December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

CoS supoenas records of all anonymous remailers? (Unverified)
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[FWIW, Biased Journalism is a reasonably reputable source. --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- Date: Tue, 9 Apr 1996 18:27:02 -0700 To: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu, eric(a)remailer.net, farber(a)cis.upenn.edu (Dave Farber) From: jwarren(a)well.com (Jim Warren) Subject: (fwd fyi - NOT verified!!) very urgent news Seems like it's just a tad overbroad, if true. Another example of, "all the 'justice' that one can buy"? --jim >Date: Tue, 9 Apr 1996 15:44:52 -0700 (PDT) >From: shelley thomson <sthomson(a)netcom.com> >Subject: very urgent news >To: jwarren(a)well.com > >Hello, Jim Warren: > > The church of scientology plans to subpoena the records of every >anonymous remailer in the USA. > > I publish a news/black humor magazine on the net called **Biased >Journalism**. As a journalist I have covered the collision between the >church of scientology and the net. My last three issues have focused on >legal action by the church against Grady Ward and Keith Henson. > > Today I had a note from Grady Ward, whose deposition was finished >today. He said that they asked him a lot of questions about me, and >warned me that they may issue a subpoena for me and a demand for my >email. > > The church presumably intends to claim that I am not a real >journalist because I only publish on the net. I need to prepare a legal >defense, and needless to say, can't afford a lawyer. If you can direct >me to any resources, I would appreciate it very much. > > On the basis of events today, Ward believes the church will >issue subpoenas for the records of every anonymous remailer in the USA. > > If these records are delivered to the church, our First Amendment >rights go with them. > > Shelley Thomson > > publisher, **Biased Journalism** > 800-731-0717 voice message >

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RSA_dog
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IDC Government ("Better Government Through IT Research") has snail-mailed an 8-page report on the January 1996 RSA Data Security Conference on "The Future of Cryptography." For math hermits untracked by the RSA bloodhound: RSA_dog

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Scientology harassing anon.penet.fi again!
by mirele＠xmission.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

forwarded from rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman): Here's what Grady said to me in several messages. Note that they seem to be after anon.penet.fi again too. (He has given me blanket permission to distribute his e-mail to me to anyone who may find it of use.) ------- Date: Thu, 04 Apr 1996 08:52:38 -0800 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> I've just received e-mail from: kaj.malmberg(a)mallu.pp.fi (Kaj Malmberg) The Poilice CID in Helsinki who is being pushed by the criminal cult yet again to get a search warrant for Julf's anonymous remailer, claiming I have been violating my injunction to post cult crap. I told him that as usual the criminal cult is lying and that I gave him and Julf explicit permission to investigate any or all of my posts I have ever made through the remailer. The criminal cult is trying to use the fact of my injunction to further their own conspiracy theories. South Africa, Finland, where does it end? Grady ------------- Date: Fri, 05 Apr 1996 07:41:25 -0800 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: Kaj Malmberg, Finland At 10:11 AM 4/5/96 -0500, you wrote: >Why did you give them this permission? I think it sets a VERY bad >precedent. Chris Schafmeister was upset when I mentioned this >on the IRC channel yesterday afternoon -- he thinks you're being >too nice, polite, and cooperative for your own good. I like to err on the side of openness. Each to their own I suppose. Basically I trust Kaj to sense who is the criminal perpetrator in this case. I also sent him the set of trial stipulations in the Snow White case that ought to give him very interesting background on the criminal cult. >In my opinion, Julf and the Finnish cop should Just Say No >to the CoS. He is still free to do as he wishes. ------------ Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 14:16:32 -0700 To: Ron Newman <rnewman(a)cybercom.net> From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: a few more questions No one was with me. Total hours day one: 7.5 Total hours day two: 3.25 hours, as per order of Judge Infante. Also I believe all american anonymous remailers will be subpoenaed for their records as will all my ISPs, and contents of safety deposit box held as evidence. At 04:56 PM 4/9/96 -0400, you wrote: >Was anyone with you (on YOUR side) at either day's deposition? > >How many hours total did you go each day? > -------- Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 19:37:57 -0700 To: Ron Newman <rnewman(a)cybercom.net> From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: what is the latest regarding penet? I don't know what's up today, but Julf wrote yesterday to tell me that my id grady(a)northcoast.com had NOT been used to go through his remailer. No word on what the police are doing to subpoena his system, if they are. Grady -------------- Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 22:57:26 -0700 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: what is the latest regarding penet? That is all he told me: that he could verify to authorities that grady(a)northcoast.com had not used his remailer. He didn;t mention anyone else or how he was helping the CID with their inquiries. Yes, you can put this datum on the web. At 01:52 AM 4/10/96 -0500, you wrote: >Was something else used to go through his remailer? > >Has he said anything in public about this? > >Should I post your message about it on my web site? Grady Ward | | http://www.northcoast.com/~grady +1 707 826 7715 | | (voice/24hr FAX) | 34877c8566839cb7 | grady(a)northcoast.com | aeab8ec5e5ee97fe | -- Ron Newman rnewman(a)cybercom.net Web: http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/home.html mirele(a)xmission.com -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.1 GAT d- s++ a C++ U P L E- W++ N++ o-- K++ w--- O++ PS++ PE-- Y+ PGP+ t 5 X-- R- tv-- b++ DI++ D++ G e++++ h+ r* x++ ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------

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Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-04-10 10:33:19 EDT, D. Denning allegedly writes: >For two-way authentication, the reverse process would be performed. In the >current implementation, location signatures are 20,000 bytes. For >continuous authentication, an additional 20 bytes per second are >transferred. Re- authorization can be performed every few seconds or >longer. The location signature is virtually impossible to forge at the >required accuracy. This is because the GPS observations at any given time >are essentially unpredictable to high precision due to subtle satellite >orbit perturbations, which are unknowable in real-time, and intentional >signal instabilities (dithering) imposed by the U.S. Department of Defense >selective availability (SA) security policy. Further, because a signature >is invalid after five milliseconds, the attacker cannot spoof the location Umm, excuse me, but doesn't it take longer than 5 ms for a data packet to transit from point A to point B? We ARE talking about transmitting via the Net here, aren't we? >by replaying an intercepted signature, particularly when it is bound to the Replaying an intercepted signature would completely unnecessary. GPS positions are calculated by comparing the phase differential between several different satellite signals. It would be trivial for anyone who understands the inner workings of reprogram their GPS receiver (or build a hacked one) to give a false location. Simply calculate the distances to the satellites relative to your position, (GPS already does this to determine your position) and then calculate them in reference to another location. (This other location would have to be close enough to receive signals from four of the same satellites that you are receiving, if I remember GPS specs correctly.) Phase-shifting the signals according to the distance differences between your true location and the other location yields a signal set that can be fed into any GPS receiver to yield the other location, in real time. >message (e.g., through a checksum or digital signature). Continuous >authentication provides further protection against such attacks. See above. Is this a troll? Jonathan Wienke

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CoS and anon remailers
by Jim Byrd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's more details. For quite some time the Church of Scientology has been pestered by an anonymous poster "Scamizdat" who regularly has been spilling cult secrets onto the net. These include directions on how to harrass critics. Scamizdat (whoever he is or they are) appears to have been using anonymous chained remailers. Grady Ward, a critic of the cult, has been taunting the cult with "Have you stopped Scamizdat yet?" I believe that Grady is almost certainly NOT Scamizdat. The church appears to have concluded that Grady is Scamizdat, has sued him, applied for a writ of seizure to raid his house (denied), and asked for a deposition (granted). It appears that Scientology is interesting in getting into the records of American anon remailers. They are also interested in anon.penet.fi. Once before, they raided anon.penet.fi when some of their internal information leaked out onto the net, and that poster has never been heard from again. Someone asked if this wouldn't violate the ECPA. In the past the cult has seized whole computers, complete with email, and ignored court orders to return them. The whole story may be found on http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/scientology/home.html Here is a file I got from Ron Newman's web page: --------------- Article 78833 of alt.religion.scientology: Path: news.cybercom.net!dial2-30.cybercom.net!user From: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server,alt.religion.scientology,comp.org.eff.talk Subject: Warning - Scientology attacking remailers again! Date: Wed, 10 Apr 1996 11:15:40 -0500 Organization: Cyber Access Internet Services (617) 396-0491 Lines: 138 Distribution: inet Message-ID: <rnewman-1004961115400001(a)dial2-30.cybercom.net> NNTP-Posting-Host: dial2-30.cybercom.net Keywords: Scientology remailers anon penet anonymous Grady Ward Xref: news.cybercom.net alt.privacy.anon-server:3524 alt.religion.scientology:78833 comp.org.eff.talk:25569 The following are a series of messages from Grady Ward, which he has authorized me to distribute to the Net at large. Grady is being sued by the Church of Scientology for alleged copyright violation (they claim he is the mysterious "Scamizdat", which he denies.) For more details, see http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/scientology/grady/home.html http://www.northcoast.com/~grady/ According to Grady, the CoS has once again demanded access to anon.penet.fi, and may soon subpoena other remailers as well: ------- Date: Thu, 04 Apr 1996 08:52:38 -0800 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> I've just received e-mail from: kaj.malmberg(a)mallu.pp.fi (Kaj Malmberg) The Poilice CID in Helsinki who is being pushed by the criminal cult yet again to get a search warrant for Julf's anonymous remailer, claiming I have been violating my injunction to post cult crap. I told him that as usual the criminal cult is lying and that I gave him and Julf explicit permission to investigate any or all of my posts I have ever made through the remailer. The criminal cult is trying to use the fact of my injunction to further their own conspiracy theories. South Africa, Finland, where does it end? Grady ------------- Date: Fri, 05 Apr 1996 07:41:25 -0800 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: Kaj Malmberg, Finland At 10:11 AM 4/5/96 -0500, you wrote: >Why did you give them this permission? I think it sets a VERY bad >precedent. [deleted] was upset when I mentioned this >yesterday afternoon -- he thinks you're being >too nice, polite, and cooperative for your own good. I like to err on the side of openness. Each to their own I suppose. Basically I trust Kaj to sense who is the criminal perpetrator in this case. I also sent him the set of trial stipulations in the Snow White case that ought to give him very interesting background on the criminal cult. >In my opinion, Julf and the Finnish cop should Just Say No >to the CoS. He is still free to do as he wishes. ------------ Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 14:16:32 -0700 To: Ron Newman <rnewman(a)cybercom.net> From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: a few more questions At 04:56 PM 4/9/96 -0400, you wrote: >Was anyone with you (on YOUR side) at either day's deposition? > >How many hours total did you go each day? No one was with me. Total hours day one: 7.5 Total hours day two: 3.25 hours, as per order of Judge Infante. Also I believe all american anonymous remailers will be subpoenaed for their records as will all my ISPs, and contents of safety deposit box held as evidence. -------- Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 19:37:57 -0700 To: Ron Newman <rnewman(a)cybercom.net> From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: what is the latest regarding penet? I don't know what's up today, but Julf wrote yesterday to tell me that my id grady(a)northcoast.com had NOT been used to go through his remailer. No word on what the police are doing to subpoena his system, if they are. Grady -------------- Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 22:57:26 -0700 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: what is the latest regarding penet? At 01:52 AM 4/10/96 -0500, you wrote: >Was something else used to go through his remailer? > >Has he said anything in public about this? > >Should I post your message about it on my web site? That is all he told me: that he could verify to authorities that grady(a)northcoast.com had not used his remailer. He didn;t mention anyone else or how he was helping the CID with their inquiries. Yes, you can put this datum on the web. -------------- Date: Wed, 10 Apr 1996 07:17:01 -0700 To: rnewman(a)cybercom.net (Ron Newman) From: Grady Ward <grady(a)northcoast.com> Subject: Re: what is the latest regarding penet? Ron, Yes do please distribute my messages as you deem necessary. Some people ought to be aware of what is coming down. My feeling is that they will be doing anything they can to attempt to produce "hard evidence" that I am part of the Grand Conspiracy. I would say it is virtually certain that U.S. anon remailers will be subpoenaed as well as any foreign ones in which they can handle the authorities. Grady Ward | | http://www.northcoast.com/~grady +1 707 826 7715 | | (voice/24hr FAX) | 34877c8566839cb7 | grady(a)northcoast.com | aeab8ec5e5ee97fe | -- Ron Newman rnewman(a)cybercom.net Web: http://www.cybercom.net/~rnewman/home.html

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Re: Anonymous Remailer threat: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailer records?
by Jim Byrd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:01 AM 4/10/96 -0700, Jim Warren wrote: >My understanding is that the most famous remailer, anon.penet.fi, is of the >first flavor -- and was raided by reps of the Church of Scientology, >several years ago, with a Finnish search warrant, and that this produced >some [much?] of the evidence against their opponent who had allegedly been >splattering COS copyrighted "works" all over the net. (Interesting >application of private property rights -- protecting religious secrets.) The story is weirder than that. The first poster of church secrets (with lots of commentary) was Dennis Erlich, an ex-scientologist. Dennis was raided and sued, and is awaiting trial. His ISP, Tom Klemesrud, refused to cancel Dennis' account, and so was sued, and is awaiting trial. A lady met Klemesrud in a bar, identified herself as an IRS agent, and talked her way into Klemesrud's apartment. She proceeded to remove her clothes and spread blood all over the apartment. She there identified herself as a representative of the Church of Scientology. Klemesrud posted an account of this bizarre affair to alt.religion.scientology, and an anonymous poster "-AB-", using anon.penet.fi, posted a differing version of events. The Church went ballistic over this post, and raided anon.penet.fi to find the identity of -AB-. This turned out to be an alumni account at Cal Tech. The poster has never been heard from again. The raid on anon.penet.fi occurred in Feb. 1995. "Scamizdat" has never used anon.penet.fi, and his (their?) identity is still unknown.

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Re: PEP Announcement (fwd)
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:17 PM 4/10/96, you wrote: > Thanks for the good review, Bob. You're absolutely right about the > pgp/original message window problem. I wrestled with it through most of >the > development process, and it remains the interface element I'd like to > change most. I ended up choosing the PGP window because I didn't want the > user to be faced with the choice of saving it unencrypted or losing it > forever. I did think, however, that it automatically verified and added > keys on decryption. Are you sure it doesn't? Got me there. I didn't even check for it. Heh. Now I know better... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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onyma
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) writes: >Not meant to be snide, even if sounded that way. I just get confused by >your various nyms The term `nym' is erroneus: The Greek words are an-onym, pseud-onym, syn-onym, hom-onym pp, derived from `onyma', name.

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Re: Tense visions of future imperfect
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:59 AM 4/9/96 -0800, frantz(a)netcom.com (Bill Frantz) wrote: >> Financial Times, April 9, 1996, p. 13. >> Garfinkel described it like this: "My name is Agent >> Jenkins. I'm an investigator with the secret service, >> working on a counterfeiting case. And it's tough. Last >> year, my office got a priority call from an economist at >> Stanford. The economist was looking at something called the >> money supply and velocity and both were increasing a little >> too fast. They just didn't add up. The economist finally >> figured an organisation was printing its own electronic >> money -- just like the US government does. Personally, I find the idea that the government could hope to track the economy so closely as to notice a $10M/year addition to the money supply to be disturbing (though it was done in a science fiction story about 20 years ago :-) With digital cash, it's also unrealistic - we finally have a technology for moving money around _without_ them being able to track it all, if we want to deploy it. >> "This counterfeit currency looked just like the real thing, >> except it was a fraud. She even found some of it -- a >> digital dollar that was signed and sealed by the US >> government's secret key, yet had a serial number that had >> never been issued. The money that was being made was on the >> Net. It was everywhere and nowhere. And it was encrypted, >> so that we wouldn't even know it if we found it. Last >> month, we estimate, the total fraud was up to $900,000 a >> month, and it is increasing still." > >I don't see how this third scam would work in a system such as DigiCash >which uses online clearing. Unissued serial numbers would be refused when >presented for clearing. In Chaum's DigiCash, the payer makes up the serial number, blinds it, and has the bank sign it blind, so the bank never knows the number until the payee deposits it. So this doesn't work. (The payee knows the number when he receives it from the payer, but in online operation he deposits it right away.) (There are alternative ways to structure transactions so the payee issues the serial number, or even so the bank does, but they're not needed.) What the bank _does_ know is whether the total number of digibucks with its signature on them that it's received is larger than the number it's signed - so if their private signature key has been stolen by counterfeiters, they'll know for sure once the counterfeiting level exceeds the amount of float of outstanding digibucks they've issued; they may suspect it earlier if the redemption level is high enough that the float statistics look real funny. On the other hand, with Chaum's system, what role would the US government have in issuing digibucks, rather than banks doing it? The one-big-bank approach doesn't scale well, though I suppose the Feds could pay member banks with digibucks instead of paperbucks or journal entries if they wanted to, and FedBucks might be more spendable in some markets than VisaBucks or TwainBucks or MeritaKroner or HKL$ or YakuzaYen or Chemical$ or CocaRubles. >If this kind of scam, particularly the counterfeiting scam, >occurs too often, public trust in the cash will disappear, and people will >refuse to buy it. In a multiple-bank scenario, that works fine. With a government-issued legal-tender digital currency, it's an offer you can't refuse... >Note that people trying to maintain anonymity are particularly vulnerable >since they have to hold cash for a period of time to defeat traffic >analysis attacks. Holding digital cash for a long time isn't difficult - it's easier than holding paper cash for a long time, since you can keep multiple encrypted copies (so stealing them isn't very useful to the thief and isn't as damaging to the victim), and you can stash floppies in smaller, less armored safe deposit boxes than you'd need for large quantities of cash. Of course, if you happen to become dead while you're storing it, the paper cash is far more useful to your heirs, so I assume we'll have a government-sponsored cash-escrow system announced soon to protect the government's interest in collection of inheritance taxes... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215

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Re: No matter where you go, there they are.
by rick hoselton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:04 AM 4/10/96 -0400, Peter Wayner wrote: > >Hmm. Here's an interesting question. Let's say that there are 3 >satellites in view broadcasting signals f1(t), f2(t) and f3(t). >...Okay, so why can't I just tape the signals I get from each of >the three satellites. >Or course, I could be completely missing some neat feature of >DGPS. ... Any thoughts? I have read that GPS uses encryption to place time-dependent, location-dependent inaccuracies into the signals. Innacuracies small enough so they are not a problem for civilian navigation, (mostly) but large enough to prevent GPS from being a useful method of military targeting for anyone who does not hold the keys. Perhaps Ms. Denning is suggesting that the US feral government could act as a "trusted server" (and she has repeatedly suggested such trust) and tell us whether a GPS that "thinks" it's at some location, right now, is REALLY at some known location.

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