December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: "Soul Catcher" Computer Chip (fwd)
by Alex Filacchione 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

QUOTE SOUL CATCHER IMPLANTS British scientists are developing a concept for a computer chip which, when implanted into the skull behind the eye, will be able to record a person's every life time thought ands sensation. =-=-=-=-=-=- Hahaha! That's a good one. Maybe these guys should share some of their findings w/ the worlds leading neurologists, since they seem to know so much. "Every lifetime thought"?????? Even one thought. Hmmm, perhaps they would care to explain human emotions in scientific terms, fully explained, no vagueness allowed? Care to share "translation tables" for neuro-electric impulses that show signature of certain emotions? This is just so ridiculous. I would just like to ask them one question. "How?" Record what someone sees? Maybe.... Alex F alexf(a)iss.net

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Injunction Against Spammers
by Otto Matic 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today Concentric Network Corp. won an injunction [15] against Cyber Pro- motions, Inc. -- the outfit against which AOL lost a court fight to keep its subscribers free of email spam -- see TBTF for 9/8/96 [16]. Cyber Promotions, it seems, was forging a Concentric Network return address in their spams, so thousands of outraged Netizens bombarded the ISP daily with demands that Concentric stop supporting an activity that is, in fact, forbidden by their terms of service and of which Concentric was entirely innocent. The wording of the promise that Cyber Promotions was compelled to sign forbids them specifically from thus abusing Concentric in the future. It seems to me that the spammer will be free to choose another ISP "goat," or to forge a nonexistent return address on their future spams, without penalty. This timely news just arrived on Glen McCready's <glen(a)qnx.com> "0xdeadbeef" mailing list. [15] <http://home.concentric.net/press/spam.html> [16] <http://www.tbtf.com/archive/09-08-96.html> otto =-=-=-=-=- Otto Matic "Fuckin' A, Miller!" Bud, Repo Man --------------------------------------------------------- Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com ---------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Government Denial of Service Attacks
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:33 AM 10/9/96 +1000, Julian Assange wrote: >I will not coment on the correctness of the U.S government's funding >allocations, however the above statement is clearly designed to be >deceptive. Given the GDP of the U.S as a whole during fiscal 1996 was >greater than that of any other country at any other time, including the >U.S in previous years (the U.S like most other countries has postive >growth), of course the absolute value of taxes collected will be larger. I make the point only because this very important fact never occurs to anyone. Our rulers like to say that they can't make do with a cent less of the vast sums they collect from us and, in fact, all of them say that they will need more. Just pointing out that with all they have, they can probably stand to cut back a little. The Fortune 500 did. DCF

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RE: legality of wiretapping: a "key" distinction
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Black Unicorn [in reply to Vlad the Conqueror] I understand that it's difficult for you to grasp how firmly entrenched the concept of wiretapping is in law enforcement, courts and the legislature, and that your novel new approach has been tried before. .................................................................. This should help him understand it. I won't say who this quote is from, but he was a very respected French author: "Both the English and the Americans have kept the law of precedents; that is to say, they still derive their opinions in legal matters and the judgements they should pronounce from the opinions and legal judgements of their fathers. [...] The English or American lawyer who thus, in a sense, denies his own reasoning powers in order to return to those of his fathers, maintaining his thought in a kind of servitude, must contract more timid habits and conservative inclinations than his opposite number in France. Our written laws are often hard to understand, but everyone can read them, whereas nothing could be more obscure, and out of reach of the common man, than a law founded on precedent. Where lawyers are absolutely needed, as in England and the United States, and their professional knowledge is held in high esteem, they become increasingly separated from the people, forming a class apart. A French lawyer is just a man of learning, but an English or an American one is somewhat like the Egyptian priests, being, as they were, the only interpreter of an occult science. [...] Thus it is England, above all that supplies the most striking portrait of the type of lawyer I am trying to depict; the English lawyer values laws not because they are good but because they are old; and if he is reduced to modifying them in some respect, to adapt them to the changes which time brings to any society, he has recourse to the most incredible subtleties in order to persuade himself that in adding something to the work of his fathers he has only developed their thought and completed their work. Do not hope to make him recognize that he is an innovator; he will be prepared to go to absurd lengths rather than to admit himself guilty of so great a crime. It is in England that this legal spirit was born, which seems indifferent to the substance of things, paying attention only to the letter, and which would rather part company with reason and humanity than with the law." .. Blanc

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Binding cryptography - a fraud-detectible alternative to key-esc
by Bert-Jaap Koops 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In this message, we introduce binding cryptography, a new proposal for establishing an information security infrastructure that does not hamper law enforcement. We present an alternative that can give law-enforcement agencies access to session keys, without users having to deposit private keys. Unilateral fraud in this scheme is easily detectible. We outline the proposal below, and announce two articles which will describe the proposal in more detail and which will provide the legal and the technical context. The text is also available at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/binding.htm. 9 October 1996 Eric Verheul, everheul(a)ngi.nl Bert-Jaap Koops, koops(a)kub.nl Henk van Tilborg, henkvt(a)win.tue.nl ------------------------------------------- (c) 1996 Eric Verheul, Bert-Jaap Koops, Henk van Tilborg This message may only be redistributed in its entirety and with inclusion of the copyright notice. Credit if quoting. _Binding Cryptography, a fraud-detectible alternative to key-escrow proposals_ _1. Introduction_ Information security, and so cryptography, is essential in today's information society. A robust (information) security infrastructure must be set up, including a Key Management Infrastructure. However, the unconditional use of encryption by criminals poses a threat to law enforcement, a problem that is hard to solve. Consequently, governments have two tasks. The first is stimulating the establishment of a security structure that protects their citizens, but which does not aid criminals. The second task is coping with the use of encryption by criminals outside of this framework. We think that encryption outside of the framework (e.g., PGP) should not be outlawed - but it need not be mainstream either. It is crucial that any such established security structure is widely accepted and trusted, as this will lower the demand for encryption outside of this framework, and so will make the second goal easier to achieve (or, at least, not more difficult). The establishment of such a widely accepted and trusted security structure is now the challenge that (US) IT businesses face if they want to participate in the recent CLIPPER IV initiative. _2. Binding cryptography_ In a series of two articles, we address the establishment of an information security infrastructure. Several proposals have been made by governments and others to establish such an infrastructure, but a satisfactory overall solution remains yet to be found. In the non-technical article [VKT], we review several technical proposals and a few government initiatives, focusing on key-escrow proposals. We present a series of criteria that acceptable solutions should meet, and note that all proposals so far fail to meet many of these criteria. We argued that the establishment of a worldwide security infrastructure can not be achieved without strong cooperation of governments. In fact, governments themselves should take up the challenge of establishing a security infrastructure, based on public-key encryption, which does not hamper law enforcement. We offer a new solution to achieve this: "binding data", which also improves upon current proposals. It has the advantage that it helps the establishment of a strong security infrastructure which discourages abuse for criminal or subversive purposes by making unilateral abuse easily detectible. It allows a straightforward monitoring of compliance with law-enforcement regulations, without users having to deposit ("escrow") keys beforehand. Thus, an information security infrastructure can be established, which does not worsen the crypto problem for law enforcement. Metaphorically speaking, our solution consists of equipping public-key encryption systems used for confidentiality with a (car) governor (a speed-limiting device). The specifications of this governor are rather general, and so many systems can probably be equipped with them. It is inspired by the proposal of Bellare and Rivest [BR], in which users' encrypted messages consist of three components: 1. the (actual) message encrypted with any symmetric system, using a random session key; 2. the session key encrypted with the public key(s) of the addressee(s); 3. the session key encrypted with the public key of a Trusted Retrieval Party (TRP). In effect, the TRP is treated as a virtual addressee, although the message is not sent to it. When a law-enforcement agency is conducting a lawful intercept and strikes upon an enciphered message, they take the third information component to the TRP. If shown an appropriate warrant, the TRP decrypts the information component and hands over the session key, so that the law-enforcement agency has access to the message. Observe that users are not obliged to escrow their (master) keys, they only give access to the (temporary) session keys used in the communication. The concept of "virtual escrow" has been the base of several escrow products (AT&T Crypto, RSA Secure, TIS Commercial Key Escrow). The main drawback of this concept is that it offers no possibility, at least for others than the TRP, to check whether the third component actually contains the (right) session key; moreover, the TRP will only discover fraud after a lawful wiretap. This renders the solution almost entirely unenforceable. Therefore, we propose a binding alternative, which adds a fourth component to the encrypted message: 4. binding data. The idea is that any third party, e.g., a network or service provider, who has access to components 2, 3 and 4 (but not to any additional secret information) can: a. check whether the session keys in components 2 and 3 coincide; b. not determine any information on the actual session key. In this way, fraud is easily detectible: a sender that attempts to virtually address a session key to the TRP (component 3) that is different from the real one he uses on the message (or just nonsense) will be discovered by anyone checking the binding data. If such checking happens regularly, fraud can be properly discouraged and punished. The binding concept supports the virtual addressing of session keys to several TRPs (or none for that matter), for instance, one to a TRP in the country of the sender and one in the country of the addressee. The solution therefore offers the same advantage for worldwide usability as the Royal Holloway [Holl] concept. We also remark that the concept supports the use of controllable key splitting in the sense of Micali [Mica] as well: a sender can split the session key and virtually address all the shares separately to the addressee and various TRPs using the binding concept. Moreover, the number of shares and the TRPs can - in principle - be chosen freely by each user. Finally we remark that the time-boundedness conditon (the enforceability of the timelimits of a warrant) can be fulfilled by additionally demanding that encrypted information (or all components) be timestamped and signed by the sender; a condition that can be publicly verified by any third party (e.g., monitor) as well. A PKI that incorporates binding data hence has the following four players: - Users, i.e., governments, businesses, and citizens, - TTPs offering trusted services (e.g., time-stamping and certification of public keys), - TRPs aiding law-enforcement agencies with decrypting legally intercepted messages, - Monitors, monitoring communications encrypted via the PKI on compliance with binding regulations. For instance, these could be network operators or (Internet) service providers. In [VKT], we explain how we envision the framework in which the binding concept could present a security tool in the information society. We think the concept is flexible enough (e.g., in the choice of TRPs) to be incorporated into almost any national crypto policy, on both the domestic and foreign use of cryptography. In a mathematical paper [VT], Verheul and Van Tilborg propose a technical construction for binding data for an important public-key encryption system: ElGamal. This construction is compatible with Desmedt's [DESM] traceable variant of ElGamal. The construction is based on the techniques used in zero knowledge proofs. We expect that these constructions can be improved and that various other public-key encryption systems can be equipped with binding data. We present this as a challenge to the cryptographic research community. An outline of the mathematical construction of binding ElGamal can be found at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bindtech.htm. _3. References_ [BR] M. Bellare, R.L. Rivest, "Translucent Cryptography. An Alternative to Key Escrow, and its Implementation via Fractional Oblivious Transfer", see http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest [Desm] Y. Desmedt, "Securing Traceability of Ciphertexts - Towards a Secure Key Escrow System", Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1995, pp.147-157. [Holl] N. Jefferies, C. Mitchell, M. Walker, "A Proposed Architecture for Trusted Third Party Services", Royal Holloway, University of London, see http://platon.cs.rhbnc.ac.uk [Mica] S. Micali, "Fair Public-key Cryptosystems'", Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '92 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1993, pp. 113-138. [VKT] E. Verheul, B.J. Koops, H.C.A. van Tilborg, "Binding Cryptography. A fraud-detectible alternative to key-escrow solutions", Computer Law and Security Report, January-February 1997, to appear. [*] [VT] E. Verheul, H.C.A. van Tilborg, "Binding ElGamal. A fraud-detectible alternative to key-escrow solutions", will be submitted to Eurocrypt97. [*] For the Computer Law and Security Report, send subscription enquiries, orders and payments to: Pam Purvey The Oxford Fulfilment Centre PO Box 800, Kidlington Oxford 0X5 1DX UK Tel: +44 1865 843373 Fax: +44 1865 843940 For the United States: Elsevier Advanced Technology Fulfilment (enquiries) 660 White Plains Road, Tarrytown New York, NY 10591-5153 USA Tel: 914 333 2458 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Center for Law, Administration and facs +31 13 466 8149 Informatization, Tilburg University e-mail E.J.Koops(a)kub.nl -------------------------------------------------- Postbus 90153 | This world's just mad enough to have been made | 5000 LE Tilburg | by the Being his beings into being prayed. | The Netherlands | (Howard Nemerov) | --------------------------------------------------------------------- http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Netscape does the right thing
by Paul Robichaux 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----BY SAFEMAIL----- When you buy Que's current Netscape book (_Special Edition, Using Netscape 3_), the included CD has the US-only, 128-bit, non-export version of Navigator on it. It's a licensed copy, even! (Of course, the book also has a small yellow "NOT FOR EXPORT" tag on the back cover, but who's counting?) For $49, getting a licensed copy of the 128-bit Navigator 3.0 plus a 1000+ page book is a pretty good deal. My hat's off to Netscape for choosing to put the 128-bit version on the CD, and to Macmillan/Que for bothering to get the software in the first place. I really do believe that Netscape wants to get secure software out as widely as possible. (Disclaimer: I wrote chapter 29 (the intro to JavaScript chapter) for _Special Edition, Using Netscape 2_. Que reused it, but I don't get paid any extra. It's a comprehensive book, and the CD has lots of cool stuff on it too.) - -Paul -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----BY SAFEMAIL----- Version: 1.0b3 iQEVAwUBMlvuQkp5FfADoAyJAQGpqQgAmkLHxKaVxdghoQy84ChCegj8FKBhXpvs eHFefwTBydaf1VD8ixDGdygy1Ch2Na0//y0hC8xF3gHg+/uTxbTh5Z+V+/0ISlu9 qsyoZMfda8AnMlEDF/PdNgONp2/E/+BguYcp9044RgPCVIVEH8cN9ff97QzUIOk1 VjR0hYnG98UYDmvEop/509VUDPvokbFLHG4iXl//3uTtY2sOuNG8zWNAV9SApGBM 6aOBS8+gW9DTGzlOTUlR5ncFSji9a4jJv2XkXsIin/v1MTjxooYn5ISrC+/jo2iT vmDtlk7y5k1SzzWkP0JtSM0ZbjV5xMyb4wNyRQfH7LIpUJ9uqpdKdg== =p0Ej -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Paul Robichaux LJL Enterprises, Inc. paul(a)ljl.com Be a cryptography user. Ask me how.

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Re: Binding cryptography - a fraud-detectible alternative to key-esc
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I haven't seen the technical papers behind the postings you've made to the net, but the overall approach sounds very similar to "Clipper II", the Software Key Encryption work that the TIS people (Steve Walker?) and Dorothy Denning were touting a year or so ago. It wasn't in your references, and it's clearly close enough to be worth your attention. The design was interesting - it chose a set of public and symmetric key encryption that allows the recipient to validate the sessionkey-encrypted-to-key-copy-holder*. A not-highly-technical description of the TIS CKE Commercial Key Escrow system is at http://www.tis.com/docs/products/cke/present.html, particularly present9b.html. It's worth reading for the appalling graphics alone :-) I don't seem to have a copy of the technical description anywhere. <IMG href="http://www.tis.com/docs/products/cke/pres7a.gif"> A major capability that was missing from Walker's SKE work is the ability to split the copied* key into two or more parts, all of which are need to recover the session key, while making it possible to validate that the pieces do add up to the session key. (This was also missing from the Clipper chip in hardware, which pretended to do it in the master key setting process.) Can you extend the approaches you're using to allow an outside party, or at least the recipient, to validate that the two parts of the copied key contain the complete session key? [* I'm using the terms "copied key" and "Key copy holder" to refer to the copy of the key that you're giving to some third party and the third party. The term "escrow" is generally not applicable to the applications that transmit a copy of the key to some third party, and the technologies involved don't specify, communicate, or enforce conditions for access. TIS's CKE does at least cart around a 32-bit user-defined string for specifying recovery conditions, but there's not technical enforcement. ] # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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[NOISE] About piracy & key recovery / hacked pages & Clinton-Gore
by scrappo.reverb＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hmmm... let's see... At about the same time I see people talking about major software/hardware companies going into the key recovery biz and piracy sites _not_ getting taken off of servers (SPA). Piracy. Software companies. Don't they have a common bond somewhere? Wouldn't it be ironic if a rash of piracy occurred with said companies products being pirated? I also noticed two other parallels: Hacked web pages and (although not here) the Clinton/Gore re-election. Hmm... Didn't somebody say something about the real Dole page getting a lot of hits? Maybe the Clinton page gets a lot of hits too. Wouldn't that be a hoot if somebody hacked their page and changed it to something more meaningful, say, how they are pushing the terribly dangerous key-recovery project. Even a subtle hack, such as putting a link to national and international sites carrying PGP, would have an effect. In the true spirit of the subject, I am not responsible. err... I am not responsible if this happens. Food for thought/no need to reply.

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Re: Production of ALPHACIPHER Snake Oil Cancelled!
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: From: Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)got.net> : At 9:11 PM -0700 10/17/96, ! Drive wrote: : >This may have already been posted, but I found it interesting... : > : >from: http://www.aa.net/cyber-survival-hq/ : > : > Development of the ALPHACIPHER product line has been voluntarily : >cancelled : >due to the possibility of : > non-compliance of users of ALPHACIPHER with the new key : >escrow : >law. : : : And just which _law_ might that be? Care to name an Act? Or even a Bill? I don't know, I'm only affiliated by the ISP, goto the page and find a mailto link and ask the owner. : : Come to think of it, just what the hell is "Alphacipher," and why should we : care? : : : > ALPHACIPHER currently has no built-in key generation function, and the : >proposed release of an : > ALPHACIPHER key generator has been terminated. All purchasers of ALPHACIPHER : >are entitled to a complete : > refund, and this has already been done. : : Were there any actual purchasers? : : > The New ADFGVX cipher is still offered for sale, as it is a breakable : >cipher, at least in theory. Why would one want to purchase something advertised as breakable? 'course advertising that its not breakable would would keep me away also. : : Ah, yes, now I understand. Sounds like just a new marketing ploy for the : same old snake oil. : : --Tim May

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Re: More threats from FOTM (Friends of Timmy May)
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 15 Oct 1996 21:54:20 -0700 (PDT), Sandy Sandfort wrote: >Does anyone remember the Russian word for "uncultured"? It was >in one or two of Tom Clancy's books. nekulturny? # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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