December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Quickremail v1.0b
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 17:28 1996-05-27 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >I'm planning on starting up a remailer, probably on Lance's machine (to >take advantage of his expertise) sometime this summer. I do want to get PGP >for the VAX before then, and the MIT site doesn't appear to have this code. Why would anyone set up a remailer at Lance's (or Sameer's) machine? They have remailers running already. If the thugs break root and obtain one remailer key from a machine, they probably get all the keys on that machine, compromising all the remailers in one single attack. Or am I missing something? Is there any benefit of multiple remailers on a machine where root is running his own remailer? Matts ps. The vax pgp is available at ftp://ftp.net-connect.net/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/vaxpgp262.tar.Z

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Re: none [mail2news broke]
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rich sez: : Usura just answered this on alt.privacy.anon-server. The basement : mail2news gateway is temporarily blocking posts from c2.org until the : alt.syntax.tactical forgers go away or can be filtered with new code. : While I publicly whined that SOMETHING needed to be done about the problem : (for PR reasons if nothing else), I'm disappointed that there was no : public announcement of the downtime first. Heck, when Scientology came : knocking, there was an 11-day window before utopia shut down... My fault, I didn't imagine shutting down access for c2.org would have a big impact. (other then that the forgeries would stop) Besides the block was in effect for about 12 hours and I was mearly testing if the code did work. (apperantly it does) My sincere apologies if mail has been lost due to this situation. bEST Regards, -- -AJ-

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World Economic Forum (fwd)
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Horsemen continue to ride. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Last night, C-SPAN carried a public session from the WEF meeting held last February in Davos, Switzerland. It looked like a chorus of kinder gentler totalitarians, fascists, and Big Brothers. Louis Freeh, speaking in bureaucratese, said it was time to create an international police force, stamp out uncrackable encryption, and enlist business as allies in implementing the total surveillance state. Elie Wiesel, guru of Humanism from Boston U., was more direct and explicitly called for an international police force to protect us from nuclear terrorists and other bogeymen. One bright note: Freeh said a recent poll of interest to his bureau discovered that 10% of Americans believe the U.S. government was complicit in the Oklahoma City bombing. Maybe there is hope after all.

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Re: Remailers & liability
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 23:28 1996-05-27 -0700, Greg Broiles wrote: >If I have some idea who the remailer operator is, and >they are root, I feel like I learn something if the operator says "My system >doesn't log traffic." If the operator isn't in a position to know (because >they're not root) or if I don't have a reason to trust them, I assume the >remailer is logging traffic. And a remailer that logs traffic may be more >dangerous than no remailer at all, because the amount of security provided >is illusory. One benefit of non root / anonymous remailers is deniability. When the police come knocking on root's door, root can say that he didn't know about the kiddie porn remailer and he will shut it down asap. It will be hard to prove that he had intent to run a remailer (assuming that remailers are outlawed, like they are in France?). A remailer that logs traffic is still useful because it will take the enemy some time and money to get the log. With plenty of remailers in your chain, that's plenty of time and money, and hopefully at least one remailer isn't keeping logs. Matts

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ONE_two
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

5-28-96. NYPaper: "Physicists Put Atom In 2 Places At Once." A team of NIST physicists has proved that an entire atom can simultaneously exist in two widely separated places. The achievement not only sheds light on the paradox of Schrodinger's cat but could also have important consequences for cryptography, a science that creates codes to safeguard the electronic transfer of money, state secrets and other valuable things. ONE_two

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DCSB: The FSTC Electronic Check Project
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Frank Jaffe, of The Bank of Boston and The Financial Services Technology Consortium (FSTC) "The FSTC Electronic Check Project" Tuesday, June 4, 1996 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Frank Jaffe is a Senior Systems Consultant in the Applied Technology Group at the Bank of Boston. Frank is currently the project manager for the FSTC Electronic Check project which involves over 30 companies. Frank has played a leadership role in planning the amalgamation of Bank of Boston's five major retail computer systems into a single, common software system; acting as project leader for a new teller system, and leading the screen phone R&D project in cooperation with Northern Telecom and Bellcore. The FSTC Electronic Check project will develop an enhanced all-electronic replacement to the paper check. Electronic checks will be used like paper checks, by businesses and consumers, and will use existing inter-bank clearing systems. Like its paper counterpart, the Electronic Check represents a self contained "information object," which has all of the information necessary to complete a payment. Likewise, paper checkbooks are replaced by portable Electronic Checkbooks; pens & signatures are replaced by signature card functions and digital signatures using advanced cryptographic techniques; stamps and envelopes by electronic mail or other communications options such as the World Wide Web over the Internet. The fully automated processing capabilities of Electronic Checks opens the possibility of other types of financial instruments, such as electronic cashiers, travelers, and certified checks. Electronic check writing and processing will be integrated into existing applications, from cash registers to personal checkbook managers to large corporate accounting systems, to greatly increase the convenience, and reduce the costs, of writing, accepting, and processing checks. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, June 4, 1996 from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $27.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men, and "appropriate business attire" for women. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, June 1, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston". If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Planned speakers for the following few months are: July Pete Loshin Author, "Electronic Commerce" August Duane Hewitt Idea Futures We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, rah(a)shipwright.com . For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . Looking forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZnOlvgyLN8bw6ZVAQEm8gP/deJ/J0ncmiUTJo82jeGMRp38q+8u+/LH zUZ3dgOCXFM9Nldni/EM0nKiRAgPJTqlcGkrE6Q44s2+ZSPtTiop2Tbx+3xoCW9t zTeKoLoTLgcS7LYS1b/VpcJqN9+q7gGxqmyAd88yZei+i4ZHw6kUGB6MyeHMPq+t CSrEOkkikXE= =SWUd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: Philosophy of information ownership
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ C'punks, At 10:55 PM 5/27/96 -0700, Bruce Baugh wrote: >What specifically bothers me is the reselling of information that I chose to >reveal for a specific transaction, most especially when I did so with an >assumption of privacy. ^^^^^^^^^^ The magic phrase in law is--and should be--"reasonable expectation of privacy." The world is full of unreasonable assumptions about all sorts of things. One certainly has the right to feel bothered about acts that violate one's assumptions, but this hardly gives one the right to compel others to comply with those whims. >...I'd feel much ground >for complaint if I learned the list owner were selling credit histories >gathered during the subscription process. (Unless, of course, I assent to a >clause to the effect that the list owner can do anything he wants with my >credit info, as opposed to the specific purpose of getting payment for the >list.) Every day, merely by existing, we give other people information about ourselves. is it reasonable to expect these people to no release nor use that information unless we specifically give them permission? I don't think so. In most situations, we must take positive steps to assure that our privacy will be maintained. Generally, it is incumbunt upon us--not others--to secure our own privacy. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Philosophy of information ownership
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:29 AM 5/28/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >Contracts are the key. Agreed. The more that can be explicitly spelled out about these matters, the better. A separate problem arises when the government compels the disclosure of information for one purpose - getting a driver's license, say - and then turns around and sells it to others. It's much harder to either negotiate a new contract or go to a competitor when the other party is a government. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Re: Philosophy of information ownership
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:25 AM 5/28/96 -0700, Sandy Sandfort wrote: >information about ourselves. is it reasonable to expect >these people to no release nor use that information unless >we specifically give them permission? In many cases, sure it is. I can't see how giving you the information to establish that I can pay a bill I owe you should be in any sense treated as a license do anything else with that info. A great many transactions are finite, and ought not have lingering implications or side deals dangling off the end. In the long run, this is where anonymous payments come in. In the meantime, I muddle on as best I can. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Remailer chain length?
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Mark, Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 16:21:22 -0400 (EDT) > From: "Mark M." <markm(a)voicenet.com> > Subject: Re: Quickremail v1.0b > > > At 17:28 1996-05-27 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > > >I'm planning on starting up a remailer, probably on Lance's machine (to > > >take advantage of his expertise) sometime this summer. I do want to get PGP > > >for the VAX before then, and the MIT site doesn't appear to have this code. > > > > Why would anyone set up a remailer at Lance's (or Sameer's) machine? > > They have remailers running already. If the thugs break root and obtain > > one remailer key from a machine, they probably get all the keys on that > > machine, compromising all the remailers in one single attack. Or am I > > missing something? Is there any benefit of multiple remailers on a machine > > where root is running his own remailer? > > It's better than nothing. And besides, the more remailers there are, the > more difficult it is to do traffic analysis on remailer traffic. Actually, > its the more remailers people chain messages through, but there are software > packages that can do this easily. The more remailers there are, the longer > remailer chains have the possibility of becoming. If this is strictly true, why not simply run several instances of a remailer on the same machine. Then randomly chain them prior to sending them off site. This would be a lot cheaper and faster than trying to convince hobbyist to set it up or businesses to to use their profit & legal council. Jim Choate

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