December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Distributed DES crack
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Wed Jul 24 16:31:44 1996 Has anyone thought about TI or Motorolas DSP-Eval-Boards (at 99$ a piece at 40 MHz with optimized assembler they might easily outrun a PPro200) Don't look at me that way, I know only little about DSP-Programming. By the way, using FPGA's (as suggested earlier) at around 100 MHz should be extremely fast (after all, on one 100000 Gate FPGA, one should be able to do lot of parallel things at one clock cycle -> test several keys at once...). I estimate, that at reasonable cost (lets say, <$500) you should be able to put enough FPGAs on a board to do enough keys in parallel to equal 1 key per cycle, i.e. 1e8 keys/sec. That would amount to: 7.2e8 secs ->8340 days If you build 100 such machines you win in 3 months (without any of the mentioned optimisations (2e55 instead of 2e56, etc.) - --------< fate favors the prepared mind >-------- Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/remopini/rpcrypto.html - ------< words are what reality is made of >------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMfYz0RFhy5sz+bTpAQGj0Af/Xto3KiZMxb4zybeRcGK3mOINTmgiBo3i Ewbzk5V0DRmNU0j6a1GFh0hmPnHwAZoopLr0VjdiBYRKCj73AEp2FHNuWxhRdp33 KKa4qfWATJM3ESGRpNTfTQr/ruCzxbkGTtDki/j0HC4UbRi/fdjy6MinstjaIJ3t eIcX18+SKOxmV+hzZ8qrJeHlEI3e2RPl0YscXSnHVGlHZNOFUiJB/jPz/Gs8ph9i aZR6bv+T8UVC36CzFF/B9Syxr6QFXVM5xcZ9tAui6VyAk7GOd/O5AKG8Z51jO+OK Nf77HxT3g3wovPz/9pC+6yr9haaokBYPDs4YrBNKA8Wtln2HgdTr3w== =OjX2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: Distributed DES crack
by Andy Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 24 July 1996 12:11, pjn(a)nworks.com wrote: > You are assuming that we will not get the right equasion/code/whatever > untill the very end. There is a good chance that it will only take > half that time...and a slim chance that we will get it with the first > try... My figures were based on 2^55 tries, which is exactly half of 2^56. - Andy

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Pachinko Cards in WSJ
by moulton＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The July 24 1996 edition of the Wall Street Journal has a front page article about the "cashless Pachinko cards" in Japan which resulted in losses for several businesses. This was discussed in cypherpunks when the story originally broke months ago. The article in the WSJ relates how the cards were the results of fears that the money laundered from the pachinko halls was being sent to North Korea to fund the nuclear program there. The CIA provided intelligence about this to the Japanese authorities according to the article. Far too many details to summarize here, I suggest those who are interested read it. Fred

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OPS_nuk
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The WSJ Page Ones a loser's game about the CIA's role in promoting Japanese pachinko cards to halt the surreptitious funneling of betting cash to the construction of a North Korean nuclear plant. And the op's nuking by the Kobe quake looting of card-reading mechanisms, cracking encryption codes, and counterfeiting not-so-smart cards for counter- tipping the house fix. Mondex, watcher bleedin arse. ----- http://jya.com/opsnuk.txt OPS_nuk

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Brute Force attack Question
by ichudov＠galaxy.galstar.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I've been thinking about brute force attacks, and there is something that I do not understand. Maybe someone could explain me where I am wrong. Suppose Alice sends letters to BoB, and they always exchange plain text ASCII data. Suppose also that they use DES for encryption. They are afraid that Perry intercepts their messages and tries to brute force their DES key. Perry has 100,000 computers (and 20,000 couriers alone:) and his brute force attacks are as follows: he tries all keys in succession, looks at the decrypted texts, and *if* the decrypted text looks like a potential message (has only ASCII characters for example) he looks at that key closer as it is likely that he has found the right key. What is Alice and Bob decide to obscure their letters and add random NON-ASCII characters at random places? They may agree to just ignore all non-ASCII characters, so these characters would never change the meaning of their letters. If they do that, Perry does not have any easy way to tell whether he really recovered the right plaintext or not, because even correct key would still produce a lot of non-ASCII characters. If percentage of ASCII characters in all 256 byte space is 40%, Alice and Bob may agree to put in junk characters to make up exactly 60% of the message. This way messages will look like random character data. Is there any good method for attackers to circumvent this obscurity? What is the general method to make a judgment whether the recovered text really is a plain text if Alice and Bob noisify their letters? I can think of this: we sift through all recovered plaintexts and remove all non-ASCII bytes, and then do some simple testing to see whether the remaining ASCII data resembles normal English texts. This kind of testing seems to be quite expensive though, compared to just testing for ASCII vs. non-ascii bytes. Anything else I am missig? Thanks. - Igor.

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RE: Brute-forcing DES
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Count me in: Good reason to get the XT (!!!!!!) and the 12Mhz Vendex286 out of the garage ... We can throw in the Mac too if the code's portable. And the 486-100. And you can have McArthur, the P-133, after bedtime. And the 486-20 portable, why not? I'm also available for assembler coding/optimizing on a limited basis. Excellent project! On Tue, 23 Jul 1996 pjn(a)nworks.com wrote: > Date: Tue, 23 Jul 1996 16:25:44 -0500 > From: pjn(a)nworks.com > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Brute-forcing DES > > > Any one up for a distributed brute force attack on single DES? My > > back-of-the-envelope calculations and guesstimates put this on the > > hairy edge of doability (the critical factor is how many machines can > > be recruited - a non-trivial cash prize would help). >

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Re: Digital Watermarks (long, getting off-topic)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:14 PM 7/24/96, Gary Howland wrote: >Timothy C. May wrote: > >> Pre-recorded DAT tapes were available for a while...they did not sell. I >> believe this was because DAT machine purchasers were sophisticated and new >> how to make CD-to-DAT copies, with or without SCMS. > >Don't forget that pre-recorded DAT tapes are at least an order of >magnitude more expensive to manufacture than CDs. The _selling_ price of DATs was only slightly higher than CDs, around $15 in the U.S. Some DATs were priced identically to CDs, and still didn't sell. (Not surprisingly to me, given the chicken-and-egg effect.) Manufacturing costs of CDs are very low--I've seen estimates as low as 10 cents or less--and the final selling price is dominated by royalties, overhead staff costs, distribution cost, and, of course, "what the market will bear." DAT manufacturing costs could be $1-2, but the above factors would still dominate. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Kids and Computer Privacy Was Re: No more stupid gun thread ...
by David Rosoff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 03.48 AM 7/24/96 -0500, Scott Schryvers wrote: >Should kids have crypto? [weapons] Your analogy fails when I consider the simple point that crypto is not a weapon in and of itself, no matter what the misguided ITAR says. "... two plus two make five ..." >Under Itar crypto is a weapon. If a kid were to bring a disk >containing pgp to school could they be expelled for carrying a weapon? No, because crypto, *by itself* does NOT present a threat to any other kid or to any teacher or to the kid carrying the code. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMfZR5hguzHDTdpL5AQHqsgP5AcEWBP0SeGCWwgOKGgDVuzz4yJRXk218 lSepjhxa+OnK6Aw5Gxk/+ykJAZM++VPH4LKR3ztRP5X3CJMC8zJ+f4qatmqzRptU yKagSL8yF2/xN9ltwJcl6T3F4f88LJKD0vDpp4M+FeIX90zDosxPl0TYYv3niG2u v2ePUFTwWKI= =IlGz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Digital Watermarks for copy protection in recent Billbo
by Alex F 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Yes, but concievably if (whoever would be incharge, FBI?) *could*, > >under law do this, even if they are wrong. It is a lot harder to > >prove that they intentionally harrassed *you* than it is for them to > >say that they were following leads and show evidence. Yes, this may > > To go to trial, an indictment would be needed. How likely is this? The likelyness is irrelevant to the point. Possibility is relevant. Probability is not. > Discussion of "in theory they could arrest you" points often neglects the > realities of the legal system. Does that really matter? . In REALITY, it will never be enforced. So what? The potential is still there, and in essence, that is ALL that matters! The discussion of "in theory...." doesn't neglect the realities of the legal system, rather it highlights the POTENTIAL for abuse. Even if the law is never enforced, could it not be used as an example to justify other laws that *may* be introduced? Does it not set a dangerous precedent? We are talking about dangerous empowerment here. Hmm. The arguement "well, we would never REALLY enforce it" just doesn't hold water with me, and makes me uncomfortable. > A large fraction of pawnshop items have questionable provenance, the items > having been stolen at some time in the past. Could J. Random Buyer who > walks in, sees an item he likes, buys it, and walks out with it be > handcuffed and taken down the lockup for the crime of buying stolen > property? Doubtful, in the real world. And defense would be ridicuously > easy. A defense would be easy, fine. But it would still cost $$$. Do you see what I am getting at? This is done ALL THE TIME (no, not at pawn brokers. I'm talking about taking advantage of either cost or time to get what you want). > A trivial increase in frequency, and still not allowing the hypothesized 30 > KHz signal to be added. DATs often sample at 44 and 48 KHz, switchably. The > CD standard is of course still what it is. That's not the point. What we are talking about here is a covert channel. Whether it is at 30KHZ, 22KHz or right in the middle of the audible range. Mine was ONE proposal, a theory of sorts, thought up off of the top of my head as a possible way of doing this. You can also add a digital serial number right in the audible range, if you like. Static that is recorded along with analog sound is at certain frequency ranges, typically. When you have a disk that holds 640Mb or so the serial number's size is trivial in comparison. Sending the whole number at once will barely be audible even if in a good frequency range simply because of speed. If you send it in bits and pieces during the song, and furthermore record this data in the middle of the frequency range where static is located, you won't hear it anyway. However certain devices will be able to read the data w/o problem. Similarly, you have a CD, let's say Beethoven's 9th symphony. You have ~640 MB on the CD. If you want to sneak someone an encrypted message, say a top secret document and it is compressed down to 1K, then putting this into the audio signal as described above is fairly trivial. The other end doesn't even need to know bit counts. The document can be spreadout, reversed, whatever and just signaled w/ a flag (much like PPP and other protocols). All the other end needs to decode is a flag at a set frequency range, both of which can be constantly changed. interestingly, Alex F =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Alex F alexf(a)iss.net Marketing Specialist Internet Security Systems =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

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FTP Software Licenses Pretty Good Privacy 07/23/96
by reagle＠rpcp.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HAMBURG, GERMANY, 1996 JUL 23 (NB) -- By Sylvia Dennis. FTP Software, the Internet/connectivity software company, has licensed Pretty Good Privacy's encryption technology of the same name (PGP). Plans now call for FTP to integrate PGP within its range of TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) software. Under the terms of the agreement, PGP has licensed its encryption software to FTP for use in OnNet32 2.0 for Windows 95 and Windows NT, both versions of which will ship in the third quarter of this year on both sides of the Atlantic. Tom Steding, PGP's chief executive officer, said that a critical piece of the company's business strategy is to proliferate the "seamless integration of encryption technology" within e-mail applications programs. "We see this partnership as a powerful combination of two leaders who, together, will use their considerable market weight and technical expertise to promote and enhance the PGP towards becoming a universally accepted industry standard," he said. According to Rebecca Buisan, product marketing manager with FTP, the company has made several enhancements to OnNet32 to integrate PGP into its basic functions. There is now a two icon system which allows users to access a tool bar, designating options to encrypt or decrypt a message, and make a digital signature. Mail messages can also be left on a server or computer in an encrypted format, to be decrypted and read at will. "Experience has proven that cryptography only works if implemented effectively, so that it is simple for the user," she explained. According to Buisan, FTP has conducted extensive human factors testing to fine-tune PGP's cryptographic software into a "flexible and intuitive application that people will be encouraged to use." According to FTP, its implementation of the PGP encryption software is interoperable with current freeware versions available for free download from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) or one of the many other FTP (File Transfer Protocol) sites that distribute the package. The MIT site is at http://web.mit.edu/pgp . PGP was originally developed in 1991 by Phil Zimmerman. The package allowed PC users, for the first time, to send information in a secure encrypted format without fear of intervention. FTP's Web site is at http://www.ftp.com . (19960722/Press & Reader Contact: Manuela Dorken, FTP Software, +49-89-614130, Internet e-mail manuela(a)ftp.com; PGP, 415-631-1747, Internet e-mail info(a)viacrypt.com)

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