December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

HUGE denial of service attack against any ecash customer!!!
by Ian Goldberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- (Again Cc:'d to ecash-feedback, hoping for a security prize. I wonder who's keeping track... Also Cc:'d to cypherpunks, for fun...) So I had some more free time... (Dave cringes when I say that.) Here's a cute one: Give me an account number, and I can prevent it from being used until an arbitrary time in the future (of my choosing). How? Simple. Send a deposit message with 0 coins (well, any message will work, I think, but this is one of the simplest messages there is) with a timestamp of some future time. Messages stamped prior to that (such as everything coming from the actual user for that account, until the time comes) will be politely discarded. (Actually, I think the last reply to a withdrawal request is continually resent, but I'm not exactly sure of this.) In any case, the actual user will be unable to withdraw money from his mint until the time sent in the denial-of-service message. (Unless he forward-dates his computer's clock, or something...) I've tested this against myself and Sameer (with his cooperation, of course). Anyone else want to be locked out for an hour? (Actually, I could pretty effectively lock out _everyone_ for an arbitrarily long time, it seems...) - Ian "Right. I want the sources to the client and the server released. Now." :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZpj3kZRiTErSPb1AQF0SAQAmOEZJTg0v3utWFodDXZ4iv4xa7I+QbNQ Nlsbkug8dtkdf+Jboe+vBtrs5IWSSff8bWntGwfODckct26NwzpVM9bUIXohVoRQ jOkRT9a8m/X00jUAoFOTq5O5Rz87a3Uw8MGFugP5Y4DCk+UqnTA70cuozyOCgb8m 8oke89V9Q0E= =ARMe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: Why does the state still stand:
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 15 May 96 at 18:42, Black Unicorn wrote: > Potential, but you can manage risk with things like dead drops from > trusted parties to forwarding agents to offshore drops to.... I can just visualize a trusted party dropping discretely a bright yellow Caterpillar D-12 in a dead letter box... ROTFL! Sorry, but I couldn't resist. I just *love* silly humor... > Realization means that their is a changing of hands or of forms of > assets. Income tax and taxes on currency now are dependent on such > transactions. Someone already noted the problems with just taxing > possession on a given date of e.g., inventory. To tax efficiently > you have to tax an event of transfer. Why? is it because of the nature of a transfer, it lend itself more to reporting and detecting? Or is it simply because of the legal system structure? > Give me context. It's possible to kill the president too. That > doesn't mean it will become the basis of government. I think that Mr. Bell defined the context quite well and thoroughly. And, as he said, the president is unlikely to be the target of choice because it is not the most efficient one. Who cares about the president? Who is he without the govt machine? > That's that anonymous transactions are for. If anonymous transactions are feasible, so will be the AP scheme... AP can be, in a way, characterized as a weapon because it behaves like one. And no weapon in the history of humanity remained unused. > I forwarded two large segments of the work to the list, yes. If > you, or anyone else on the list, would like copies, let me know. Theses were the first two that constitued part 1 of 4. I wondered if you posted the other parts. If so, tell me so I can get to the archives. Regards. JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, Silverware and mouth blown crystal glasses JFA Technologies, R&D consultants. Physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Why does the state still stand:
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:44 PM 5/16/96 -0400, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"frantz(a)netcom.com" 15-MAY-1996 22:39:50.97 > >>You could require daily payment and forgo the escrow agent. (Assuming you >>are willing to risk a day's pay as an experiment in reputation.) Note that > > This could work for fixed payments. But what about things like >profit-sharing? I think building trust in this kind of thing is a big problem. There are so many ways you can get ripped off. Failure to distribute. Fake costs in the accounting. Off record sales of the product. Phantom partners who do nothing but funnel profits to someone. etc. etc. etc. A fully anonymous audit may be what is needed, unless you are able to build enough trust in an individual nym that you won't get ripped off. Anyone got a protocol for fully anonymous auditing? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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NYT on Netscape Flaw
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, May 18, 1996, pp. 31, 43. New Netscape Software Flaw Is Discovered By John Markoff Computer science researchers at Princeton University said yesterday that they had discovered a new and potentially serious flaw in the Netscape Communicatlons Corporation's Navigator software, the leading program used to browse the World Wide Web of the Internet. The flaw, which was found in recent versions of the Netscape software that support Sun Microsystems' Java programming language, could allow people to write destructive or malicious programs and potentially destroy or steal data or otherwise tamper with a computer that was connected to the Internet and used the Navigator program. Netscape executives said that the researchers had been in touch with them about the problem on Thursday and that the software company was in the process of producing a new version of the Navigator program that would protect against potential attacks. This is the third flaw in the Navigator program discovered in recent months by the Princeton group. Netscape has been under tremendous scrutiny over the security of its popular software since the fall, when a group of researchers at the University of California at Berkeley discovered a flaw in the Netscape security system. In the most recent case, Thomas Cargill, an independent software consultant working with the Princeton group, discovered a problem in the way Netscape has used the Java language in its Navigator program. The group disclosed a similar flaw in March in the Netscape Navigator that would permit a Java program to run illicitly on a computer that was running the Netscape program and perform damaging operations. "Netscape has fixed a series of problems, and the overall security of their system has improved, but there is still some reason for concern," said Prof. Edward Felton, the leader of the Princeton group, which includes two graduate students, Drew Dean and Dean Wallach. Programs that are known as viruses and worms are a serious threat to computer networks because they can move from machine to machine quickly, carrying out destructive applications. Sun Microsystems' Java language has been designed to limit what a virus can do once it is transferred across the Internet. But the security mechanisms only work if the virus's code can be restricted in a safety "box" constructed out of software. Netscape's executives acknowledged yesterday that the Princeton University team had on both occasions been able to find doors that let program code out of the safety box. "We're trying to create a sandbox which has rooms where only certain things happen," said Jeff Trehaft, Netscape's director of security. "What happened is that the Princeton team found a door and it turned out that there weren't adequate protections surrounding the door." The company said it was in the process of posting on the Internet a new version of the most recent test version of its next-generation Internet program, version 3.0 beta. The program contains a special fix to prevent the new attack. He said Netscape had not yet posted a fix for the most recent commercial release of its software, version 2.02, but was instead encouraging customers to use the 3.0 beta software. Since the Berkeley researchers discovered the first security flaw the company has offered a $1,000 "bugs bounty" to programmers who are able to locate security flaws. [End]

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RE: Edited Edupage, 9 May 1996
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just had to say this, on two statements from Doug Hughes: >1. You don't understand at all. It's not about being people down, it's about bringing them 'UP'. >2. ...making sure everybody has a good education is of paramount importance to any society. ...................................................................... These sentiments are noble and on the face of them sound agreeably empathetic with Mankind. But what would be required to bring people "up" (in spite of themselves) and compose them into someone's idea of a good citizen in a great society, would be to own them and thus to have the right to turn them and shape them into what they "ought to be", so that they may function on the same level as "everybody else". Alternatively they could be set free (from tyrants & such - and we all know who they are) to attend to the project of constructing a life, to seek after creative solutions to the problems of existence on their own chosen level of effort & ambition. Which is what this American society was supposed to be about, I've read. (Other countries have their own well-known methods of solving this "problem".) .. Blanc I hope I'm not the only one here who thinks so.

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Re: Securing CDROM from piracy
by sawyer＠nextek.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> >> >Is there any way of making >> >sure that the guy doesnt pull a fast on on us? Can we ensure that he cannot >> >duplicate the thing and start selling it without sharing the profit. >> >> Well, I suppose you could get it copyrighted before you hand it over for >> distribution. I'd also put my logo and other info somewhere in the code, >> such as an "About" box. They would have a hard time saying it wasn't >> yours. >> >You are missing the point. Lets say a firm X is marketing my product. Now if >they sell 500,000 copies and tell me that they have sold only 100,000, I have >no way of figuring out. > > '88888888:::888888%' Vipul Ved Prakash Fax : +91-11-3328849 > '8888888::88888%' Positive Ideas. Internet : vipul(a)pobox.com Ok, I see what your looking for now. How about tracking the number of product registrations, either via a mail-in card or fax? I'm assuming that since this is a product to be sold, not given away, that persons purchasing the program would most likely take the time to fill out a product registration card and send it in. Since not everyone fills these cards out, it is not a 100% accurate method, but if there were any major discrepancies, then you would be aware of it. Thomas J. Sawyer sawyer(a)nextek.com

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FW: anonymous companies
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Wei Dai A company implies a particular kind of persistent structure, with a hiearchy of owners, managers, and employees. It is far from clear to me that this is the most likely organizational form in an anonymous digital economy. One possible alternative is to have no persistent organizations. Teams form spontaneously to work on individual projects. Each individual member jointly negotiates a contract with every other member, and these contracts are enforced through some arbitration system. ......................................................................................... This "virtual corporation" is something that I've read about (about 2 years ago) which is an idea already in use - someone has an idea for a kayak design, then he contracts out to other individuals all the different kinds of work he needs done to get it built. As soon as the project is complete, the company dissolves. But here is where I think the problems with an attempt at total anonymity will occur, as has been mentioned: where the virtual meets the actual, where the anonymous electronic interaction must meet the solid real to complete the transaction. The work of constructing physical things must be accomplished in an actual location. If the place is rented, rather than owned, the renter will be able to identify the rentee. Solid objects like kayaks need materials for construction. Someone must 1) get the particular kind of material which the kayak design requires, and 2) make it available for distribution to those who will want to use it. Material or parts buyers must be able to examine the stuff to make a purchasing decision. These must be delivered to an actual physical location. If large trucks are rented to deliver these things, then the drivers must know where that location actually is to deliver them. Once the kayaks are constructed, they also must be delivered to the owner or to a store or storage building. They must be inspected for quality and meeting design specifications. They must be sold where individuals can look at the kayak, perhaps sit inside, and compare it with other models elsewhere (I don't think just looking at a photo on a web page will do for every purchasing decision). Back stock requires storage and probably someone to guard the building. Perhaps the kayak purchaser will want lessons on using the thing, in an actual river. In all these situations, decisions must be made which require a physical presence and interaction with the material of construction, with the object of attention. This is a point where anonymity would be very difficult and loss of confidence possible (if someone reneged on their agreements). I can imagine total anonymity used most successfully when it is limited to activities which are totally electronic in nature, like programming, web design or ecash transfers. The more that a virtual company requires physical contact with the construction, storage, and movement of physical goods, and the more time that it engages the individuals involved, the more difficult it will be to keep away from everyone the knowledge of who is who in relation to those things and where everything is located in physical space. I was thinking that I couldn't see purchasing groceries anonymously (if I made the purchases myself). Perhaps with a certain kind of store design.....still, it would be difficult. *Someone* would see me walking out with the groceries (why does this sound so funny). .. Blanc

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Re: anonymous companies
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:42 PM 5/16/96 -0700, Wei Dai wrote: > > I'll just give one problem: the principal-agent problem. How do owners of > the company make sure the managers operate the company in their best > interest? Actually looting of companies happens a lot right now today, and very seldom leads to criminal charges. Twice I have lost a job because the company I worked for went under, apparently due to looting. > Solution: reputation. If the managers don't do the right things, the > owners arrange so that the managers lose reputation and won't get hired in > the future. Unfortunately the science of reputation is not so advanced > that we know this will actually work. At present venture capitalists seem to rely on the sniff-their-arses method. They talk to people and try and get a feel as to whether they are planning a robbery. This method is obviously likely to be less effectual as businesses move to the net. This problem is probably the major reason why Net startups are physically located in Silicon valley, rather than world wide or nation wide. Of course the problem is that if the venture capitalists can find them to sniff their arses, the bad boys can also find them to shake them down. In some businesses we can solve this problem by cryptographic control mechanisms, such as open books banking. In others, such as net startups, I see no solution other than increased reliance on personal individual capital. Athenian capitalism worked largely on personal capital. Because of their terrible arithmetic system, bookkeeping was really bad, and in consequence stock investments tended to go sour. Socrates lost a bundle in this fashion, which may explain his lack of enthusiasm for capitalists. > Solution: smart contracts. This is Nick Szabo's idea of building > contractual obligations into cryptographic protocols so that the parties > have no choice but to fullfil them. But again we don't know whether this > will actually work for this problem. It will work for many particular cases of this problem. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Zimmermann v. ViaCrypt??
by Mark Voorhees 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a story @ http://infolawalert.com/stories/051796a.html describing how Phil Zimmermann is trying to retrieve all the rights to PGP from ViaCrypt in order to jump start his new venture, PGP, Inc. He's taking a sell out or get sued approach with ViaCrypt, which until recently has not had much success marketing PGP. Mark

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A cryptographic alternative to escrow agents (Matts' half coin)
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Black Unicorn wrote (was: Why does the state still stand) >> . What if a company does not pay as expected - other than adopting >> Assassination Politics, what method could an employee use towards >> getting their expected remuneration for work done? > >If payment is made weekly, it should be made in advance to an escrow agent >who would issue a certificate that the payment for employee r2dd54 has >been received. The payment would then not be released to anyone without >the consent of the corporation and the employee. > >Obviously the escrow agent would have to be trusted. It should be possible to avoid that trusted escrow agent using blinded ecash and Matts' half coin algorithm. Bob wants to buy a $100 service from Alice. Alice wants to get paid if she performs the service. Bob and Alice each create half of a $300 ecash coin. They send their half coins to the ecash mint for signing, with instructions to withdraw $200 from Bob's account and $100 from Alice's account for the signing of a $300 coin. When the mint has received both half coins, it signs the complete coin, withdraws the money and returns the signature to both Alice and Bob. Nobody can now use the coin alone because they don't know the other half of the random coin number. Next, Alice delivers the service to Bob. If Bob is satisfied with the service, he and Alice write a message to the mint requesting that the complete coin be credited with $100 to Bob's account and $200 to Alice'. Alice has now been paid. If Bob refuses to pay, Alice will never give him her half coin and he loses $200, but he got a $100 service, resulting in a net loss of $100. If Alice refuses to deliver the service, Bob keeps his half coin and she loses $100. Both participants lose $100 each if they don't complete the deal. That way they have the same incentive to come to an agreement. To simplify the messages to the mint you could use two coins. One for $100 and one for $200. That way there would be a one-to-one relation between deposits, withdrawals and coins. The algorithm described above (Matts' half coin) is copyrighted by yours truly Matts Kallioniemi. Patents pending. Matts Kallioniemi <matts(a)pi.se> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEVAwUBMZzMVBVFhWUyiUQRAQHs8Af/TQf8zLYfwictsXoqvOahCvQ1aJ4F6Dem w6PARUXIhb0XWIFYRZSiXGsRoUVpWiWtupSIf7PHG/dkGfAamvq0wgQpEJm3+7IP 6qSaOYovKnY19GxTo9QHkyHQ8LFu+CSVJMMPoZtX6tCJX62VkFuJapI1CLQOPb78 Ntqf8kNiX1/IpOfrqiF0Fx1YV2nTno417q4vaJYnZWQFJ+sYf5q0NG0xahDPlwUx I11AtFcpIGOCHek3GGAgH9KYSt6UpAOmk57bSne5+zMN5U78cGDsizLYm+MDtzAx Nt4FYoeYxM0gKs529ruUgTdfZNqVtsXjjeNlbVBi4hyfczs3b3I7ug== =oLLR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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