December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

DCSB: Betting on the Future
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: rah(a)tiac.net Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Mon, 15 Jul 1996 11:26:33 -0400 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: DCSB: Betting on the Future Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Duane Hewitt Idea Futures "Betting on the Future" Tuesday, August 6, 1996 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Duane says: > I am a Molecular Biologist by trade but I am fascinated by all aspects of > science and technology and especially their long term ramifications. I am > completing my Master's Degree thesis as well as working full time at the > University of Massachusetts at Amherst. I have some part time work > maintaining Web pages and I have been involved with the Idea Futures Web > site from the very beginning. I also am currently working on a hypertext > reference on the biology of aging. Many of these interest can be accessed > from my home page at http://www.lucifer.com/~duane > > I will introduce the concept of Idea Futures which is a market in which > the odds of future events are set by betting. It is designed to reward > those who can accurately forecast future outcomes. It has been recognized > by the Austrian Broadcast System, and the Point Survey and mentioned in > _Wired_. I will discuss the implications of such a market as well as some > of the history behind it. I will also propose how a similar market could > be used to construct a market based voting system. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, August 6, 1996 from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $27.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men, and "appropriate business attire" for women. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, August 3, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston". If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Planned speakers for the following few months are: September Tatsuo Tanaka Some Economics of Digital Cash October Philippe LeRoux Stock Exchanges and the Web We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, rah(a)shipwright.com . For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . Looking forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMepi6vgyLN8bw6ZVAQFsOwP/UuOoWa0LUEyY4dmQ21KIR4GwhB6PurSa L97eVsbVOigP+TVPFJX7RKqYhCxIL8gDUnSRimGnATmhLo5wdE0UXvgakeGaD5s+ vKPfhuaG9/MnuZvWFbBEZOrTTKqVE8bfoU2yiw6xTvhyQY0lDA2BSO8vjip28nOA 0Wkuh1VUBhY= =/5+9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To unsubscribe from this list, send a letter to: Majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu In the body of the message, write: unsubscribe dcsb Or, to subscribe, write: subscribe dcsb If you have questions, write to me at Owner-DCSB(a)ai.mit.edu --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Further Trends in Key Escrow?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm watching a CNBC report about the NASDAQ market and proposed fixes to certain alleged abuses about stock recommendations, bid-ask spreads, brokers, etc. One of the "industry" proposals involving taping the phone calls of NASDAQ brokers. (The proposal: 10% of all calls to customers would be recorded for later review.) It occurs to me that wider taping/interception of communications could be a consequence of a wide move toward "key escrow." And not just by governments. Once communications are "escrowed," the infrastructure for gaining access to communications is available. Thus, professional associations may request access, as with the NASDAQ talk of tapping the phone calls of brokers. (To be clear, this is a tapping system which NASDAQ dealers would have to agree to deploy in order to keep their affiliation; as this is ostensibly a voluntary, non-coerced, private arrangement, I don't argue it should be outlawed. I don't like it, but my concern is elsewhere: namely, the temptation to use a GAK system for these and similar purposes.) The whole infrastructure of mandatory voluntary key escrow could allow all sorts of special interest groups to ask for access and insist upon it with their members, customers, and affiliates. A danger to think about. Even if the non-government gakkings are ostensibly voluntary, the effect would be a sea change in expectations of communications privacy, with the key escrow infrastructure used to give access to formerly secure communications to growing numbers of groups. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.27 - No New News on Crypto: Gore Restates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:05 PM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >This post is a courtesy to others who may have been expecting more. It's not that we're expecting more...it's just that we're hoping for BETTER. >It's a >one-time statement to this list, which I've just joined, of my current >practice: Silence does not constitute assent. >David Well, that's where you're confused. Our positions are not morally equivalent. Despite trying to hide behind the smokescreen of calling the government's GAK position "voluntary," we all know that they are trying to misuse their influence to gently force us to use GAK, if by no other means that forcing the taxpayer to pay for the system as they have done already. The opponents of GAK, on the other hand, are not denying to anyone the right to implement a truly voluntary "key-escrow" system, or more likely many privately operating ones. However, such systems will be a service for the customer, not the government, and the key will almost certainly not be provided to the government on request, and in fact the key will likely be stored in an encrypted form that the government won't be able to use. Quite simply, we do not require your "assent." You should be trying to get OURS. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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random numbers reverse-engineering
by Jüri Kaljundi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there somewhere where I could find more information on finding out RNG algorithms or reverse-engineering RNG's, once you have some quantity of random numbers generated by some RNG? For example a local bank is giving each customer a list with 600 one-time passwords (6-digit decimal numbers), and I believe they use the account number as (one of the) seeds for the RNG. Is there some program that I could use, together with the numbers and possible seed, to try to break the RNG? Jüri Kaljundi AS Stallion jk(a)stallion.ee

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Re: Markoff on Clipper III
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:35 PM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >>At 02:33 PM 7/14/96 -0400, Duncan Frissell wrote: >>>Last time I looked, the oath they took was to protect the Constitution -- >>>not the nation or national security. > >Did you miss the part in the Constitution about "provide for the common >defence" If there is anything that is clear about GAK, it is a system which is NOT intended to benefit all citizens approximately equally. The vast majority (over 99.99%) of the population will never be the victim of any sort of terrorism. If anything, it's intended to provide job security for government employees who are increasingly aware that the unhappy villagers will be showing up at the castle with their torches. The best thing the government could do to prevent terrorism is to simply stop misbehaving; to stop doing those things that make many ordinary citizens feel that they are far more a victim of their government that any terrorist or criminal. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: brokers as middlemen
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:48 PM 7/15/96, L. Detweiler wrote: >this reminds me of something else. the stock exchange as it now stands >is not the paradigm of true capitalism as some would have others >believe. in fact I see it as the paradigm of what might be called >"middleman capitalism", a version of capitalism that is rapidly >diminishing and disappearing in the onslaught of the information age. > >essentially, in the new version of capitalism, middlemen who do not >*add*value* to the delivery of a product are going to be increasingly >cut out of the loop. I am not saying *all* middlemen will be cut out, >but many that now exist will be. I agree with Vlad/Larry's points, and this is in one of the other recommendations for the NASDAQ, that it be even further electronic-mediated, with more information made available on bid/ask spreads. The rise of discount brokers, who provide essentially no advice to customers, is part of this "disintermediation." Ditto for electronic trading systems, such as Accu-Trade. >in my opinion, the *stock*broker* as his job is now defined is in many >ways the classic middleman that does not necessarily add value to the >information that flows through his hands. if he is just an agent for >carrying out the demands of clients, then I'd say that this role is >going to disappear as markets become more automated, or rather capital >moves toward stock exchanges that diminish this overhead. however, there >are many brokers that add far many more services than mere >blind investor response, such as analyzing company profitability, >forecasting, etc-- these are adding value imho. Agreed, and this is already happening. >I think the end result of the information age is going to be something >that could be regarded as the ultimate capitalist market-- something >that eliminates all "unnecessary" middlemen. I suspect the stock exchanges >of the future will *not* be regulated because they *cannot* be. it >will be a matter of buyers and sellers choosing the systems that >best suit them regardless of what governments feel is appropriate, fair, >or whatever. I emphatically agree! There is little need for regulation in this new environment, and "reputations matter." And regulation is becoming problematic. (To cite one example. Some are calling for registration and regulation of "investment advice," which is largely unregulated in the U.S. today. That is, I can self-publish a newsletter, "Tim's Stock Picks," and the First Amendment says this can't be restricted (Caveat: But I can't sell "Tim's Legal Advice," "Tim's Earthquake Safety Advice," or "Tim's Medical Advice" to clients...go figure). Some want investment newsletter writers "held accountable." Great, so I'll move my newsletter to Anguilla or Monaco. What do they do then? Stop U.S. subscribers from getting them? Set up postal stings, where illegal investment or medical advice is treated as illegal child porn from Denmark? Use key escrow to monitor received Net traffic?) >its interesting how the restrictions on stock buying and selling are >becoming quite orwellian in the way they are designed to limit >mere information transfer in many cases, it seems. TCM has written >about this far better than I could in previous posts. ("inside trading" >restrictions). Again, I agree. I won't quote anymore of Vlad/Larry's piece, as I agree with it all. (Vznuri should probably "reclaim" his Detweiler personna, so that such good messages as these accrue to his True Name's reputation.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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d.Comm: Your Login Information
by hotlists＠d-comm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thank you for logging into d.Comm. At d.Comm we believe a key part of any successful product, magazine or other, is a comprehensive knowledge of the market; in our case our readers. The information you provide us with not only helps us to fine-tune the magazine, but also enables you to manage your information content, through the hotlist section. We therefore wish to thank you once again for helping us to keep d.Comm dynamic. When your World Wide Web browser prompts you for a login and password use the following: Login: cypherpunks Passwd: 107084 URL: http://www.d-comm.com/ (note: your login is case-sensitive) You may end up back at the login when you try to enter a section of d.Comm that you attempted to enter before you received your username. If this happens, please click the reload button on your Web browser. If you have trouble and need some help, please send mail to: hotlists(a)d-comm.com Note: If you wish to change your allotted password, Password management is available at : http://www.d-comm.com/s-bin/hl_passwd If for any reason you encounter any problems, please do not hesitate to contact us. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Eddie Hold Editor d.Comm & Communicate The Economist Group http://www.d-comm.com/

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Re: Markoff on Clipper III
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:20 AM 7/15/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >At 3:50 AM -0700 7/15/96, Duncan Frissell wrote: >>At 09:35 PM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >> >>>Did you miss the part in the Constitution about "provide for the common >>>defence" >> >>That's a meaningless part of the Preamble. > >Anyone who thinks substantive parts of the Preamble are "meaningless" is >deserving only of contumely. Perhaps you should review your high school >civics course--you did have one of those, yes? > >David > Welcome to the list. Yes my high school Civics class was good. So were my law school Con Law courses. Yes, David I would say you practice "contumely" -- Rudeness or contempt arising from arrogance; insolence. But then so do I. I'll say again, the Preamble speaks of the reasons the drafters of the Constitution had for writing the thing, it does not set forth any powers of the federal government. Goals not means. GAK is a means not a goal. DCF

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Re: CookieScan 0.0 rev 0
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:34 PM 7/15/96 -0800, Chris Hull wrote: >Do y¹all think there might be an interest in a >utility which would allow the user to deal with >browser cookies? There might, but it's a difficult problem, and implementation-dependent and doesn't always tell you much. While your browser may store cookies in a disk file to use between sessions, by the time the cookie gets filed on disk, it's long since cooled down and may have been written over multiple times. The interesting time to detect cookies is when they arrive - this means either watching the network data stream for cookies (non-portable, unless you use a cookie-proxy, which is the obvious way to implement it), or else grubbing around in the browser's memory (highly non-portable, unless you're modifying the browser source.) The "doesn't always tell you much" is because cookies often seem to contain encrypted or hashed data that isn't meaningful to the browser-user, only to the cookie-originators. The cute trick you can do with cookies, which is probably used by advertising sites such as doubleclick.com, is for the web page owner to include an IMG which is an href to a CGI program at a cookie company. The CGI program is able to look at the HTTP_REFERER variable, which tells what page you were last on, and can therefore create or use cookie information that tracks where you've been between companies (e.g. Alice can contract with Cookies Inc. to tell if you've been to Bob's site recently, if Bob also uses Cookies Inc.) # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs # Re-delegate Authority!

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Re: How I Would Ban Strong Crypto in the U.S.
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:58 AM 7/15/96 -0400, Raph Levien wrote: >4. Thus, the best leverage for the TLAs to win is to guide the >development of a key management infrastructure with the following >property: if you don't register your key, you can't play. I believe that >this is the true meaning of the word "voluntary:" you're free to make >the choice not to participate. > >5. This is _important_. If you can't get the keys for your >correspondents, you can't use encryption. If they build a key management >infrastructure that actually works, people will use it. The obvious counter is to use the key management infrastructure for authentication, but use a technique like Diffie-Hellman to decide on a session key. I see two problems with this approach: (1) It still allows traffic analysis. (2) It will be difficult to implement for one-way transmissions (e.g. email). A more complex structure would overcome (2) above. Use you GAK key to sign your PGP key. Post your PGP key on the MIT server (or successors), and people who want non-GAKed communication with you would use your PGP key, with the benefit of government approved authentication. I still think this whole GAK thing is going to fail on the, "Which government?" question. I don't see either multi-nationals or their governments wanting to share their secrets with each other, and I don't see how to set up universal GAK to prevent that form of industrial espionage. Also, the key which decodes the GAKed data is just too valuable and too easy to steal. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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