December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[LONG,FUNNY,NOISE] Cypherpunk wannabe threatens a lawsuit :-)
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks, I offer these two Usenet articles for your amusement. In article 1, I follow up on Bruce Bough's article, and, among many other things, defend his right to vote (questioned by the orthodox Jewish homophobe Dan Hartung). (It's very long and technical, so you can skip it.) In article 2, Bruce Bough follows up on my article and threatens to prosecute me under the Americans with Disability Act for misspelling his name. This is almost as funny as his litanies about his dementia and memory loss. Have fun. Article 1: =============================================================================== From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.misc,news.admin.censorship,news.admin.policy,alt.config,news.groups,alt.journalism,atl.general,alt.culture.usenet,alt.internet.media-coverage,alt.wired,alt.cyberspace,talk.politics.misc,news.admin.net-abuse.misc,ga.general,misc.news.internet.discuss,soc.culture.russian,alt.flame.jan-isley,talk.forgery,alt.usenet.kooks,alt.grelb Subject: Re: Towards A Usenet Social Contract References: <4rpvfi$smg(a)doc.jmu.edu> <4rv6m7$3ns_002(a)mycroft.kenosis.com> Message-ID: <i6a1qD209w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> Date: Sat, 13 Jul 96 09:25:41 EDT In article <4rv6m7$3ns_002(a)mycroft.kenosis.com>, bruce(a)kenosis.com (Bruce Baugh) wrote: >In article <4rpvfi$smg(a)doc.jmu.edu>, bumgarls(a)falcon.jmu.edu (Lee S. Bumgarner) wrote: > >>Is a little premeditation too much to ask for a smoothly working system? > >Yes. The _only_ info the voting process needs to know is whether the >voter is a unique individual. This is in practical terms not an >achievable task. But processes like serialized authenticated ballots at >least move in that direction. Voter registration that gathers _any_ info >beyond establishing the legitimacy of the address is a step in the wrong >direction. Information not in hand can't be abused, and I see great >potential for abuse of any sort of repository of information about voter >interests, preferences, etc. > >Further, any step toward increasing centralization seems to me counter >to the fundamental paradigm of Usenet, which owes its survival to its >decentralized nature. No system with anything like a real center could >have survived the growth of recent years. One of the last things we need >(in addition to info that can be put to abusive purposes being >collected) is any additional bottleneck. > >>in my opinion, prevents this system from being viable. If we have a >>registration system, then the cabal would be small, say 20 or so people. >>They would not be system admins, simply interested readers. > >I give you...news.groups. All that's necessary of this concept exists. >Further, by functioning in an ungoverned environment, it ensures that >what status people have is _earned_ by virtue of their views and >arguments. The current system is completely open to addition of new >figures to the pantheon. Again, centralization creates the potential for >bottlenecks. > >I don't trust _anyone_ with the power to establish a "cabal" of this >sort. I start with myself. Anyone who holds strong views of matters of >controversy faces the problem of bias, and anyone not informed enough >to hold views on them has no business selecting authority figures. I remember how someone recently argued on news.groups that Bruce Bough's votes should be invalidated because he's dying from AIDS. I strongly disagree with Dan's (?) reasoning, which was, I recall, that someone with only a couple of months left to live shouldn't be telling others how to run Usenet after his death. I think we should consider Bruce's opinions as being representative. After all, a Usenet vote is an interest poll, and the voters are just a sample of a larger population. Not everyone who thinks like Bruce Bough is going to die together with him from AIDS within a few months (sigh). Let him vote. The use of numbered ballots (as proposed by Dr. Grubor and implemented by me), will stop the following kinds of net-abuse: * Cabal supporters such as Russ Allberry (spit) e-mailing pre-filled ballots to their mailing lists, sometimes gathering tens of thousands of votes from people who haven't read the CFV; * Cabal supporters forging cancels to censor Usenet articles they claim contain "unauthorized voting instructions". This pretext has been used to stifle campaigning against the proposals the Cabal wanted to pass, as well as to suppress protests against UVV misconduct by Jan Isley (spit) and his cohorts. The use of a simple randomized question about the CFV - find the line that says this and fill in the missing word on the ballot (as proposed by Dr. Grubor and implemented by me), will stop the following kinds of net-abuses: * Cabal supporters such as Stephanie da Silva (spit) vote YES on every moderated newsgroup without reading the CFV; * Cabal supporters such as Chris Stein (spit) vote NO on every unmoderated newsgroup without reading the CFV. There can be no pre-filled ballots under Dr. Grubor's proposal. But Dr. Grubor's proposals don't address the issue of votetaker fraud. For example, we've exposed Jan Isley (spit) as a liar and a forger, who frivolously "invalidated" or "lost" votes from people he didn't like (including myself), and forged cancels for their protests on news.groups. Emory University called Isley's (spit) forgeries "reprehensible" and pulled his plug for net-abuse. The UVV's refusal to use numbered ballots and to ask (simple) questions about the CFV on the ballot is just a lame excuse. They really want to be able to forge cancels for protests posted to news.groups about votetaker misconduct. For example, of the following dozen votes I've cast, I've only received an ack for my NO vote on soc.culture.israel.moderated (fuck you, Jonathan Kamens). Where are the acks for the following ballots: 1. I e-mailed voting(a)hut.fi and wrote: I vote NO on soc.culture.israel.moderated I received an ack (thank you, Jani). 2. I e-mailed voting(a)hut.fi and wrote (ballot mark skipped): >Voter name: Dr. Dimitri Vulis > >| Insert YES, NO, ABSTAIN, or CANCEL inside the brackets for each >| newsgroup listed below (do not delete the newsgroup name): > > Your Vote Newsgroup > --------- ----------------------------------------------------------- >[ NO ] rec.arts.comics.marketplace.forsale >[ NO ] rec.arts.comics.marketplace.wanted So far, I received no ack. 3. I e-mailed voting(a)hut.fi and wrote: >I vote YES on rec.games.bridge.okbridge So far, I received no ack. 4. I e-mailed voting(a)hut.fi and wrote: >I vote YES on soc.adoption.parenting So far, I received no ack. 5. I e-mailed mtac(a)infobahn.net and wrote: >I vote NO on misc.transport.air-industry.cargo So far, I received no ack. 6. I e-mailed ccmp(a)infobahn.net and wrote: >I vote YES on comp.cad.microstation.programmer So far, I received no ack. 7. I e-mailed ceg(a)infobahn.net and wrote: >I vote YES on comp.emulators.game-consoles So far, I received no ack. 8. I e-mailed smo(a)infobahn.net and wrote: >I vote NO on sci.med.obgyn So far, I received no ack. 9. I e-mailed saf(a)infobahn.net and wrote: >I vote YES on sci.agriculture.net So far, I received no ack. 10. I e-mailed david.bostwick(a)chemistry.gatech.edu and wrote: >Give your real name here: Dr. Dimitri Vulis >If you do not give your real name, your vote may be rejected. > >[Your Vote] Group (Place your vote below in the brackets next to the group) >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >[YES ] comp.lang.dfl So far, I received no ack. 11. I e-mailed david.bostwick(a)chemistry.gatech.edu and wrote: >Give your real name here: Dr. Dimitri Vulis >If you do not give your real name, your vote may be rejected. > >[Your Vote] Group (Place your vote below in the brackets next to the group) >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >[ YES ] misc.invest.misc (renames misc.invest) >[ YES ] misc.invest.mutual-funds (renames misc.invest.funds) >[ YES ] misc.invest.options >[ YES ] misc.invest.marketplace So far, I received no ack. 12. I e-mailed dhartung(a)mcs.com and wrote: >Give your real name here: Dr. Dimitri Vulis >If you do not give a real name on the above line your vote may be rejected. > >[Your Vote] Group >----------------------------------------------------------------------- >[NO ] soc.religion.paganism So far, I received no ack. What's going on? Why are 11 of my ballots not being acknowledged? =============================================================================== Article 2: =============================================================================== Path: ...!newsfeed.internetmci.com!usenet.eel.ufl.edu!psgrain!rainrgnews0!news.aracnet.com!mycroft From: bruce(a)kenosis.com (Bruce Baugh) Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.misc,news.groups,alt.usenet.kooks Subject: Re: Towards A Usenet Social Contract Date: Sun, 14 Jul 96 00:17:16 GMT Organization: Kenosis Design Lines: 29 Message-ID: <4s9eac$1ag_006(a)mycroft.kenosis.com> References: <4rpvfi$smg(a)doc.jmu.edu> <4rv6m7$3ns_002(a)mycroft.kenosis.com> <i6a1qD209w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: ppp-u11.aracnet.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII X-Newsreader: News Xpress 2.0 Beta #2 In article <i6a1qD209w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com>, dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis) wrote: >of a larger population. Not everyone who thinks like Bruce Bough is going to >die together with him from AIDS within a few months (sigh). Let him vote. Dimitri, I invite you to pick a date, not more than twelve months in the future, beyond which you're certain I will die. I will then post the next day. Not, of course, that I expect you to have the honor to admit now that you're deliberately misreading and misunderstanding my posts, nor to admit in the future that you made a claim demonstrably wrong. Nor, I see, can you spell my name correctly, even though you quote it routinely in reply lines and sig files. People who can't read what's in front of them on screen lose credibility when it comes to proposing sweeping changes and radical innovations in software. Further, you might want to read up on the Americans With Disabilities Act. Slanderous and defamatory statements about the handicapped - and my government agrees that I do have a real problem, though it's not AIDS - open you up to interesting liability. Bruce Baugh <*> bruce(a)aracnet.com <*> http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce See my Web pages for New science fiction by Steve Stirling and George Alec Effing er Christlib, the mailing list for Christian and libertarian concerns Daedalus Games, makers of Shadowfist and Feng Shui Unsolicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at $50/hour, min $100. ===============================================================================

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setting up disposable remailers
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some thoughts on solutions to the remailer operator liability problem. It occurs to me that the risk for the remailer owner could be reduced by separating concerns. That is, introducing separate roles for setting up the remailer so that the identity of as many parties as possible is not determinable to the litigator. Model 1 ------- Separable roles: - person owning the remailer - person installing remailer software - person handling complaints to the remailer In this model a new remailer owner would anonymously email a member of the cypherpunks list asking if they would be interested in installing a remailer in the owners provided account. The remailer owner would anonymously open an account with an ISP offering anonymous shell accounts, and accepting digicash, or cash, and anonymously email the account details to the installer. Optionally, a third party (the maintainer) could be persuaded to accept complaints for the remailer, and (anonymously) send signed instructions to the remailer to bar certain receiving addresses. The only determinable target for a typical litigator would be the ISP. If a more powerful adversary were the litigator, such as a TLA anxious to demonstrate an excuse for it's continued existance, it is possible they may retrieve the identity of the installer (if they do indeed have taps and large IP traffic recording facilities for instance). They may try to hold the installer responsible if unable to find the owner. Model 2 goes some way to reducing risk for the installer. Model 2 ------- In this model the additional separable role of setting up a shell command mail processor on the account is introduced. What I mean by this is as has been discussed on the list recently, that a mail handler which executes signed shell commands emailed, and anonymously emails back the command output. That is to say the remailer owner now passes the account information to the installer of the mail processor. The shell installer sets up the command processor, and leaves. Now the owner gives the PGP secret key of the command processor to the remailer installer (or if the owner feels competent, does this part themselves). Provided that the anonymous remailers used for all of the steps are type2 mixmaster remailers, the system should be much more secure. Adam -- #!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj $/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1 lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)

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Encrypted file systems
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some more thoughts on encrypted file system design criteria. A wish list: - Choice of secret key encryption algorithms (IDEA, 3DES, MDC, Blowfish) - Multiple architectures (MSDOS, Win31, Win95, WinNT, Unix, Mac) - High performance (hand optimised assembler for each architecture) - Compression - Ability to chain algorithms (IDEA and then 3DES for example) - Possible to have encrypted file systems on separate partitions, or - Encrypted file system located in a file in another file system (much like DOS stacker drives) this is an ease of use criteria -- I suspect re-partitioning drives would put off many potential users. - Ease of use. Graphical user interface for setup and administration functions, with a very simple set of configurations options displayed by default, with more advanced configuration options available in "expert" mode. - All directory and FAT information should be encrypted, so that it is not possible to discover even number of files, or percentage of disk used without the key - Facility for duress key, with the real data hidden in the unused space of the first encrypted drive. To increase the plausible deniability all unused blocks within a file system should be filled with garbage, so that it is not possible to tell if there is more data there. - File system steganographically hidden in files on another file system (encrypted or not). Support for a wide selection of file formats (Aiff, Wave, Midi, JPEG, GIF, RGB, MPEG). - Ability to use stegoed file system in files on an unencrypted file system, and boot from a floppy to access stegoed file system, with no other traces left on hard disk. Thought for the day: the main barrier for a Chinese dissident to using such software is that being caught with a boot floppy with the software for a stegoed drive would be dangerous. What would solve this would be if Microsoft, Apple, UNIX vendors, Slackware linux included this functionality (or this software itself as useful freeware included with the CD distribution) in their respective O/Ses as non-optional modules -- that is you get the software installed whether you want it or not. If everyone has the software, mere possesion of the software no longer is a problem. Throw in a few useful utilities, like a steganographic interface to anonymous remailers, the address of a few ftp/www by email services, and you have a system with interesting possibilities. To improve the national security of the US, the NSA should be dropping CDs with such software (much like war-time propoganda leaflets air dropped) on undemocratic countries with poor human rights records. Instead they expend their efforts on ITAR... Adam -- #!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj $/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1 lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)

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Markoff on Clipper III
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On the Friday "Clipper III" rehash by the Admin: Balancing Privacy and Official Eavesdropping By JOHN MARKOFF "The president and vice president took an oath to protect our national security," Simon said. "They feel they have to err on the side of protecting national security." The government also said that it did not see an immediate technical solution to the problems that would result from the global proliferation of "strong cryptography." ************** Last time I looked, the oath they took was to protect the Constitution -- not the nation or national security. I don't see an "immediate technical solution" to strong crypto either. Or, indeed, a long-term solution. DCF

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Re: Dep. AG Gorelick on CSPAN2 advocating escrow
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:34 PM 7/13/96, Deranged Mutant wrote: >Saw Jamie(?) Gorelick, Dep. Attny Gen. on CSPAN2 talking about needs >for key escrow. Emphasized the what if people lose their keys, or >someone dies, or if an employee steals company secrets & encrypts >them... rather than the usual what if terrorists use crypto line >(though she did mention that too). > >Guess they're taking a new tack to sell it to the public. A lot of >bunkum... (project left to the reader how these can be handled in a >non-GAK manner). And as we all know, having discussed this many times, even if one buys these arguments for the advantages of key escrow, THEY DO NOT APPLY TO COMMUNICATIONS! That is, imagine Alice and Bob communicating over some channel. Alice has files on her computer. Putatively, if she dies, leave her company, whatever, it is desired to reconstruct these files. Fine. A potential use for key escrow. (If voluntary, of course.) But what does this have to do with a channel between Alice and Bob? Why should the keys for this channel ever need to be escrowed for the reasons Gorelick cites? After all, Alice has the files she sent stored locally, and Bob presumably has the same files he received. There is essentially no rationale for escrowing the keys of a transient communication. The Administration and even cryptologists apologizing for GAK (who ought to know better) are curiously silent on this rebuttal to their claims. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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My impending death
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since Vulis decided to drag in a disagreement from elsewhere, I have a brief invitation. He says I'm going to die in the next few months. My birthday is in October. So on my birthday in 1997, I'm going to have a party. All present will be invited to petition Vulis for more oracular pronouncements about the fate of past and present posters to Cypherpunks. In the meantime, I give thanks to the God of Killfiling, and fire mine up. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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New mixmaster remailer announcment
by Bill O'Hanlon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PGP message

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.27 - No New News on Crypto: Gore Restates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:17 AM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >At 7:05 AM -0700 7/13/96, Deranged Mutant wrote: >>This is particularly problematic... if the mainland Chinese gov't >>requested a key from a N.Amercian or European (or even UN controlled) >>escrow agency, who is to say it isn't really for political reasons >>(even though they may claim the persons are drug smugglers)? >> >>Or what if the 'crime' was, say, discussing Mormon beliefs, which is >>illegal in Singapore (and I think Russia as well)? >> >>Or what if some terrorist was using keys escrowed in a country that >>sponsered terrorist acts? > >Your best shot would be to make sure the part about the system being >voluntary was hard-wired into any legislation or rule-making. Wrong. Our "best shot" is to ensure that no "key escrow" legislation is adopted, and moreover export restrictions on crypto are eliminated. _THAT_ is "our best shot." The obvious problem with writing "voluntary" into any legislation (and thinking it actually means something!) is that there is a vast difference between the dictionary definition of the word "voluntary", and the way the USG would like to interpret it. I think most people define "voluntary" as something which is a free choice, devoid of coersion. But that's already damaged when the government's involved. Aside from robbing us of our assets in the form of taxes, the fact that it was able to do things like harass Phil Zimmermann for a few years (when, if there had been a "regulation" concerning writing encryption, it would have said, "writing encryption is unrestricted and VOLUNTARY") clearly proves that the government tries to do manipulate us regardless of friendly terminology like "voluntary." Clipper was always claimed to be "voluntary," but more recently they added to the restrictions, for example saying that a Clipper-type crypto phone can't be allowed to operate when connected to a non-escrow telephone. Again, the government is getting further and further away from "voluntary" as most of us understand the term. More importantly, I believe that the most fundamental right the public has is to be able to REFUSE a benefit. Let's suppose, hypothetically, that we "all" could agree that that GAK would provide net advantages and benefits to the public. I assert that despite this, the public is and should still be completely free to _refuse_ these benefits, and to go without GAK. This position, the truth of which is obvious to most of the readers of CP, would astonish and frustrate government employees and their sympathizers. Today, it appears that the vast majority of those that are paying attention to this issue agree that GAK is NOT desirable, and in any case they don't want it. The simple conclusion is that as long as we aren't supposed to have a dictatorship in this country, the will of the public to _refuse_ the claimed benefit should be respected and followed. Under those conditions, GAK wouldn't and couldn't happen. >Unless and until ITAR is modified by Congress, Congress didn't write ITAR, nor did it approve ITAR. However, the Burns crypto bill will, apparently, negate most if not all of the influence of ITAR on crypto. > the USG has what Mark Twain called "the >calm confidence of a Christian with four aces" on this matter. "A Smith and Wesson beats four aces." And if the government keeps pushing, it'll come to this. > That >is--unless and until Congress acts, the Administration has absolute >discretion with respect to the conditions under which they will liberalize >the administration of ITAR. That's not clear. The _constitutionality_ of the application of ITAR to encryption is challengeable in court, with or without any actions by Congress. So they DON'T have "absolute discretion." Furthermore, regulations must (at least theoretically) conform to law. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Markoff on Clipper III
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:33 PM 7/14/96 -0400, Duncan Frissell wrote: >On the Friday "Clipper III" rehash by the Admin: > >Balancing Privacy and Official Eavesdropping > > By JOHN MARKOFF > > "The president and vice president took an oath to protect our >national security," Simon said. "They feel they have to err on the side of >protecting national security." > > The government also said that it did not see an immediate >technical solution to the problems that would result from the global >proliferation of "strong cryptography." > >************** > >Last time I looked, the oath they took was to protect the Constitution -- >not the nation or national security. It's called "mission creep." And they didn't quite tell the truth: Their main loyalty is to "government security" or even "job security." >I don't see an "immediate technical solution" to strong crypto either. Or, >indeed, a long-term solution. Thank heavens for that! Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.27 - No New News on Crypto: Gore Restates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:06 PM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >At 2:37 PM -0700 7/14/96, jim bell wrote: >>At 10:17 AM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >>>Your best shot would be to make sure the part about the system being >>>voluntary was hard-wired into any legislation or rule-making. >> >>Wrong. Our "best shot" is to ensure that no "key escrow" legislation is >>adopted, and moreover export restrictions on crypto are eliminated. > >Nope. That's some people's preferred shot, but may not be the best one Okay, "best" by which definition? And don't avoid the question: Am I not free to reject YOUR opinion of what the "best" solution is FOR ME? >or even a realistic one. "Realistic"? Who's definition? >It's certainly a partisan political advocacy (in the >sense that people are partisan about this issue, not in the sense of a >particular political party). Meaningless tripe. All you're saying is that people disagree. People disagree about a lot of things; that doesn't legitimize opposing opinions. > Yet that attitude didn't get any legislation to stop Clipper I. We didn't NEED "any legislation to stop Clipper I." Quite the opposite, anyone promoting Clipper NEEDS legislation to force it on unwilling citizens. >My point was very simple--if the government is going to say a system is >voluntary, make them put it in writing in the rules or legislation. Why have the "system" in the first place? No legislation, no system. Simple. > We >failed to do that with Clipper I (when they said in non-rulesmaking >statements that they had no intention of making escrow mandatory--but >nobody said "OK. Put it in writing as a formal policy.") No, you're misrepresenting the issue: You're trying to subtly suggest that we should have agreed with MOST of the Clipper proposal AS LONG AS it was explicitly made voluntary. (Yet nothing prevents Congress from writing and passing a law which prohibits the executive branch of government from making escrow mandatory; they haven't done this.) Quite the contrary: I don't trust the government to implement any such proposal EVEN IF it is, ostensibly, "voluntary." The voluntary/involuntary aspect is an excellent reason to oppose Clipper, but is by no means the only one. Also, I don't trust the government's definition (and dynamically changeable interpretation) of the word, "voluntary." Since Clipper was funded with tax dollars stolen from the public its very existence is already a violation of the "voluntary" requirement. The fact that Clipper was developed without substantial public (and I mean PUBLIC, not some selected committee of bootlickers) input and debate proves that the government knew it could get no support for the idea. One of the recently revealing aspects of the government's dishonesty concerning Clipper was a clarification which stated that Clipper telephones could not communicate with any crypto telephone that didn't implement key escrow. But as anyone who followed the Beta vs. VHS competition saw, the market generally abhors two mutually incompatible standards, particularly if a certain level of compatibility is required or is at least desirable, and particularly if there is no good reason to maintain BOTH those standads. The main disadvantages to maintaining two tape formats was the inconvenience of sharing tapes with people who had the opposite format, the requirement that retail stores maintain two stocks, and the requirement that rental people support both formats. There were no powerful incentives to maintain two standards, and thus one had to die. Crypto telephones, by definition, need to be far more compatible with each other than VCR machines. They must actually talk to each other. Imagine a world in which there were two different crypto formats, and for stupid political reasons they were entirely incompatible: System "A" couldn't talk to system "B." What would happen? It's obvious: One format would kill the other. People wouldn't tolerate the compatibility. The US Government wanted the surviving system to be Clipper, and to accomplish this they used stolen tax dollars to secretly develop a system that they hoped would nip the potential competing systems in the bud. It didn't work, of course, but it is clear what they tried to do. If, on the other hand, there was no impediment to system "A" talking to system "B", both systems could easily co-exist. A few suckers would buy Clipper phones; the rest of us would insist on good encryption. Clipper would eventually die, just as Beta VCR's eventually did. The government understands this, that's why they inserted the requirement for incompatibility. >. As a result, many >in government even at the higher policy-making levels are still calling for >mandatory escrow. Had it been in the rules, it's less likely they could >have overtly gone against a rules-making covenant/compromise. Hmmmm... I thought Congress made arming the Contras in Nicaragua explicitly illegal. Yet Ollie North got away with it, effectively. What is it that makes you so certain that Government has gotten any more honest in the past 10 years? >It's simple pragmatic regulatory politics. And that's exactly the problem! That's because it's also wrong. We don't need to be "pragmatic" by YOUR definition. >It's how the system works, Actually, in the past the system has "worked" by suckering in the public, in exactly the way you're attempting to do. Tricking them into supporting things that were bad for them. Remember the "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution"? > and >using the system itself to achieve one's goals is one of the more powerful >techniques around. You don't have to like it, but you do have to decide >whether you'd rather be "right" or get the result. In a sense, we ALREADY have "the result," or at least a substantial fraction of it. Development of domestic crypto is ostensibly free. The only thing desired further in the elimination of any residual restrictions, WITHOUT letting the government set up any sort of key-escrow system, voluntary OR involuntary. As far as I can see, cooperation at this point with the pro-GAK forces can only hurt the cause. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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