December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: talker (fwd)
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 8 Sep 1996 16:41:06 -0500 (CDT), Jim Choate wrote: >> Date: Sun, 8 Sep 1996 13:23:06 -0700 (PDT) >> From: "Z.B." <zachb(a)netcom.com> >> Subject: Re: talker >> >> I just checked www.juno.com to see what kind of system they have, and it >> appears that it is a free email service. No charges at all. No wonder >> we get so many idiots from there - free mail and they probably don't >> bother to verify the people they give service to, either. > >Well we know at least one cpunk who is anti-anonymity.... Not necessarily. I think he's just saying that if it's free and anonymous you have no quality control. Even a token fee keeps out an amazing number of loons... - "'Anonymity is bad,' says a source who wishes to remain anonymous." - Nuff' said. * Home: Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp * Autoresponder: send email w/subject of "send resume" or "send PGPKEY" * Work: cadams(a)acucobol.com | V.M. (619)515-4894 | (619)689-6579 * Member in good standing of the GNU whirled hors d'oeuvre

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Re: Voluntary Disclosure of True Names
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:49 AM 9/5/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: > I have seen it repeated here often that somehow anonymity is some kind > of a "right" that one should have in all kinds of different & important > transactions, not merely on "cyberspace debate societies". I see > here frequently the implication that *private*entities* that want to > enforce identity in their own transactions are somehow implementing > a corrupt, orwellian system. We hold that private entities have the right to attempt to impose corrupt orwellian systems provided they do not do it at gunpoint, but we doubt that they will succeed without guns. > it sounded to me like that was all > Dyson was advocating. "Restrictions much stronger than a warrant" would imply that remailers would have to keep logs under penalty of law. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Browne and foreign tyrants
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote: > >And this was a real shame. Over 30 million people died in WWII, directly or >indirectly. We knew that Hitler was going to be a problem well before 1936. > Think how many could have been saved... > >If anything, WWII is excellent proof that AP is a good idea. Stauffenberg >was the German who bombed Hitler's meeting in 1944 but failed to kill him. >Stauffenberg knew as early as 1942 that Hitler needed to be killed, and a >recent "60 Minutes" episode related how hundreds of people knew about this >plot. In the late 30's Bugsy Seigel was in Europe visiting a friend (a countess, I believe). At one of her parties Hitler and a few henchmen also showed up. When Buggsy found out who they were he went to get his gun and finish them off. It was only on the pleading of his friend, that it would set off an international incident and could ruin her, that Buggsy relented. Too bad he wasn't more of a hot head. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Just say NO to perscription DRUGS.

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Re: Conservation Laws, Money, Engines, and Ontology
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One thing that occurs here. I imagine a scenario where you have a "share" of resources on a system(and ISP for example). You're metered as to how much you can post or store. Actually as it is now posting is regulated through extra payments per meg above the limit. Spam is being somewhat regulated by Terms of Service type things, but my point is what is to prevent pooling resources among several system to achive the same Spam pursuits some have. Say for example that an individual gets several accounts to balance the load at thier point. The Usenet for example has no "choke point". How could ISP's apply conservation here? If you limit the amount of traffic you still aren't holding back the flow of "spam". Here's where reputations could come in. You cound't open a new account anywhere without a good "reputation". This could aid in balancing the load of certain people. ??????????????????????????????????????? Greg Kucharo sophi(a)best.com "Eppur si moeve" -Galileo ???????????????????????????????????????

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AST Final Agenda
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I hope you will be able to join us for our conference in Ottawa next week. Here is the final agenda. Dave PROGRAM ADVANCED SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES CONFERENCE II Sponsored by Privacy International Electronic Privacy Information Center September 16, 1996 Citadel Ottawa Hotel and Convention Centre Ottawa, Canada 9:00 am COFFEE AND REGISTRATION 9:30 am WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION: NURTURING THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY Advanced surveillance functions have become an integral part of widescale information systems used by governments and businesses. Monitoring of the activities of individuals is seen as a desirable - and often technically essential - componennt in many of these systems. Once regarded as purpose-built stand alone innovations, the modern surveillance device for identification, profiling or tracking has been re-invented as a tool for commercial leverage. In these introductory remarks, Simon Davies and Dave Banisar explores the key technical, political, cultural and legal changes that are nurturing the growth of surveillance technologies across the world. o Simon Davies, London School of Economics & Director General, Privacy International oDave Banisar, Electronic Privacy Information Center & editor, International Privacy Bulletin 10:15 am FEATURED SPEAKER: SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES What kinds of technologies are the intelligence agencies of the world using? Who are they using it against? Are they legally accountable for their actions? Mike Frost, a former spy for the Canadian Security Establishment will talk about his experiences using these technologies to spy on Canadian citizens and the relationship of the CSE to the US National Security Agency. o Mike Frost, Former Intelligence Officer, Canadian Communications Security Establishment & author, Spyworld 11:00 am BREAK 11:15 am SURVEILLANCE AND THE INTERNET SIGINT ONLINE: GOVERNMENT SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ON THE NET o Wayne Madsen, Author, Handbook of Personal Data Protection >From Fort Meade, Maryland to Cheltenham, England and from Canberra, Australia to Issy les Moulineaux in Paris, signals intelligence (SIGINT) specialists are honing their skills at monitoring digital information. SIGINT agencies everywhere are increasingly throwing their surveillance web over the Internet and other data networks of interest. This session shall examine the methods by which SIGINT agencies conduct such on-line intelligence-gathering activities, including manipulation of encryption systems to exploiting weaknesses in communications architectures, including the use of anonymous remailers, rigging encryption systems, and tampering with the simple network management protocol (SNMP). You will discover that Mae West is more than just a deceased movie star. Datamining the Net: Cookies, Crawlers and Trackers o Simson Garfinkel, author, Practical Unix and Internet Security and PGP: Pretty Good Privacy. A great deal of information is gathered on individuals on the Internet. >From Alta Vista to cookies to digital cash to Web Crawler, sophicated tools to collect, index and process this information are being developed. Simson Garfinkel will discuss these technologies, what information is being gathered and what is being done with it. 12:30 pm LUNCH (provided) 1:30 pm CONSUMERS AND SURVEILLANCE INTELLIGENT VEHICLES AND TRACKING Phil Agre will outline the remarkable variety of technologies of surveillance currently being planned or implemented for road travel. The motivations for these systems are numerous and include logistics, traffic management, law enforcement, pollution control, and marketing. Despite the diversity of motivations, certain unifying themes emerge. The vast majority of the functionalities provided by these systems can be provided anonymously. o Phil Agre, University of California, San Diego GENETICS AS A SURVEILLANCE IDEOLOGY Researches in the field of genetics are still largely dominated by the works of molecular biologists who tend to comprehend reality through the classical Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm which postulates that it is possible to reduce the universe to a mechanical model in which peticular effects can be described as the direct results of specific causes. Such an approach does not acknowledge the fact that human physical and mental health is the result of very complex interactions. Most illnesses and deviant behaviors are multifactorial (physical and social environments are at least as much important as the genetic factors) and polygenic (numerous genes could be involved). In short, there are large probabilities that an individual carrying many "defective" genes may never develop the corresponding illness. Unfortunately, such fields of activities such as risk management, insurance, law and policy-making also work mostly within the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm. In such a context, genetics can easily be transformed into an ideological justification for surveillance and social control of populations or individuals "at risk" as well as minimizing social and environmental responsabilities. o Pierrot Peladeau, Progesta Inc. & editor Privacy Files 2:45 pm BREAK 3:00 pm SOLUTIONS: PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES A PRIVACY COMMISSIONER CASE STUDY: INTRODUCTION OF A DNA PROFILE DATABANK TO NEW ZEALAND Bruce Slane, Privacy Commissioner of New Zealand, will outline aspects of a new law which came into force in New Zealand last month. The law sanctions the establishment of a DNA profile database for police use in criminal investigations. The law also spells out how blood samples may be obtained from suspects for DNA analysis - voluntarily, by court order, and ultimately by force if need be. Bruce will explain the role of a Privacy Commissioner in scrutinising laws increasing state surveillance using the DNA law as a case study. o Bruce Slane. New Zealand Privacy Commissioner CAN PRIVACY STANDARDS ACHIEVE EFFECTIVE DATA PROTECTION? Privacy standards are becoming an important feature of the privacy protection landscape. The CSA Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information is likely to followed by other attempts to negotiate standards in other countries and at the international level. What are the market and regulatory incentives for the adoption of privacy standards? Can privacy standards exist alongside data protection legislation? What are the minimum requirements for a registration/accreditation system for a privacy standard? o Colin Bennett, University of Victoria 4:30 pm WRAPUP ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- MORE INFORMATION More information on the conference will be available at the Privacy International mailing list at pi-news(a)privacy.org (subject: subscribe) or at the PI Home Page at http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/ottawa/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- REGISTRATION Registration Fees [] Standard - $250 CAN ($175 US) [] Non-profit organizations/Educational - $125 CAN ($75 US) Information Name: ___________________________________________________________ Organization: ______________________________________________________ Address: _________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ Phone/Fax: _________________________________________________________ Electronic Mail:_____________________________________________________ Credit card Number/Expiration Date: _________________________________ (Your credit card will be billed by "Diane Publishing" - Do Not Email!) First Virtual Account (include email address)_________________________ Fax Registration form and credit card number to +1 202.547.5482 Send Check or Money Order in $US made out to Privacy International to: Privacy International Washington Office 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 Washington, DC 20003 USA 1-202-544-9240 (phone) 1-202-547-5482 (fax) pi(a)privacy.org(email) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Privacy International was formed in 1990 as a watchdog on surveillance by governments and corporations. With members in more than 40 countries, it has created an international movement that has helped to counter abuses of privacy by way of information technology. Privacy International has conducted campaigns in Europe, Asia and North America to raise awareness about the dangers of ID card systems, military surveillance, data matching, police information systems, and credit reporting. It is based in London, UK, and is administered by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) in Washington, D.C. Privacy International publishes a quarterly newsletter (the International Privacy Bulletin) and organizes conferences each year on privacy and technology. More information is available at http://www.privacy.org/pi/ The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a public interest research center in Washington, DC. It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging privacy issues relating to the National Information Infrastructure, such as the Clipper Chip, the Digital Telephony proposal, medical record privacy, and the sale of consumer data. EPIC is sponsored by the Fund for Constitutional Government, a non-profit organization established in 1974 to protect civil liberties and constitutional rights. EPIC publishes the EPIC Alert, pursues Freedom of Information Act litigation, and conducts policy research. For more information, email info(a)epic.org, HTTP://www.epic.org or write EPIC, 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 301, Washington, DC 20003. +1 202 544 9240 (tel), +1 202 547 5482 (fax).

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Re: Photoshop, Steganograhy, and cypherpunks?
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Sep 09 08:17:48 1996 > Digital watermarking > adds copyright information to > a photograph that doesn't alter the photo's > appearance. The watermark is detectable even > after the photo is edited or printed and rescanned. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ go ahead, have a laugh!!! (or show me an affordable scanner with REAL 8bit color and a calibrated color scheme). - ------< fate favors the prepared mind >------ Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/crypto/crypto.html - ----< words are what reality is made of >---- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMjO2kBFhy5sz+bTpAQGbCwf/TCkJvS/8Z3ER3YdR7S2jNw0SrIkDXRT/ GtfvKgmTrk+YMI+5Ko9aL7wu2XgdUF5dzjo1slpNBp8hbrMWUGiNufcI5FDnzrqP z5lCTZefsHounFV8LaQk19iODOAt6EA5Bo7hAMNH4MTsl07dHJ2wudEntmLA4Hpl Xo1U/u/+PrTROK/O4wHEcDVyMsEFhHW7rBdhx5U5Sh58CtI3ijQ9xfW2L9dCQHUF +SVaXTgHYaHnpBpKitkAgEEd2m2jVC7E6S0pPkEBm0k0yXzBNT9zBaD5xtUxI/kI sJWNQCCq4f0VXm1wl27H+FYYUD/VdLc/pniFppmVa+WEDFGGlWXnqw== =ajST -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Erasing Disks, was Re: What the NSA is patenting
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See Peter Gutmann's paper, "Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory" in The Sixth USENIX Security Symposium Proceedings. My feeling after hearing his paper was that the only thing I would trust was thermite. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | "Lone Star" - My personal | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | choice for best movie of | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | 1996 | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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ALERT: Call the Commerce committee to protect your privacy! (9/7/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

======================================================================== SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE SCHEDULED TO VOTE ON PRO-PRIVACY ENCRYPTION LEGISLATION (S.1726) ON THU SEPTEMBER 12, 1996 YOUR HELP IS NEEDED TO ENSURE PASSAGE CALL THE COMMERCE COMMITTEE (PHONE NUMBERS BELOW) September 8, 1996 Please widely redistribute this document with this banner intact until September 30, 1996 ________________________________________________________________________ CONTENTS The Latest News What You Can Do Now Background / What To Expect This Week Description of S.1726, Pro-CODE Bill Chronology of Pro-Crypto Legislation For More Information / Supporting Organizations ________________________________________________________________________ THE LATEST NEWS On Thursday September 12, the Senate Commerce Committee is set to vote on legislation designed to enhance privacy and security on the Internet. The bill, known as the "Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act," (S. 1726) is the best hope yet for real reform of U.S. encryption policy, and its passage by the Commerce Committee would signify a critical step forward in the struggle for privacy and security in the Information Age. The bill faces significant opposition from the Clinton Administration, who continues to cling to a cold-war era view of U.S. encryption policy. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE COMMERCE COMMITTEE HEAR FROM SUPPORTERS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY ON THE INTERNET. Please take a moment to contact the committee by following the simple instructions below. ________________________________________________________________________ WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW It's crucial that you call the Commerce committee members below and urge them to pass S.1726 out of committee without amendments. (This is also known as a "clean" bill.) Any opportunity for amendments (even if they are good) opens us up to the possibility of hostile amendments that could restrict the use of encryption even further than today's abysmal state. It could even prohibit the use of encryption without Clipper Chip-like key 'escrow' technology, which includes built-in surveillance and monitoring functionality. 1. Call/Fax the members of the Senate Commerce committee and urge them to pass S.1726 out of committee "cleanly". Do not use email, as it is not likely to be looked at in time to make a difference for the markup on September 12th. Use the sample communique and directory listing below to make it a simple TWO MINUTE task. 2. Sign the petition to support strong encryption at http://www.crypto.com/petition/ ! Join other cyber-heroes as Phil Zimmermann, Matt Blaze, Bruce Schneier, Vince Cate, Phil Karn, and others who have also signed. 3. Between now and Wed. September 12, it is crucial that you call all these members of Congress. P ST Name and Address Phone Fax = == ======================== ============== ============== D SC Hollings, Ernest F. 1-202-224-6121 1-202-224-4293 D MA Kerry, John F. 1-202-224-2742 1-202-224-8525 D HI Inouye, Daniel K. 1-202-224-3934 1-202-224-6747 D KY Ford, Wendell H. 1-202-224-4343 1-202-224-0046 D WV Rockefeller, John D. 1-202-224-6472 na D LA Breaux, John B. 1-202-224-4623 na D NV Bryan, Richard H. 1-202-224-6244 1-202-224-1867 D ND Dorgan, Byron L. 1-202-224-2551 1-202-224-1193 D NE Exon, J. J. 1-202-224-4224 1-202-224-5213 D OR Wyden, Ron* 1-202-224-5244 1-202-228-2717 R SD Pressler, Larry* 1-202-224-5842 1-202-224-1259 R MT Burns, Conrad R.(*sponsor) 1-202-224-2644 1-202-224-8594 R AK Stevens, Ted 1-202-224-3004 1-202-224-2354 R AZ McCain, John 1-202-224-2235 1-202-224-2862 R WA Gorton, Slade 1-202-224-3441 1-202-224-9393 R MS Lott, Trent* 1-202-224-6253 1-202-224-2262 R TX Hutchison, Kay Bailey 1-202-224-5922 1-202-224-0776 R ME Snowe, Olympia 1-202-224-5344 1-202-224-6853 R MO Ashcroft, John* 1-202-224-6154 na R TN Frist, Bill 1-202-224-3344 1-202-224-8062 R MI Abraham, Spencer 1-202-224-4822 1-202-224-8834 * supporter or cosponsor. The bill also enjoys broad bi-partisan support from members not on the committee including Senators Leahy (D-VT) and Murray (D-WA). 4. Here is a sample conversation: SAMPLE PHONE CALL You:<ring ring> Sen:Hello, Senator Mojo's office! You: SAY I'm calling to urge the Senator to pass S.1726, the THIS-> Burns/Leahy/Pressler bill, S.1726 when the committee votes on it on Thursday. It's critical to the future of privacy, security, and electronic commerce on the internet. Sen:Ok, thanks!<click> IF THEY SAY "The Senator has concerns about the bill", please answer, "Please try to work these issues out as it moves to the Senate floor, but passage out of committee will send an important signal to the Administration." 5. To help us measure the effectiveness of the campaign, WE NEED TO HEAR FROM YOU. Please tell us who you called, and how they sounded. We'll be passing this information to folks in D.C. who can help apply pressure where needed. $ Mail vtw(a)vtw.org Subject: I called so-and-so Hey, I called Sen. Mojo. He sounded iffy, call in the reinforcements. ^D 6. Forward this to your friends and colleagues in appropriate forums until the date of expiration at the top. Forward a copy of this to your Internet Service Provider as well, and ask them to put the following text in their message of the day (motd), or on their WWW page: ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT The U.S. Senate will be voting on a proposal to encourage better security on the Internet on Thu Sep. 12th. Your help is needed to call Congress. See http://www.crypto.com/ for more details. ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ________________________________________________________________________ BACKGROUND / WHAT TO EXPECT THIS WEEK For the past 3 years, Cyber-Rights Activists, citizens, and industry leaders have been working hard to reform US encryption policy. Support has been building behind several legislative proposals this year because they send a clear signal to the Administration about the need for security and privacy in the Information Age. The digital revolution is currently being held hostage by the White House's Cold War restrictions on privacy-enhancing encryption technology. Now, with Congress less than a month away from adjournment, everyone who supports encryption and privacy is working to see this bill leave committee in order to send a clear message to the White House that they are on the wrong side of the encryption issue. Although this bill may not become law this year, its passage out of committee will be a landmark event that will clearly tell the White House that the Congress, the public, and the computer industry care about security and privacy, and need strong, reliable encryption technology in order to make the Internet a viable platform for commerce, education, and democracy. Success for our side is not certain, and the next week is not without risks. On September 12th, the Senate Commerce committee will hold a "markup", where the bill is examined, voted on, and if there are enough votes, passed out of committee. Two things could happen: -the committee could pass the bill as written, -the committee could pass the bill with amendments. Any amendments are not likely to be friendly, and in particular, quiet sources have told privacy activists that the Clinton Administration has been readying a legislative assault on your right to use encryption for several weeks now. A Clipper-like amendment could be attached to the bill if our side does not have enough votes to block all amendments. It is crucial that all netizens who consider privacy and security important take a moment to call members of the Commerce Committee right now and urge them to vote S.1726 out of committee without amendments. ________________________________________________________________________ DESCRIPTION OF S.1726, PRO-CODE BILL Privacy-enhancing encryption technology is currently under heavy restrictions kept in place by the White House. Encryption that is currently allowed to be exported is not sufficient to protect confidential information. This policy acquires an "Alice-in-Wonderland" quality when one realizes that strong encryption products are available abroad both for sale and for free download off the Internet. The Pro-CODE Act resolves to: 1. Allow for the *unrestricted* export of "mass-market" or "public-domain" encryption programs, including such products as Pretty Good Privacy and popular World Wide Web browsers. 2. Requires the Secretary of Commerce to allow the less restricted export of other encryption technologies if products of similar strength are generally available outside the United States, roughly up to DES strength. 3. Prohibits the federal government from imposing mandatory key-escrow encryption policies on the domestic market and limiting the authority of the Secretary of Commerce to set standards for encryption products. ________________________________________________________________________ CHRONOLOGY OF PRO-CRYPTO LEGISLATION 9/12/96 (scheduled) Senate Commerce committee will hold markup of S.1726 and hopefully pass it out of committee with no amendments. 7/25/96: Full Senate Commerce committee holds positive hearings on S.1726. FBI Director Louis Freeh testifies along with many cyber-luminaries. Hearings are cybercast Internet Cyber-Rights activists with HotWired and WWW.Crypto.Com. You can see the photos, read the testimony, and listen to the audio transcript at http://www.crypto.com/events/072596/ 6/26/96: Senate subcommittee holds positive hearings on S.1726. Hearings are cybercast Internet Cyber-Rights activists with HotWired and WWW.Crypto.Com. You can see the photos, read the testimony, and listen to the audio transcript at http://www.crypto.com/events/062696/ 5/2/96: Bi-partisan group of Senators introduce Pro-CODE Act, which would free public-domain encryption software (such as PGP) for export, free much commercial encryption for export, and reduce the government's ability to push Clipper proposals down the throats of an unwilling public. Original sponsors include: Senators Burns (R-MT), Dole (R-KS), Faircloth (R-NC), Leahy (D-VT), Murray (D-WA), Pressler (R-SD), and Wyden (D-OR). 3/5/96: Sen. Leahy (D-VT) and Rep. Goodlatte (R-VA) announce encryption bills (S.1587/H.R.3011) that significantly relax export restrictions on products with encryption functionality in them, as well as free public domain software such as PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). ________________________________________________________________________ FOR MORE INFORMATION / SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS There are many excellent resources online to get up to speed on crypto including the following WWW sites: http://www.crypto.com http://www.privacy.org http://www.eff.org http://www.cdt.org http://www.epic.org http://www.vtw.org Please visit them often. The following organizations have signed onto this alert: Center for Democracy and Technology Electronic Frontier Foundation Electronic Privacy Information Center Voters Telecommunications Watch ________________________________________________________________________ End alert ========================================================================

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RE: IDC_ard
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jya(a)pipeline.com (John Young) forwarded: >9-8-96. NYP Mag: >"The True Terror Is In the Card." >Faced with rising crime, illegal immigration, welfare >fraud and absentee parents, many bureaucrats and members >of Congress insist that the nation would run more >smoothly if we all had counterfeit-proof plastic >identity cards. >http://jya.com/idcard.txt (11 kb) And to get all the Christian Right (no pun intended) up in arms, just suggest that the best way to prevent theft of these ID cards would be to place the information on a microchip and implant it in your body. Forehead and right wrist preferably. James

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Distributed data haven monetary supply?
by DAVID A MOLNAR 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When writing about Eternity services or other distributed data havens, one has to cover the issue of cost. After all, it takes some expenditure of resources to store data, which can translate to actual $$ (or riyals or dinar or kroner or whatever). So far that I've seen, the problem of delivering that payment has been put down to "e-cash payment" of some kind (hopefully untraceable), or creative wire transfer. In both cases, we end up needing to implement e-cash on a wide-scale basis, or completely reforming the way banks work in most countries. After all that trouble, then, our value is still stored in terms of a real currency. What if a node in a data haven could issue its own certificates/money for goods/services? The idea seems similar to me to the "TrustBucks" discussed recently on the list. A node's operator issues credits to others in exchange for money, favors, or space on their own machines. However, if every node issues its own currency, but only to those it trusts, we have the same problem as w/PGP...there is no guarantee that data may flow freely from node to node, which invites weakness. It's also an open invitation to inflation, as each operator may mint many billions of $ w/o immediate consequences (perhaps combined w/spam in a misguided publicity attempt?) Question : would it be preferable for a group of nodes to issue e-cash? I'm thinking in terms of a system where the bank's secret key is split between the participating nodes (or a certain voting subset), with a certain threshold needed to mint new currency. If there are several such constallations (and methods of exchanging currency between them), it multiplies the number of points one must subvert in order to manipulate the system. Perhaps groupings might agree to share stored data freely between nodes in the interests of security. A user then has several different "economies" to choose from, each of which has different policies. Once a data haven begins to devrive actual _income_ or benefit from these transactions, its attitude toward economic policy may affect its ability to secure and retreive data on command. A rich haven, for instance, may be able to afford better bandwidth between nodes, or funding for research into distributed computing. In contrast, a "poor" haven may suffer from outdated equipment, hardware failures, and possibly intermittent loss of data. Of course, such effects will not be particularly pronounced so long as a data haven is largely a volunteer effort. If a haven were to evolve into a socially stronger entity, with clearly defined "rights" and "responsibilities" for nodes, then its policies would have greater effect. I do not see a guarantee that such a structure would be anarchic in nature, even though the technology itself is amenable. Y'know, a group currency could prove to be a powerful tool to assert dominance/influence over a single node, much as we may speak about "dollar zones" or "yen blocs" in the real world. Gridlock might also be a problem...what if the system is set up to demand unanimous consent, but one of the nodes just died? How does one cast out a node or add a new one without collecting the bank's key in one place? What's to stop me from adding myself as a node under 15 assumed names? My concern is that these fears might engender the kind of 3l33t mindset sometimes seen on really lame wAR3z BBSs : a small power group, intense distrust of outsiders, almost cultish fac,ade of devotion to said small power group, et. al. None of which is helpful. Comments? Is it a good idea, or will it lead to ever-more confusion? Sorry if this is a bit long, repetitive of other things previously discussed to death elsewhere, or rambling. :-) -David Molnar

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