December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Java flaw is in bytecode verifier
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From http://java.sun.com/sfaq/960327.html: > Researchers at Princeton recently found an implementation bug in the Java > bytecode Verifier. The Verifier is a part of Java's runtime system which > certifies that applets downloaded over the Internet adhere to Java's > language safety rules. Through a sophisticated attack, a malicious applet > can exploit this bug to delete a file or do other damage. This is one of the more worrisome places for a bug to exist. Much of Java's security rests in the claim that it can screen for and detect bad bytecode sequences. This screening code is extremely critical for Java security and I am surprised to see that it was implemented in a flawed manner. I've been writing Java quite a bit in the last couple of weeks, and I find that I have crashed my browser, whether Netscape or appletviewer, many times. Granted some of my code has been pretty buggy, but it's still not supposed to crash the browser. Obviously some of the runtime checks are not being done properly. I had expected that the bug would be in these areas, something like the stack overflows that we have seen cause problems in the past. A simple error in the bytecode verifier (if that is what this really is) seems like a more fundamental security flaw. The researchers have still not released full details on the bug, although they had planned to do so by the end of March. Maybe they are waiting for the fix to be distributed. Hal

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PsychicCash IPO
by M. Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PsychicCash(TM) Announces Initial Public Offering PsychicCash, a leading developer of electronic commerce systems, today announced that it will sell 4.5 Million shares of common stock at a price of $25 a share. "This IPO will make me very rich" said co-founder Dan Thompson, "but of course you already knew that." PsychicCash pushes secure, thought-driven commerce into the modern world. PsychicCash is the holder of a number of crucial psychic commerce patents, including those on psychic blinding, psychic key-exchange, and psychic anonymity. The PsychicCash technology is based on the idea that there is no need for paper bills or plastic cards. Instead, a user simply thinks to exchange money. PsychicCash requires no hardware, and little knowledge of cryptography, however, it does require doing 1024-bit modular exponentiation in your head. "This is the logical progression of things," said PsychicCash supporter Dionne Warwick. "The use of PsychicCash(TM) to secure transactions should completely remove consumers' concerns about the safety of psychic commerce." Through the use of their patented technology, PsychicCash allows users to transmit value to any vendor, in any denomination, in any currency. With a future release of the protocol, a few additional multiplications will allow PsychicCash users to anonymize either party. The release is currently on hold due to problems in accidentally revealing (thinking) blinding factors. "Psychic debit" technology allows secure transmission of value across time as well as space. That is, one can deduct amounts from payee's bank accounts before the idea to purchase has even been conceived. (A similar use of this technique overcomes prior art claims on PsychicCash patents by shifting the date of filing back as far as needed.) As with all cryptographic solutions, PsychicCash must first get export approval from the US government for each of its' products. However, an ingenious system, called telepathic key escrow (TKE), should allow the company expedited commodities jurisdiction approval. Using TKE, a user simply thinks his key to the National TKE Center, which will then allow access to the key only with a court order. Whether or not other countries will allow the NTKEC to escrow their citizens' keys is still unclear. For more information: Tel: 206-936-0123 Within the US and Canada, phone: 1-212-888-8879 fax: 1-212-935-3882 e-mail: sales(a)psychiccash.mil for customer and technical support: think Matt Thomlinson University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Check my home page -- http://weber.u.washington.edu/~phantom

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li >"In fact, had Unicorn not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est >Detweiler might not have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti >00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information Unicorn = Detweiler = Agent Provocateur

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Complete Waste of Bandwidth
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- As you may remember, I wrote the Geek Code. Well, for those that care, run on out and pick up the April 18th issue of Rolling Stone (it has a 1/2 naked guy on the cover) and take a gander at page 20. It's and article about yours truly and the Geek Code. Cool, eh? *grin* -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.2 iQCVAwUBMWB2LjokqlyVGmCFAQEX4gP/TRTZjtPrlF0mD6gGwz/qyc1+dQpzP/ae T9H/jojqSxX5o1BYC1DEQQtAW/K28VKMRvaAlx7tqIxMvNPyVHGIcDqSovzTDo8C D5P79xQR+NGuzWZFaOsIOT89vWw3JF8nw8ug2oqQIxlwqWqqk9ju6JRa+yywC6K9 xlAIYiDK3XM= =+X1Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Finger for PGP Public Key \/ / -=-=-=-=-=- -=-=-=-=-=- \/ http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/Welcome.html -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.12 GED/J d-- s:++>: a- C++(++++)$ ULUO++ P+>+++ L++ !E---- W+(---) N+++ o+ K+++ w+(---) O- M+$>++ V-- PS++(+++)>$ PE++(+)>$ Y++ PGP++ t- 5+++ X++ R+++>$ tv+ b+ DI+++ D+++ G+++++>$ e++$>++++ h r-- y+** ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------

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Re: What backs up digital money?
by FRank O. Trotter, III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quite a time to go on vacation and have the power supply to my laptop first show wires then break! A great series of rants about the backing of ecash, and I missed most of it (at least in real time). I'll add a few of my thoughts and see if it all goes any further. Ecash is a means of transferring value, currently USD at Mark Twain, betweeen parties. Ecash, however denominated, is not a currency in itself. Any "currency" or other "value units", be it USD, DEM, gold, silver, coupons, etc can be transferred by the ecash system. The Mint licensee must agree and then issue the units. This is, after all, software. The value unit or currency has value because people agree it has value. CyberBucks were (and still are) somewhat convertable to tangible goods - they are for sure convertable to intrinsic goods as demonstrated by the CyberBucks trial. USD and DEM have value only because we all accept them as payment - as fiat currencies there is no formal backing. Gold has value because ... One of the keys in any system is that users feel comfortable about the future value of the units or currency, be the units a national currency, a commodity, or a coupon. There are two components to this: 1) The user must believe that they will receive the units back from someone at a later date - this is plain old fashion credit risk. For example if I am running an ecash system with gold then you have to believe that I will give you gold upon request - same for USD and this is why banks for the time being should be the primary issuer to avoid a general credit risk. If users are unsure or unable to determine if the Mint operator will return the nominal value of the units then there is not enough confidence to run a system. Consider pre-FDIC days in US banking. 2) The user must believe that the units will have a value in the future. We can agree that FOT Units are each worth US$1.0 million today, but how will their value be determined tomorrow? Non-national currency, however attractive from a theoretical standpoint is weak under this guideline. I am a strong believer that ecash will support many national currencies, commodity based implementations such as gold and silver, as well as coupons and commercial equivalents. Use of ecash for payments will depend only on the creative uses presented by someone willing to sell at a profit a product that attracts customers. There is likely some point where a non-national currency will become attractive first to the internet community, then to the public at large. If done with low credit risk it can survive. You should consider that two of the key elements to determine value are precisely known in ecash and not in circulating money - money supply and velocity. One now has only to consider other factors like purchasing power to obtain a base value. Ecash puts banks back into the business of being banks - acting as a storehouse of value, and as a means to transfer this value, all for a fee. The early bank models were exclusively along these lines, with the various lending and investing functions added later. All for now, a start anyway. FOT Disclaimer - Personal not corporate thoughts. Frank O. Trotter, III - fotiii(a)crl.com www.marktwain.com - Fax: +1 314 569-4906 --------------------------------------------

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Re: ACM/IEEE Letter on Crypto
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:24 PM 4/1/96 -0500, Dave Banisar wrote: > Association For Computing Machinery [address deleted] > Institute of Electronics and Electrical Engineers [address deleted] >April 2, 1996 [thank heavens it wasn't April 1!] >Honorable Conrad Burns >Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space [etc] >Dear Chairman Burns: > > On behalf of the nation's two leading computing and engineering >associations, we are writing to support your efforts, and the efforts of >the other cosponsors of the Encrypted Communications Privacy Act, to >remove unnecessarily restrictive controls on the export of encryption >technology. The Encrypted Communications Privacy Act sets out the >minimum changes that are necessary to the current export controls on >encryption technology. However, we believe that the inclusion of issues >that are tangential to export, such as key escrow and encryption in >domestic criminal activities, is not necessary. The relaxation of >export controls is of great economic importance to industry and users, >and should not become entangled in more controversial matters. As far as it goes, and considering that it's from an industry group, this sounds like an excellent response to this Burns bill proposal. (Not "Bill," because it's still not available, apparently.) This response is probably as close as we can expect to a repudiation of the Leahy bill. It still isn't clear, though, whether the Burns bill is intended to be just an elimination of export controls on encryption, or whether it will contain other provisions. My question, which still hasn't been answered, is: "Does this bill exist yet?" The answer is really not inconsequential, because if it _isn't_ at least sketched out yet, then that either should give us the opportunity to add provisions we want, or alert us that there is still the risk from Denning-types of including provisions we don't want. Either way, action is called for, if only action to keep somebody else from taking action. I don't have any objection to a bill which merely eliminates export requirements on encryption; that would be a substantial step in the proper direction. If that's the best we can do for this session of Congress, I hope we can achieve this as a stepping-stone. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: New release of SFS available
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:07 PM 04/1/96 -0500, Tim Scanlon <tfs(a)vampire.science.gmu.edu> wrote: ^^^^^^^ >pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz >> >> I have just uploaded version 1.19 of SFS to the grumbo.uwasa.fi FTP site as: ... >> The head of the FBI Louis Freeh has been quoted as saying that "this will >> provide adequate protection against your little sister or your mother, while >> allowing law enforcement agencies to investigate people using encryption for >> illegal purposes". The head of the French DSSI agrees: "There have been too >> many cases of industrial espionage by foreign government intelligence agencies. > >Remind me not to use this junk. Ever. Got one! Reeeeeeeeel 'im in! ROFLMAO Dave Merriman ------------------------------------------------------------- "Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." P. J. O'Rourke (b. 1947), U.S. journalist. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> http://www.shellback.com/personal/merriman/index.htm

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)spook.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'cubed'} = '<alias(a)alias.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> mix cpunk latent"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono nymrod) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 1 Apr 96 6:48:11 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org -*#*######## :48 100.00% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *-##+*****+* 2:09 100.00% cubed alias(a)alias.alias.net ***+#** 19:29 99.99% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com ++++++++++-+ 1:22:18 99.99% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net +++--*+*+--* 38:14 99.98% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com **++******** 17:30 99.97% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net .---.------ 5:25:05 99.97% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net #*########*# 1:07 99.97% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ****+******* 8:11 99.97% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org ++++-++++**+ 46:53 99.92% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com .-*.-#*#+### 4:28:59 99.89% ncognito ncognito(a)gate.net #*# ##***-## 6:36 99.72% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -+-___.--*-* 15:11:14 99.69% spook remailer(a)spook.alias.net +***+*+**+** 19:46 99.66% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org __.--*----- 13:53:43 99.64% gondonym alias(a)nym.gondolin.org __.--*--+-- 13:48:57 99.64% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com --***++**-* 13:59 99.59% replay remailer(a)replay.com ++**++*+**+ 8:46 99.57% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net ++- - ***--+ 2:46:31 99.26% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net --+++-- -+++ 3:47:33 98.96% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com -- --+--+++ 1:57:42 98.49% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com *#-#####*## 1:30 96.59% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu _* #+# -### 1:08:06 96.24% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi .___ -__.. 47:32:06 95.78% c2 remail(a)c2.org *****.+-+++ 37:24 94.43% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com --------- 6:03:31 83.40% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu *+++++ 34:15 34.40% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com #* ** 1:02 25.24% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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RE: Witch hunt
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri(a)netcom.com> >Tim May == Rousseau??? hehehehehe. and I fail to comprehend how >anyone so universally despised as Detweiller could be considered >to have employed any "effective critical technique". maybe I >should send him some email, but alas I perceive that to be another >waste of time. Send HIM some E-mail? That's pretty funny Larry! What happened, someone sever your Corpus Callosum? Brian

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gnutar + pgp filter mode
by William Hayward 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The gnu tar archiver allows to use an arbitrary compression program (option --use-compress-program=PROG). This works well with pgp if a small wrapper is used: #!/bin/csh -fb if ("$1" == "-d") then exec pgp -d -f else exec pgp -e -f endif The only problem is that this doesn't work well for larger amounts of data, because pgp reads in all data before starting with its work. Perhaps a future release of pgp will have a real filter mode. Hadmut BTW: Does this "crypto-hook" cause export restrictions to apply on gtar ? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMV/0tmc1jG5vDiNxAQFtAAP/TMuYeYf5q7k1Y8DrBjb6XFKYYFANH3RH FvThWq1BUgI+unH97EZkNkCzZJYT5qmLGk3+JLufCAw/o9YR7jKcldm2LNYJ96t2 BDcSGDF3qx/IUzQBa5NV+gUerNRVSwA3LzkTbXufOxYH0cB3KNcsx3B0bE1rEDa/ GCcJ1L6T+2s= =FMiZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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