December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Imprisoned Capital
by Bart Croughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Duncan Frissell wrote: >There is no straightforward link between amount of capital invested and >productivity or wages. If there were, some steel plants in the Soviet Union >would have had the best paid and most productive workers on earth. It's not a coincidence that you mention the Soviet Union. As I said in a previous post, Austrian economists like Murray Rothbard, Hans Hermann Hoppe, etc. don't consider government expenditures to be *investments* of capital; they consider all government expenditures to be *consumption*. >Additionally, countries which prevent capital outflows don't receive capital >inflows and thus become poorer. >DCF This is a good point when you talk about governments that will prevent *all* capital from flowing out. But a government could prevent the outflow of capital of it's own citizens, and still allow capital of foreigners to leave the country. As long as foreign capital isn't imprisoned, foreign capital could be attracted. Bart Croughs

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BlackNet as a Distributed, Untraceable, Robust Data Haven
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:05 AM 8/16/96, Greg Kucharo wrote: >The only ideal I can think of would be the fictional "Port Watson". What >is you had a system that spanned countries, using the internet as a linking >device. It would be the same service. But when you specified the kind of >data you wanted to post, the system would route it to the appropriate >server in a country where it wasn't illegal. > I have to speak up here and say that there is an actual working exemplar of a distributed, untraceable data haven. While it lacks a robust _payment_ mechanism, that is also untraceable, so does the "Visit Port Watson" example (which has never actually existed). The simple structure I built in 1993 for "BlackNet" actually works. It has been discussed in many places, and will be the subject of a couple of sections in Peter Ludlow's new book, "High Noon on the Electronic Frontier" (http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/mitp/recent-books/comp/ludph.html) Features of relevance to any discussion of data havens: * messages are posted to message pools, including any of the 18,000+ Usenet groups copied automatically in sites around the world. * the initial messages are in plaintext, of course, as how else could readers determine which are of interest to them? "Anyone have details of the medical condition of Chirac?" might be an example. * a public key is posted along with the plaintext, thus allowing a reader to respond _privately_ by encrypting his message to the public key and posting it (through a chain of remailers and eventually to a mail-to-News gateway, for example). * this establishes two-way communication, in a "black pipe" that is visible to all, but opaque to all but the parties. * if some jurisdictions attempts to cut off a particular newsgroup, e.g., "alt.anonymous.messages," then the traffic can be shifted to other newsgroups, e.g., "talk.politics.singapore." * posting can be as untraceable as a chain of remailers linked to a mail-to-News gateway can be. * thus, two agents can establish a communications channel between themselves without knowing the identity or location or jurisdiction of each other. (There are some subtle issues of man-in-the-middle attacks, as with these sorts of protocols for establishing communication between parties who have not met; webs of trust, again. For the several cases of communications using BlackNet I was personally involved with, mostly in '93, this did not ever become a problem any of us were aware of.) * as I mentioned, BlackNet lacks a robust, untraceable payment system. Alice and Bob may be able to connect up with each other, by exchanging reciprocally encrypted messages in a public place, but transferring money is problematic. (I don't know just how well the Mark Twain/Digicash stuff really works at this time....someone motivated to actually transfer money would be a better judge, along with the several cryptographers on this list who've looked at it more recently and in more depth than I have.) The important thing to note is that BlackNet, and similar systems, do not depend on any particular jurisdiction or site to host the communications. The anarchic, distributed Usenet is used. (And there is no reason why mailing lists, a la Miron Cuperman's message pool list of a few years back, or the Web itself could not be used. Using a Web site does potentially open the owner of the URL site to charges of conspiracy, though the fact that the messages are encrypted (after the early plaintext.) There are certainly things yet to be done, but it's important that the example of BlackNet be mentioned. Solve the payment problem (for real, not the semi-GAKked version of Digicash that Chaum now appears to be promoting) and there's no need for "physical" data havens in Anguilla, Burma, St. Barts, Lichtenstein, or wherever. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Jurisdictionless Distributed Data Havens
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:52 AM 8/15/96 -0500, "Douglas R. Floyd" <dfloyd(a)io.com> wrote: >As of now, I am looking for someone who can help me implement a redundant >controller system, so when the DH is contacted, even if the first one if >smashed, the "RAID" stays operable. One approach is "Just Don't Do It" - let the user (or user interface program) handle the RAID work. You can get fancy and use Shamir Secret Sharing, or non-fancy and use N+1 sparing RAID, or medium fancy and use {<even-bits>,<odd-bits>,<evens xor odds>}, depending on how private and how reliable you want to be. Having just the even bits of decently-encrypted cyphertext makes cracking tough.... Some issues to think about - - Access patterns - who do you want to be able to retrieve the data? --- only the owner? --- people who the owner shares a secret with? --- Everybody? --- Everybody who knows where the pieces are? --- One retrieval? Many retrievals? - How do you want the data delivered? Anon remailer? HTTP? POP3? - Threats - who don't you want to be able to read the data? --- who don't you want to be able to delete the data? --- who don't you want to find out who retrieved the data? - Payment - who pays? Writers? Readers? Cops with warrants? Account holders or one-shot users? Digicash only? How much? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Defuse Authority!

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Physical Havens
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Let's take a look at the successful havens of history. 1. Hashishim( Old man of the mountains)-The Aga Khan survived thousands of years of harassment by the surrounding powers by placing a few well choosen daggers. 2. The monastic system- These whole setup was an excellent model. The monks were burrowed away in those places for centuries. The church built them like fortresses to withstand the heathens, both mentally and physically. The original "data warehouse". 3. The pirate havens- Places like the carribbean(originally), then Madagasgar(last). Pirate havens did business for everyone. 4. The silk routes- The trading centers of the old silk road sprang up overnight then vanished. Original anonymous trade. All of these physical havens eventually fell to the persistance of the major powers of the day. Or were co-opted by others who absorbed the critical black market features of these systems. ??????????????????????????????????????? Greg Kucharo sophi(a)best.com "Eppur si moeve" -Galileo ???????????????????????????????????????

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Re: remailers/kiddie porn
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>"The Internet is like heaven for the pedophile," said Toby Tyler, >a United States police officer who lectures at the FBI Academy on child abuse. ... >However computer experts agree the existence of just one re-mailing system in a country with more lax laws is enough for the global distribution of child >pornography on the Internet. >Tyler said the most widely used re-mailing system currently operates from Finland, through which about 99 percent of all child pornography with untraceable >address codes passes. Classic governmental statistics abuse. Given that probably far over 99% of all untraceable remailer return addresses are on Penet, it's no surprise that 99% of all material with untraceable destination addresses goes through there... The largest userid number I've seen on Penet was about 500,000, and I doubt there are 5000 addresses on nymservers or reply-block users. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Defuse Authority!

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Re: Stealth Buildings Was Re: "X-Ray Gun" for imperceptible searches [NOISE]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:01 PM 8/15/96 -0400, you wrote: >I repeat. Generations of sweating engineers have discovered and confirmed >that there is not an easy, "Silver Bullet" cure of the canonical problem >of shielding electromagnetic energy from reaching someone who knows how >to interpret it. I also repeat - the problem isn't TEMPEST, which I agree is a tough problem. The problem is preventing radar imaging from detecting the shape of metal stuff you're carrying, and shielding with a sufficiently thick layer of metal should do that. I don't know, for the technology they're using, if this means tinfoil-thickness or armor-plate thickness, but random-thickness metal should help. Of course, walking through the airport wearing plate armor will probably disturb the security guards more than mere chain-mail :-) >Bill, you are welcome to look at a layer of tin foil and give a sigh of >relief that you've shielded your gun or your crypto diskette or your >private body parts feom someone who knows what they're doing. Go ahead, >chant a mantra too, if it makes you feel better. I've always enjoyed the one that goes You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford one, one will be provided for you. License and registration, please. Go to jail. Go directly to jail. It's not a threat, it's just a choice you can make. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> Defuse Authority!

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Re: Burden of proof
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:31 PM 8/15/96 -0700, DAVID A MOLNAR <molnard1(a)nevada.edu> wrote: > What is to stop the IRS from pointing out that you received the >money from your employer? What employer? What money? Some Anguillan consulting bodyshop sent some guys who did the work, and MegaCo paid the bodyshop. The shop paid the guys some typical low wages, and also bought computer services from another Anguillan company, which deposited its profits in its bank account in Jersey. Employee Jean D'Eau used the company Visa card for the account and took some business trips to San Diego, stayed in a hotel in Seattle, rented cars, ate out, bought computer toys at 47th St. Computer, paid for his Netcom account, and got a Visa Cash advance in Jamaica. No problem, mon.

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implausible defenses & tax havens
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:15 PM 8/15/96 -0400, Robin Powell wrote: >This relates to something I have been wondering about: If one could >get one's company to pay one in electronic cash, what is to stop one >from piling the coins in a Datahaven somewhere (assuming one existed >that would be usable for these purposes) and say to the IRS: Money? >What money? Can you find any of my money? I, uhh... lost it! Yeah, >that's it!! This scenario is more or less the same as being paid in paper cash and then hiding the paper cash. That's not an especially sophisticated tax evasion tactic. If you were on a jury, and you heard a defendant testify that they worked at a job site (either as an employee or a contractor) for years without ever being paid, and that they managed to maintain a lifestyle consistent with full-time work without ever receiving taxable income (whether as wages or dividends or interest or ..), and that the HR/personnel/AP people who testified that the defendant had been paid were mistaken or lying .. would you believe that testimony? Winning in court takes a lot more than making up a conceivable but incredibly implausible chain of events to explain away incriminating circumstances. (* OJ and other cases of nullification notwithstanding. But precious few people have the $ to pay for the kind of defense work needed to get that sort of result.) The notion of "burden of proof" is important, and defense lawyers can jawbone about it for hours - but the bottom line is that the "I don't know anything about getting any money" defense is bullshit. If the jurors can't imagine themselves or their kids or their friends doing what you're claiming you did (working without being paid and with no expectation of being paid), you lose. -- Greg Broiles |"Post-rotational nystagmus was the subject of gbroiles(a)netbox.com |an in-court demonstration by the People http://www.io.com/~gbroiles |wherein Sgt Page was spun around by Sgt |Studdard." People v. Quinn 580 NYS2d 818,825.

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The dangers of using radar
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I picked this up on Marsha Woodbury's jokes list (not all are fiction!): >>Two members of the British Lothian and Borders traffic police were out on >>the Berwickshire moors with a radar gun recently, happily engaged in >>apprehending speeding motorists, when their equipment suddenly >>locked-up completely with an unexpected reading of well over 300 mph. >> >>The mystery was explained seconds later as a low flying Harrier hurtled >>over their heads. The boys in blue, upset at the damage to their radar >>gun, put in a complaint to the RAF, but were somewhat chastened when the RAF >>pointed out that the damage might well have been more severe. >> >>It seems that the Harrier's target-seeker had locked onto the 'enemy' >>radar and triggered an automatic retaliatory air-to-surface missile attack. >>Luckily, the Harrier was operating unarmed. >> >>Otherwise... "Gee Officer, sorry about your patrol car........" Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ finger amehta(a)cerfnet.com for public key

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Re: Lunch with Bill, anyone?
by Marc J. Wohler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:31 AM 8/16/96 -0700,John C. Randolph wrote: >Meeting Bill Gates would be every bit as exciting as meeting Tony >Orlando. Or maybe Wayne Newton. I don't mind the sarcasm regarding Gates, but watch what you say about Wayne Newton!

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