December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: NIST Draft Key Escrow Paper
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The *most recent* draft version of the white paper -- not the early 5/10 version that I quoted from but the one publicly released yesterday -- is available at http://www.epic.org/ We should thank the good folks at EPIC, those swell touch-typists, for taking the time to put the paper online, along with their comments on it. -Declan >Date: Tue, 21 May 1996 15:55:08 GMT >To: declan(a)well.com (Declan McCullagh) >Subject: Re: NIST Draft Key Escrow Paper >From: jya(a)pipeline.com (John Young) >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, pfarrell(a)netcom.com >X-PipeUser: jya >X-PipeHub: pipeline.com >X-PipeGCOS: (John Young) > >We've just heard back from Ed Roback of NIST that he'll fax us a copy of >the Draft Key Escrow Paper, which we'll scan and send to Pat Farrell for >his Web site. I'll ask Pat to announce it's availability when ready. >

1 0

Re: NIST Draft Key Escrow Paper
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to prompt faxing by Ed Roback of NIST, we have transcribed and sent to Pat Farrell the Draft Key Escrow Paper entitled "Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public Safety in the Global Information Infrastructure," 25 pages (50 kb). Pat will shortly announce its availability on his Web site. Much easier to grab it from Pat, but for anyone without Web access, we'll E-mail it. Send a blank message to jya(a)pipeline.com with the subject KMI_txt. Here's the cover letter of the report: ____________________________________________________________ Executive Office of the President Office of Management and Budget Washington, D.C. 20503 May 20, 1996 MEMORANDUM FOR INTERESTED PARTIES SUBJECT: Draft Paper, "Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public Safety in the Global Information Infrastructure" FROM: Bruce W. McConnell [Initials] Edward J. Appel [Initials] Co-Chairs, Interagency Working Group on Cryptography Policy Attached for your review and comment is a draft paper entitled "Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public Safety in the Global Information Infrastructure." It presents a vision and course of action for developing a cryptographic infrastructure that will protect valuable information on national and international networks. The draft paper is the result of the many discussions we have had with interested parties concerning the use of encryption. While those discussions have explored the use of both key recoverable encryption and non-recoverable encryption, the draft paper addresses an infrastructure which uses key recoverable encryption. We believe such a key management infrastructure, voluntary and supported by *private sector* key management organizations, is the prospect of the near future. It would permit users and manufacturers free choice of encryption algorithm, facilitate international interoperability, preserve law enforcement access, and, most importantly, provide strong system security and integrity. Recognizing that a robust infrastructure is not yet a reality, we are also considering measures to liberalize export policy for some non-escrowed products. Appendix II of the draft paper begins to summarize current policy, and we intend to expand and improve that section. We believe that clearly articulating such a vision will accelerate the ability of the United States to realize the full advantages of the global network for commerce, security and public safety. However, such a vision cannot become a reality unless it is widely shared. Therefore, rather than being a finished product, the attached paper is a draft which we ask you to help us improve. We hope it will contribute to constructive discussion and promote a clearer understanding of each others' needs and concerns regarding the use of encryption. We welcome your comments and look forward to further discussion. Written comments may be sent to our attention, Room 10236, NEOB, Washington, D.C. 20503. ____________________________________________________________

1 0

Re: NIST Draft Key Escrow P
by David Sobel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan McCullagh wrote: >The *most recent* draft version of the white paper -- not the early 5/10 >version that I quoted from but the one publicly released yesterday -- is >available at http://www.epic.org/ > >We should thank the good folks at EPIC, those swell touch-typists, for >taking the time to put the paper online, along with their comments on it. > >-Declan And EPIC's thanks to Pat Farrell, who actually made the *appendices* available online as well. Having found Pat's work, we've now appended the appendices (?) to our version of the paper. - David

1 0

Re: (Fwd) Re: TCM: mafia as a paradigm for cyberspace
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:34 PM 5/20/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >>Second, everybody like Jim Bell who is pushing the AP scheme is doing >>so on ethical basis: that the coercion the government imposes on to >>the individuals by regulations, and guns backed taxation justifies the >>killings. I have to see yet any cypherpunks who seems to agree with >>AP that envision another use than govt control. > >right, and Hitler didn't have any other use for his government other >than to bring utopia to the masses, and used all the ovens for cooking >pizzas (after all, what else could an oven be used for?!?!?). > >the above sentence I find absolutely abhorrent: it justifies killing, >not merely because of the effect (the sort of "ends-justifies-the-means" >argument used by most here), but that in addition it is >supposedly "ethical". ethical?!?!? Then you've obviously dramatically mis-read my ideas. I don't claim that _EVERYBODY_ who will fall victim will "deserve" it by your or my opinions, or by generally-agreed-upon philosophy like the libertarian's "Non-Initiation of Force Principle" (NIOFP). Rather, I claim that the justification for any given killing must (and will, or won't, depending) come from some external fact having nothing to do with AP. For example, if you believe in NIOFP, then anyone who violates it has initiated force, and the victim of such force (or, perhaps, anyone else?) can legitimately use a system like AP to fight back. If you _don't_ believe in libertarian philsophy, obviously you won't necessarily agree with AP, but the source of your agreement is that, not something inherently wrong with AP. >the assassination politics is quite Hitleresque at its root. >"kill our enemies, and everything will be better. it is our enemies >that are the root of all evil in the world. extinguish them, and >you solve all problems automatically" THat's a false claim. If the "enemies" are enemies because of what they've actually done wrong, say violate your rights, then it should be your right to stop them. The method you choose shouldn't matter. >there is a trite saying, "two wrongs do not make a right" (trite >because most have mastered the simple truth of it in their pre-teen >years). a concept not grasped by some second-graders. some >require a lifetime of lessons to comprehend it in the end.. You seem to be assuming that if there are TWO "wrongs" here. But I've tried to make it abundantly clear that justification for the self-defense comes from the initial "wrong." Where, then, is the SECOND "wrong"? What, exactly, makes it wrong? If a person can't get justice any other way (not to be confused with merely a chance at justice) then why deny that person his rights? I acknowledge that if there is no initial "wrong" (the target didn't actually do anything wrong) then the act of targeting him is, itself, wrong, but you're apparently unwilling to back up this hypothetical. >I'm very disappointed that others have not chased Assassination >Politics proponents to take their trash somewhere else. of course >the real situation is that those that started this list have >sympathies for this kind of thinking, so no such thing will happen. It should be obvious to anyone around here that if AP "works," it will work regardless of whether it meets with your approval or any other subset of humankind. That makes it worthy of discussion even if you don't like it. >to Jim Bell and Avon: please read Machiavelli. read about ancient >assassination clubs and the history of bloody politics. if you want >to seriously further your ideas, start a web site with ample >historical research. your ideas are not new whatsoever. Your objections are invalid. The mere fact that SOME organized killing systems occurred in the past has essentially no relationship to the system I describe. The prospect of perfect anonymity, allowing the system to be open to anyone who chooses to contribute, will make it vastly different from anything that came before. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

2 1

Re: AP
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:21 PM 5/20/96 +0000, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >On 20 May 96 at 10:28, Jim Ray wrote: >> >And you'll also note that the anonymity issue generate more >> >interest from more CPunks because it (hopefully) will acheive the >> >same goal without any killing. >> > >> our >> anonymity-baby threatens to have govt. kill it in the crib, > >It is not yours, it only *is*. > >> with the support of the people. > >Here, again, Jim Bell would probably say that this sentence proves >him right... Absolutely! Even these days, what passes for "the support of the people" is simply the generally-agreed-upon position of the news media, which the public is supposed to accept as their opinion. Before alternative sources of information such as the Internet appeared, TV stations and print media could just about mold public opinion any way they wanted, within limits. >> I have not respected a US president in my lifetime, yet I get _pissed_ when they get >> shot/shot at. > >I somehow agree with you here. I could say, "I don't want to see any president get shot," but that's simply because I want them to resign instead. And it really isn't the president, per se, who is the problem: It's the entire political system which chooses the candidates, from which the public is only given a one-of-two choice in the matter. If the system were cleaned up, and massively reduced in power, we could have a figurehead president that nobody would even dream of harming, because he exercises no abusive power. And in any case, since I think it is legitimate for "us" (everyone else in the world) to pay for the death of (say) Saddam Hussein or Moammar Khadafi, it would be selfish of me to suppose that any system which could easily achieve that could somehow be tuned to ensure that "our" presidents are somehow immune. I would much rather see _all_ the leadership under the risk of the gun than none of it. >> Killing seems to be a first resort for some, >> and IMO ends do not justify means. > >Well, here, you are threading on a very difficult path. Of course, >the ends does never justifies the means in an *uncoerced* context. >But what JB says, is that AP would be a justified "self defense" >against coercion. That's right. However, I've noticed that the people who object to AP rarely want to talk about the self-defense aspect of the situation; they want to assume that nobody has done anything wrong enough to justify AP from being used against them. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

RE: Interactive Week exclusive - White House to launch "Clipper III"
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Declan B. McCullagh >... Self escrow will be permitted under specific circumstances. The >escrow >agent must meet performance requirements for law enforcement access." .................................................................. (So I guess it wouldn't be kosher to use the Mafia....) .. Blanc >

1 0

Re: Rumor: DSS Broken?
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 21 May 96 at 10:39, jim bell wrote: > It is at least arguable that the NSA might have a vested interest in > allowing an enemy to continue to use a flawed encryption system, as > in Enigma. Is is arguable? Maybe, but only if you specify the exact context. The Enigma stuff happened when the world was as war, and the peoples that would have used such things in the same context as DES is used now were non-existent. The case of covering-up knowledge of DES and Enigma are quite different because happening in different *contexts* . But maybe the govt is keeping the population in ignorance, not telling them that a war *is* going on *now* ? JFA Some peoples believe that words have an intrinsic meaning outside of their appropriate context. You can usually find specimens of this group either in political circles or in Voodoo ceremonies. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMaH8NciycyXFit0NAQEIzAgAkDMyygi1ifl7ey580gvOMRreUnhbNUp4 vL19wWfvEtPr+svUMhV1px6TGDpJepdheqjyUwB3Qk4t0KHdEn0j35RviKznaD0X bUKBamIVRbTNtgvmm0LOmdykeywtNgZmFx9tvKKwF6cQTZ8e4uqfYp8dqjCuIG8j xmiJDoaDF9M5h40gCs95/DEwM3XX7O+FS7HSXBQ57vP4Y3N86OawTPe4Zx6Gxfeb qCYiEp0R0/5XjbzGUCJQrct3kjq7t8l3mQwhUc/UktMK1DacVs2QqqgqYCVEVYMg zfTg/5DdlBm+ozsomtnpByMsJ1kR3VZx8KeO9rX+SlZgNidE7hKSlw== =v+6X -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants; physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 I reserve the right to post publicly any private e-mail sent to me. Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

1 0

Re: Long-Lived Remailers
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An NSA operative with the code name 'tcmay(a)got.net' wrote... > Let's call the first site "Alice" and the emanation site "Bob." > > That is, all messages sent to the persistent site Alice appear to come from > the site Bob. > > The Church of Clams can simply send messages addressed to themselves > through the Alice remailer and see immediately that they appear to come > from Bob. Unless Alice will automatically rotate between some random set of Bob1, Bob2, Bob3... It also wouldn't be too difficult to set up a message that goes through several points before emerging at a randomly-chosen exitpoint, including a completely independent remailer. Actually, there's an Idea. Set up a single address; use added headers in the style of: :: Remailers-To-Chain: 7 Remailers-To-Avoid: remailer(a)nsa.gov Final-Destination: tcmay(a)got.net Each remailer could construct a message that decrements the remailers counter, preserving the other headers. The usual caveat on encrypting at each step would apply; but since remailers' pubkeys are available, that's a trivial concern. A lot more could be done with this general concept. One immediate problem is that the frontend address is a target, even though it can't be obviously connected to any objectionable messages. Packet sniffing is always a concern, etc etc... Flame away. dave ---- David Smith Box 324 Cape Girardeau MO USA 63702 http://www.prairienet.org/~dsmith dsmith(a)prairienet.org Reality is only for those lacking in true imagination... Send mail w/'send pgp-key' in subject for PGP public key

2 1

NSA's Dual Missions
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:39 PM 5/21/96, jim bell wrote: >Yes...but... How can the NSA serve two masters? If the NSA has the >American public's best interests at heart, then it should have revealed the >flaw if it knew of it. (Otherwise, it can't be trusted...) Reminder: the NSA ostensibly has dual missions. First, the gathering of signals and communications intelligence. Second, the securing of American signals and communcations. This second mission is primarily military, diplomatic, and other governmental communications, but has also been extended to assisting in the securing of commercial communications. NSA's (and its daughter org, the NCSC's) involvement in DES fits in here. Some years back there was the "Commercial COMSEC Endorsement" program. Anyway, Bamford describes the dual missions, albeit for the world of 1982 and earlier. --Tim Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Re: Long-Lived Remailers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:31 PM 5/21/96, David E. Smith wrote: >Unless Alice will automatically rotate between some random set >of Bob1, Bob2, Bob3... It also wouldn't be too difficult >to set up a message that goes through several points before >emerging at a randomly-chosen exitpoint, including a >completely independent remailer. Sure, Alice can always herself add remailer steps. I explicitly mentioned this in my message last night, when I wrote: "(Hal, to use him as the example, could start using his own choice of remailer hops to accomplish much the same result. We've talked about this for a long time, too...." But this is just using more remailers. We know this works. What Mark Grant was suggesting was something different, a kind of "disposable final emanation point," designed to go away easily under legal pressures. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0