December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Fwd: Re: Clipper III analysis
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== >From: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >To: "cypherpunks" <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Date: Thu, 06 Jun 96 16:51:18 >Reply-To: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >Priority: Normal >X-Mailer: PMMail 1.5 UNREGISTERED SHAREWARE >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Subject: Fwd: Re: Clipper III analysis > ==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== >From: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >To: "cypherpunks" <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Date: Thu, 30 May 96 01:16:32 >Reply-To: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >Priority: Normal >X-Mailer: PMMail 1.5 UNREGISTERED SHAREWARE >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Subject: Re: Clipper III analysis > On 29 May 1996 14:53:30 pdt, tcmay(a)got.net wrote: >> A good Questioned Document Examiner will be able to demonstrate >> that the signed document in question was not authored by Joe >> Blow, even if it contains his digital signature. > >I was of course talking about digital signatures, not handwritten signatures. > >I would be very interested to hear how a "Questioned Document Examiner" can >possibly determine that a digital signature was not applied by a particular >person. I believe he was referring to document analysis. By closely comparing a questionable work with those of known authorship, a skilled analyst can hopefully find enough [dis]similarities to say whether a document was authored by a given person. This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com. ===================END FORWARDED MESSAGE=================== This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com. ===================END FORWARDED MESSAGE=================== /* From Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> on a Warped PC running a proudly unregistered (for now) PMMAIL 1.5! The Enigman Group - We do Web Pages! */ This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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ID this 31173 NCR keyboard
by unknown＠example.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

! At 05:46 PM 6/3/96 -0700, you wrote: ! >ncr terminals are the most 31173 D0Dz ! ! I'm guessing that "D0Dz" is a variant on "dudes"; ! is "31173" supposed to be an upside-down "ElliE"? ! Having worked at NCR, I like their cash-machines and cash-registers, ! dislike the Microchannels in some of their PCs, ! dislike the terminals they used to make (I think SunRiver ! is the current manufacturer for that product line) ! and like their Teradata descendants. ! # Thanks; Bill ! # Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com ! # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs ! # Rescind Authority! Oops. I wrote that just looking at the keyboard. Picked it up at Seattle's Ex-Pc for $3. It's so old, I think it requires a non-PC BIOS. No manual, labels etc. Anyone have a clue as to what this is: NCR F1 F2 [...] F18 F19 F20/RESET| ESC [...] TAB |[five direction keys] CONTROL Q [...] }/] CONTROL |CLR 7 8 9 / CAPS_LOCK A [...] ~/` |NEW | - 4 5 6 * [up] |/\ Z [...] [upup] |LINE | + 1 2 3 |NEW [space] | 0_ 00 . |LINE It was designed for easily customizing your keytable, being an actual flat terminal with square keys easily pulled out and interchanged. The back of the keyboard has three switches for the boolean selection of languages: US English, UK/Int. English, French, German, Swedish/Finnish, Danish/Norwegian, Spanish, Italian. So, where to get a NEW keyboard like this: FLAT, with a full set of SQUARE, EASILY pulled out keys.

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Re: How can you protect a remailer's keys?
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> The best solution I could come up with (and was willing to write and use) >> is to specify the passphrase on the command line argument to the compiler >A far better solution would be to have a long-running daemon hold the >secret key. The mixmaster client could talk to the key daemon through >a unix-domain socket with the permission bits set such that only the >mixmaster user can connect. Each time the machine is rebooted, the >operator must start the daemon and give it a passphrase. >Second, if your machine is seized or someone gains unauthorized >physical access to it, the easiest way to get a root shell is by >rebooting single-user. However, if the only cleartext copy of a key >is in memory rather than in the filesystem, once the machine is >rebooted the secret key is lost. How about adding an "Oh s___" feature that would dump the key? You could even tie it to a login attempt (i.e. be sneaky and rename the actual root account to something else. Possibly hack the login client to return "root" as the username, etc, etc to complete the illusion if they are using TEMPEST. Then set it so that a root login makes the daemon dump the password) This would have possibilities, too, if you made it react to a) certain files in certain directories, b) certain signals or c) certain network messages. This would allow you to put in an innocous clear signal. Set it to a temp file created when editing your remailer's configuration (or userlist). Make it so that you have to conciously DISABLE security or it dumps the password. Have an innocent program terminate it. Be able to cancel it by sending an email (or using telnet) - this would be great if you had a trusted friend. Also, with some modification, you could set it to react to an external stimulus - say a panic button? or a card lock? You could even have fun putting all your sensitive stuff on an external hard drive and rigging your panic button to a) stop the remailer and b) activate the thermite charge on the external drive. // This was typed on a Warped PC by an equally warped Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> // The Enigman Group - We do Web Pages! // Opinions expressed are not necessarily my own, much less another's. This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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Fwd: Re: Class III InfoWar
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== >From: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >To: "cypherpunks" <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Date: Sun, 02 Jun 96 18:04:15 >Reply-To: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >Priority: Normal >X-Mailer: PMMail 1.5 UNREGISTERED SHAREWARE >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Subject: Re: Class III InfoWar > On 2 Jun 1996 03:06:14 pdt, hal9001(a)panix.com wrote: >At 21:33 -0400 6/1/96, winn(a)Infowar.Com wrote: > > >>The article discussed the advanced information warfare techniques used by the >>perpetrators. "According to the American National Security Agency (NSA), they >>have penetrated computer systems using 'logic bombs' (coded devices that >>can be >>remotely detonated) > >Unless the definition has changed recently, a "logic bomb" is normally a >piece of code in a program that is triggered when a specific event occurs >(such as the programmer's name not appearing in a payroll file for a >designated period of time [which might trigger a salami round off routine >to start cutting checks 2 months after s/he is no longer working for the >company]). I believe that is what they were referring to. However, the press garbled it as usual. It seems like the original was something like 'logic bombs' (bits of code that can be triggered remotely). Probably sounded more impressive the reporter's way... This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com. ===================END FORWARDED MESSAGE=================== /* From Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> on a Warped PC running a proudly unregistered (for now) PMMAIL 1.5! The Enigman Group - We do Web Pages! */ This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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Re: forged addresses
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 29 May 1996 19:38:16 pdt, nobody(a)nowher.com wrote: >Hi, I'm not sure if there was ever a thread on this, but I was wondering if >anyone can determine your real email address, if you were to fake it to your >email client. > >I hope that this doesn't offend anyone, since this is a high traffic list, but >I was wondering if this would work. To try it out, I setup my client to think >I was someone else, and sent myself an email. I could only figure out what >ISP it came from. > >What I would like to know is, can any of the experts on this list determine my >address from the header of this post?? I didn't receive anything except your nobody@... address. >again, if this is something that I shouldn't have done, just let me know, and >it won't happen again. > Hmmm... I'm going to have to play around with this. I can get outbound email access through my school district's mailserver simply by filling in the appropriate fields in netscape (we have a WAN hooked up to a T1). It would seem to me that this would be rather secure for several reasons, if for no other than that NO logging is made... In a large district, like mine (probably 10-15 thousand potential users), I doubt they would have the resources to track any of the 100 or so Internet machines on my campus alone, even if they could tell it came from here. This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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Re: INteresting tidbit
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On the Encryption note, and I swear not along the lines of the 'DOJ' >and 'FBI Snooping' Big-Brother events, I heard another story recently. > ># begin story > >A person working on the MBONE project did an unannounced experiment >across the internet using Triple-DES for MBONE, and the very next day, >'ATF' agents knocked on his door and warned him against exporting >munitions. The experimentor was shaken by the fact that agents >approached him so quickly after the experiment. > ># end story > >Extrapolations of fact: > 1. Internet traffic is monitored. > 2. The ability to snoop for encrypted traffic is present > 3. The ability to identify encryption levels is present > (How else can they differentiate DES-1 from DES-3?) > 4. The ability to crack DES-1 in near real-time mode is present. > (See above). First, this has been loosely confirmed for ages. Someone was mentioning that FBI offices supposedly have software that (on a 486) can crack a DES-1 key in under an hour. Multiply * modern high capacity computers = problem. However, this does not nessesarily follow from #3. First off, you could probably tell the encryption used from a file format; the software on the other end has to know what it's getting. Secondly, you could probably tell quite a lot about what was used by some intense analysis. Finally, if their software cannot read it and analysis suggested it was more than DES-1 then they might go after someone w/o being able to read the document in question. > 5. If above=true, then Feds dropping the Zimmerman PGP case probably > also points to it also being crackable in a similar manner. Not necessarily. This freemen issue shows that the FBI is getting gunshy about bad publicity, which they were getting. > 6. Using encryption only flags traffic for capture and decryption, > using strong encryption makes you all that more interesting. Sounds like the old argument for encrypting everything... >Sorry, couldn't resist. I'll try not to start a threads about >electro-plasma propulsion craft at Area 51, metallic-ceramic skin >and pulse-jets on the Aurora spy plane, heat-imaging video cameras >on satellites and planes that can watch you through your houses' roof, >etc. :) What??? Now you're going to tell us X-Files is just a TV show? <g> This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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Re: FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:54 PM 6/6/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >(There may be cases people can dig up where some newspaper or newsletter >was "shut down," but I think such cases would be hard to find in the last >several decades. Am I wrong on this?) Not newspapers but a number of radio stations of course. Licensure. Even under CDA, we are not subject to license, however. Though I wonder how the FCC will behave as TV stations join the radio and "radio" stations that are already netcasting beyond its control. DCF

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Fwd: Re: [crypto] crypto-protocols for trading card gam
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== >From: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >To: "ogren(a)concentric.net" <ogren(a)concentric.net> >Date: Thu, 30 May 96 02:30:30 >Reply-To: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >Priority: Normal >X-Mailer: PMMail 1.5 UNREGISTERED SHAREWARE >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Subject: Re: [crypto] crypto-protocols for trading card gam > >Disadvantages: > >The entire integrity of the system relies on the security of the >game company's key pair. If the secret key is comprimised, either by >Cards are not transferrable. In order to make cards transferrable the >game company must be able to invalidate cards which have been traded >to others. In other words if Alice wants to give a cards to Bob she >must: I would just have multiple validators w/separate keys. sign w/each. This would not eliminate the problem but could reduce it... >1. Contact the game company and tell them she wants to give the card >to Bob. 2. The game company must issue a new card to Bob with a new >serial number and with Bob's public key rather than Alice's. 3. The >game company must invalidate Alice's old card. Since there is no way >that the game company can make sure all copies of the card have been >destroyed it must create a "invalid serial number list" and have the >players dial into that list everytime the game is played. > >Since step 3 is so costly to implement, I think it is unlikely that a >cryptography-based trading card game will have tradable cards. Much easier - with each card, store its ownership history. EACH time it is transfered, have it be signed by the previous owner. Originally, the game company signs it as a valid card. On selling it, they record the purchaser's identity (email address, etc)and seal the card with the company key (or set of keys - see above). Repeat as needed. This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com. ===================END FORWARDED MESSAGE=================== /* From Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> on a Warped PC running a proudly unregistered (for now) PMMAIL 1.5! The Enigman Group - We do Web Pages! */ This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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Fwd: Re: Idea 'bout banning the internet
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

==================BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE================== >From: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >To: "jwilk(a)iglou.com" <jwilk(a)iglou.com> >Date: Mon, 03 Jun 96 20:36:49 >Reply-To: "Chris Adams" <adamsc(a)io-online.com> >Priority: Normal >X-Mailer: PMMail 1.5 UNREGISTERED SHAREWARE >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit >Subject: Re: Idea 'bout banning the internet > On 3 Jun 1996 19:48:48 pdt, jwilk(a)iglou.com wrote: >What if in the future a country banned the internet and all things that had >to deal with it (ie- telnet, irc). It would be the "underground" thing. >Just a thought, it would really suck! As I think about it it is impossible >or is it???? Hell the usa cant even ban porn let alone the whole thing. They >could ban it like they did fizzies. Hey there making a comeback did you here >now they have nutrasweet in them. If you know what fizzies are than your >pretty kewl. I'm only 13 and love then they are the drink of the future!!!! > >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >Blake "Pokey" Wehlage Gaa- 3.69 ><jwilk(a)iglou.com> Record- 2-4-4 >Age- 13 Final Standings- 2nd Place (Beat in Championship) > >President & Founder: > >Revolution Software "I have the fastest glove in the east!" >Profanity Software "Hackers never stop hacking they just get caught" >VSoft > >My life- Rarely eat or sleep, Hack til' 7:00a, goto school, play goalie >til' 8:00p, hack til' 7:00a >Hank Aaron- d:-)!-< Pope- +<:-) Santa Claus- *<:-) The Unabrower |:-) > >Current Girlfriend(s)- Lindsey Wilcox, Laura Schubring > >Personal Quote- Mr Plow, thats my name, that name aguin is Mr. Plow >-Homer Simpson >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > You know, even counting the header, your signature is longer than the message... BTW, I doubt most of us care about your current love life or soccer standings. We won't even mention Homer Simpson... This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com. ===================END FORWARDED MESSAGE=================== /* From Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> on a Warped PC running a proudly unregistered (for now) PMMAIL 1.5! The Enigman Group - We do Web Pages! */ This Message Was Sent With An UNREGISTERED Version Of PMMail. Please Encourage Its Author To Register Their Copy Of PMMail. For More Information About PMMail And SouthSide Software's Other Products, Contact http://www.southsoft.com.

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RISKS: YAJSH
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reposted from RISKS: Yet Another Java Security Hole: ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 2 Jun 1996 07:46:20 +0000 (BST) From: David Hopwood <david.hopwood(a)lady-margaret-hall.oxford.ac.uk> Subject: Another Java attack There is another serious security bug in the class loading code for all currently available Java browsers: Netscape up to versions 2.02 and 3.0beta4 (except Windows 3.x) Oracle PowerBrowser for Win32 HotJava 1.0beta 'appletviewer' from the Java Development Kit up to version 1.0.2 Sun, Netscape, and Oracle have been sent details of the problem (which is partly related to the ClassLoader attack found by Drew Dean, et al. in March). The attack works by exploiting a design flaw in the mechanism that separates JVM classes into different namespaces. Using this bug, an attacker can bypass all of Java's security restrictions. This includes reading and writing files, and executing native code on the client with the same permissions as the user of the browser. The only way to avoid this problem at the moment is to disable Java. For more details see http://ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk/~david/java/bugs/ Technical details will be posted when Sun, Netscape, and Oracle release patches. David Hopwood david.hopwood(a)lmh.ox.ac.uk http://ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk/~david/ ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 6 Jun 1996 14:15:46 -0700 From: mrm(a)doppio.Eng.Sun.COM (Marianne Mueller) Subject: Another Java attack David Hopwood, a Java researcher in the UK, has uncovered a new security bug in Java [RISKS-18.18]. In simple terms, he has been able to manipulate the way objects are assigned and the way they collaborate, in order to undermine the applet security manager. Hopwood contacted JavaSoft directly re: the bug, and we have had a team working on a fix for the past 72 hours. In addition, we are applying Hopwood's model to conduct a security review, to determine if there are other bugs that may apply. We are currently thoroughly testing the fix, and plan to release a patch as soon as possible. As we complete more testing of the fix, a more detailed description of the bug and the fix will be added to the JavaSoft security FAQ at http://java.sun.com/sfaq/. JavaSoft is grateful for the internet security community's active interest in reviewing our code and we welcome feedback that makes Java better technology. ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | Technology (n): | | A substitute for adulthood. stevenw(a)best.com | Popular with middle-aged men.

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