December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Photobuster to beat radar...
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sun Nov 24 18:19:39 1996 At URL: http://www.havenofhope.org/photobuster/photob2.html Photobuster is a spin off from a specialty electronics company (Grand Systems) who saw the need for a system to foil the photo radar picture. We realize that people like your selves don't usually speed on purpose and can't afford to pay hundreds of semolies just because you look away from the speedometer from time to time. Our easily installed electronic Photobuster unit is a an electronically triggered device that mounts in the rear window with a satellite unit that mounts at the license plate. It watches the right side of the road for a photo radar setup. If you are driving at speeds in excess of the operators setting on the photo radar, it will attempt to photograph your car. When it does this the Photobuster senses the attempt and triggers a return response rendering the radar photo useless. It has an audible warning and a visual light to let you know each time you save 100 bucks. This unit only triggers if the photo radar attempts to photograph your car. NOTE: Photobuster has nothing covering your plate as is with other filter, poleroid and lenticular optical devices. We are told it is not legal in most areas, to install any kind of plastic cover over the plate, see through or not. ************************************************************ Lynne L. Harrison, Esq. | "The key to life: Poughkeepsie, New York | - Get up; lharrison(a)mhv.net | - Survive; http://www.dueprocess.com | - Go to bed." ************************************************************ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMpjYDD5A4+Z4Wnt9AQGEiwP+OwSodqT2IMQJIFxf/OPFIr7JSJJY7uWc tBfpskpydWvpcKe49PZMbflNOsTgjuW/MyRXLwu8j/mMIEKqwe7KvYPEVUIHNjx3 by3dLMglaihuObbAViewOTS2mjat2bWtB24cGwHI1/94gc8trLlXS3VTtCQYcnkl Btw1KpGDCek= =pfBU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: IPG Algorith Broken!
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:16 PM 11/24/96 +0000, The Deviant wrote: >On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Bill Frantz wrote: >> I thought Shannon proved one-time-pads to be unbreakable using information >> theory. > >Different ball game. OTP isn't "unbreakable" . OTPs are secure because >no matter what key you use, it _will_ decrypt, so your plaintext is still >hidden simply because it could decrypt to whatever the person trying to >decrypt it wants it to. Its not that its unbreakable, its that its >breakable in _so many ways_. I think we differ on the definition of "unbreakable". A quick stab at my (admittedly very vague) definition includes the inability of the analyst to determine (by the structure of the plaintext) that he has a correct decryption. When I look in AC2, Schneier uses "break" in many ways. Let me evaluate OTP against his taxonomy of attacks: Ciphertext-only: Unbreakable Known-plaintext: Unbreakable, since the pad is never reused Chosen-plaintext: Unbreakable, ditto Adaptive-chosen-plaintext: Unbreakable, ditto Chosen-ciphertext: This attack doesn't seem to apply Chosen-key: This attack requires that the OTP doesn't have 1-bit-of-entropy/bit which implies it isn't an OTP. Rubber-hose: Since any decryption is equally plausable, OTPs are resistant to this attack. OTOH, it means they may keep beating you even after you've given them the correct decryption. Purchase-key: This attack seems the only way to break an OTP. If you accept Purchase-key as a valid attack, and it certainly has worked in many real-life situations, then no system is "unbreakable" and there is not any point in using the term. If you leave it out of the valid forms of attack, because all systems are vulnerable to it so it doesn't help in selecting a cryptosystem, then the OTP is "unbreakable". How do you want to define "unbreakable"? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Aga is talking to himself
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:15 AM 11/24/96 -0500, aga <aga(a)dhp.com> wrote: >On Sun, 24 Nov 1996, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: actually the message was from lucifer(a)dhp.com: >> aga <aga(a)dhp.com> writes: ... messages suppressed It looks like our juvenile "friend" is talking to himself. I am truely sorry that he feels a need to harass ladies who have actually made something of their lives. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: IPG Algorith Broken!
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The algorythm cannot be considered secure until it has been > peer-reviewed. They refuse to release the algorythm for review, simply saying > that "you can't break the code" therefore "it is secure". This isn`t strictly true. Don Wood (spit) has actually released the algorithm details for review. It`s just that no-one considers it even worthy of looking at. I wearily downloaded the details then realised I had better things to do than sift through pages of pompous self important drivel about "software one time pads." Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Killfiling stupid faggots
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

abostick(a)netcom.com (Alan Bostick) writes: > > In article <199611220304.VAA02832(a)manifold.algebra.com>, > ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) wrote: > > > Dr. John Martin Grubor is the most harmless and most entertaining > > among all kooks. > > > > His posting volume is a bit high, but other than that DrG never > > got anyone in trouble. > > I dunno about "harmless". Publishing lists of "known homosexuals" > can have repercussions that outweigh their entertainment value. Yes. John Gilmore met Alan Bostick through Grubor's list. They fucked each other in the ass (how's that for entertainment!) but now John Gilmore has AIDS. P.S. Whoever said Gilmore is bi and eats pussy is a fucking liar. Gilmore is 100% queer. He hasn't touched pussy since he was born. diGriz

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Sameer R.I.P.
by drose＠AZStarNet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C2 has a nice corporate-style fig leaf on its site. Sameer has decided, it seems, to get out of the anonymity business and pursue other interests. Nice run while it lasted. FYI, Sameer does mention that his recent legal brouhaha had nothing to do with this decision.

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Re: IPG Algorith Broken!
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:10 AM 11/24/1996, The Deviant wrote: >On Sun, 24 Nov 1996, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: >> At 6:56 PM 11/23/1996, The Deviant wrote: >> >On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: >> >> The good news is that you can prove a negative. For example, it has >> >> been proven that there is no algorithm which can tell in all cases >> >> whether an algorithm will stop. >> > >> >No, he was right. They can't prove that their system is unbreakable. >> >They _might_ be able to prove that their system hasn't been broken, and >> >they _might_ be able to prove that it is _unlikely_ that it will be, but >> >they *CAN NOT* prove that it is unbreakable. This is the nature of >> >cryptosystems. >> >> Please prove your assertion. >> >> If you can't prove this, and you can't find anybody else who has, why >> should we believe it? > >Prove it? Thats like saying "prove that the sun is bright on a sunny >day". Its completely obvious. In other words, you can't prove it. Thought so. >If somebody has a new idea on how to attack their algorithm, it might >work. Then the system will have been broken. You never know when >somebody will come up with a new idea, so the best you can truthfully >say is "it hasn't been broken *YET*". As I remember, this was mentioned >in more than one respected crypto book, including "Applied Cryptography" >(Schneier). Page number? Perhaps it would be helpful to hear a possible proof. If somebody were to show that breaking a certain cryptographic algorithm was NP-complete, many people would find this almost as good as proof that the algorithm is unbreakable. Then if a clever person were to show that the NP-complete problems were not solvable in any faster way than we presently know how, you would have proof that a cryptographic algorithm was unbreakable. There is no obvious reason why such a proof is not possible. diGriz

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kickouts done the Cypherpunks way...
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Suppose Mr. X, owner of foobarpunks mailing list, wants to kick out Mr. Y, for his obnoxious letters to the mailing list. Mr. X, however, is concerned that Mr. Y would subscribe through some proxy address and would continue replying to messages to foobarpunks. It is assumed that the only person out of the whole universe, Mr. Y, cannot be trusted. The problem is that X does not know which of the subscribers is Mr. Y. The question is, is there a technical way to disable Mr. Y from reading the list, or detect which subscription address is a proxy for Y? If we assume that, at the moment when Y was kicked out, he was not subscribed through any other addresses, the solution becomes simple: for any new subscription request we require a letter of recommendation from some other subscriber. Since other subscribers are presumed to be trustworthy, their recommendations would be sufficient. It is actually being done in some of the mailing lists. The problem becomes more complex when Mr. Y is already presumed to have infiltrated the mailing list, possibly through several proxy addresses. Is there any way to detect/find which if the subscriber is Y? One of the simple-minded solutions is to _mutate_ mailing list messages so that all readers get slightly different copies of mailing list messages for each recipient. (Such mutations may include common misspellings, inserting spaces, etc) If the mailing list bot keeps track of what changes were made in messages to which individual, and if we assume that Mr. Y has to quote significant parts of messages he replies to, finally the variations in messages may be reconciled with variations in quoted parts. Mr. Y is not stupid, and may go as far as comparing letters, received through different proxy addresses, in order to detect "variations" and avoid quoting them. The question is, is there a strategy of making variations and detecting them in quotes to finally catch Mr. Y? - Igor.

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The American Black Chamber - Yardley - Re: 1996 Codebreakers
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> wrote: > I just got a review copy of the new (1996) ed. of Kahn's The >Codebreakers from my local used bookstore. Its a little disapointing, >about 20 new pages of material. Kahn states in the forward that all >the new material is in a chapter at the end. ....... > Anyway, copies should be in bookstores soon. If you don't >have a copy already, Kahn is the definitive history book, and is well >worth having. I just got a copy* of the 1981 "The American Black Chamber", by Herbert O. Yardley, with a new (1981) intro by Kahn. ISBN 0-345-29867-5. The original had been published in 1931, went through a couple printings, and sold twice as many copies in Japan as the US. In 1933 the US passed a law banning the publishing of any material that had been published in diplomatic codes, and of course they withheld permission for future printings. Lots of good material on the state of crypto from WWI through the 1920s. Crypto wasn't yet on a mathematical basis, though it was starting to emerge in cryptanalysis. After the World War ended, most of the traffic was cracking diplomatic correspondence, especially for disarmament negotiations. Getting users to take crypto seriously was a problem - most of the US communications during the Spanish-American war used a sort of "rot-1898", and even during the World War, military plans were often broadcast on radio using wimpy codes, causing much damage to both sides. Codes were generally designed by people who didn't have extensive cracking experience, and therefore most new codes were easily cracked as well. Yardley's organization diverted some of its expertise to cracking secret inks, which were extensively used by German spies. Language and cultural differences caused surprising difficulties - there was one person they could find who knew German shorthand systems, and finding Japanese language experience after the war was difficult, since they didn't want to use Japanes immigrants for security reasons and most missionaries wouldn't do military work (both for ethical reasons and because it would lead the Japanese government to crack down on missions to Japan, Korea, and China.) Kahn speculates that the ability to crack Japanese naval codes in WWII was probably enhanced by Yardley's people's work - PURPLE was much stronger than the earlier Japanese diplomatic codes, but the Japanese Navy believed that "This time, it's all right" (cable chief, to foreign minister :-), when it wasn't. Yardley reports at the end of the book that he believed the science of cryptography would die out - AT&T had invented a cypher machine during the war, and had invented one-time pads, and the combination would make code clerks obsolete and codes unbreakable...... Shortly after that, in 1929, the new Secretary of State was shocked to discover that his department was funding eavesdropping. "Gentlemen don't read each others' mail." # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk # (If this is posted to cypherpunks, I'm currently lurking from fcpunx, # so please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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public
by rudd_a＠alph.swosu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am new here, and I was wondering, why are there still stupid, immature people on line who have the audacity, here in the 90's, to still call people a "cocksucking faggot". I mean no offense here, but please, stop using such offensive words! Thanks.... As I said, I am new here, and am a libertarian/anarchist who wants the government to butt out of our lives...I am very interested in privacy, and am also against censorship. I hope there are others out there who feel as I do, but if not, I guess I'll find out I'm on the wrong place!! :-) Anyhow, I hope you can welcome a Cincinnati goth who lives in Oklahoma...thanks!!....Amy **************************************************************************** ***** * * It's better to regret something you did than something you * * didn't do. * * * * * ********************************************************************************

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