December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Cookie alternatives
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney wrote: >It is interesting to consider how shopping carts might be done without >cookies and similar technologies which allow servers to get more >information about me than necessary. One partial solution would be to turn cookies into nonces - instead of using server-supplied cookies, which may or may not contain hashed/hidden information, client software (and by extension, the human(s) in charge of it) could control the generation and modification of cookies. Some cookie uses are predictable - e.g., "Put the current date and time in the cookie", or "Put the user's E-mail address in the cookie". The user could be presented with dialog boxes asking "Server sneaky.tricky.com would like to set a cookie which will record the date and time of this visit. OK?" or "Server sneaky.tricky.com would like Netscape to generate a random number to keep track of your visits. OK?" A switch from server-generated cookies to client-generated cookies shouldn't involve too many changes on the client software side. (One danger which occurs to me about such a scheme is the potential leakage of client state information, assuming that the algorithm used to generate the pseudorandom cookies is or will be known to attackers.) -- Greg Broiles |"Post-rotational nystagmus was the subject of gbroiles(a)netbox.com |an in-court demonstration by the People http://www.io.com/~gbroiles |wherein Sgt Page was spun around by Sgt |Studdard." People v. Quinn 580 NYS2d 818,825.

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New MiddleMan Remailer! (reno)
by Middleman Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ATTENTION *** ATTENTION *** ATTENTION *** ATTENTION I'm proud to announce the birth of a new middleman remailer! This new remailer uses John Perry's middleman mixmaster code and is located at cyberpass.net thanks to Lance Cottrell. Here are the statistics: NAME: Janet Reno SHORTNAME: reno ADDRESS: middleman(a)cyberpass.net MIXMASTER KEY: reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net b864a69c831f38593d24187122e954f6 2.0.3 -----Begin Mix Key----- b864a69c831f38593d24187122e954f6 258 AASx+Qa23TBIu7MTGZQekob8EJrxyhNPYPBRhzZC 17F5scF1MzFIk1PhY0O78QN29aYMHlo99jE37Hlh MvJpQ7HUrqnklRIaRZJBLxUcuBoTckMltIJEdh1r 9Lbh8e5AIoqPr6c9SAxr7Q3v2cthkwuBYEiWDlui 0vGtsX/EC6lTdwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- John Perry, will you please add my remailer to your list when you get a chance? middleman(a)cyberpass.net

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Re: Opiated file systems
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> But, on the other hand, it wouldn't be to hard to have the user set both > keys (yeah, so that didn't actually say anything, so what...), and then do > an every-other-byte type thing (although that would be slow... every other > block would be more efficient), and have 2 EFS's in one file, and make it > so that on the "duress" one the extra space appears to be "free". > One could make it a real file system, and add a fake disk error to prevent > over-writing of the "non-duress" filesystem. This sounds a lot like security through obscurity... What happens when someone reverse-engineers the software and sees that it's carefully skipping over blocks? If you don't want people to know about your encrypted data, use stego. Even if They find the stego software, you can always produce the keys to unlock the duress data from two or three .gif files, and say "that's all there is." Use stego to hide data. Use encrypted filesystems for convenience. If you try to put the two together, you'll probably end up with feature-bloat. The idea of an encrypted filesystems being accessable over the internet sounds interesting, though. Sort of a cross between NFS and CFS. Would be great for backup purposes. ===================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve(a)edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. -- | ===================================================================:)

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Re: Surf-filter lists
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fine, call it "blocking," "restricting access to," or "muzzling." My point still stands. -Declan >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >On Tue, 16 Jul 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >> More to the point, as I wrote at the end of the original CWD, it's a >> bait-and-switch maneuver. Go after porn, they say, but the censor political >> information. > >ARGH! I've been keeping quiet about this for a while, but I thing I >gotta say something before I throttle my Zip drive... > ><rant>A Private organization cannot "censor" anything. The fundamental >definition of the word require some agent of the government take action >to censor. To accuse Surf-Watch, net-nanny, AOL, MSU, AT&T, or whatever >of "censorship" accomplishes nothing except to make us look the >fool.</rant> > >I agree that the problem with the "bait-and-switch" filtering of net >materials by these various filtering packages needs to be addressed. If I >want to protect my kids from seeing alt.naughty.pictures, I shoudl still >be able to unfilter political and health speech. The real problem isn't >censorship, it's disclosure by the makers of filtering packages about >what exactly their packages are going to filter for me and my family. >However, in the upcoming war of filtering packages (and it will get ugly) >trade secrets are going to make any company hesitant to reveal what it is >they are filtering and what criteria they are using to determine if >something qualifies. > > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.6.2 >Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.2 > >iQCVAwUBMe0jezokqlyVGmCFAQH0SAP+ONXs2f4GxjIrC6cp2sc9CgTrebL4cBWB >UqpH4H3UO0TiKZN4T6MGVC6kCA3OwQnd0DNC0f0D6+iZTPkwN228Am6ZH4+t9hZs >OrmCbZCiWZipLfT1gphIHqFHSqIQ506LkkGgLK0gjsS2ahrI+cNYJA3yYBviMkB1 >zuj1KRJ+pMk= >=ddI5 >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu >\ /__ Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Finger for PGP Public Key > \/ / -=-=-=-=-=- -=-=-=-=-=- > \/ http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/Welcome.html > >-----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- >Version: 3.12 >GED/J d-- s:++>: a- C++(++++)$ ULUO++ P+>+++ L++ !E---- W+(---) N+++ o+ >K+++ w+(---) O- M+$>++ V-- PS++(+++)>$ PE++(+)>$ Y++ PGP++ t- 5+++ X++ >R+++>$ tv+ b+ DI+++ D+++ G+++++>$ e++$>++++ h r-- y+** >------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------

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Philippine government moves to block incoming net-porn
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 17 Jul 1996 21:44:36 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship Subject: Philippine government moves to block incoming net-porn The attached note appears to have been sent to all ISPs in the Philippines. It asks them to report back on how they can "block entry of pornographic materials through the INTERNET." Note how it equates censoring porn with preventing sex tourism. General information about international net-censorship is at: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~declan/international/ http://www.eff.org/pub/Global/Singapore/ Thanks to David Sobel for forwarding this. -Declan =================================================== REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 865 VIBAL BLDG., EDSA CORNER TIMES ST., Q. C. 15 July 1996 M E M O R A N D U M TO: ALL REGISTERED VALUE ADDED SERVICES PROVIDERS RE: REQUEST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO BAR OR BLOCK ENTRY OF PORNOGRAPHIC MATERIALS THROUGH THE INTERNET The Special Committee for Children, constituted pursuant to E.O. 275 dated 14 September 1995, is tasked to ensure the special protection of children from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development. Said Committee takes action on specific issues involving the implementation of the provisions of R. A. 7610 which covers several areas of concern, among others, child prostitution and other sexual abuse; child trafficking; obscene publications and indecent shows using children as performers or models; other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions predjudicial to the child's development. The Committee has raised the concern on the INTERNET being used as a very convenient medium for advertising sex tourism in the Philippines, with particular focus on the alleged availability of Filipino children for sexual liaisons and entertainment. Some materials used in the network for the afformentioned puprose were given to this Commission. Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Department of Justice, requested this Commission to bar or block entry of pornographic materials through the INTERNET. In view of this, you are requested to give your comments/position and suggestions on this matter, particularly on the possibility of barring or blocking pornographic materials through the INTERNET, and submit the same to this Commission by 18 July 1996 attention to Director Edgardo V. Cabarios, CCAD at fax no. 921-7128. Your cooperation and prompt action on this matter is greatly appreciated. Signed Simeon J. Kintanar Commissioner

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Re: Washington Post -- "Block but Verify"
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:33 PM 7/16/96 -0400, Rabid Wombat wrote: > >A user-selectable menu would be, umm, interesting ... just how could one >describe, in terms offensive to absolutely no one, what one's product is >offering to block? Quite easily. The PICS standard has categories and software like CytberPatrol lets parents select by category. There is a granularity problem of course. 57. The CyberNOT list contains approximately 7000 sites in twelve categories. The software is designed to enable parents to selectively block access to any or all of the twelve CyberNOT categories simply by checking boxes in the Cyber Patrol Headquarters (the Cyber Patrol program manager). These categories are: Violence/Profanity: Extreme cruelty, physical or emotional acts against any animal or person which are primarily intended to hurt or inflict pain. Obscene words, phrases, and profanity defined as text that uses George Carlin's seven censored words more often than once every fifty messages or pages. Partial Nudity: Full or partial exposure of the human anatomy except when exposing genitalia. Nudity: Any exposure of the human genitalia. Sexual Acts (graphic or text): Pictures or text exposing anyone or anything involved in explicit sexual acts and lewd and lascivious behavior, including masturbation, copulation, pedophilia, intimacy and involving nude or partially nude people in heterosexual, bisexual, lesbian or homosexual encounters. Also includes phone sex ads, dating services, adult personals, CD-ROM and videos. Gross Depictions (graphic or text): Pictures or descriptive text of anyone or anything which are crudely vulgar, deficient in civility or behavior, or showing scatological impropriety. Includes such depictions as maiming, bloody figures, indecent depiction of bodily functions. Racism/Ethnic Impropriety: Prejudice or discrimination against any race or ethnic culture. Ethnic or racist jokes and slurs. Any text that elevates one race over another. Satanic/Cult: Worship of the devil; affinity for evil, wickedness. Sects or groups that potentially coerce individuals to grow, and keep, membership. Drugs/Drug Culture: Topics dealing with the use of illegal drugs for entertainment. This would exclude current illegal drugs used for medicinal purposes (e.g., drugs used to treat victims of AIDS). Includes substances used for other than their primary purpose to alter the individual's state of mind such as glue sniffing. Militant/Extremist: Extremely aggressive and combative behaviors, radicalism, advocacy of extreme political measures. Topics include extreme political groups that advocate violence as a means to achieve their goal. Gambling: Of or relating to lotteries, casinos, betting, numbers games, on-line sports or financial betting including non-monetary dares. Questionable/Illegal: Material or activities of a dubious nature which may be illegal in any or all jurisdictions, such as illegal business schemes, chain letters, software piracy, and copyright infringement. Alcohol, Beer & Wine: Material pertaining to the sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages. Also includes sites and information relating to tobacco products. Homosexual sites were excluded under "Sexual Acts" because many have links to personal ads or more explicit sites and the gun sites were excluded under "Militant/extremist." There will always be interpretation problems obviously. Actally, the individual is the best at filtering his own stuff. DCF

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Responding to Pre-dawn Unannounced Ninja Raids
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:12 AM 7/18/96, The Deviant wrote: >I have several friends that this has happened to, and pretty much it goes >like this... round 7:00 AM, when your just going to bed (well, some of us >don't have jobs till nighttime.. thank god.), they knock down your doors >and windows (yes, they do come through windows), and they take the >equipment, disks, tv's, CD players (yes, i know somebody who had their CD >player taken. And a pile of CDs. Music ones even.), clock radios, pretty >much everything electronic they can cary. If you ever DO get any of it >back, most likely it is not the same equipment, i.e. they coppied it all >and kept the original. I wonder when and how raids in the U.S. moved from the "Come out with your hands up" verbal announcement (for the cases that needed more than a knock on the door) to this blast-in-the-doors approach, where the raiders are dressed in "tactical black" and are wearing black Nomex hoods and carrying MP-5s and blast any "perp" who looks at them cross-eyed? As people as diverse as Marine Colonel Jeff Cooper and Watergate felon G. Gordon Liddy have noted, any black-clad "ninjas" entering a home at 4 a.m. without clearly announcing themselves are asking for trouble. (Liddy got in a lot of trouble for calling for "head shots" on rampaging BATFags. Frankly, I'm not a good enough shot--especially in high-stress situations--to make head shots with my H & K .45, so I can only hope to make torso shots.) It's a mark of what has gone wrong with this country that ordinary citizens actually fear the midnight raids, the no-knock searches, the "threat suppression" by ninjas. (There are many cases where homeowners awoke to the sounds of crashing doors and windows, reached for a nightstand gun, and were shot dead by the "ninja" raiders. In some of these incidents, the raid was at the wrong house, or the "suspicions" of drug or terror involvement were later shown to be wrong. "Oops.") Personally, I think all folks should be armed at all times in their homes. Those who aren't are taking their chances. My personal choice is a Heckler & Koch USP .45. loaded with Federal Golden Sabres, a hollowpoint round that has a 92% one-shot stop rate, with adequate penetration through Kevlar vests (typically worn by BATF raiders). I may die, but I hope I can take at least two of them with me. (Interestingly, the same class of folks who want to ban "military-grade crypto" are also seeking to ban Kevlar vest-piercing rounds. Fortunately, though KTW ammo is no longer available to "marks" (= civilians), .45 ACP +P does a pretty good job. Certain +P .357 Magnum rounds are even better penetrators, but recoil and muzzle blast is pretty severe with these loads.) This may sound callous, even paranoid. I don't normally talk about such things, but such raids are becoming increasingly common. (Check out the case of the retired doctor in Malibu whose beachfront home was raided without any warnings by the local cops. He reached for a gun and was blasted with 9mm slugs. His wife survived. Turned out the County of L.A. had hopes to seize his property in a drug "forfeiture" and sell it at great profit. They suspected marijuana was being grown. No drugs, no plants, nada was ever found. "Oops.") (I expressed my views about being armed in a Usenet article last summer, and received a "friendly phone call" from a Deputy Sheriff of Santa Cruz County. (Someone who disliked my article faxed a copy of my article to the Sheriff's Department.) When he asked me some questions to find out why I was not trusting the police and "felt the need" to be armed, I got quite forceful in my comments about the role of the Second Amendment. (I should have just told him to fuck off, in retrospect. Anything volunteered to the cops is usually a mistake.) He said he might "send a vehicle" out to my ranch to "talk to me." I asked on what basis, on the basis of what criminal charges? I also said I'd "be ready." He announced unctuously that my "threat" had just been "logged" and would be considered in any future criminal procedures. Needless to say, I got a lot more of my guns ready. So far, a year later, they haven't raided me yet. Knock on wood. This country has gone to the dogs.) The fact is, the "War on Drugs" has tainted this country. Whatever one thinks of drugs, the result of this War has been that cops are now paramilatary in nature, that midnight raids have become much more common, that both cops and citizens are now armed with more firepower than ever before (I have more than 4000 rounds of ammo at my place, for my sniper rifle, my (so-called) assault rifle, and my various handguns. Anyone inside my house without an invitation is assumed to be a threat to me and will face retaliation.) Crypto is just another weapon to use to protect our liberty. Sorry for the rant, but this recounting of pre-dawn raids on computer users reminds me that the American political system will likely treat "rogue computers users" the way it treats suspected drug dealers: break down the doors, enter at dawn, kill anyone who moves, and let God sort out the innocent. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Educational cryptanalysis competition (small prize)
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Educational Cryptanalysis Competition (opened 17 July 1996) ===================================== Cypherpunks teach. Here's your chance. I have a piece of code I wrote ages ago, before reading Schneier. Despite identifying these points as weaknesses I still cannot break it. weak keys rapid collapse in the case of chosen text attack reduced-round versions have a correlation attack Obviously my crytanalysis needs some serious help. The aim of this competition is: to show how to find AND EXPLOIT weaknesses in this cypher. Answers resembling "That's junk - use XXXXX." score zero. Well-prepared comprehensive answers could score highly. - - Entries will be judged on educational grounds as well as on raw results. - - All entries are placed by the entrant in the public domain, and there may be a compilation of good answers come out of this. (With entrants' names except where they state a prefernce for anonymity. ) - - Entries by teams are allowed. - - The number of entries is unlimited. - - The closing date is 30 Sept 1996. - - The judge is Peter Allan. (me) - - There is one prize (a box of chocolate coffee beans). A full pair of programs using this code can be collected from my mail filter. echo rlprm_2.0 | mail -s send_goodies peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk #define RPT 15 #define CRYPT_DEPTH 4 /**********************************/ mkkey(origpass, key) /*** **** The pass (a text string) is used to produce **** a key. Chars used as int. Details in docs. **** 200000 passwords all gave different keys in my test. ***/ char origpass[9]; unsigned char key[8]; { char clearpass[9]; int i, j, k, l, m, ten; /*** make the key from the clearpass ***/ /*** unsigned char[8] from char[9] ***/ ten = FALSE; k = l = m = 0; strcpy(clearpass, origpass); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { if (clearpass[i] == '\n') ten = TRUE; if (ten) clearpass[i] = '\0'; } clearpass[8] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) key[i] = (unsigned char) i; for (j = 1; j < 256; j++) { for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) key[i] = key[i] + clearpass[i] + j; /* swap bytes */ k = key[j % 8] % 8; l = key[k] % 8; m = key[k]; key[k] = key[l]; key[l] = m; /** this loop is redundant if chars are 8 bits *** and for all I know they are everywhere **/ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) key[i] = key[i] % 256; m = m % 8; key[m] = 256 - key[m]; } /**** for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) printf("%d ", key[i]); puts(" "); ****/ } /**********************************/ sym_encrypt(abpos, key, authbuf, cipherbuf) int abpos; unsigned char key[8]; unsigned char authbuf[ABLEN]; unsigned char cipherbuf[MESSLEN]; { int i, j, k, ptr1, ptr2, rpt; int ka1, ka2, kk; unsigned char smoke[CRYPT_DEPTH][8]; unsigned char tmp; /*** **** From the key, make a set of keys to **** be used in order. ***/ for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) smoke[0][j] = key[j]; for (i = 1; i < CRYPT_DEPTH; i++) { for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) smoke[i][j] = smoke[i - 1][j]; for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) { if (j % 2) { smoke[i][j] = (smoke[i][j]) * 3; } else { smoke[i][j] = ((smoke[i][j]) * 3) / 4; } } } #ifndef NOCRYPT /*** **** see the tech waffle file for details ***/ for (rpt = RPT; rpt; rpt--) { if (cl_debug) printf("encryption repeat count is %d \n", rpt); for (i = 0; i < CRYPT_DEPTH; i++) { /**swap driven by values **/ for (k = 0; k < abpos - 1; k += 2) { kk = authbuf[k] ^ authbuf[k + 1]; ka1 = kk / 16; ka2 = kk % 16; kk = ka1 ^ ka2; if ((kk == 1) || (kk == 2) || (kk == 4) || (kk == 8) || (kk == 14) || (kk == 13) || (kk == 11) || (kk == 7)) { kk = authbuf[k]; authbuf[k] = authbuf[k + 1]; authbuf[k + 1] = kk; } } /** xor with key **/ for (k = 0; k < abpos; k++) authbuf[k] ^= (key[k % 8]); /**rotation **/ kk = authbuf[abpos - 1] / 32; ka1 = 0; for (k = 0; k < abpos; k++) { ka2 = authbuf[k] / 32; authbuf[k] = (authbuf[k] * 8) + ka1; ka1 = ka2; } authbuf[0] += kk; /**swap driven by key **/ if (cl_debug) printf(" depth is %d \n", i); for (j = 0; j < 8; j = j + 2) { ptr1 = smoke[i][j] % abpos; ptr2 = smoke[i][j + 1] % abpos; tmp = authbuf[ptr1]; authbuf[ptr1] = authbuf[ptr2]; authbuf[ptr2] = tmp; } } } #endif /*** Now that it has been encrypted it should **** be stored as 'hexabetical' [A-P]. ***/ for (i = 0; i < abpos; i++) { cipherbuf[i * 2] = (authbuf[i] % 16) + 'A'; cipherbuf[i * 2 + 1] = (authbuf[i] / 16) + 'A'; } cipherbuf[abpos * 2] = '\0'; } /********************************/ sym_decrypt(abpos, key, authbuf, cipherbuf) int abpos; unsigned char key[8]; unsigned char authbuf[ABLEN]; unsigned char cipherbuf[MESSLEN]; { int i, j, k, ptr1, ptr2, rpt; int ka1, ka2, kk; unsigned char smoke[CRYPT_DEPTH][8]; unsigned char tmp; for (i = 0; cipherbuf[i]; i = i + 2) { cipherbuf[i] = cipherbuf[i] - 'A'; cipherbuf[i + 1] = cipherbuf[i + 1] - 'A'; authbuf[i / 2] = cipherbuf[i] + cipherbuf[i + 1] * 16; } /*** **** From the key, make a set of keys to **** be used in order. ***/ for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) smoke[0][j] = key[j]; for (i = 1; i < CRYPT_DEPTH; i++) { for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) smoke[i][j] = smoke[i - 1][j]; for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) { if (j % 2) { smoke[i][j] = smoke[i][j] * 3; } else { smoke[i][j] = (smoke[i][j] * 3) / 4; } } } #ifndef NOCRYPT /*** **** repeat suitable number of times: **** first swap bytes in the authbuf **** then cycle bits round to prevent some swaps undoing others ***/ if (abpos == 0) return RUBBISH; /** zerodivide detected-avoided **/ for (rpt = RPT; rpt; rpt--) { /* printf("encryption repeat count is %d \n", rpt); */ for (i = CRYPT_DEPTH - 1; i > -1; i--) { for (j = 6; j > -1; j = j - 2) { /*** key-driven swap ***/ ptr1 = smoke[i][j] % abpos; ptr2 = smoke[i][j + 1] % abpos; tmp = authbuf[ptr1]; authbuf[ptr1] = authbuf[ptr2]; authbuf[ptr2] = tmp; } /**rotation **/ kk = authbuf[0] % 8; ka1 = 0; for (k = abpos - 1; k >= 0; k--) { ka2 = authbuf[k] % 8; authbuf[k] = (authbuf[k] / 8) + ka1; ka1 = ka2 * 32; } authbuf[abpos - 1] += (kk * 32); /** xor with key **/ for (k = 0; k < abpos; k++) authbuf[k] ^= (key[k % 8]); /*** value-driven swap ***/ for (k = 0; k < abpos - 1; k += 2) { kk = authbuf[k] ^ authbuf[k + 1]; ka1 = kk / 16; ka2 = kk % 16; kk = ka1 ^ ka2; if ((kk == 1) || (kk == 2) || (kk == 4) || (kk == 8) || (kk == 14) || (kk == 13) || (kk == 11) || (kk == 7)) { kk = authbuf[k]; authbuf[k] = authbuf[k + 1]; authbuf[k + 1] = kk; } } } } #endif } /**********************/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAgUBMezfIB98EdWB2LS9AQFbwgP+Oq8zBlI5d1comIQ5S2+ysnSDLAN5W/L2 UgQyrYZ/Cchn9I8CEFn9UDevmInpABSL8yNQWUHrb4cvWxiTGNnFz54gicaPT7Ki qVETDC5o7nxWOT8qhWmGNTApJC8RBjEkY+90HyYKf2sLEd8hkGLwOGSAF/YWxqkY TKqYWVNKCjA= =3qEU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: An interesting instance of poltical anonymnity, now revealed
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:09 PM 7/17/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > I find the CBS News response unfortunate. There's also the simple >question on lying to maintain the identity: what's so bad about lying? Why >he revealed himself is somewhat of lesson also. > -Allen > > _ Wednesday July 17 9:12 PM EDT _ > >'Primary Colors' Author Steps Forward > > NEW YORK (Reuter) - One of the best kept secrets in political, > journalistic and publishing circles was revealed Wednesday when > Newsweek journalist Joe Klein admitted he was ''Anonymous'', the > mysterious author of a novel based on President Clinton's 1992 > presidential campaign. If they really wanted to know who did it, why didn't they do a word analysis of the book, and compare it to known writers? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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FTP SW to support PGP in OnNet
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Seems the demise of PGP in favor of S/MIME has been somewhat exaggerated. Blurb in this week's InfoWorld led me to http://www.ftp.com/mkt_info/onnet32/tr-pgp.htm It would be a mistake, though, to say that they have a clue: E-mail compatibility Most e-mail systems can send and receive only plain text (technically, 7-bit ASCII characters). So PGP converts the encrypted information (which is 8-bit) into plain ASCII text using the radix-64 algorithm. This has a side effect that enhances security even when you don't use encryption. If you merely add authentication to the message, radix-64 still converts the whole message using its own algorithm. The resulting message -- even though it's not securely encrypted -- looks garbled to the casual snoop. D'Oh! - -rich censor the internet! http://www.stanford.edu/~llurch/potw2/ boycott fadetoblack! http://www.fadetoblack.com/prquest.htm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMe1rFJNcNyVVy0jxAQEZHQH/aDm0unOzogxpzm+Cj/XozLvLIhrwnTt8 JZR+KH1CVONifOhwCdQsEn7aoH4YbhbolaWZBH0FG99g2KHbGhmbMA== =QSLW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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