December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[Noise] Re: Clinton Backs Internet 'Decency Act'
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:35 AM 6/14/96 -0700, you wrote: >This is also at odds with what Clinton said. The full text of the statement >is available on whitehouse.gov, among other places. I don't see how necessarily. (1) He supports the bill, and (2) he thinks the bill is within the realm of constitutionality, his statement is rather weak, but I think if you take the two points above, their summation is obvious and _is_ contrary to the bravado of Gore's MIT commencement speech. This is not to say he could very well back off to save face, which is what he is starting to do, and I hope he continues to do... Statement by President Clinton in reaction to Court Decision THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ___________________________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release June 12, 1996 STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT The Justice Department is reviewing today's three judge panel court decision on the Communications Decency Act. The opinion just came down today, and the statute says we have twenty days to make an appeal. I remain convinced, as I was when I signed the bill, that our Constitution allows us to help parents by enforcing this Act to prevent children from being exposed to objectionable material transmitted though computer networks. I will continue to do everything I can in my Administration to give families every available tool to protect their children from these materials. For example, we vigorously support the development and widespread availability of products that allow both parents and schools to block objectionable materials from reaching computers that children use. And we also support the industry's accelerating efforts to rate Internet sites so that they are compatible with these blocking techniques. -30-30-30- _______________________ Regards, Democracy is where you can say what you think even if you don't think. -? Joseph Reagle http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

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Re: Remailer Operator Liability?
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10.18 AM 6/15/96 -0400, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: >Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 15-Jun-96 Re: Remailer Operator >Liabi.. by Zed(a)zeta.org.au >> distributed to a minor who was using a nym. I think pressure on anonymous >> remailers is going to increase as various groups complain that the paw >> innocent widdle kiddies are "vulnerable to corruption"(or some bullshit like >> that) because their age can be hidden. Read the decision. The CDA _may_ be > >This is true. Yesterday evening I interviewed the director of >enforcement for a TLA here in DC. He expressed his concern about >anonymous remailers and anonymity online. (More on this later.) > >The word here in DC is "accountability." > >-Declan Am I the only one who thinks that any kid who is competent enough and smart enough to use a nym will not only 1) not be warped or corrupted by the horrible porno demons but also 2) won't even care about porno? =============================================================================== David Rosoff (nihongo o chiisaku dekimasu) -------------> drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu For PGP key 0xD37692F9, finger drosoff(a)acoma.arc.unm.edu or get from keyservers pub 1024/D37692F9 1995/07/01 David Rosoff <drosoff(a)arc.unm.edu> Key fingerprint = 25 7D AA 01 85 41 43 89 50 5A 33 76 F1 F1 99 67 I accept anonymous mail. If I didn't sign it, you don't know I wrote it. === "Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will / To strive, to seek, to find-- and not to yield." <---- "Ulysses", by Alfred, Lord Tennyson -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMcMI4xguzHDTdpL5AQHSUQQAo0YJvapyiC5r2eoY5BDaEEf164zxE+ub JUw807Ovtsg0SSoyESHOAyO4S8usq4dV8JVJRlmGitAo+p9BJPWe8UYX8u4LU9se LZoCOkgwomRLdLL4D4/3ALaT/qanTpuJ/NelxGN7871+jSA6qiuL8nSLdTiU3zL8 YHaWo7z1nNI= =m9F9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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The FCC wants you!!! (fwd)
by Mark Allyn 206-860-9454 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From nanog-owner(a)merit.edu Sat Jun 15 01:48:51 1996 Date: Sat, 15 Jun 1996 00:12:58 -0700 (PDT) From: Michael Dillon <michael(a)memra.com> To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: The FCC wants you!!! Message-ID: <Pine.BSI.3.93.960615001101.4644Q-100000(a)sidhe.memra.com> Organization: Memra Software Inc. - Internet consulting MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu Precedence: bulk If you know American ISP's who don't normally hang out on ISP mailing lists or if you have any contacts in the educational system who are concerned with the cost of technology, then please forward this message to them. Here is the opportunity for direct political action that really can make a difference without requiring well-funded intermediaries and lobbiests... Michael Dillon ISP & Internet Consulting Memra Software Inc. Fax: +1-604-546-3049 http://www.memra.com E-mail: michael(a)memra.com ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 14 Jun 1996 22:13:01 -0600 (MDT) From: Dave Hughes <dave(a)oldcolo.com> Reply-To: inet-access(a)earth.com To: inet-access(a)earth.com Subject: Re: Accuracies of My Own Resent-Date: Fri, 14 Jun 1996 23:14:53 -0500 (CDT) Resent-From: inet-access(a)earth.com Jack Rickard says: > > In any event, my perception is that Dave is always early to the table, and > by the time the world is ready to buy something, he's already moved on. I > was vaguely aware of his wireless activities, and somewhat more interested > in them with the recent NIIBand proposals. There ARE some issues and I do > hope Dave is successful in steering this toward the 15 km version as > opposed to the limited range Wireless LAN version some of the big guys seem > to be determined to push through. > > In fact, this is actually a rather key issue specifically for Internet > Service Providers and more specifically for those in rural areas. As a > newbie to the mailing list, I may be reintroducing something that has > already been done to death. But this NIIBand could be a huge advantage for > small ISP's in rural areas (not JUST academia and K-12 Dave) if done right, > and another fiasco if done wrong. The FCC has this open for comment now. > If Mr. Hughes would provide info on docket numbers and where to write, you > all could have a significant impact. On the one hand, you can offer 24 > Mbps links by radio at 10-15 km. On the other, 3COM can do wireless LAN > inside a building for about 1000 feet. All from a stroke of the FCC pen. > > Yes, this is a far more significant issue than most ISPs realize - whether the FCC, in both responding to the Apple-WINForum proposal to allocate 350Mhz of spectrum in the 5Ghz bands for what the FCC dubbed the "NII/SUPERNET" Band for 'no licence' wireless - will do that in BOTH the 'wireless lan' segment AS WELL AS the requested '15 km' segments and thus permit anyone, including ISPs to have no-comm cost bandwidth up to 2Mbps between two points, or, with relay, 1Mbps (above and below T-1) for the cost of the radios. Spread spectrum technology which is a revolution in radio communications (wide band, digital processor controlled low power - with no practical interference versus traditional narrow frequency band high power - with so much interferecne, the frquencies have to be licenced and highly controlled). And yes I, and a too-small handful of others are deep into the issues at the FCC level as the decision hangs in the balance. Because I am the Principal Investigator on the $375,700 'Wireless Field Test for Education Project' I was invited to a roundtable with FCC Commissioners nominally debating 'wireless for education' two weeks ago, and, using our real-world wireless project going on in the San Luis Valley (one school being relaibaly connected now 15 miles at 115kbs, bypassing US West, from NT-Lan router to Cisco Router at the POP. Zero local loop cost) and reporting on the other projects we have examined (8 Belen, New Mexico Schools, conected T-1 between each other in a WAN - up to 10 miles across the district. Zero local loop cost (which would normally run $84,000 a year wiht telco T-1 between schools). We made an impression, but know what giant forces we are up against. Some FCC staffers want to 'auction' the longer range (even 15km) stuff. Some big communications companies, led by the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Assn - CTIA, would like all 'no-licence' that can compete with them to be killed. Our arguements, that got a few thinking anyway, was that IF the FCC rules permit radios to be made which go 15-45 miles, no licence, no interference, and solve the problem of the 16,000 school districts whose biggest problem is the cost of bandwidth *between* school building of a district first, then the cost from the main hub to the POP, second, then between the student and/or teacher at home to the school, at 56kbs or above, THEN the problem of 'community' networking will also be solved. For school districts are coincident where people live and log on from. (ditto ISPs) We turned a few heads when I showed my calcuations that, if the 14 School Districts of the SanLuis Valley are connected to the one central POP at T-1 by US West, it will cost $1.2 million over 10 years. If by T-1 25mile radios (yeas they exist now) it will cost $173,000 for the same 10 years. Now if ISPs want to strike a blow for economic telecom freedom, you can start by accessing our NSF Wireless Field Test web site, http://wireless.oldcolo.com and go into the Regulatory section where you will find direct documents, links to the FCC, the Belen Paper, and my long but piercing piece 'The Case for Public Spectrum' (and if you are a skeptic about the technology, read the Paul Baran short papers - the invetor of packet switching) Then all you have to do to sumbit public comments o the NIIBand matter is to email: 96-102(a)fcc.gov and that is the email address for the Docket Item. You *must* comment before July 15th, or yours will not be considered. (but under the law and regulation, if you *do* comment, your comments must be summarized by the staff and presented to the COmmissioners with the staff views. You do NOT have to comment on all the heavy duty technical issues. Right from the chief FCC Engineer who drafts the rules, and was the father of the original Spread Spectrum rules in 1985 he says that your statemnt of what you NEED, and why, would be much appreciated. As simple as 'I am an ISP who needs T-1 from my site, 8 miles to the nearest POP, no licence/cost wirless, with a radio I can afford' is to the point. (of course the more you show your technical economic need in sophisticated terms the better it will be received. The FCC engineers are no dummies and political handwaving doesn't impress them (it only impresses the COmmissioners whenthe handwavers are called AT&T or Congress) I can just about assure you the FCC staff doesn't even know you exist, as a class, (small ISPs) or what function you serve in the food chain, or why you shouldn't just pay $650 a month for your local loop T-1 like anybody else. And unless you email them (and they now have a policy that email must be taken as seriously as formal paper mail filings), your colective case won't even be mentioned when the likes of Motorola, AT&T, CTIA, the NSA (who gets gas pains when secure wireless is mentioned) are testifying. All will not be totally lost if this NPRM does not fly (new spectrum) for we still have the more congested Part 15, 1 watt bands. And the 4 NSF types who attended the FCC rountable were impressed enough with our case that we spent a day with them and they are about to fund a 'developmental' project that will be done by TAPR, that may bring you that $500 T-1 plug and play radio, with range. (by licencing the guts to mfgrs). Matter of fact I will be in Washington DC at the NSF Monday on this (being carrie dby my sidekick in radio engineering matters) and two other matters. One of which will (their idea, not ours) see part of our team in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia in August, linking 8 sites to the satellite Spintlink downlink site run by Mongolian engineers in an old Soviet lab. (web page at www.magic.mn already - but they can't get the signal across town, so crappy is their phone system). So by September you willbe pinging systems in Mongolia, the last 10km of which will be wireless. I always wanted to help set up the Ghengis Khan BBS in a Mongolian yurt, running OS2 (cause IBM is everywhere), with NAPLPS character sets (Chinese, Cyrilli Russian, and Mongolian - none of which are ascii), solar powered, and with spread spectrum radios linking China to Russia. With nary a Telco in a hundred miles. And I got a hunch I will have that done before ISPs in NYC do it. Dave Hughes dave(a)oldcolo.com Oh yeah, if you http://192.160.122.3 you will reach, by wireless, the OS2 system in my home. Not blazingly fast beacause I am trying out a different set of radios. And teh wired 56kbs frame relay to which it is attached is actuallythe slowest link in the chain. But its been running 160kbs for almost a year now, for $0 cost from me to my own Internet service.

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Re: Remailer Operator Liability?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The real problem with remailers and kids, from my experience, is not kids who use nyms; it is people sending sexual material, unsolicited, to children. I have had a few complaints from parents where this has happened. I am pretty sure it is illegal, CDA or not, at least if the material is obscene rather than merely indecent. As Declan says, the issue is accountability. If the remailer operator ends up being considered the person who sent the mail, he could be in deep trouble. Hal

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Attorney General wants to "expand crypto laws"
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just heard parts of a speech by J. Reno on KCBS. The speech was given in San Francisco either today or yesterday. According to the announcer, Reno is calling to "expand the use of cryptography laws". IMHO, this can only mean restrictions on the domestic use of crypto. Does anybody on this list have a transcript of her speech? Disclaimer: My opinions are my own, not those of my employer. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Proposal: PGPmail Plugin for Netscape/Mosaic
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There was a little discussion about this on the coderpunks list, but I didn't get the impression that anyone was ready to run out and do it. I'm not sure whether plugins could also be used for receiving mail in addition to sending, but if so it does seem like a good way to add the functionality. Also, as I understand it, Netscape plugins have to be downloaded and installed ahead of time by the user, so it is not quite true that this gives one-click PGP access to everyone with a browser; it will only be for Netscape users who have downloaded and installed the right plugin. Also, plugins are architecture specific so he would have to be running the kind of computer for which a plugin is available. I have a Java applet which sends PGP mail similarly to the model you describe. This will work in principle for any browser which supports Java, and does not require anything to be downloaded or installed ahead of time (other than the Java-compliant browser). It is still pretty rough and is more of a proof of concept than a production program but I think it is another potential approach. Look at <URL: http://www.portal.com/~hfinney/java/java.html > and follow the links to the PGP compatible mail applet. Hal

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Re: Fuseable Links - no guarantees??
by kooltek＠iol.ie 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 11:44 PM 6/14/96 -0400, Warren wrote: >>I have never paid much attention to the protection of firmware or the >>technical issues revolving around such schemes...was wondering: >> >>I recently saw an add for a UK based group that says they can take a PIC >>OTP micro and read the prom (for a fee, of course) - How the heck is this >>done?? I have my suspicion that they (somehow) magically peel off the >>ceramic coating (without destroying the chewy center), get a circuit mask >>and 'micro probe' the I/O of the IC...they then download the secret recipe >>to the afore mentioned 'chewy center'. The advert was probably for a device/program called PICBUSTER. This is basically a technique of popping the PIC16C84 microcontroller. The chip is an EEPROM micro. There are a few ways of popping the chip but the simplest is to ensure that there is set the supply voltage to the programming voltage less about 0.7 Volts. This is generally done with the aid of a diode such as the 1N4148. Then the fuses are reset. For normal programming there should be at least 5 Volts differential. The smaller differential seems to only allow the protection to be popped. It is not a fusible link as such. If you want to read the details they are on http://www.iol.ie/~kooltek/picbust.html >> >>Is this close to accurate?? How is it 'done' ??? > > >While I have never come even close to needing to attempt this kind of thing, >long ago it occurred to me that if the "no read" bit was stored in a >programmable bit, and if the location of that bit was known or could be >identified, you could expose that particular bit through a tiny mask hole >and cause the part to be readable again. Locating that bit (assuming >there's just one) would be relatively simple: Take a test part, program it, >read-lock it, and then expose it to a VERY slowly sliding mask with UV >behind. Do this for both axes, to find the bit's location on the chip. Apparently the protection fuse in the EPROM versions of the microcontrollers are fairly readily identifiable. Most of the OTP microcontrollers are essentially EPROM types without the quartz glass window. The commonest procedure for popping these is to first remove the coating and then to measure accurately where the protection fuse is. Then, with another that is to be popped, a small hole is drilled over the fuse area. The drilling operation stops before reaching the silicon die. Then some strong acid, either Sulphuric or Nitric is dropped in to disolve the coating. Then a UV lamp is shone on the fuse to reset it. The latter techique for popping chips is by far the most dangerous. It requires proper acid handling procedures and good ventilation. Another technique is to fool the microncontroller into switching from internal to external EPROM and then back. This hack generally works on the 8051, 8751, 8052 and 8752 microcontrollers. I was coincidentally just finishing a section on popping chips for a book that I am working on :-) Regards...jmcc (John McCormac) ******************************************** John McCormac * Hack Watch News jmcc(a)hackwatch.com * 22 Viewmount, Voice&Fax: +353-51-73640 * Waterford, BBS: +353-51-50143 * Ireland ******************************************** -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAzAYPNsAAAEEAPGTHaNyitUTNAwF8BU6mF5PcbLQXdeuHf3xT6UOL+/Od+z+ ZOCAx8Ka9LJBjuQYw8hlqvTV5kceLlrP2HPqmk7YPOw1fQWlpTJof+ZMCxEVd1Qz TRet2vS/kiRQRYvKOaxoJhqIzUr1g3ovBnIdpKeo4KKULz9XKuxCgZsuLKkVAAUX tCJKb2huIE1jQ29ybWFjIDxqbWNjQGhhY2t3YXRjaC5jb20+tBJqbWNjQGhhY2t3 YXRjaC5jb20= =sTfy -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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CYPHERPUNKS
by Blake Wehlage 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok, here is the thing I feel and I know that I really am a main factor for the unraveling of the true meaning of the mailing lists. I have had many posts that were unappropiate, and very stupid. That is why I am unsubsribing, and will no longer make posts to the list. You can still reach me at jwilk(a)iglou.com I do though feel I have picked up some very needed knowledge of PGP and crypto. Thank you. I still will keep the title of youngest cypherpunk with pride. Blake Wehlage <jwilk(a)iglou.com> URL: http://www.iglou.com/members/jwilk.html "World's Youngest Cypherpunk" Age 13

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Proposal: PGPmail Plugin for Netscape/Mosaic
by John Hemming - CEO MarketNet 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The suggestion of building in PGP keys into web pages is something that I have operated on http://mkn.co.uk/ for around 10 months. The program that incorporates this is ftp://ftp.mkn.co.uk/mktnet/pub/horse.zip which is a PGP implementation that is independent of PGP per se.

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Re: pretty good reputation
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Vipul Ved Prakash <vipul(a)pobox.com> > by what i understand pgp's "web of trust" scheme has flaws. according to > pgp (alice trusts jane, jane trusts snoopy, bob trusts alice) implies > bob trusts snoopy. No, this is not true. PGP does not implement any form of trust delegation as you have described here. Rather, each person must explicitly indicate that they trust someone as a key signer. Without that individual action, snoopy and bob in the above example are useless to alice as key signers. What PGP does do is that if alice has indicated that she trusts jane and snoopy, and she needs a key for bob, she can use bob's key signed by snoopy and snoopy's key signed by jane to decide that she has a good key for bob. Just having bob's key signed by snoopy is no good, even if alice trusts snoopy, because she can't be sure that she actually has snoopy's key. So she needs snoopy's key signed by someone else that she trusts, in this case jane. > what is required is a reputation system wherein trust is _qualified_ > rather than _quantified_. its senseless to say i trust him five units. > it will be more appropriate if pgp has a separate tag for "type of trust" > or something like that. > > this kind of thing can be difficult to handle, since it a fuzzy > parameter. add to the problem a global-system like internet where all > communication is not person to person. i was wondering if there are > any working mathematical models for reputation systems, and how > successful they are. There was considerable discussion in the design of PGP's key signatures on this issue, and Phil decided against trying to let people express publicly how much they trust others. Among other things, he was afraid that people would feel compelled to lie for social reasons, leading to inaccurate trust estimates and weak key validations. There has been considerable discussion in the "official" Internet encryption working groups (PEM and its follow-ons, for example) about issues of trust in the context of Certificate Authorities which exist in a hierarchical structure and sign each others' as well as end users' keys. Different CA's may have different policies about how they check identity, and figuring out from this how much trust to put in a key certificate ends up being a potentially messy problem. I also found a paper several years ago, I think by the USC/ISI people, about systems which would allow trust delegations in a model more like the web of trust. Also some of the recent work by Matt Blaze and (largely independently) Ron Rivest for generalizations of key certificates could perhaps serve as a basis for extending trust in a web model. Hal Finney

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