December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Clinton must like terrorists...
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Clinton must like terrorists... because his most recent proposals will end up making more of them. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: A Libertine Question
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca > >In this context, right and wrong do not need to enter the discussion. >[. . .] >So, how do *we* get crypto widespread? ............................................................... Interest in crypto will spread when everyone's files are by law made available to anyone working in a government agency and people begin to get this growing feeling that there is something terribly wrong. . . . .. Blanc

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RE: A Libertine Question
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:19 PM 7/29/96, jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: >I find it funny that I'm considered Conservative by most people who know me. >Your opinion may vary. ;-) I don't find it surprising (a different word from "funny") that you are a kind of "conservative." Many folks calling themselves conservatives actually want various kinds of laws, safety nets, social order, etc. (Many "conservative farmers" want government price guarantees, for example.) >tcmay(a)got.net wrote: >>Who takes responsibility when people fail to save enough of their >>paycheck to last them through the month? Who takes responsibility when >>people drink too much, miss work, and are fired? And so on. > >One common thread in many of these discussions is the ease with which moral >judgements are made about the situation: "fail to save", "drink too much". This is quibbling. Use whatever other word or weasel phrase for "fail to save" and "drink too much." Common euphemisms are: "became a victim of ethanol addiction," "lacked personal financial skills," etc. My point was an obvious one, clearly made, which I won't repeat here. >I know the social psychology explanation that people who view the world as >ordered attach these types of judgements to situations which violate their >ordered view of the world. "She was just asking for it dressed like that..." This is fatuous nonsense. I made no comment even remotely similar to this. (In fact, in my view, a woman can wear a tiny string bikini and, if attacked, blow away her attacker; though the bikini may make concealed carry a bit harder.) >However, now I'm puzzled. From what I've read of Tim May, he does not hold such >an orderly view of the world. The "rules" of existence may prove to be >deterministic, but the results are chaotic. So Tim, where are these moral >judgments coming from? The likely reason you are confused is that you set up a straw man, found it conflicted with other things I have argued, and now wish me to "explain." >Think of how many of our laws are being enacted that tacitly make being >poor or >indigent a crime. Curfews being a recently discussed example. If the >equation is >one of economics, then "who takes care of" people does indeed enter the >equation. I suggest that it is more economical to provide for a minimum quality >of life- if only as a form of insurance for myself. Think: Rawls. I have strongly argued against curfews, as I don't want cops telling my 15-year-old child when she or he can and can't be on public roads. As to "insurance," be my guest. That is, you and others are perfectly able to form insurance pools, old age retirement funds, etc. These are usually called "pension plans." However, please don't hold a gun to my head and demand that I contribute to a plan, especially one which is a Ponzi scheme like Social Security (SS is not self-funding, and "IOUs" are being placed in the pot for the future, as is well-known.) Sounds fair to me. >The alternative is to have garbage collectors to "take care of" those that fall >behind. Think: Soylent Green. A bad form of argument, citing bad SF movies to prove your points. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: what's a weapon? (fwd)
by Wayne H. Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 13:33 96.07.29 -0400, David Lesher wrote: >------- Forwarded Message > >Drawing an analogy with encryption and US ITAR, a poster reported that >A piper is being taken to court for practicing on Hampstead Heath, >which has a by-law forbidding music. Mr Brooks, the piper, has denied >the charge. He claims he wasn't playing a musical instrument, but >practicing with a weapon. In 1746 in England, bagpipes were declared to >be instruments of war, not musical weapons, and a subsequent Act of >Parliament specifically stated that they were weapons. > >> If you have ever heard the pipes being practiced you'll know why. Wayne H.Allen whallen(a)capitalnet.com Pgp key at www.capitalnet.com/~whallen

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game theory
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I agree with Tim that game theory is very interesting and a potentialy useful tool in cryptography. However, game theory currently has a major limitation. An even moderately complex game is likely to have a very large set of equilibria (possible solutions where none of the players will deviate from their strategy if they knew the strategy of all other players). It takes a lot of work to calculate the equilibria set, and even if this is done, game theorists are hard pressed to explain or predict which equilibrium is the actual outcome. I have not read any of Schelling's work, but the notion of Schelling points seems to be closely connected to that of equilibria in game theory. If this is the case, then I don't see how it can be usefully applied to the complex interactions of an entire society. It is easy to say that current social conventions are an equilibrium in some game, but how much is this worth? What we would like to know is what is the entire set of possible equilibria, why we are in one of them (instead of the others), and how changes in the game (such as introduction of strong crypto) change that set. I find it unlikely that game theory will soon advance to such a state that it will give us the answers to these questions. Wei Dai P.S. Now that I've reread Tim's original messages, I realize that maybe Schelling points are not really the equilibria of game theory. If this is the case, Tim, can you please clarify its actual meaning? (Perhaps by quoting a definition from Schelling's book?) ObCrypto: Here is a simple cryptographic application of game theory. A fair exchange protocol allows two parties to reveal valuable secrets to each other one bit at a time. Modeled as a game, it goes like this: There are N (an even number) rounds. On odd rounds Alice decides whether to reveal a bit to Bob or to stop the game. On even rounds Bob decides whether to reveal a bit to Alice or to stop the game. The goal is to get as many bits as possible and secondarily to reveal as few bits as possible. Now using backwards inductions, we can show that the only subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is that Alice stops the game in round 1. The analysis goes like this: on the last round (if the game goes that far) Bob will have gotten all of the bits from Alice, so it makes no sense for him to reveal his last bit to Alice. On the next to last round, Alice knows that even if she reveals her bit, she cannot get Bob's last bit, therefore she would stop on that round. Therefore Bob would stop on round N-2, and on it goes. Wei Dai

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RE: A Libertine Question
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:13 PM 7/29/96 -0400, Duncan Frissell wrote: >Perhaps the communitarians in the audience will have to fall back on >disfellowship as the ultimate sanction (like the early Christians). They >won't be able to apply any more advanced weaponry. Just as the ultimate net sanction is excommunication (usually via the ISP, killfiles etc.), the ultimate communitarian sanction is shunning. Anything more takes force, and government reserves the use of force to itself. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Cave ab homine unius lebri | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | [Beware the man of one | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | book] - Anonymous Latin | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: game theory
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:42 AM 7/30/96, Wei Dai wrote: >I agree with Tim that game theory is very interesting and a potentialy >useful tool in cryptography. However, game theory currently has a major ... >I have not read any of Schelling's work, but the notion of Schelling >points seems to be closely connected to that of equilibria in game theory. >If this is the case, then I don't see how it can be usefully applied to >the complex interactions of an entire society. It is easy to say that >current social conventions are an equilibrium in some game, but how much >is this worth? What we would like to know is what is the entire set of >possible equilibria, why we are in one of them (instead of the others), >and how changes in the game (such as introduction of strong crypto) change >that set. I find it unlikely that game theory will soon advance to such a >state that it will give us the answers to these questions. ... >P.S. Now that I've reread Tim's original messages, I realize that maybe >Schelling points are not really the equilibria of game theory. If this is >the case, Tim, can you please clarify its actual meaning? (Perhaps by >quoting a definition from Schelling's book?) I certainly make no grandiose claims that any _single_ facet of reality is guaranteed to be useful, as I'm sure Wei Dai would agree. I presented the theory of Schelling points because I've found the notion to be interesting, unifying, and helpful in my understanding of many phenomena. (Clearly, there are dozens or even hundreds of such "core concepts.") Schelling was addressing a different aspect of game theory than conventional equilibria (as in payoffs, I presume to be Wei's emphasis). The David Friedman paper I cited the URL for (http://www.best.com/~ddfr/Academic/Property/Property.html) has a fuller explanation of Schelling points than I can justify writing here. He writes: "Such an outcome, chosen because of its uniqueness, is called a Schelling point, after Thomas Schelling who originated the idea. It provides a possible solution to the problem of coordination without communication. As this example shows, it is relevant both to situations where communication is physically impossible and to situations where communication is impossible because there is no way that either party can provide the other with a reason to believe that what he says is true." My conjecture that game theory and cryptography have some natural and fruitful points of intersection is of course just a conjecture. I have long believed--though I cannot formally prove it--that many of the problems with digital cash and related ideas are "made to converge" by consideration of iterated games, e.g., reputations, expectations, expected payoffs, and so forth. I believe we see this in the "real world," where economies actually work in ways that the pure theory (absent game theory) would suggest problems. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: e$: The Demographic "Transaction" (was Re: Schelling Points...)
by Arun Mehta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 19:37 29/07/96 +-200, Bart Croughs wrote: >The only effect of more stringent enforcement of anti child-labor legislation is to harm the children involved. You may think that the millions of families in Third World countries who are too poor to provide for their children, will be magically become rich enough to send their children to school once the anti child-labor legislation will be enforced. < This is getting off-topic, if there is such a thing on this list, but anyway... of course legislation alone is no good. Typically, it is accompanied by efforts to provide alternate livelihood to the older children or parents, free schooling, etc. > Child labour in the West didn't stop because of anti child-labour laws; it stopped the moment the people became rich enough to provide for their children, thanks to the capitalist revolution in the 18th & 19th century. The same path will have to be followed by the Third World countries today.< Take your point, though we may be talking chicken and egg here. If you have lots of children, you and your children never will become rich enough to change... >Instead of posting to the net to increase outrage about the violations of harmful child labour laws, you better begin posting to the net to increase outrage about the socialist governments in the Third World that keep their populations in poverty.< Socialism as an economic philosophy is fairly discredited, and is on its way out without my expressions of outrage needed to help it along. Yet, the capitalist economy seems to be no better at dealing with extreme poverty. Arun Mehta Phone +91-11-6841172, 6849103 amehta(a)cpsr.org http://www.cerfnet.com/~amehta/ finger amehta(a)cerfnet.com for public key

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"Filter"software for money laundering
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Apparently the Poles are seeking tools for controlling the economic transactions of its citizen-units. Thanks to Bob for forwarding this to us. I am copying Andrzej Adamski on my response.) At 2:59 PM 7/29/96, Robert Hettinga wrote: >--- begin forwarded text >Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 16:06:53 +-200 >Reply-To: Law & Policy of Computer Communications > <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> >Sender: Law & Policy of Computer Communications > <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> >From: Andrzej Adamski <aadamski(a)CC.UNI.TORUN.PL> >Subject: "Filter"software for money laundering >Comments: cc: "comcri-l(a)man.torun.pl" <comcri-l(a)man.torun.pl>, > "lacc(a)suburbia.net" <lacc(a)suburbia.net> >To: Multiple recipients of list CYBERIA-L <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> > >Sorry for cross-posting this message: > >Dear All, > > Are you familiar with any > software or any listing of producers of software to be used in > tracking money-laundering? > > If so, let me know. Yes, the Cypherpunks mailing list (send a request as described below) has software to defeat methods of tracking money-laundering. In particular, anonymous remailers, unbreakable cryptography, offshore data havens, digital cash, information markets, and a large body of thought about methods to defeat attempts by Central States to control and track the economic transactions of individuals and corporations. I realize our Polish correspondent may be seeking tools to _assist_ the Police of his country in stopping his countrymen from moving funds around without the approval and control of the apparatchniks who control such things in command economies, but I think he needs to know just how hopeless the task really is. The Polish state will crumble, though it may take a couple of generations. --Tim May, Crypto Anarchist Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Denning vs. Gilmore
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:14 PM 7/29/96 +0100, Roderick Simpson wrote: >Today, Monday, July 29, Dorothy Denning begins her debate vs. John Gilmore >over The Absolute Right to Privacy on Wired Online's Brain Tennis site. Do >citizens of the world have an "unalienable right" to privacy - or are there >reasons why governments ought to have access to our communications? This >debate will run daily through August 7. Follow along at >http://www.wired.com/braintennis/. To get into the debate yourself, go to: > >http://www.hotwired.com/cgi-bin/interact/replies_all?msg.21655 > >An excerpt of Dorothy's first post today: > > "I'm not ready to accept 'the cat is out of the bag.' The Wicked Witch of the East wasn't "ready to accept" a house being dropped on her. Denning's personal desires are equally irrelevant. > Let's look for a way of enjoying > the benefits of encryption without > unnecessarily hindering the ability of law > enforcement to perform its mission. I consider the primary benefit of good encryption to be the "hindering the ability of law enforcement to perform" the particularly abusive "mission" they've chosen for themselves. > Let's use encryption for privacy, but also give > law enforcement access to communications and > computer files when there is probable cause > and a judge has issued a court order. Many if not most of us out here believe that the ("probable cause") system is abusive, and has all the prospects of continuing to be abusive in the future. > In some cases, that access must be > surreptitious. But some of us consider such access to be unconstitutional, however "useful" you may believe it to be. In the past, the government has had the extreme luxury of not being forced to convince the public of its "right" to wiretap. Now, the advance of technology is forcing the question of such approval to be answered, and the Denning-types are getting really worried that the public isn't going to give that approval. Tough! Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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