December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Interesting Identity Hacking Experiment: www.switchboard.com
by Just Rich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.switchboard.com/ is a white pages directory. Basically, it's the Database America CD-ROM on the Web. The difference is, it's writeable, and free. Pretty cool. I don't think it was wise for them to allow anyone with an email address to change anyone else's white pages entry, though. Can anyone think of a prominent politician who would be in the phone book? The freeform "more information" field is just asking to be used. Potentially interesting applications for anonymous web proxies and secure pseudonym servers. At least they don't make direct changes to the database -- I'd guess they only set a flag to look in the separate user-supplied file. I.e., I changed my entry, then hit "unregister," and all the original information returned immediately. -rich

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Re: Electronic Freedom press release
by sj＠io.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:50 PM 3/3/96, LibertyWMA(a)aol.com wrote: (quoting George Phillies) > When the Secret >Service raided Steve Jackson Games to suppress publication of 'Hacker' I >immediately wrote Congress to protest. Serious distortion of the facts. "Hacker" was published as a reaction to the raid; it was not the target of the raid. The book you are thinking about is GURPS CYBERPUNK, which the Secret Service encouraged us to believe was the object of the raid, but testimony at the trial indicated that that was not the case. The SS was ignorantly indifferent to free speech and publisher's rights, rather than taking direct aim at them. See www.io.com/SS/ for more information. Our case was a victory, but if it is cited in support of irrelevancies, it has no more meaning than if it is forgotten completely. Steve Jackson, sj(a)io.com - this will do till I fix my .sig file . . .

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Third Generation Problems
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill rites: >Duress codes need to be designed to minimized the chance of such responses >when they are used. Absolutely but is a third generation problem: First generation: being able to protect the information (encryption) Second Generation: being able to respond to risks (duress) incurred by the first generation solution (duress codes) Third Generation: being able to respond to risks incurred by using the second generation response (using the duress codes). Is nice to plan for each up front but often the succeding generation risks only become apparent after living with the preceeding generation solution for a while. This should not prevent anyone from implementing the first because of what *might* happen in the second. "Doing nothing" is a sound solution only for politicians. Besides the purpose of "duress codes" is not just to provide an avenue for use in case of threat, it is also to deter the threat in the first place by reducing the "win" probability for those who might issue the threat. (previously mentioned a very real consideration for the fifth amendment. will not repeat.) Warmly, Padgett

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Re: Randomness paper (posting it)
by rollo＠artvark.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

OK. Post it WHERE? >> Postscript, only in FrameMaker format, or as Interchange - MIF or as Text. > >If you can save it as text, then please post it as text. > > Yiorgos Adamopoulos adamo(a)noc.ntua.gr > National Technical University of Athens, NOC Rollo Silver | e-mail: rollo(a)artvark.com | Artvark | Home page: http://www.artvark.com/artvark/ | PO Box 219 | Voice: 505-586-0197 | San Cristobal, NM 87564 USA | Compuserve 71174,1453 | =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by Paul_Koning/US/3Com%3COM＠smtp1.isd.3com.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unicorn @ schloss.li (Black Unicorn) wrote: >On Tue, 26 Mar 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote: >>... >> In fact, I suppose that government operation of the identification system >> (drivers' licenses, passports, etc.) in general is also horribly inefficient >> and should be attacked on efficiency grounds. > >You might not like what you get in response. Streamlined and uniform >identity documents generated at birth and renewed with tax filings would >be the likeliest efficiency improvement. An inefficient government >identification system is to the advantage of the privacy seeker. Indeed. A wise man once said "Thank goodness we don't get all the government we pay for". Government inefficiency is our friend (except at tax time) -- don't wish for it to get more efficient unless it gets a lot smaller FIRST. paul !----------------------------------------------------------------------- ! Paul Koning, NI1D, C-24183 ! 3Com Corporation, 1-3A, 118 Turnpike Road, Southborough MA 01772 USA ! phone: +1 508 229 1695, fax: +1 508 490 5873 ! email: paul_koning(a)isd.3com.com or paul_koning(a)3mail.3com.com ! Pgp: 27 81 A9 73 A6 0B B3 BE 18 A3 BF DD 1A 59 51 75 !----------------------------------------------------------------------- ! "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over ! any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent ! harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not ! a sufficient warrant." -- John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" 1859

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InfoWarCon IV - Final Schedule
by winn＠Infowar.Com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

P L E A S E D I S T R I B U T E W I D E L Y F I N A L S C H E D U L E IW4 -- InfoWarCon (Europe) '96 Fourth International Conference on Information Warfare: Defining the European Perspective Brussels, Belgium May 23-24 1996 Sponsored by: National Computer Security Association Winn Schwartau, President and CEO, Interpact, Inc. Robert David Steele, Chairman & CEO, Open Source Solutions Group CoSponsors: IBM Internet Security Systems, Inc. Jane's Information Group Network Systems, Inc. Norman Data Defense Background Information Warfare represents a global challenge that faces all late-industrial and information age nation states. It also represents the easiest and cheapest way for less developed nation-states and religious or political movements to anonymously and grieviously attack major nations and international corporations. Not only are the definitions of InfoWar unclear, but they span many areas and disciplines. This conference will examine the European perspectives on all three classes of Information Warfare while contributing some American lessons learned, mistakes made and successes enjoyed. Class One: Personal Privacy Class Two: Industrial and Economic Spying and Warfare Class Three: Global Conflict, Terrorism and the Military As at all other Information Warfare Conferences, this special European Conference encourages active audience participation, contribution and debate. May 22, 1996 17:00 - 20:00 Pre-Registration 18:00 - 21:00 Hosted Cocktail Party with Music Meet Mr. Schwartau, Mr. Steele and many of our other distinguished guests and conference speakers for casual 'off-line' conversation.. May 23, 1996 07:00 - 08:30 Registration 07:00 - 08:30 Sponsored Continental Breakfast PLENARY SESSIONS 08:30 - 09:00 Keynote Speech Maj. General Edwin Ebert J-6 Assistant Chief of Staff (C4I) USA 09:00 - 10:00 "Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway" Winn Schwartau, President and CEO, Interpact, Inc., USA 10:00 - 11:15 East Versus West: Military Views of Information Warfare Moderator: Robert Steele East: General Nikolai Ivanovich Turko, Information Warfare Russia West: US - Gen. Jim McCarthy USAF (Retired) 11:15 - 11:45 Sponsored Break 11:45 - 13:00 Information Warfare or Information in Warfare? Support for Conventional War Fighting Moderator: Winn Schwartau Panel: Russia: Admiral Vladimir Semenovich Pirumov (Retired) Chairman of Scientific Counsel of the Russian Security Counsel Sweden: Navy Captain Bo Wallendar UK: Captain Patrick Tyrell, Assistant Director, Information Warfare Policy, Ministry of Defence 13:00 - 13:30 Dealing with Internet Intruders in Emergency Mode: An IBM Perspective Peter Streibelt, IBM Europe Program Manager for Advanced Networking and Internet Emergency Response 13:30 - 14:30 Lunch BREAKOUT SESSIONS 14:30 - 16:00 Breakout One: Defending Against the Internet: The Threat to European Civil Prosperity Moderator: Mich Kabay, Klaus-Peter Kossakowski, DFN-CERT, Univ. of Hamburg, Germany Christopher Klaus, CEO and Founder, Internet Security Systems, US Peter Streibelt, IBM Europe Breakout Two: "Paradigm Shift" Moderated by: Winn Schwartau Dr. Phillipe Beaumard, University of Paris, France Colonel George Dunlop, USAF 16:00 - 16:30 Sponsored Break PLENARY SESSION 16:30 - 18:00 "Hackers: National Resources or Merely Cyber-Criminals?" Co-Moderators: Mich Kabay, Ph.D., Director of Education, NCSA and Robert Steele, President, OSS, Inc. Rop Gonggrijp - Hactic and The Digital City, Amsterdam, Andy Mueller-Maguhn, CHAOS Computer Club Germany "Frantic" - Anthony C. Zboralski - Convicted French Hacker 18:00 - 21:00 Hosted Reception 21:00 - 23:00 Self-paid Dinners for "Birds of a Feather." Rallying points will be provided. May 24, 1996 07:00 - 8:30 Sponsored Continental Breakfast 08:30 - 9:00 Keynote Speech "Efforts to Maximize Information As New Age Weapon" General Pichot-Duclos, France PLENARY SESSIONS 9:00 - 10:00 "Creating Smart Nations Through National Information Strategies: Intelligence And Security Issues" Robert David Steele, President, OSS, Inc. US 10:00 - 11:15 "The Convergence of Military and Commercial Vulnerabilities" Moderator: Winn Schwartau Panel: Bob Ayers, Chief IW Division, DISA, Department of Defense, US Captain Patrick Tyrell, Assistant Director, Information Warfare Policy, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom 11:15 - 11:45 Sponsored Break 11:45 - 13:00 Societal Impact of Information Warfare Moderator: Winn Schwartau, Panel:The Croatian View: Pedrag Pale, Chairman of the InfoTech Coordinating Committee, Ministry of Science, Technology, and Informatics Dr. Ken Dark, Fellow, University of Camabridge, UK 13:00 - 13:30 Sponsored Luncheon Presentation 13:30 - 14:30 Special Luncheon Presentation BREAKOUT SESSIONS 14:30 - 16:00 Breakout One: Legislation & Personal Privacy: A Global Electronic Bill of Rights? Dr. Mich Kabay, Director of Education, NCSA Simon Davies, Electronic Privacy International, UK Dr. Leroy Pearce, Senior Technical Advisor, representing MajGen Leech, Asst. Deputy Minister of Defence Information Services, Canada Breakout Two: "Industrial Espionage: An Update" Moderator: Robert Steele Maurice Najman, Television Coorespondent, France Miguel Chamorro, Exec. Director, Interpol (invited) UK, Arish Turle, Kroll Associates 16:00 - 16:30 Sponsored Break PLENARY 16:30 - 18:00 Defining War in the Information Age "The New National Security" Brief comments by Winn Schwartau and Robert Steele - and then a lively interactive audience debate. 18:00 - 18:10 Closing Comments 18:00 - 20:00 No-Host Reception For complete schedules, and information on InfoWarCon IV (Europe) MAIL OR FAX OR EMAIL: National Computer Security Association 10 South Courthouse Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 Phone 717-258-1816 or FAX 717-243-8642 EMAIL:conference@ncsa.com To obtain the latest edition of this program, send EMail to: euroinfowar(a)ncsa.com For more information about NCSA: WWW: http://www.ncsa.com CompuServe: GO NCSA Email: info(a)ncsa.com Sponsorships for various InfoWarCon (Europe) 96 events are still available. To Find out how to sponsor portions: Contact Paul Gates at the NCSA: pgates(a)ncsa.com To reach: Winn Schwartau: winn(a)infowar.com Robert Steele: ceo(a)oss.net V 1.19/3.11.96 SH Peace Winn Winn Schwartau - Interpact, Inc. Information Warfare and InfoSec V: 813.393.6600 / F: 813.393.6361 Winn(a)InfoWar.Com

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 28 Mar 1996, jim bell wrote: > > Escrowing encrypted keys makes them useless to subpoena, and in > > fact it helps the key owner because the escrow agent can (and, in fact, > > must!) be obligated to inform the key owner if his key is requested. At 05:49 AM 3/29/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: > I thought I would take the time to let everyone know that this is > baseless as well. Most jurisdictions forbid third parties to reveal > prosecution inquries to the principal for which they are holding > documents or other information. A VERY few have laws on the books that > require this disclosure. Switzerland is no longer one of them. If you had actually read the article that you criticize you would have noticed that the "must" was enforced by cryptographic protocols, not by the blunt sword of the law. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Open letter from the Congressional Internet Caucus
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- Date: Fri, 29 Mar 1996 09:45:11 -0800 From: Congressional Internet Caucus <inetcauc(a)hr.house.gov> Organization: U.S. House of Representatives X-Mailer: Mozilla 2.0 (Win16; I) Mime-Version: 1.0 To: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu Subject: Open letter from the Congressional Internet Caucus To the Internet Community at-large, Finally, there is something that both Democrats and Republicans can agree on -- it is time to get Congress on-line for the 21st Century. Over the past few years, the Internet has changed the way we communicate, do business and educate our children. Millions of people log-on to the Internet each day to send and receive information. And this new medium has created thousands of new jobs in our nation's economy. As more and more people go on-line and as the Internet becomes a greater part of our daily lives, new questions arise about how to deal with this new medium. Members of Congress are having to make policy decisions on Internet issues that will impact our future. What role, if any, will the federal government have in developing the Internet? How will Congress respond to Internet-related issues? From encryption to indecency, copyright protection to universal service, Congress will need to make prudent public policy decisions about a medium that presents such enormous opportunities for all Americans. Congress must not make these decisions without the full understanding of and familiarity with the Internet. The Internet will also transform Congress and the government. From communicating with constituents to making government documents available on-line, we need to move into the Information Age NOW. Members of Congress need to use the Internet. To solve some of these problems, we are forming the Internet Caucus: a bipartisan, bicameral group of members with diverse viewpoints. What we share is a mutual concern for promoting the Internet. We will not just talk the talk. Caucus members will walk the walk into cyberspace by signing a pledge to 1) educate themselves about the Internet, 2) get on-line, 3) and educate other members about the Internet. The caucus will also serve as a clearinghouse of information for the public and other offices about Internet related issues. With the assistance of an advisory committee comprised of public interest groups, industry, and respected experts on the Internet, members will discuss and debate policy options. We look forward to getting your input on the many issues before Congress. See you on-line! Sincerely, Congressman Rick White http://www.house.gov/white/ Senator Patrick Leahy http://www.house.gov/~leahy Congressman Rick Boucher http://www.house.gov/boucher/welcome.htm Senator Larry Pressler http://www.senate.gov/senator/pressler.html Speaker Newt Gingrich mailto:georgia6@hr.house.gov Congressman Jack Fields Congressman Edward Markey Congressman Mike Oxley http://www.house.gov/oxley/welcome.html Congressman Christopher Cox Congresswoman Anna Eshoo http://www-eshoo.house.gov/ Congressman Bob Goodlatte mailto:talk2bob@hr.house.gov Congressman Tom Campbell mailto:campbell@hr.house.gov Congressman Robert Walker http://www.house.gov/walker/welcome.html Congresswoman Jennifer Dunn mailto:dunnwa08@hr.house.gov Congressman Vern Ehlers http://www.house.gov/ehlers/welcome.html Senator Slade Gorton http://www.senate.gov/senator/gorton.html Senator Conrad Burns http://www.senate.gov/~burns Senator Ron Wyden http://www.senate.gov/senator/wyden.html Congressman Sam Farr http://www.house.gov/farr/welcome.html Congressman Bill Luther http://www.house.gov/luther/welcome.html

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:49 AM 3/29/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Thu, 28 Mar 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> Escrowing encrypted keys makes them useless to subpoena, and in >> fact it helps the key owner because the escrow agent can (and, in fact, >> must!) be obligated to inform the key owner if his key is requested. > >I thought I would take the time to let everyone know that this is >baseless as well. Most jurisdictions forbid third parties to reveal >prosecution inquries to the principal for which they are holding >documents or other information. A VERY few have laws on the books that >require this disclosure. Switzerland is no longer one of them. As usual, Unicorn is FOS. Not entirely in his facts, but in his conclusions. To "forbit third parties to reveal prosecution inquiries" is an obvious violation of freedom of speech, and in fact is PRIOR RESTRAINT. Maybe Unicorn can't see what's wrong with that, but I can. It is unclear whether this has ever been tested in court, or whether that test occurred recently. Now, in practice I recognize that in the past large organizations which are subpoenaed usually comply with requests to keep an inquiry secret, but one of the effects of the "crypto revolution" and the "net revolution" is clearly to decentralize information power from the places it used to be carefully kept (IBM, ATT, etc) and is now distributing it among many more, far smaller organizations which are much closer to the people the prosecutors might be inclined to target. (for example, your friendly neighborhood ISP). Furthermore, the development of good encryption will allow a willing ISP (for example) to send an encrypted (and possibly semi-anonymous) message to the target of the investigation (or possibly a public USENET area, unaddressed), containing a pre-arranged alarm code to be sent to the target of the investigation, in such a way that any other people (for example, the brainless cops) won't know. The target will be assured (though encryption and signing, or prior arrangement) that the message could only have originated from the contractor (ISP) but the target (and nobody else, as well) will not be able to prove this knowledge to a third party. For example, if I ask my ISP to send me an anonymous, encrypted message with the word, "Rosebud" in it to me if he receives any requests to tap my connection, he can do so with no fear of being discovered, because no third party can decrypt the message, know who is is from, or know the real meaning of the word, "Rosebud" in the context of an encrypted, anonymized message. Further, since the whole thing is by pre-arrangement, even I cannot prove (to the satisfaction of a third party) that the message really meant what I would interpret it to mean. The message is useful to me, as a warning, but it could never turn around and "bite" the ISP. The end result is that your foolish opinion of what the law allows will simply become irrelevant: The government cannot mandate what it cannot enforce, and it cannot enforce what it cannot detect. You may ask, "Why would the operator of a small ISP want to take even a minor risk informing the target of the investigation?" There are a number of obvious answers: 1. He's promised his customer to do so. 2. It's in the contract. 3. And the ever-popular, "He's afraid of getting killed, or his ISP business torched, if word later leaks out that he failed to inform his customer of an investigation." Don't underestimate the significance of such a risk to those people. Destruction of even a full phone switch would not have fazed ATT in the 1960's, but a small ISP depends on valuable equipment at (presumably) a single location. Getting a person mad at them for failing to anonymously inform them of an inquiry would NOT be the best tactic for these small-time operators. >Even if a judge was convinced by the defense not to levy heavy fines >against a third party who pleaded that he or she was simply unable to >comply, informing the principal would literally assure such fines would >be imposed regardless. Again, you assume that informing "the principal" would be detectable. Your wishful thinking is palpable. I really wish you'd be able to distinguish what "the law" could do, given limitless knowledge of the actions of the population, and the REAL WORLD, in which those judges and prosecutors and cops are limited in what they can do by what they can know. This is critical, because we are rapidly approaching a time in which what these people know will be dramatically limited by many of the technologies regularly discussed on Cypherpunks. >Criminal charges of obstruction could easily attach. Bullets could easily fly. You repeatedly state what might, hypothetically, happen, but you don't back it up with a realistic assessment of what actually would _likely_ happen. > Obstruction in connection with narcotics cases or other major >felonies are generally extraditable offenses as well. Someday, obstruction of the Constitution by government agents will be a death-penalty crime. >Once again Mr. Bell pulls legal analysis out of his rectum rather than >basing it in fact or research. > >With Mr. Bell as a defense attorney, who needs prosecutors? If I intended to limit myself to the tools of the court room (that's the enemy's playpen, BTW) I would probably be just as ineffective as the next defense attorney. I've frequently found that the question of who wins in any confrontation is strongly affected by whether I allow myself to be lured into the home territory of the other. This is actually more a psychological battle than a physical one. You obviously believe that the cops and judges can frequently win, if they are able to control the location of the battle; this is true, but it ignores the fact that "the legal system" is generally an 8-hour-per-day, 40-hour-per week system. Going outside the system and attacking directly bypasses all the rules and restrictions which are set up to allow THEM to win. This may sound unfair to people brainwashed to believe that the court system is and should be the final arbiter, but I suggest that long ago they lost whatever moral authority they once might have had. Every time you talk about them fining or prosecuting some third party for not cooperating, you demolish your own claims. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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POT_ktl
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-29-96 NYT reports on the Montana Freemen's competition with the USG: printing money and fostering free market brigandry; building arsenals for terrorizing the weak and suppressing dissent; amassing national security treasure for the protection of the people; and PC education to boot. The USG, looking in the mirror, says such actions are a criminal conspiracy, a "school for crime." POT_ktl

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