcg(a)pb.net | Small people talk about people. | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------| |That which does not kill us, makes us stranger. - Trevor Goodchild | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: "privatizing" phones?
by Geoffrey C. Grabow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:26 07/28/96 +0200, Remo Pini wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Date: Sun Jul 28 12:24:57 1996 >> Even if they did change the frequency the call was on, >> it would be a simple matter to decode how the frequency >> change was negotiated, and "follow" the call (also easily >> accomplished with cellular calls). Failing that, there is >> a very limited range of frequencies allocated for cordless >> fones, and simply re-scanning for the conversation is a >> trivial inconvenience. //cerridwyn// >> > >Most of those systems do also change the order of the transmitted data, and >that's not limited to a few possibilities. If it's digital, they usually >encrypt it (only weak, but hey, you normally have to find the key real >time!) >> The key doesn't need to be found in real time! You can always record the call and decrypt it later. If the information deals with an event in the future, you could have plenty of time to crack it. G.C.G.

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(Don't laugh *too* hard now...) "Filter"software for moneylaundering
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Encoding: 17 TEXT Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 16:06:53 +-200 Reply-To: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> Sender: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> From: Andrzej Adamski <aadamski(a)CC.UNI.TORUN.PL> Subject: "Filter"software for money laundering Comments: cc: "comcri-l(a)man.torun.pl" <comcri-l(a)man.torun.pl>, "lacc(a)suburbia.net" <lacc(a)suburbia.net> To: Multiple recipients of list CYBERIA-L <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> Sorry for cross-posting this message: Dear All, Are you familiar with any software or any listing of producers of software to be used in tracking money-laundering? If so, let me know. Regards, Andrzej Adamski Chair of Criminal Law & Criminal Policy Nicolas Copernicus Univwersity 87-100 Torun, Poland aadamski(a)cc.uni.torun.pl --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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RE: Implementing DSS Fortezza KEA
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- From: source@iaccess.za[SMTP:source@iaccess.za] Sent: Monday, July 29, 1996 7:05 AM To: coderpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Implementing DSS Fortezza KEA We have almost completed our SSL 3.0 implementation, and are looking for the specs on Fortezza DSS and KEA and would like to know where it is available. >From the US National Security Agency. As another respondee said, the details of KEA are not available, but information on implementation of the protocol is. It's in the public domain.

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call your rep
by L Jean Camp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>the Senate commerce committee held its final >>hearing on Burns's bill yesterday with the appearance >>of FBI Director Freeh and Bill Reinsch at Dept of Commerce. >>The Senate committee would like to hold a mark-up on >>the bill (Pro-CODE) next week, but lack the certain votes of the members >>of the committee to do so. >> >>Expressions of support for S. 1726 to critical Democrats >>and Republicans are needed--especially: >> Olympia Snowe, R-Maine, 224-5344; Bill Frist, R-Tennessee >>224-3344; Spencer Abraham, R-Michigan 224-4822; Ernest >>Hollings, D-South Carolina, 224-6121; Daniel Inouye D-Hawaii >>224-3934; Wendell Ford D-Kentucky 224-4343; James Exon, >>D-Nebraska 224-4224; Jay Rockefeller D-West Virginia 224-6472; >>John Kerry D-Massachusetts 224-2742; John Breaux D-Louisiana >>224-4623; Richard Bryan D-Nevada 224-6244; Byron Dorgan >>D-North Darkota 224-2551. >> >>Calls are needed by Tuesday in order to schedule the mark-up. >>

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Re: Digital Watermarks for copy protection in recent Billbo
by Alex F 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Jim Choate <ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com> writes: > You want a continuous Fourier transform, not a discrete one, to > determine the frequency spectrum of the waveform being sampled. > The FFT is simply an algorithm for computing the DFT without > redundant computation. In general, any Lebesgue integrable > complex function will have a Fourier transform, even one with a > finite number of discontinuities. The reverse transform will > faithfully reproduce the function, modulo the usual caveats about > function spaces and sets of measure zero. > Well of course! My thoughts exactly. Great minds think alike. Now, would you mind doing a little translation (for the laymen), since I didn't understand? I appreciate it, Alex F =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Alex F alexf(a)iss.net Marketing Specialist Internet Security Systems =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

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Re: Publicly Verifiable Anonymous Voting System
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:53 27/07/96 -0700, JonWienk(a)ix.netcom.com wrote: >Here is the how the voting system works. > >1. All voting information (public keys, ballots, ballot signatures, etc.) is >publicly available via a Web site or other similar means, and can be downloaded ... One problem with such a system is sheer complexity. Even an illiterate person must be convinced of the transparency of the system, i.e. that his/her vote "counts". In the conventional system, where you mark a piece of paper that goes into a locked box watched over by reps of the rival parties, which you can subsequently view being opened and processed, you intuitively understand how the system works. This was one of our arguments (not, admittedly, our strongest) against electronic voting when they sought to introduce it in 1989 for the Indian federal elections -- further details on http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/evmsunob.htm Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ finger amehta(a)cerfnet.com for public key

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