December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re:FPGAs and Heat (Re: Paranoid Musings)
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oddly enough, I just left a talk at the '96 Genetic Programming conference on developing adaptable hardware and silicon evolution. One of the speakers at this particular session was the Product Line Manager from Xilinx and one of the goodies he handed out was pre-release data sheets for the new XC6200 series of FPGAs they are producing (the chips are already out in limited quantities) so here is a little update on the state of the art in this area. Tim May writes: > Bill Frantz wrote: > >> o As more and more chips are added to a machine, two effects occur: > >> > >> o Interconnections increase and increase running time; > >> o Heat from the chips eventually limit [sic] the size of a > >> machine. > >Fast machines produce a lot of heat. > > But, as many have pointed out, this is not a realistic limit. One can also use reversible logic to get arond the heat problem if mechanical means are not enough. This is a necessity for molecular-scale computing and during the post-session BS at another talk we speced out a system that could probably evolve a reversible logic compiler. Heat will not be a "wall" at any scale, it may add to the cost a little bit but the problem is solvable. The interconnection problem has also been solved in this chip series. [A long-standing problem with FPGAs is that there were generally a limited amount of "wires" running between the logic elements and thus a lot of cells were wasted because there were no interconnections left, I/O to the outside world was also a problem.] The chip has a really cool interconnection method which allows a much more efficient use of the chip real estate and which makes the entire chip directly addresable (like regular RAM) through an on-chip interface module. Given the relatively compact design in Ian and Dave's paper and the new chips one might even fit two or four cracking engines on a single FPGA. Either the NSA did not do thier homework in this area or they are lying. > >Now I have no problem with believing NSA would invest $7 million. However, > >$700 million makes me wonder. With FPGAs, there is a significant risk that > >people will change the crypto system and make the investment worthless. > >(Which, I guess, is why they prefer general purpose computers.) However, > >if they can get the equivalent of a few bits of key back by cryptanalysis, > >then they knock the costs down to entirely reasonable (for them) levels. > > An FPGA is field-programmable. (FPGA = Field Programmable Gate Arrays) The > Xilynx and Altera lines of FPGAs could be reconfigured for other > algorithms, surely. (I recall several preliminary designs discussed in > various places.) There are two types of FPGAs, one is based on anti-fuse technology which is essentially a big complicated PROM, but the Xilinx FPGAs use SRAM to configure the interconnections between logic elements. The newest line from Xilinx, the XC6000 series has the capability to be reconfigured either partially or completely from an on-chip cache in 5 ns. That is five nanoseconds and you have a completely different piece of virtual hardware. If the configuration is loaded through the slowest I/O port on the chip it only takes 200 microseconds. Even if the encryption algorithm is secret these chips open up interesting posiblities for developing general-purpose cryptanalysis machines. [Hmm, there may be a paper in there... "Evolving A General-Purpose Cryptanalysis Engine"...] What is even better from the perspective of the NSA accountants is that they only need to build the machine _once_, after that they just load up a new set of interconnections and now the DES cracker is an IDEA cracker. Add to this the fact that the XC6000 series were designed to be built cheaply in large quantities (the Xilinx rep figures the price will get down to $29/chip in 5K lots for the samples he was passing around and he is a wafer guy and not marketting droid so this may be reasonably accurate.) If anything, the Blaze, et many als. paper _underestimated_ the cost of a FPGA hardware cracking engine, particularly if you amortize the savings FPGAs give over the long term with thier almost limitless flexibility. jim

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Re: G7 Anti-Terrorism Reports [BRIEF]
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 30 Jul 96 at 18:47, Jonathan M Summers wrote: > Cypherpunks: > > At 1735 CDT on Tuesday, July 30, 1996, CNN Atlanta during World News > Tonight reported (in a _very_ brief flash) several "resolutions" adopted > by the Group of Seven (G7) trade meeting in Paris. > > At the bottom of the list of resolutions was to "prevent terrorist from > using the Internet" (quote from CNN anchorwoman). The Pacifica Report noted 'more controls on the Internet' and controlling the use of encryption, but didn't discuss this at length. Rob --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: Paranoid Musings
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 30 Jul 96 at 11:13, Bill Frantz wrote: [..] > (1) Now everyone knows that 40 bit RC4 is weak, but just how weak is it? Differentiate between the cipher and the key-initialization. There may be a flaw in how the key is set up that can make brute-force searches easier. Known plaintext of a few headers may also help in guessing the s-box state, even if partially: combined with flaws in the key, this could be exploited, especially if one has a lot of experience and computing power handy. [..] > (2) What did Microsoft give up to export its crypto API? > > Well, if you were a TLA, what would you want. I think I would want an > agreement to be able to insert my own code in that vendor's products. Then > I would be able to have widely distributed Trojan horses signed by the > vendor. I would have the opportunity to significantly weaken standardized > crypto systems installed world wide. Risky. Code can always be reverse engineered. If a flaw is exploited in too-strong an algorithm (3DES and 4k-bit RSA keys, for instance) to prosecute various people, somebody might notice. If US companies seem to magically have proprietary info from foreign companies, this would also be a sign of suspicion. I think the C[r]API will be used as a form of mandating GAK instead. Rob > > > Conspiracy theorists, start your mailers. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Bill Frantz | Cave ab homine unius lebri | Periwinkle -- Consulting > (408)356-8506 | [Beware the man of one | 16345 Englewood Ave. > frantz(a)netcom.com | book] - Anonymous Latin | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA > > > > --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Blaming the Internet for Terrorism
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This comes from today's (Wed. July 31) LI Newsday, though the byline is the AP: "Bombing Becoming All Too Popular" The Associated Press Washington - The number of Americans attacking and attempting to attack each other with bombs each year has nearly doubled this decade. For every Olympic park or Oklahamo City tragedy, police report dozens of foiled attempts where death and destruction are narrowly averted. [..] The rapid escalation poses a vexing problem for law enforcement. Unlike international terrorists with recognized agendas, these culprits are most often low-profile operators plotting in the privacy of back yards, garages and basements with easily obtained materials and simple instructions straight off the Internet. [..] In 1989, there were 1,699 criminal bombings attemted or carried out nationwide. By 1994, the last year with complete figures, the number has risen to 3,163, according to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Local cases, which seldom make national headlines, demonstrate the breadth of the threat. [Examples follow...only one names the Internet:] In Baton-Rouge, La., an 18-year-ooold dropout and two friends were indicted this month for stealing bomb-making materials from two high-school chemistry labs, Court records allege the three plotted to blow up a train returning the young woman's parents from vacation to get insurance money, and had followed a terrorist handbook published on the Internet. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: crypto CD source
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <16689.9607301944(a)exe.dcs.exeter.ac.uk> you wrote: : Some time ago on the list there was some discussion of putting : together a CD full of cryptographic software and reference material. : Nothing came of it, but I think several people expressed an interest, : for those of you who were interested, take a look at: : http://www.sevenlocks.com/ [..] : They have a large supply of crypto software available on-line as well. : (No mention of ITAR on their software down load pages (78 Mb of : security related software they claim), and it looks you could download : the lot even if you weren't in the US). ftp.replay.com has 220 Mb of crypto software available for download at no charge .... bEST Regards, -- Alex de Joode | Replay IP Service & Web DZign -- The Netherlands usura(a)replay.com | http://www.replay.com mailto:info@replay.com

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Crypto Law and Veincheck
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.ispo.cec.be:81/ispo/lists/ispo/0464.html ---------- European Crypto Law information sources Robert Horvitz (horvitzr(a)omri.cz) Tue, 21 May 1996 13:22:59 +1GMT Reply to aadamski(a)cc.uni.torun.pl (Andrzej Adamski) who said: My name is Andrzej Adamski, I'm from Poland, Nicolas Copernicus University . I would be very grateful for getting hints where to find information on the current EU encryption policy/ legislation. What about present developments in the area of the European infrastructure of pubic (sic) key look like? ------------------------------------------------------------ Adam, the best place to start your research is at the "Cryptography in Europe" website: http://www.modeemi.cs.tut.fi/~avs/eu-crypto.html To see the wider context, visit the "Crypto Law Survey" website created by Bert-Jaap Koops in the Netherlands, at: http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/lawsurvy.htm The EU and EC seem likely to cave in to pressure (blackmail?) from the American spy agencies and impose "back doors" on any strong encryption package. Unless Europeans stand up and insist that privacy of communication is an essential human right. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Robert Horvitz, International Coordinator, OSI Internet Program Motokov Building - Room 518, Na Strzi 63, 140 62 Praha 4, Czech Rep., tel 42 2 6114-2751, fax 6114-2750, email horvitzr(a)omri.cz ---------- For more on cryptography and encryption, see the IPO search page at: http://www.ispo.cec.be/topic/simple.html As an example, for artful use of crypto, see the "veincheck" proposal at: http://www.ispo.cec.be:81/ispo/lists/ispo/0252.html Social Applications of Biometrics Joe Rice (joerice(a)innotts.co.uk) Tue, 26 Mar 1996 21:28:20 -0800 I would welcome some input to shape the following IT technology. The technology is a physiological biometric based upon the detection and comparison of subcutaneous blood vessels, essentially bar-code reading of people.

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Re: New Clinton (anti-) Encryption Policy nnn
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> CLINTON ADMINISTRATION FACT SHEET: U.S. CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY (Industry, > international cooperation urged) > Following is the text of the fact sheet: kersnip > Militia groups advise their members to use encryption to hide illicit > weapons, financial, and other criminal activities. Using encryption to hide illicit weapons? I think somebodys been watching too much TV. VR Troopers Transform!!

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Re: fbi, crypto, and defcon
by TQDB 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Tue, 30 Jul 1996 17:31:25 -0400 > From: Stephen Cobb <stephen(a)iu.net> > To: cypherpunks(a)feist.com > Subject: Re: fbi, crypto, and defcon > Okay, so their boss is part of the law making process, subject to the checks > and balances that exist between the three branches of US government. They > are in a position to supply their boss with data and I am personally > impressed with their grasp of some of that data (it sounds to me like they > are telling their boss that hackers like the ones at Defcon are not the > problem). I think what they are really saying is that they would love to bust most hackers, but since they can't they might as well use some of them to catch the bigger fish. If they truly did believe in the laws they are supposed to uphold they wouldn't associate with hackers (who commit computer crimes) at all. > All of us who have some understanding of these issues need to do our best to > educate the public and the politicians, even if we have to start from the > "See Jane hack" level (pun intended). Otherwise dumb laws will be passed and > then we will have to engage in mass civil disobedience (which I have > personally done in the past). Stopping bad laws from becoming law is a lot > easier than overturning them later. This is exactly one good reason for having additional support for our Hack The Lies (HTL) project. Besides spreading truthful and factual information to the public, we recognize that the government definately could use its share of help from people who know what they are talking about. .TQDB

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Re: Smart cards "a giant leap backwards" - Canadian Privacy Commissioner
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:23 PM 7/30/96 -0400, Richard Martin wrote: >Very little that might be new or enlightening to the world; attendees >of CFP '96 will remember [fuzzily, in my case] the closest thing to >Bruce's counterpart in the states admitting that the USA doesn't actually >have much of a counterpart to the privacy commissioner. Most Central European countries have both privacy commissioners and legal requirements that everyone register their addresses with the police. I'll do without the former if I can also avoid the latter. DCF

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G7T_err
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpts of four reports on the G7+1 antiterrorism meet in Paris: WSJ: + Mass Transport: The International Civil Aviation Organization will implement new standards for bomb detection at domestic and international airports. The eight nations will jointly develop standards for more detailed and accurate passenger and cargo lists, as well as new vehicle-identification tagging methods to make car-bombing investigations easier, U.S. officials said. + Information Sharing: The U.S Federal Bureau of Investigation will lead an effort to develop an international forensic database. The FBI offered to share certain computer records with the other seven countries. + Wiretapping and Internet: The eight countries said they would develop new lawful means to intercept communications among terrorists. They agreed to study how to prevent the Internet from becoming a tool for planning and executing terrorist events. + Explosives Tracing: The U.S. will share its research on new technologies to trace the origin of explosive devices U.S. officials said, and will push for international use of such technologies if they are found to be workable. + Other Measures: Controlling trade in certain weapons and chemicals financing of terrorist organizations and forgery of travel documents also will be studied. WaPo: The 25-point plan calls for close cooperation in formulating a range of security measures, including tightened controls on firearms and explosives; prevention of terrorist communications on the Internet; improved bomb detection methods at airports; and interdiction of terrorist groups' financial resources. They also called for the expediting of extradition procedures and faster exchanges of information on terrorist activities, including any use of chemical, biological or nuclear materials. Details on all 25 points were left for law enforcement and forensic experts to work out, with deadlines for finalization of specific measures set for 90 days to six months. FiTi: Among the measures agreed in Paris were an accelerated programme of research designed to find ways to mark explosives so their origin could be identified after a blast; the development of ways to prevent terrorists using electronic or wire communication systems, including the Internet and tougher sentences. The ministers also called for investigations into organisations with social, charitable and cultural goals which were abused by terrorists; restrictions on asylum- seeking by those who had committed attacks or were suspected of planning or funding them; and more effective border controls and extradition procedures. NYP: The details were not all made public today, but the measures the officials agreed to draft included devising methods to monitor terrorist attempts to communicate over the Internet; developing standards to make it easier to trace the origin of explosives used in terrorist bombs and cracking down domestically on the manufacture, sale, transport and export of explosives and firearms. ---------- For extensive background, links to related sites and latest information on the G7 series of meetings see: http://www.diplomatie.fr/actual/g7lyon/index.gb.html ---------- For today's four full reports: http://jya.com/g7terr.txt (20 kb for 4) G7T_err

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