December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: List for crypto minus political rubbish
by sparks＠bah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<rant> Personally, I enjoy some of the rantings, although I would like a forum for new users to get some help and guidance.. perhaps they can scan my ISP to see if I have accessed some bomb making info ... </rant> >Status: U >Date: Sat, 3 Aug 1996 13:34:10 GMT >To: Matts Kallioniemi <matts(a)cyberpass.net> >Subject: Re: List for crypto minus political rubbish >From: jya(a)pipeline.com (John Young) >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >X-PipeUser: jya >X-PipeHub: pipeline.com >X-PipeGCOS: (John Young) >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk > >On Aug 03, 1996 14:38:59, 'Matts Kallioniemi <matts(a)cyberpass.net>' wrote: > >>Just about everything on cryptography has already been said far too many >times. >>Just read Applied Cryptography and be done with it. What remains to >discuss is >>politics, psychology and marketing. How do you get people to use the >>cryptography that already exists and how will the authorities react when >people >>do use it. > > >An exemplary air-clearing for a smoke-filled agenda; and two challenging >questions which may pose a High Noon amongst munitions-slingers. Bravo, >Matts, for cryptic concision. > > > >

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Re: AP story: Police look for Olympic bombing Internet link.
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:26 PM 8/3/96, Jonathan Corbet wrote: >My local paper (a Knight-Ridder rag) printed this story -- unquestioned -- >as well. Needless to say, I think a statement like this needs to be >responded to. Letters to the editor, folks! Wouldn't it be nice to have a >press that did a little more than print what the "authorities" have to say? ... >Meanwhile, I have a question: as far as I know, no bombing has actually >been tied to the Internet in any way. Does anybody know otherwise? Even >though it's not really relevant to the principles of the debate here, it >seems worth pointing out. But, as I keep saying, this is not a very useful argument. Given that bomb-makers get their information somewhere (encyclopedia articles, books, Loompanics catalogs, etc.) and given that the Web is beginning to seriously compete with these traditional sources, I have no doubts that the Net will sooner rather than later be implicated in a bombing. If one makes the arguments the the Net should not be regulated because it has not been used to supply information for a crime, then what happens when the Net *is* implicated? That particular argument then crumbles. I prefer to argue it this way: "Sure, the Net could be used for information on bombs. So could encyclopedias, books, "Time" and "Newsweek," and CNN. So what? We don't throw out the First Amendment and our belief that people can read and write what they want just because a few bombers may gain knowledge. We don't shut down chemistry departments because bombers learn about chemistry. And so on." This is, I think, a more lasting and persuasive argument. --Tim May HOW TO MAKE A PIPE BOMB: "Buy a section of metal water pipe 1/2 by 6 inches long, threaded on both ends. Buy two metal caps to fit. These are standard items in hardware stores. Drill a 1/16th hole in the center of the pipe. This is easy with a good drill bit. Hanson is a good brand to use. Screw a metal cap tightly on one end. Fill the pipe to within 1/2 inch of the top with black powder. Do not pack the powder. Don't even tap the bottom of the pipe to make it settle. You want the powder loose. For maximum explosive effect, you need dry, fine powder sitting loose in a very rigid container." (more information at http://sdcc13.ucsd.edu/~m1lopez/pipe.html, or by using search engines)

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Anonymous Message Broadcast
by Laszlo Vecsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone implemented a simple anonymous chat system (an anonymous irc) using the technique described in Applied Cryptography 2nd edition? I'm speaking of the Anonymous Message Broadcast documented in section 6.3, it begins on page 137. Can the same system be implemented using base256 (unsigned char, 8bit ASCII) instead of the simple on/off binary method that is described in the explanation? How would it differ. Thanks. (define(RSA m e n)(list->string(u(r(s(string->list m))e n))))(define(u a)(if(> a 0)(cons(integer->char(modulo a 256))(u(quotient a 256)))'()))(define(s a)(if (null? a)0(+(char->integer(car a))(* 256(s(cdr a))))))(define(r a x n)(cond((= 0 x)1)((even? x)(modulo(expt(r a(/ x 2)n)2)n))(#t(modulo(* a(r a(1- x)n))n))))

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Re: FAA to require transponders on all aircraft passengers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:21 PM 8/3/96, David Lesher wrote: >They are going to hang one of these on EVERY bag? > >At what per-unit cost? > >It's all the airlines can do to get barcode labels on each piece >that geos by, much less even a credit-card-sized gadget. And how >many will they lose??? > >THEN think of the RFI problems..... It turns out that I'm one of the early investors in a start-up company developing a very similar product, albeit (we hope) with some technological advantages. Lucky Green, for one, has met the principals in this company and can confirm what I'm saying. (I began working with them, and investing, several years ago. It was partly the long-term implications of their ideas which triggered my proposal a few years back: the "position escrow system." Under position escrow, citizen-units would voluntarily escrow their positions for access by authorized law enforcement officers, dietary compliance agents, social workers, and other interested officials. The system is voluntary, as key escrow is voluntary, in that it only applies when people leave their houses and use the public streets; they are of course free not to leave their houses, and hence not to voluntarily escrow their movements.) I heard about the Micron-FAA deal on CNN, and went to the Micron Web site for details. It's a spread-spectrum system, so it may well work in a luggage environment (though perhaps not as well as the units planned by the company I'm an investor in). The "every bag" point is feasible, though I would assume conventional luggage tags would work adequately. "Per-unit" costs could be low enough....these units will be reused many times, after all. The RFI problems are actually the least of the concerns, given the "code space" technology which is possible. (That is, tens of thousands of transponders can share the same RF spectrum in a local environment by allocation of frequencies or, even better, by using code space allocation...there are some close parallels with cryptography, of course, as there are in communications technology and spread-spectrum technology in general.) Personally, I'm not convinced that the Micron-FAA deal with accomplish much, but the authorities are rushing to "do something," so struggling Micron may get some of the largesse. (Besides, "bag escrow" will allow other agencies--such as DEA--to sniff bags for traces of cocaine residue and then automatically issue arrest orders for the citizen-unit associated with the bag. The surveillance state needs technology like this.) --Tim May HOW TO MAKE A PIPE BOMB: "Buy a section of metal water pipe 1/2 by 6 inches long, threaded on both ends. Buy two metal caps to fit. These are standard items in hardware stores. Drill a 1/16th hole in the center of the pipe. This is easy with a good drill bit. Hanson is a good brand to use. Screw a metal cap tightly on one end. Fill the pipe to within 1/2 inch of the top with black powder. Do not pack the powder. Don't even tap the bottom of the pipe to make it settle. You want the powder loose. For maximum explosive effect, you need dry, fine powder sitting loose in a very rigid container." (more information at http://sdcc13.ucsd.edu/~m1lopez/pipe.html, or by using search engines)

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Re: Information gathering by news servers
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12.33 PM 8/2/96 -0400, Scott McGuire wrote: >How much information about what someone reads can be gathered >by a news server? Is there an anonymous way to read a public >news server, or would a server have to be set up intentionally >to allow anonymous reading? You could use the Anonymizer (http://www.anonymizer.com/) in combination with a Web Usenet archive: Dejanews, for example. (http://www.dejanews.com/) =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo ga sukoshi dekiru) ---------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu PGP public key 0xD37692F9 -----> finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu or keyservers 0xD37692F9 Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 Do you know who's reading your email? ---> http://www.arc.unm.edu/~drosoff/pgp/ Is it a forgery? --- I have PGP signed all email and news posts since May 1996. =============================================================================== "Relax. It's not a real alarm. They can't crack _Pentagon_ codes. Can they?" :p -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMgOHcBguzHDTdpL5AQE2QAQArHuoLVA0dOJ+LddI2TumYvD/vaFrWBmI LQ3pDNlDRHdyY7u1RouVKkJbYVTvxNZCKQyaWYMgcA38eZl52V65DFq+N11Jhwm4 egCBlOlezDjPOeTk/nK25Ojavdb8ABtqGXGRFf4GwfFBQPq2kApzi8MewYEYeCJG HaofCy5FDWU= =bG1v -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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FYI: CTST Conference Proceedings
by Marshall Clow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I received thei week an advertisment for the 1996 CardTech/SecureTech conference proceedings. These people have a web site at <http://www.ctst.com>, but it's really lame. (It doesn't contain this table of contents, for example) Since I am not building/using/designing smart card technology right now, I won't be buying it. However, the some of the titles caught my eye: Does anyone have access to this kind of stuff, and would they be willing to post a summary? Here's a (partial) TOC: Volume 1 - Technology Changing the face of Money The Legislature's Perspective on the Future of Money Legal and Regulatory Challenges on the Development of Digital Money Privacy and American Business Introduction to Card and Identification Technology ... Advanced Identification Technology Workshop ... Advances in Signature Verification A Proposed Standard for Biometric Decidability New Imaging Technology Enables Non-intrusive Credit Card Fraud Prevention Secure Private Key Generation using a Finderprint Photo-ID Encryption and Pattern Recognition for Counterfeit Resistance The Voice Password(tm) Chip Low-Cost Biometric Security A Direct Fingerprint Reader Smart Card Technology Seminar ... Magnetic Stripe Card Technology Seminar ... Biometric Technology Seminar ... Optical Memory Card Technology Seminar ... RFID Technology Seminar ... PC Card Technology Seminar ... 2-D Bar Code Technology Seminar ... Volume 2 -- Applications Stored Value Card Applications Seminar ... Telecommunications Applications Seminar ... Government Applications Seminar Go Beyond Security -- Build in Privacy: One Does Not Equal The Other ... A Citizen Card for Europe The Spanish Social Security Card Project (TASS) Government Cards and the Information Age Information Security Applications Seminar ... Physical Security Applications Seminar ... Financial Applications Seminar ... Retail & Loyalty Applications Seminar ... Large Scale Identifications Seminar What's New in Licensing and Department Motor Vehicles Applications Welfare ID at the Point of Transactions Using Fingerprints & 2D Bar Codes INS Card Production Strategies and Initiaitives Counterfeiting of Cards Korean IC Card Market and Trends of Development and Investment Campus-Wide CardIssuance at the State University of New York National ID Programs Around the World Trends in National ID Programs The Future of Large Scale Identification Applications Health Care Applications Seminar ... Transportation Applications Seminar ... University Applications Seminar ... -- Marshall Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu> "We're not gonna take it/Never did and never will We're not gonna take it/Gonna break it, gonna shake it, let's forget it better still" -- The Who, "Tommy"

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Re: TrustBucks
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:11 AM 8/2/96, TrustBuckFella wrote: >An alternative model of electronic money. > >Every model of electronic money I know of except one retains some degree >of centralization. There is always a central "mint", usually a bank. If >you can't find a bank that acts the way you want, you're SOL. And the >only thing that enforces non-abuse (inflation, etc) by the bank is the >equivalence of electronic money to some form of "real" money. The sole >exception is Digicash. Unfortunately, Digicash has no restraint on ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >infinite spending-into-debt. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ You want to elaborate on this contention? If Alice transfers Digicash-type money to Bob, this is because Alice either bought the DC-money someplace, or already had it, or otherwise arranged with a bank to make the transaction. Maybe the bank "loaned" her money she didn't already have, but this is a completely separable issue from the form of DC-money. So what is this "restraint on infinite spending-into-debt"? Gullible lenders can always lend her vast amounts of money which she may never repay, but this is fully separable from what transfer protocol she uses to "spend" this loaned money. If, on the other hand, your point is something about inflation, this is also separable. Digicash and other forms of electronic money are generally not currencies per se, but are a kind of transfer order, more like a check. As such, not directly implicated in the issue of inflation. >I'm not going to try to develop the cryptographic protocols for >TrustBucks. I haven't got the requisite paranoia and pickiness >(compliments both) for that. TrustBucks also has nothing in the way of >anonymity and restraint on double-spending right now. If you can see how >it could be anonymous or restrain double-spending and still work, please >feel free to add. No protocols. No anonymity. No protection against double-spending. Looks promising. Keep us informed. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: fbi, crypto, and defcon
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 09.02 PM 8/2/96 -0700, Alan Olsen wrote: >>Can you name another business that has comparable mark-ups? > >Verisign? > >InterNic Domain name registration? > >Licence plates in Washington state? All the money they could possibly make is peanuts compared to the colossal rip-off of compact discs. :) =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo ga sukoshi dekiru) ---------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu PGP public key 0xD37692F9 -----> finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu or keyservers 0xD37692F9 Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 Do you know who's reading your email? ---> http://www.arc.unm.edu/~drosoff/pgp/ Is it a forgery? --- I have PGP signed all email and news posts since May 1996. =============================================================================== "Relax. It's not a real alarm. They can't crack _Pentagon_ codes. Can they?" :p -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMgOXvxguzHDTdpL5AQGzyQP/cDvyqIPmlU1Gg6BE+4u4GQb/RNe6LPa8 AR8fqae+dnEMsqRBF5ChEXNwNDxXCMzxVF0xXhVytlLUonlPpKCTL5E3YZ7nrj5/ SkO0/QpnyqTH1wzb6dV9RBcSxF0+V6EWX1rbHEqfXna52qWOCjDsaH3Wno5FZGJF O60tNSmcVcE= =8vn1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: More evidence that democracy is bunk
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:02 8/3/96, Martin Minow wrote: >At last month's SAFE (crypto policy) conference, one of the >legislators mentioned that someone snuck the text of the >Fourth Amendment into the crime bill, and it was voted down >in committee. > >(It would be nice to dig this out of a transcript, so it doesn't >become an urban legand.) I remember when this originally happened. It was on the news. But I thought it happened in the full House. Should be in the Congressional Record. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Re: "And who shall guard the guardians?"
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:20 8/3/96, Martin Minow wrote: >My understanding is that the United States is (finally) a signatory >to the Declaration. That doesn't matter. Violations would have to be tried by the World Court in Den Haag. The US does not recognize decisions made there (unless it suits their purpose). -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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