December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [NOISE] Nasty-Quibble-Punks
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:06 PM 3/31/96 -0800, Mike Duvos wrote: >"Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> writes: >Uh huh. > > > Incidently, EEPROMs don't work by simply charging a > > capacitor or something silly like that. No insulator is > > perfect, no dielectric is perfect, and charge would > > eventually leak away were that the case. However, if it > > were, it would be fairly easy to determine the state of a > > cell without having to get particularly close to it. Beyond > > that, there is this insane notion you seem to have that a > > charged object will lose its charge if the "insulator" is > > "stripped off" -- I wasn't under the impression a vacuum, > > for instance, was a particularly good charge carrier. > >Uh huh. Turns out Perry is wrong about this. I believe that UV EPROMs and probably EEPROMs do indeed work by storing charge on a buried, totally-isolated capacitor. The capacitor is charged with a system called "Fowler-Nordheim tunneling," which involves placing a relatively high voltage on a nearby electrode and causing the thin interface to temporarily conduct. (It's odd. That's why it's called "tunnelling.") The charge, surprisingly enough, is stable for years, in fact decades, and probably (statistically) centuries at room temperature. The reason the charge stays around so long is that the insulator, silicon dioxide, is extremely good. It has to be. If the capacitor were, say, 1 picofarad, and the resistance was 10E18 ohms (a billion gigohms) the resulting time constant would be 1E6 seconds, or about 12 days. Since EPROMs obviously hold data far longer than this (well over 100 times longer, or else our computers wouldn't work!), and since the capacitance is probably not nearly 1 pf, that tells you that the effective resistance is far above 1E20 ohms. UVEPROMS are erased, naturally enough, by exposing them to UV light, which is usually produced by a mercury vapor lamp. This UV causes enough electrons to be excited into upper electron shells in the insulator to temporarily turn it into a slight conductor, and the charge dissipates. I think EEPROMs are erased by, more or less, reversing the voltage on the charging electrode. As for keeping the charge when that insulator is stripped off, that would be a problem. It isn't that a vacuum isn't a good enough insulator; it is, but it would be hard to imagine a technique to strip off an SiO2 insulator that doesn't also allow a substantial amount of charge to flow. You could strip it off with HF (hydrofluoric acid) but that's electrically conductive. Even a gas-phase process would probably result in enough conductive products to discharge the capacitor. Ion-beam milling would also remove SiO2, but as the name implies that's applying a current to the system. Fortunately, all this is moot: Since the floating gate is inherently part of a transistor, it isn't necessary to expose it to detect its charge state: Just activate the transistor in-circuit BTW, some PLD's have a so-called "security bit" which (when set) is designed to prevent reading of the state of the rest of the programmed bits. Years ago it occurred to me that if you knew where this particular bit was stored, you could expose this bit location alone to a UV source through a tiny mask to discharge it. Finding that location wouldn't be all that hard: Just expose the chip with a series of exposures, moving a linear mask slightly, and eventually the security bit will erase. Note the location of the mask, and rotate the mask 90 degrees and repeat the process. At that point, you've located the bit (this may require a few iterations), so you expose the target part through a tiny pinhole (Edmund Scientific sells them in many different sizes, exposing only that security bit location. Jim "Mr. Bell talks about one field" Bell (Let's see, I covered solid, liquid, and vapor phase chemistry, a bit of particle physics (ion-beam milling), semiconductor physics, minor optics, electronics, some trivial math, and maybe even some detective work!) jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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NYT on CFP
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, April 1, 1996, p. A14. Pioneers of Cyberspace Move Into Wider Arena By Peter H. Lewis Cambridge, Mass., March 30 -- Cyberspace is dead, many of its electronic pioneers said at a conference here this week. As the Internet population has grown into the millions, what was once a small, self-regulating society of academics and computer wizards has been engulfed by mainstream culture. But in their efforts to preserve the libertarian spirit of the electronic frontier, the original members of the cyberspace community have emerged as a political and social force. "Last year, it was still possible for people to say cyberspace is a different place, subject to different laws and different rules and that there is a Net culture," said Hal Abelson, a professor of computer science and engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology here. "Now you have such a large percentage of the population on the Net, it just is not sensible to talk about this as some other place anymore. What you are really talking about now is the communications fabric of the country." In what was seen as a clear sign of Internet users new power, several members of Congress announced, by telephone and through the Internet, new legislation and initiatives at the gathering here, the annual Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conference. The proposals include the formation of an Internet Caucus in Congress and a Senate blll to relax the Government's laws restricting the transmission of secrets over the global information network. "Washington is coming to thls conference in droves," said Daniel J. Weltzner, deputy dlrector of the Center for Democracy and Technology, one of several public-interest groups that seek to influence Government policy related to cyberspace, "and I think it's very exciting and promising. It's the coming of age of this community." The members of Congress were wooing more than 500 of the Internet's most prominent champions, who had gathered to discuss issues that were once esoteric but are now affecting millions of people worldwide: questions of privacy, electronic copyrights, computer crime, the nature of free speech, digital pornography, electronic cash and grassroots electronic democracy. The Computers, Freedom and Privacy crowd included its usual assortment of computer hackers, academics and self- described crypto-anarchists, and even one man wearing video goggles with an antenna apparently sprouting from his head. But it also included others who wanted to assess the fusion of cyberspace and real space: Federal judges, lawmakers, White House policy experts, corporate executives and law-enforcement agents. Senator Conrad Burns, a Republican from the real frontier state of Montana, chose the conference to announce, by telephone, new legislation that would remove nearly all current Government restrictions on the export of mass-market encryption software, which is used to send secret messages over computer and telephone networks. Senator Burns's legislation would also block the Administration from imposing as a Government standard any form of data encryption that would give law-enforcement agencies the ability to decode messages. The Senator's bill places him squarely at odds with the Clinton Administration and the Justice Department. But Mr. Burns said the use of robust data encryption would foster the rise of electronic commerce, distance education and digital communicatlons, which his large, rural state desperately needs in the 21st century. While the bill might have little chance of passage this year, conference participants were heartened by what appears to be growing support in Congress for a relaxation of the Government's cryptography policy. The proposal drew some opposition. "I think we'll regret it down the road," said Dorothy E. Denning, a professor of computer sciences at Georgetown University and a computer security consultant to the military. Dr. Denning and others have argued that the use of unrestricted encryption would thwart the ability of law-enforcement and intelligence agencies to conduct wiretaps on messages sent by foreign spies, terrorists, child pornographers and other criminals. On Friday, a bipartisan group of wired lawmakers addressed the conference by telephone and Internet to announce the formation of a Congressional Internet Caucus. Fewer than half of all members of Congress are now on line. Representative Rick White, Republican of Washington, said, "The idea behind the Internet Caucus is to do two things: increase members understanding of the Internet and get more members on-line so that people can contact their elected representatives on the Internet." [End]

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Re: Chaumian ecash without RSA
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:10 AM 3/31/96 -0800, David Wagner wrote: > The bank picks a secret value k, and publishes g^k. > > To withdraw a coin, Alice picks an x, sets > y = x | hash(x), [ | is concatenation ] > chosen so that y is in G. Alice chooses a random secret blinding factor b, > sends to the bank > A->B: y g^b, > and the bank returns > B->A: (y g^b)^k, > debiting Alice's account. > > Note that this is a (blinded) Diffie-Hellman key exchange with public > exponentials g^k and y g^b; the bank returns the exchanged "secret". > > Alice unblinds this value, computing > z = (y g^b)^k (g^k)^{-b} > and now c = (x,z) is a coin in the digital cash system. Note z = y^k. > > We use the traditional online clearing protocol; to deposit the coin, a > shop S sends > S->B: x, z. > The bank checks to make sure the coin hasn't already been spent, and then > computes > y = x | MD5(x), > checking whether y^k = z. Two irritations with this protocol: 1: A coin is almost twice the size of a coin in the RSA protocol 2: Nobody except the bank can verify that a coin has face validity. The second point is more serious than you might think, as most of us want to see a world where everyone is his own bank and his own credit rating agency, as well as his own publisher. It will obstruct contracts of the form "Anne promises to provide numbers with certain cryptographic properties, provided Bob provides numbers with certain cryptographic properties." With RSA crypto cash, Anne can construct a blinded unsigned coin, and ask Bob to have it signed. For this to be reasonably convenient and practical, we need to have locally verifiable signatures. For computer mediated management of contracts, transactions, and credit ratings, we need contracts such that all intermediate transactions can be reduced to locally verifiable cryptographic protocols. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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gnutar + pgp filter mode
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The gnu tar archiver allows to use an arbitrary compression program (option --use-compress-program=PROG). This works well with pgp if a small wrapper is used: #!/bin/csh -fb if ("$1" == "-d") then exec pgp -d -f else exec pgp -e -f endif The only problem is that this doesn't work well for larger amounts of data, because pgp reads in all data before starting with its work. Perhaps a future release of pgp will have a real filter mode. Hadmut BTW: Does this "crypto-hook" cause export restrictions to apply on gtar ? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMV/0tmc1jG5vDiNxAQFtAAP/TMuYeYf5q7k1Y8DrBjb6XFKYYFANH3RH FvThWq1BUgI+unH97EZkNkCzZJYT5qmLGk3+JLufCAw/o9YR7jKcldm2LNYJ96t2 BDcSGDF3qx/IUzQBa5NV+gUerNRVSwA3LzkTbXufOxYH0cB3KNcsx3B0bE1rEDa/ GCcJ1L6T+2s= =FMiZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Cylink gives away encryption kit
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cylink to offer free SDK for embedding encryption security By Jessica Davis InfoWorld Electric Posted at 1:21 PM PT, Mar 29, 1996 Lobbing the latest bomb in a patent war over public key/private key encryption technology, Cylink Corp. will offer a Software Developers Kit (SDK) free-of-charge so that software companies can embed security and encryption technologies in their products. Cylink's move to offer Passport Gold for free follows a failed attempt in federal court to stop another company, RSA Data Security Inc., from selling a similar kit allegedly based on Cylink patents. The two companies have been engaged in a public relations feud, as well as a federal court patent dispute and IS mind share war over public key/private key/certificate authority encryption technology. Cylink lost the latest round in federal court in early March. Cylink and RSA both participated in the creation of public key/private key technologies through their partnership, Public Key Partners. PKP was formed in 1990 to establish security standards to license to software vendors. The partnership fell apart over the patent dispute. Cylink's PassportGold modules and APIs allow software developers to enable their applications to access national certificate authority electronic commerce and correspondence services that are planned by the U.S. Postal Service's ECS system and other commercial certificate authority facilities. Cylink expects its revenue stream to come from a series of products, existing and planned, that enhance the speed and effectiveness of such encryption technologies. Cylink has also announced SecureFrame, one of those products that provides a high-speed data encryption and security system for frame relay-based Wide Area Network environments. Working in conjunction with any public or private frame relay network, Secure Frame dynamically encrypts data while authenticating its source and destination, delivering throughput of up to 2.048 Mbps. SecureFrame is priced at $5,995 and will ship in April. Cylink also introduced SecureNode, an SNMP and TCP/IP-based data security hardware and software card for secure end-to-end data transfer and communication. The PC card is available now and provides network independent security management at the desktop level without hitting users with crippled CPU performance by acting as an "encryption and authentication accelerator." SecureNode cards for ISA or for PCI are priced at $595 and $695 respectively. The standalone software product is priced at $199. Sunnyvale, Calif.-based Cylink can be reached at (800) 533-3958 or http://www.cylink.com/. Please direct your comments to InfoWorld Electric News Editor Dana Gardner. Copyright © 1996 InfoWorld Publishing Company

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PICS makes headline in ET
by Richard Martin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The electronic Telegraph is an electronic version of the British daily, the Telegraph. I actually went through the bother of filling out their online registration a few months ago. The `headline' of today's edition is an article on PICS, the Platform for Internet Content Selection, boosting it as a method for screening [actually, they use the term `policing'] content on the internet. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et/access?ac=130174817686&pg=home.html Feel free to use the above url for reading the one article. I'm somewhat undecided on whether i think it would be good idea for several folks to be using my identity to read et--it obfuscates any tracking of my reading habits they may be doing--so i'll just ask folks to not tell me if they do. richard -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMWAQpR1gtCYLvIJ1AQGEHwP/dzTNcc1FcWz4ydKMX5MctyWfjBf82ka+ qSZenBZ4tjgCYCbyTDFYG/Hx3c0y5NTpwskTVwzCkZ7RFvVwAFFSsPOGrHSAAA09 b6FiC1Vvct3XJg3mjDlZhImiF04LKI2oPcsHAHmNhOomjK+tdJtN3Wuwhs6fvv90 pW17rnxvZ5o= =IqxK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Richard Martin [not speaking for a|w] rmartin(a)aw.sgi.com http://reality.sgi.com/rmartin_aw/ Alias|Wavefront - Toronto Office [Co-op Software Developer, Games Team]

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(fwd) Russians Break RSA?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friends, I just grabbed this of the ClariNet news feed on Netcom...I'm not supposed to forward anything from this service (so don't tell Brad Templeton!), but this appeared to be too important not to pass on as quickly as possible. Apparently those rumors that the Russians, always topnotch mathematicians, had developed public key crypto in the 1950s or early 60s are true--my hero Kolmogorov developed this when he was technical director at Kryptogorodok, the secret city of Soviet cryptographers hidden in the Urals (and first visited by an outsider, Stephen Wolfram, only a couple of years ago). Here's the report on a news conference announcing the cracking of their Kolmogorov system, which is equivalent to our own RSA. I haven't had a chance to talk to John Markoff, who was at the press conference, to get his comments. --Tim > Xref: netcom.com clari.world.europe.eastern:2783 > clari.news.hot.ussr:3792 > clari. > news.trouble:3258 clari.science.crypto > Path: netcom.com!bass!clarinews > Approved: doug(a)clarinet.com > From: clarinews(a)clarinet.com (AP) > Newsgroups: > clari.world.europe.eastern,clari.news.hot.ussr,clari.news.trouble,clari.sc > ience.crypto > Distribution: clari.apo > Subject: Russian Mathematicians Announce Breakthrough > Keywords: Europe Cryptography RSA > Copyright: 1996 by The Associated Press, R > Message-ID: <russia-cryptoUR7f0_4ME(a)clarinet.com> > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 96 10:40:19 PST > Expires: Mon, 7 Apr 96 12:40:19 PDT > ACategory: international > Slugword: Russia-Crypto > Priority: regular > ANPA: Wc: 116/0; Id: V0255; Src: ap; Sel: -----; Adate: 03-14-N/A > Codes: APO-1103 > > > MOSCOW (AP) -- At a press conference held minutes ago in a > crowded hall, Russian mathematicians announced that a breakthrough had > been made nearly a decade ago in the arcane branch of mathematics > known as "cryptography," the science of making messages that are > unreadable to others. > Leonid Vladwylski, Director of the prestigious Moscow Academy > of Sciences, called the press conference yesterday, after rumors began > circulating that noted Russian-American reporter John Markoff was in > Russia to interview academicians at the previously secret city of > Soviet cryptographers, Kryptogorodok. The existence of Kryptogorodok, > sister city to Akademogorodok, Magnetogorsk, and to the rocket cities > of Kazhakstan, had been shrouded in secrecy since its establishment in > 1954 by Chief of Secret Police L. Beria. Its first scientific > director, A. Kolmogorov, developed in 1960 what is called in the West > "public key cryptography." The existence of Kryptogorodok was unknown > to the West until 1991, when Stephen Wolfram disclosed its existence. > American cryptographers initially scoffed at the rumors that > the Russians had developed public-key cryptography as early as 1960, > some 15 years prior to the first American discovery. After interviews > last year at Kryptogorodok, noted American cryptographers Professor > D. Denning and D. Bowdark admitted that it did seem to be > confirmed. Professor Denning was quoted at the time saying that she > did not think this meant the Russians could actually break the > Kolmogorov system, known in the West as RSA, because she had spent > more than a full weekend trying to do this and had not > succeeded. "Believe me, RSA is still unbreakable," she said in her > evaluation report. > Russia's top mathematicians set out to break Kolmogorov's new > coding system. This required them to determine that "P = NP" (see > accompanying article). Details are to be published next month in the > journal "Doklady.Krypto," but a few details are emerging. > The Kolmogorov system is broken by computing the prime numbers > which form what is called the modulus. This is done by randomly > guessing the constituent primes and then detonating all of the > stockpiled nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union for each "wrong > guess." In the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics, > invented in 1949 by Lev Landau (and later, independently by Everett > and Wheeler in the U.S.), all possible outcomes of a quantum > experiment are realized. > As Academician Leonid Vladwylski explained, "In all the > universes in which we guessed the wrong factors, we were destroyed > completely. But since we are obviously here, talking to you at this > press conference, in this universe we have an unbroken record of > successfully factoring even the largest of imaginable numbers. Since > we are so optimistic about this method, we say the computation runs in > "Nondeterministic Pollyanna Time." Allow me to demonstrate..." > > [Press Conference will be continued if the experiment is a success.] > > MOSCOW (AP), ITAR-Tass, 1 April 1996 > > > Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Navajo code-talkers
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May comments: >According to an episode of "The X Files," which dealt with Navajo >code-talkers, the answer is that young Navajo men are losing their >fluency in Navajo, especially of the nuances and double entendres >that code-talkers relied upon. (For those who scoff at using a >television show as a source, writers for shows like this often do >more interesting research than, say, the average encyclopedia >article will report.) Navajo also has something now it didn't have before WWII, a written language, and I believe a rudimentary dictionary. Brian

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ACM/IEEE Letter on Crypto
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reply to: ACM/IEEE Letter on Crypto Association For Computing Machinery Office of US Public Policy 666 Pennsylvania Avenue SE Suite 301 Washington, DC 20003 USA (tel) 202/298-0842 (fax) 202/547-5482 Institute of Electronics and Electrical Engineers United States Activities 1828 L Street NW Suite 1202 Washington, DC 20036-5104 USA (tel) 202/785-0017 (fax) 202/785-0835 April 2, 1996 Honorable Conrad Burns Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee US Senate SD-508 Washington, DC 20510 Dear Chairman Burns: On behalf of the nation's two leading computing and engineering associations, we are writing to support your efforts, and the efforts of the other cosponsors of the Encrypted Communications Privacy Act, to remove unnecessarily restrictive controls on the export of encryption technology. The Encrypted Communications Privacy Act sets out the minimum changes that are necessary to the current export controls on encryption technology. However, we believe that the inclusion of issues that are tangential to export, such as key escrow and encryption in domestic criminal activities, is not necessary. The relaxation of export controls is of great economic importance to industry and users, and should not become entangled in more controversial matters. Current restrictions on the export of encryption technology harm the interests of the United States in three ways: they handicap American producers of software & hardware, prevent the development of a secure information infrastructure, and limit the ability of Americans using new online services to protect their privacy. The proposed legislation will help mitigate all of these problems, though more will need to be done to assure continued US leadership in this important hi-tech sector. Technological progress has moved encryption from the realm of national security into the commercial sphere. Current policies, as well as the policy-making processes, should reflect this new reality. The legislation takes a necessary first step in shifting authority to the Commerce Department and removing restrictions on certain encryption products. Future liberalization of export controls will allow Americans to excel in this market. The removal of out-dated restrictions on exports will also enable the creation of a Global Information Infrastructure sufficiently secure to provide seamless connectivity to customers previously unreachable by American companies. The United States is a leader in Internet commerce. However, Internet commerce requires cryptography. Thus American systems have been hindered by cold-war restraints on the necessary cryptography as these systems have moved from the laboratory to the marketplace. This legislation would open the market to secure, private, ubiquitous electronic commerce. The cost of not opening the market may include the loss of leadership in computer security technologies, just at the time when Internet users around the world will need good security to launch commercial applications. For this legislation to fulfill its promise the final approval of export regulations must be based on analysis of financial and commercial requirements and opportunities, not simply on the views of experts in national security cryptography. Therefore, we urge you to look at ways to further relax restrictive barriers. Finally, the legislation will serve all users of electronic information systems by supporting the development of a truly global market for secure desktop communications. This will help establish private and secure spaces for the work of users, which is of particular interest to the members of the IEEE/USA and the USACM. On behalf of the both the USACM and the IEEE/USA we look forward to working with you on this important legislation to relax export controls and promote the development of a robust, secure, and reliable communications infrastructure for the twenty-first century. Please contact Deborah Rudolph in the IEEE Washington Office at (202) 785-0017 or Lauren Gelman in the ACM Public Policy Office at (202) 298-0842 for any additional information. Sincerely, Barbara Simons, Ph.D.3 Chair, U.S. Public Policy Committee of ACM Joel B. Snyder, P.E. Vice President, Professional Activities and Chair, United States Activities Board cc: Members of the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space

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Elementrix Technology Announces Power Quantum Cryptography
by sales＠elementrix.co.il 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Elementrix Technology Announces Power Quantum Cryptography Elementrix Technology, a leading developer of security software, including the well-known Power One Time Pad (POTP(TM)) today announced the first commercial release of a next-generation unbreakable security product. Power Quantum Cryptography pushes data security into the modern world of quantum physics. Elementrix PQC(TM) is your best choice for securing your sensitive data against Hackers, Crackers, Snoops, NSA, and other Evil People. Elementrix, long recognized as an innovator in unconventional data security technology, combines absolute security with utility, performance and ease of use. Our remarkably simple algorithm gives you unprecedented speed in a software-only implementation. PQC requires no additional hardware, and no knowledge of quantum physics. By using a novel method (covered by trade secret law and now patent-pending in 26 countries) our server software transmits packets onto your local network without reading them, thus preserving their unique quantum properties. Any attempt to read the packet, except by the intended recipient will destroy the quantum waveform of the packet. Our sophisticated error-recovery system will detect this and re-initialize with a predefined Emergency Quantum State, which has all the same characteristics as the Normal Quantum State, but has not been compromised by the attempted eavesdropper. PQC provides you with fast, reliable, and secure data transmissions, XOR encrypted with unbreakable quantum randomness. Our Plug-and-Play installation assures that you can have secure transmissions within minutes. PQC ensures that your data transmissions are absolutely unbreakable, guaranteed by the Laws of Physics. The innovative PQC technology requires no public or private Keys, no master or session key, no key management, no key escrow or trusted third parties, no key distribution servers, no access codes, no substantial overhead, no special training for users, and no waiting. PQC gives you total security from anyone without the aid of an object code disassembler. Elemntrix PQC(tm) version 1.0 requires 80386 or higher IBM PC (or 100% compatible), 4MB RAM, MS-Windows 3.1, Windows For Workgroups, or Windows 95, a MODEM or LAN connection, and any TCP/IP stack for Windows. For more information: Tel: +972-4-550963 Fax: +972-4-550356 Within the US and Canada, phone: 1-212-888-8879 fax: 1-212-935-3882 e-mail: sales(a)elementrix.co.il info(a)elementrix.co.il for customer and technical support: support(a)elementrix.co.il

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