December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Prof Shamir arrested
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi Jim! Could you please tell me where I could find more about it? Is there a URL presenting the story? Did you broadcast the story to other groups? On 21 Oct 96 at 14:34, jim bell wrote: > Further recall that the so-called "Bit Tax" idea, the one most recently > proposed by that Belgian (?) Luc Soete, would apparently require that any data > transmitter keep account of any data it sends, in order to collect some sort > of tax, and thus any mistake in the count (either as a result of > misinterpretation of the rules, or a disk crash, or a power surge, etc) would > presumably turn a minor error into "tax fraud," or maybe they'll call it "bit > fraud." There is one other thing that you probably saw but did not point out: At least here in North America, networks and cables are *privately* owned. A bit tax would thus tax the use of private property by it's ownner. That is going a bit far! Also, the only one who could file for fraud is the owner. Otherwise, I could file a complaint and charge you for fraud that there are too much fart marks in your underwear... Or maybe they could institute a spoon and fork tax. Or a comma or alphabet tax, why not since it is in the same line? This is absolutely absurd and anybody planning such a scheme has *much more* than innocent intentions in mind. Ciao jfa - -- Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest of Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing. PGP encryption keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAgUBMmu/r8iycyXFit0NAQEePQf/TPFiji22lXaInCLXlYXJcJL+e8sHgk+r JXJ6n+54R81rJMTCOh6pSI/KzckXoBVpu8YEUTh46XcZICldzJGF1C5wHca9uJy9 MebhB+ccAAwxjELTbbSTUTYh/1cIHyJiucY6h3Vy/q3TAu3tJx5H248EAOvr21wc pfBp9nqAsC+WlHku1uhmOj9JbErGIhxW9rISYHNOQiCfIl1z1DPxVtac0zptG0Br Z8WDRQsOdXB6Efo8/n9oEdpJt5MaUgZdW1Ocz+bLsvQ6LdmfG5KenGYd4vW2nn2y 8tDdB9BOW5FMUFBatw7vfANOhT3O52paZ0qDJRAsJRG069MgfcrRdA== =ROpW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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(Fwd) Re: Prof Shamir arrested
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi Jim! Could you please tell me where I could find more about it? Is there a URL presenting the story? Did you broadcast the story to other groups? On 21 Oct 96 at 14:34, jim bell wrote: > Further recall that the so-called "Bit Tax" idea, the one most recently > proposed by that Belgian (?) Luc Soete, would apparently require that any data > transmitter keep account of any data it sends, in order to collect some sort > of tax, and thus any mistake in the count (either as a result of > misinterpretation of the rules, or a disk crash, or a power surge, etc) would > presumably turn a minor error into "tax fraud," or maybe they'll call it "bit > fraud." There is one other thing that you probably saw but did not point out: At least here in North America, networks and cables are *privately* owned. A bit tax would thus tax the use of private property by it's ownner. That is going a bit far! Also, the only one who could file for fraud is the owner. Otherwise, I could file a complaint and charge you for fraud that there are too much fart marks in your underwear... Or maybe they could institute a spoon and fork tax. Or a comma or alphabet tax, why not since it is in the same line? This is absolutely absurd and anybody planning such a scheme has *much more* than innocent intentions in mind. Ciao jfa - -- Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest of Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing. PGP encryption keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAgUBMmu/r8iycyXFit0NAQEePQf/TPFiji22lXaInCLXlYXJcJL+e8sHgk+r JXJ6n+54R81rJMTCOh6pSI/KzckXoBVpu8YEUTh46XcZICldzJGF1C5wHca9uJy9 MebhB+ccAAwxjELTbbSTUTYh/1cIHyJiucY6h3Vy/q3TAu3tJx5H248EAOvr21wc pfBp9nqAsC+WlHku1uhmOj9JbErGIhxW9rISYHNOQiCfIl1z1DPxVtac0zptG0Br Z8WDRQsOdXB6Efo8/n9oEdpJt5MaUgZdW1Ocz+bLsvQ6LdmfG5KenGYd4vW2nn2y 8tDdB9BOW5FMUFBatw7vfANOhT3O52paZ0qDJRAsJRG069MgfcrRdA== =ROpW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Usenet and Re: extortion via digital cash
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:34 AM 10/20/96 -0400, Scott McGuire wrote: >"Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >> At 11:01 PM -0400 10/15/96, Rabid Wombat wrote: >> >> >Also - in order to communicate back to the perpetrator, the victim needs >> >to communicate to the first step in the chain. The operator of that chain >> >> BlackNet-type pools eliminate the chain. There is no "first step in the >> chain," only a message pool or Usenet group which is propagated to tens of >> thousands of sites around the world (and even available via one's satellite >> dish and local cable, a la DirectPC, @Home, etc.). >> > >I've been thinking about the use of Usenet as a message pool and this seems to >be a good place to bring up my thoughts. As an already existing, widely >disseminated and easily used message pool, Usenet is very valuable to us. I'm >concerned that it may not last though. Many people now complain about how low >the signal to noise ratio is (even more than they complain about this list). >I've heard people say that they have given up on newsgroups in favor of mailing >list, web-zines, etc. So, if it gets too bad, might it just fade away? Or, if >it remains but becomes unpopular, will it be easy to restrict if we use it for >anonymous messages? What's needed is a method for an individual to read all of Usenet, and more, without anybody else knowing what each individual is reading. It's been mentioned before that on the back of those DSS boxes there's a connector which is supposed to eventually be able to provide computer data. Somebody mentioned that the data rate of Usenet is 100 megabytes per day. That works out to just about 9300 bits per second, continuous. That's probably only about 1/1000th of the data required to represent a NTSC video picture, and so it's about 1/100,000th of the data rate of the dish. I don't know the economics of this service in any detail, but if we assume 2 million such dishes generating about $1 of revenue per day, 1/100,000 of this revenue is about $20 per day. Obviously, the cost of this bandwidth is miniscule compared with the number of people who might want to use it. Sure, they're not just going to carry Usetnet, of course; they'd probably carry email and other services as well. However, many of the higher-bandwidth-consuming uses of the Internet will involve one-to-many broadcasting, which could be more easily provided by a dedicated satellite connection. Further, the company selling the dishes has a powerful motivation to make its product as useful as possible, since many people currently served by cable systems may have little reason to switch over absent a new feature. Given the low cost of this, there should always be enough bandwidth to implement some sort of blacknet-type system. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Radikal in English
by silenced＠meaning.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rough English translations of issues 153 and 154 of _Radikal_, a German newspaper from-and for-the radikal/autonomous left, are now available at: http://www.meaning.com/library/radikal/ The newspaper has been banned by the German government. I have no connection with the organization and had never heard of them prior to the German government's attempted blocking of xs4all.nl. -silenced (silenced(a)meaning.com)

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Stopping the buying of candidates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:24 AM 10/17/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > >There are several swirling threads about the development of crypto systems >(e.g., "binding cryptography," "key recovery," "one-way traceable e-cash") >that are designed to allow law enforcement some ability to track illegal >transactions, catch some criminals, etc. One of the other items on my wish-list (short of a more, uh, "permanent" solution to politics) is a system to actually enforce the anonymity of political donations. What I mean is this: As bad as a large political contribution is, what's worse is that the candidate who receives it knows who it is from, and how large it is, etc. Given the recent flap over the Indonesian donations to the DNC, it seems to me that it would actually clean up politics if there were a mechanism to collect donations, blind them and send them to the proper candidate, but hide the actual source of that money. Hide it from the candidates, not necessarily the anyone else. This may sound difficult. After all, it will be argued that a given contributor will want to take credit for a donation and tell those who receive it; one way to help avoid this is the assess huge penalities (say, 10 times the value of the contribution claimed) to the party or candidate who is told of the source of a contribution but does not report the breach of security. The system could be set up to actually encourage people to test it and report fraud, and perhaps be awarded anonymously for providing evidence of misbehavior; and people should be able to (falsely) claim credit for donations, at least to the candidates themselves. Any donation reported to a candidate must be declared by the candidate and is then lost; their motivation for reporting it is that it'll be lost 10x if they don't. The result should be that the candidates should have no idea where the money is actually coming from, only that they are getting it. The contributors should be able to verify (via some sort of encrypted-open-books system) that the money they donate is actually being credited to the candidates, but they should not be able to use this system to prove to the candidate they made the contribution. I really wish those people who are developing that "binding cryptography" proposal would change their minds and decide to work on a proposal such as this, one that might actually help fix the political money problem. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Fan mail from John Gilmore
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Message-Id: <199610220113.SAA19070(a)toad.com> >X-Authentication-Warning: toad.com: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use HELO protocol >To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com, gnu(a)toad.com >Subject: Please stop the off-topic and insulting posts in cypherpunks >Date: Mon, 21 Oct 1996 18:13:22 -0700 >From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> > >Whatever good opinion I had of you is quickly disappearing. You seem >to either have no self-control or you have decided not to exert it. > >If you plan to continue your current course, I suggest that instead, >you leave the cypherpunks list(s) and find somewhere else to vent your >anguish. Perhaps there is a place where people will care to hear what >you have to say. > >Thanks, > > John Gilmore

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Re: ANother Timmy May clone
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com writes: > This is the second time you've posted this. > It's an amusing product, if you like snake-oil, and more people would > have read your article if it didn't include gratuitous insults, > especially in the title. > > At 07:30 PM 10/20/96 -0400, you wrote: > >Timmy-May-style pseudo-crypto: ... I'm responding to the list since others may noticed the same: I did not post this article twice. I was surprised to see that it came back from toad.com to me twice. Some glitch much have caused is to be duplicated. Hasn't happened to any other articles... Sorry about that. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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INFO:Congress continues to push hard in the pro-encryption fight! (10/20/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| LETTER FROM 20 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON NEW CLIPPER PLAN LETTER TO THE NET FROM SENATOR CONRAD BURNS (R-MT) LAW ENFORCEMENT NOW TRACKING CRIMES INVOLVING ENCRYPTION http://www.crypto.com/ Date: October 21, 1996 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com If you redistribute this, please do so in its entirety, with the banner intact. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents Introduction Letter from 20 members of Congress on new Clipper plan Letter to the net from Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT) Law enforcement now tracking crimes involving encryption How to receive crypto-news Press contacts ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION As we look back at the last legislative session, it is amazing the progress we've made. As we build supporters for the pro-encryption forces in Congress we move the ball farther down the field. If you called, wrote, testified, or even just stayed involved in the issue this year, realize that you've made a significant difference in the way this issue went. It's not the end, though. We get a break for a couple of weeks and then Congress will be back, and ready to take up this issue again. Pro-encryption activists are gearing up the "My Lock, My Key" campaign for next year's fight. You can help by ensuring that you have told us who your member of Congress is. You never know, you might get a call or an email from one of us to help convince your legislator about the benefits of privacy and encryption! Participate in the "My Lock, My Key" Adopt-Your-Legislator campaign at http://www.crypto.com ! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- LETTER FROM 20 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON NEW CLIPPER PLAN Congress of the United States Washington, D.C. 20515 October 15,1996 The Honorable Michael Kantor Secretary Department of Commerce Washington, D.C. 20230 Dear Secretary: We write to express our serious concerns about the Administration's most recent policy announcement on export restrictions on encryption technology. First we agree with the October 4, 1996, New York Times editorial that characterized the Administration's plan as "needlessly restrictive and probably unworkable" and (though better than previous Administration proposal) "risks doing more harm than good." We recognize that this issue involves a careful balancing of commercial, consumer, law enforcement and national security considerations. However, the well-respected 1996 report by the National Research Council on this matter emphasized that U.S. law enforcement and national security would be enhanced -- not weakened -- by broader use of stronger U.S. encryption technologies both at home and abroad. Furthermore, the report stressed that efforts to control international trade in encryption technologies will only be effective if implemented on a comprehensive, multilateral basis. Unfortunately, the Administration's most recent encryption initiative shortchanges both U.S. business and law enforcement interests. The proposal is flawed for four reasons: it fails to recognize that top-down, government-imposed policies are doomed to defeat: export policies must be directly linked, or indexed, to advances in technology; export controls must be fully multilateral in order to be effective; and export control decisions will be further delayed by granting the FBI new veto authority over U.S. exports. We fear these defects will continue to leave U.S. companies at a disadvantage in the world market, leave users of U.S. encryption uncertain about the security of their information and leave U.S. law enforcement and national security agencies behind the cryptography-curve. Although we were not consulted in the formulation of this policy, we nevertheless hope that in the coming months you will work with us and industry, consumer and user groups to refine it further. In addition to conducting oversight hearing in the next Congress on the Administration's proposal, we also want to assure you that we will continue to pursue legislative solutions toward this end. Sincerely, [signed] Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) Sen. Conrad Burns (R-MT) Sen. Trent Lott (R-MS) Sen. Larry Pressler (R-SD) Sen. Lauch Faircloth (R-NC) Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) Sen. Pete Domenici (R-NM) Sen. John Ashcroft (R-MO) Sen. Alan Simpson(R-WY) Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA) Sen. Don Nickles (R-OK) Sen. Larry Craig (R-ID) Sen. Craig Thomas (R-WY) Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) Rep. Sonny Bono (R-CA) Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC) Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH) Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) Rep. Bob Barr (R-GA) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- LETTER TO THE NET FROM SENATOR CONRAD BURNS (R-MT) [We were informed that this net was for the net community, not specifically for Jonah Seiger. We bring it to you. -Shabbir] >From Conrad_Burns(a)burns.senate.gov Fri Oct 18 17:35:35 1996 >Date: Fri, 18 Oct 96 17:49:32 EST >To: jseiger(a)cdt.org >Subject: To Interested Members of the Internet Community: I am writing to thank you for all your help and support of my effort this year to pass legislation to enhance privacy and security on the Internet. As you all know by now, the 104th Congress adjourned before it had a chance to act on S. 1726, the Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era Act of 1996. The bill, which was co-sponsored by Senators Leahy (D-VT), Pressler (R-SD), Lott (R-MS), Wyden (D-OR) and many other Senators from both parties, would have encouraged the widespread availability of strong, easy to use privacy and security tools for Internet Users. Although the Senate was not able to act on Pro-CODE this year, our efforts have laid the groundwork for real reform of US encryption policy in the 105th Congress. And despite significant opposition from the administration, Netizens had a significant impact on the Congressional debate on the encryption issue. I am honored to have helped to arrange the first ever Cybercasts of Congressional hearings, and I enjoyed the many online discussions I had with Netizens. Together, we have helped to show the Congress that the Internet user community can and should have a voice in debates over critical Internet policy issues. Finally, just days before adjournment, the Administration announced yet another encryption policy initiative. The proposal continues to insist on key escrow as a condition for lifting encryption export controls, and raises numerous questions about privacy and competitiveness. This debate is not over by any stretch of the imagination. I intend to move forward on pro-encryption legislation soon after the 105th Congress begins in January. You can find out more about this issue by visiting my web site (http://www.senate.gov/~burns) You can also visit the Encryption Policy Resource Page (http://www.crypto.com/) and the Internet Policy Coalition page (http://www.privacy.org/ipc/) Set up by experts to provide resources on the encryption policy debate, these sites also contain information on how you can get more involved. Thanks again for all your support. Next year, with your help, we can reach a commonsense solution to the critical policy crisis on encryption. Sincerely, U. S. Senator Conrad Burns ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- LAW ENFORCEMENT NOW TRACKING CRIMES INVOLVING ENCRYPTION [This was forwarded to us by one of our many encryption supporters with a stronger legal background. The summary of it seems to be that someone has decided to start tracking at crimes that involve encryption. Expect these numbers to be used against us next year in the debate over crypto. -Shabbir] >From:XXXXXXXXXX Check out title V of HR 3723, just signed into law by Clinton. It expressly directs that a) all criminal presentence reports (the written story-line/history given to the judge on which the sentence is calculated) shall include info on whether crypto was used to obstruct justice/commit crime, and b) the Sentencing Comm'n (the folks who write the rules) start looking at this issue, almost surely with a view to eventually writing Guidelines that would bump up sentences of perps who made the mistake of using crypto. Other parts of the bill make various changes -- I can't tell how substantial -- to sec. 1030, the main do-not-hack/crack statute. I'm not worried about this right now, since what little I've seen looks fairly cosmetic. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO RECEIVE CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo(a)panix.com with "unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir(a)vtw.org Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger(a)cdt.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news =============================================================================

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CDT Policy Post 2.36 - Congress Promises Action on Encryption Next Year
by Bob Palacios 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----------------------------------------------------------------------------- _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 2, Number 36 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 36 October 22, 1996 CONTENTS: (1) Crypto Wrap-Up (2) Senator Burns' Sends Open Letter to Net Community (3) Bi-Partisan Group of 20 Members of Congress Raise Questions about Administration's Latest Encryption Initiative (4) How to Subscribe/Unsubscribe (5) About CDT, contacting us ** This document may be redistributed freely with this banner intact ** Excerpts may be re-posted with permission of <editor(a)cdt.org> ** This document looks best when viewed in COURIER font ** ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) END OF SESSION WRAP-UP OF CRYPTO POLICY REFORM EFFORTS In two letters released this week, Members of Congress have promised to renew their efforts to reform US encryption policy when Congress returns in January. An open letter to the Internet Community from Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT), along with a letter from 20 Republican and Democratic members of both the House and Senate sent to Commerce Secretary Mickey Kantor on October 15, are attached below. The letters cap off an active year in which the Internet community made real progress towards reforming US encryption policy to promote privacy and security on the Internet. While the Administration continues to promote key escrow and export controls, a growing segment of Congress has recognized the importance of encryption policy reform to the viability of the Internet and the future of privacy in the information age. This growing bi-partisan support, along with an increasingly mobilized Net community, has resulted in several significant accomplishments: * Three bills designed to promote privacy and security on the Internet were introduced in the House and Senate: - The Burns/Leahy "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act" (S. 1587) - The Goodlatte/Eshoo "Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act" (HR 3011), and - The Burns/Leahy/Pressler "Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act" (S. 1726). The bills, which would have relaxed export controls on encryption technology and prevented the government from imposing "key-escrow" schemes domestically, enjoyed broad bi-partisan support. * Congress held four hearings on encryption reform legislation, and heard testimony from privacy advocates, cryptographers, computer industry leaders, and others. These hearings provided a critical opportunity for the Internet community to make its case on the need for encryption policy reform. * Through online forums and the first ever cybercasts of Congressional encryption hearings, the voice of the Internet user community is finally beginning to be heard in Congress, and is helping to educate the Congress about the importance of encryption. * The Adopt your Legislator Campaign (http://www.crypto.com/) is linking Netizens with members of Congress to create a dialogue about the encryption issue. * Nearly 9000 Netizens have signed the online petition (http://www.crypto.com/petition) in support of encryption policy reform. * Leaders from the computer and communications industry joined with members of Congress, public interest organizations from across the political specturm, and the Internet community in Stanford California on July 1 to raise awareness about the need for encryption policy reform. * Other developments include progress on three ongoing legal challenges to the encryption export controls, efforts by privacy advocates to impact the encryption debate in the international encryption policies through the OECD, and the long awaited National Research Council Report which criticized current US encryption policy as "failing to meet the needs of an information age society." Despite these accomplishments, supporters of encryption policy reform still have a long way to go. In late October, the Clinton Administration announced yet another encryption policy initiative relying on export controls and "key-recovery" systems. As the Administration continues to push its plans to satisfy law enforcement concerns, the Internet community must be ready to work hard to protect privacy and security on the Internet. Fortunately, as a result of our efforts this year, we have strong and supportive allies in Congress. When Congress returns in January, expect a renewed effort to enact serious encryption policy reform legislation. With your help, we can ensure that the Internet develops into a secure platform for free expression, commerce, and privacy. WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW: Congress and the Administration are now focused on the elections. Help raise the voice of the Internet community and educate our elected officials about the importance of privacy and security on the Internet. * ADOPT YOUR LEGISLATOR - Join an innovative online campaign designed to help Netizens create an ongoing dialogue with their elected officials on critical Internet policy issues like encryption policy reform http://www.crypto.com/adopt/adopt.cgi?genre=crypto * SIGN THE PETITION - Add your name to the online petition and join the fight for privacy and security on the Internet. Nearly 9000 Netizens have signed on so far. http://www.crypto.com/petition/ ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (2) AN OPEN LETTER TO THE INTERNET COMMUNITY FROM SENATOR BURNS Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT), who along with Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) led the fight this year for the Pro-CODE bill, asked us to forward the following letter to the Internet community: X-POP3-Rcpt: jseiger@mailserver From: Conrad_Burns(a)burns.senate.gov Date: Fri, 18 Oct 96 17:49:32 EST To: jseiger(a)cdt.org Subject: To Interested Members of the Internet Community: I am writing to thank you for all your help and support of my effort this year to pass legislation to enhance privacy and security on the Internet. As you all know by now, the 104th Congress adjourned before it had a chance to act on S. 1726, the Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era Act of 1996. The bill, which was co-sponsored by Senators Leahy (D-VT), Pressler (R-SD), Lott (R-MS), Wyden (D-OR) and many other Senators from both parties, would have encouraged the widespread availability of strong, easy to use privacy and security tools for Internet Users. Although the Senate was not able to act on Pro-CODE this year, our efforts have laid the groundwork for real reform of US encryption policy in the 105th Congress. And despite significant opposition from the administration, Netizens had a significant impact on the Congressional debate on the encryption issue. I am honored to have helped to arrange the first ever Cybercasts of Congressional hearings, and I enjoyed the many online discussions I had with Netizens. Together, we have helped to show the Congress that the Internet user community can and should have a voice in debates over critical Internet policy issues. Finally, just days before adjournment, the Administration announced yet another encryption policy initiative. The proposal continues to insist on key escrow as a condition for lifting encryption export controls, and raises numerous questions about privacy and competitiveness. This debate is not over by any stretch of the imagination. I intend to move forward on pro-encryption legislation soon after the 105th Congress begins in January. You can find out more about this issue by visiting my web site (http://www.senate.gov/~burns) You can also visit the Encryption Policy Resource Page (http://www.crypto.com/) and the Internet Policy Coalition page (http://www.privacy.org/ipc/) Set up by experts to provide resources on the encryption policy debate, these sites also contain information on how you can get more involved. Thanks again for all your support. Next year, with your help, we can reach a commonsense solution to the critical policy crisis on encryption. Sincerely, U. S. Senator Conrad Burns ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (3) BI-PARTISAN GROUP OF 20 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT ADMINISTRATION'S LATEST ENCRYPTION INITIATIVE Last week, a bi-partisan group of 20 members from both houses of Congress sent the attached letter to Commerce Secretary Mickey Kantor expressing their concerns about the Administration's latest encryption policy initiative (see http://www.cdt.org/crypto for details). The members, many of whom were co-sponsors of the Burns/Leahy Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era "Pro-CODE" Act (S. 1726) or the Goodlatte/Eshoo Security and Freedom through Encryption "SAFE" Act (HR. 3011), called the latest administration effort "flawed" and pledged to continue to pursue legislation to reform US encryption policy. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Congress of the United States Washington, D.C. 20515 October 15, 1996 The Honorable Michael Kantor Secretary Department of Commerce Washington, D.C. 20230 Dear Secretary: We write to express our serious concerns about the Administration's most recent policy announcement on export restrictions on encryption technology. First we agree with the October 4, 1996, New York Times editorial that characterized the Administration's plan as "needlessly restrictive and probably unworkable" and (though better than previous Administration proposal) "risks doing more harm than good." We recognize that this issue involves a careful balancing of commercial, consumer, law enforcement and national security considerations. However, the well-respected 1996 report by the National Research Council on this matter emphasized that U.S. law enforcement and national security would be enhanced -- not weakened -- by broader use of stronger U.S. encryption technologies both at home and abroad. Furthermore, the report stressed that efforts to control international trade in encryption technologies will only be effective if implemented on a comprehensive, multilateral basis. Unfortunately, the Administration's most recent encryption initiative shortchanges both U.S. business and law enforcement interests. The proposal is flawed for four reasons: it fails to recognize that top-down, government-imposed policies are doomed to defeat: export policies must be directly linked, or indexed, to advances in technology; export controls must be fully multilateral in order to be effective; and export control decisions will be further delayed by granting the FBI new veto authority over U.S. exports. We fear these defects will continue to leave U.S. companies at a disadvantage in the world market, leave users of U.S. encryption uncertain about the security of their information and leave U.S. law enforcement and national security agencies behind the cryptography-curve. Although we were not consulted in the formulation of this policy, we nevertheless hope that in the coming months you will work with us and industry, consumer and user groups to refine it further. In addition to conducting oversight hearing in the next Congress on the Administration's proposal, we also want to assure you that we will continue to pursue legislative solutions toward this end. Sincerely, [signed] Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) Sen. Conrad Burns (R-MT) Sen. Trent Lott (R-MS) Sen. Larry Pressler (R-SD) Sen. Lauch Faircloth (R-NC) Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) Sen. Pete Domenici (R-NM) Sen. John Ashcroft (R-MO) Sen. Alan Simpson(R-WY) Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA) Sen. Don Nickles (R-OK) Sen. Larry Craig (R-ID) Sen. Craig Thomas (R-WY) Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) Rep. Sonny Bono (R-CA) Rep. Howard Coble (R-NC) Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH) Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) Rep. Bob Barr (R-GA) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ (4) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center For Democracy and Technology, are received by nearly 10,000 Internet users, industry leaders, policy makers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to policy-posts-request(a)cdt.org with a subject: subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with a subject of: unsubscribe policy-posts ----------------------------------------------------------------------- (5) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. 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Interesting article on ATM in Wired (of all places)
by rcgraves＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since I ordinarily do nothing but bash the journal of hype and unreadable blue-on-orange type, I figured I should express appreciation for Steve Steinberg's "Netheads vs. Bellheads" article starting on page 145 of the October issue. The ATM v. real networks battle is one that is becoming increasingly important at gads of institutions, such as mine. In addition to economic efficiency, there are civil liberties reasons to favor the current packet-switched technology over circuit-switched bit-mangling. The nexus on this technical front isn't as tight as it is on the encryption front, but I'd urge people in positions of technical or budgetary responsibility to line up with the good guys, i.e., us netheads. You don't want an Internet controlled by ATM technology. It would make censorship, wiretapping, and other forms of nastiness by government and other armed thugs far too easy. I'm speaking only for myself, of course, and of course there are technical reasons I'd prefer to implement gigabit Ethernet as well. The leader "Why the net should grow up" in the October 19th issue of _The Economist_, whose net reporting has improved markedly with the addition of some new staff, may also be of interest. Some overlaps with the Wired article, though the writers probably weren't technically savvy enough to realize that they were talking about the same thing. More comments on that when I find time. -rich

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