December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: SurfWatch
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"tcmay(a)got.net" 8-MAR-1996 20:20:53.36 >>The question I have is if these systems were widely implemented, could >>an Web page author or provider of content be sued for "mislabeling" >>their page? If so, under what circumstances? Could the RSAC attach >Again, I ask about what sort of _contract_ is involved? (In my case, none. >So, suppose I decide that my post, explaining the fraud that is Islam, >should be read by all Muslims. AllahAllowed, an Islamic rating service, is >upset. Just what is their recourse? I have no contract with them and have >not arranged to label my posts. So, who can sue? The government? Try the >First Amendment. Given various anti-obscenity laws that the idiot Supreme Court has already found constitutional (including those against providing "indecent" material to minors), I wouldn't depend on the First Amendment. Here are some scenarios under which rating services could turn into bona-fide censorship (by the governmental limiting of information access definition): A. The government threatens ISPs with more direct censorship (a la the CDA) unless they force their users to rate their pages with some such service. B. The government finds someone guilty of providing indecent materials to minors for not having put a rating on their web pag using some such company - or even all the companies' rating systems. I.e., under nonsense such as attractive nuisance laws. C. The government (a la the V chip) requires a rating system, or one of a collection of "government-approved" rating systems, for all web pages. D. The government in a country such as China uses rating systems to help them filter. E. The government uses already-existing ratings to easier find web pages to shut down upon its instituting a censorship plan. (This is the gun registration argument). These last two don't mean that people shouldn't be permitted to create rating systems for obscenity/whatever - just that responsible people shouldn't encourage them in doing so. Now, except for the last two, these can be gotten around by being in the right country (one not doing such evil acts), but it would be preferable if that weren't the only way to avoid them. Discouraging rating systems in the first place can help to do so. Please note that I'm making a distinction between rating systems involving placement on the web page to be rated, and other ones. The keyword-based ones get around the above arguments (except possibly D and E). as do the central database ones in which someone else is doing the rating. (They do not get around the question of whether parents should be permitted to restrict children's information access on grounds such as obscenity at all. Given that no harm has ever been proven from children's viewing such material (_possibly_ unlike the data on violence, although that is quite disputable and not an argument for censorship), whether parents properly have that degree of sovereignty over their children is questionable. Children are not the property of their parents. -Allen

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The attempt to limit Internet phoning
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I somewhat doubt the below is correct in their believing their actions are the reasons for the anti-Internet-phone move. The recent announcement by 2 New Jersey companies of a service whereby someone with a computer linkup can call someone without it (on Reuters on Yahoo) would appear to be a better explanation. -Allen From: Francisco Lopez <d005734c(a)dcfreenet.seflin.lib.fl.us> Date: Thu, 7 Mar 1996 23:31:18 -0600 From: Gleason Sackman <sackman(a)plains.nodak.edu> To: Multiple recipients of list NET-HAPPENINGS <NET-HAPPENINGS(a)LISTS.INTERNIC.NET> Subject: MISC> 'VON/FWD/IPHONE' ACTIVITIES CONSIDERED "MISUSE OF THE INTERNET" - BY ACTA (130 USA Long Distance Telephone Carriers) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 21:00:08 -0500 (EST) From: Jenny Jacobson <jenny(a)dsl.pitt.edu> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 15:03:07 -0500 (EST) From: Sandy Combs <scombs(a)together.net> To: free-world-dialup(a)pulver.com Subject: [Free World Dialup]: 'VON/FWD/IPHONE' ACTIVITIES CONSIDERED "MISUSE OF THE INTERNET" - BY ACTA (130 USA Long Distance Telephone Carriers) ******************************************************* VON ALERT -- FWD ALERT --IPHONE ALERT -- NETWATCH ALERT ******************************************************* It appears that our recent FREE WORLD DIALUP press release was the straw that broke the camel's back. The FCC was petitioned yesterday by ACTA "TO STOP MISUSE OF THE INTERNET". The sale and use of Voice-On-the-Net (VON) software is being challenged by 130 of the USA's largest long distance telephone carriers. Among them, MCI, SPRINT, and LDDS. According to the ACTA press release: "A growing number of companies are selling software programs with ancillary hardware options that enable a computer to transmit voice conversations. This, in fact, creates the ability to "by-pass" local, long distance and international carriers and allows for calls to be made for virtually 'no cost.'" And also, "...the misuse of the Internet as a way to "by-pass" the traditional means of obtaining long distance service could result in a significant reduction of the Internet's ability to transport its ever enlarging amount of data traffic." 'VON' COALITION BEING FORMED A VON Coalition is currently being formed and members will testify at the spring meeting of the FCC when they discus telephony issues. If you don't want to loose your right to VON technology, NOW is the time to be counted. WHAT CAN I DO? We need an immediate head count of those on these lists that CARE ENOUGH TO BECOME INVOLVED! Subscribe RIGHT NOW to this SPECIAL VON Coalition list: vonYES(a)pulver.com To subscribe: VON Coalition List 1) send E-MAIL to: majordomo(a)pulver.com 2) leave the SUBJECT blank 3) in the BODY write - subscribe vonyes To subscribe: VON Coalition List Digest 1) send E-MAIL to: majordomo(a)pulver.com 2) leave the SUBJECT blank 3) in the BODY write - subscribe vonyes-digest Further discussions regarding the VON Coalition will be posted to the above only. If you DO NOT act TODAY, your rights and FREE TELEPHONE via the internet may well be lost! Jeff Pulver Sandy Combs [your name here] (Press Release distribution authorized by, Jennifer Durst-Jarrell, Executive Director, ACTA 3/5/96)

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Re: Fractals, Cellular Automata, and Encryption
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:35 PM 3/9/96, Alan Bostick wrote: >Howard Gutowitz published and patented in 1992 a symmetric block cipher >algorithm, based on cellular automata, called CA-1.1 . There are a >couple of CA-based hash algorithms. CA-based PRNGs have been shown to >be isomorphic to linear feedback shift register RNGs (not linear >congruential generators, despite what Tim says) and so are subject to >the same security woes as LFSRs. Yeah, that sounds like what it is. This is what I get for answering a question without checking reference sources and/or FAQs, including my own FAQ, wherein it is written: 18.6.2. "Can cellular automata, like Conway's "Game of Life," be used for cryptography?" - Stephen Wolfram proposed use of cellular automata for crytography some years back; his collection of essays on cellular automata contains at least one such mention. Many people suspected that 1D CAs were no stronger than linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs), and I recally hearing a couple of years ago that someone proved 1D CAs (and maybe all CAs?) are equivalent to LFSRs, which have been used in crypto for many years. - Wolfram's book is "Theory and Applications of Cellular Automata," 1986, World Scientific. Several papers on using CAs for random sequence generation. P. Bardell showed in1990 that CAs produce the outputs of LFSRs.) Wolfram also has a paper, "Cryptography with cellular automata," in Proc. CRYPTO 85. - Intuitively, the idea of a CA looks attractive for "one-way functions," for the reasons mentioned. But what's the "trapdoor" that gives the key holder a shortcut to reverse the process? (Public key crypto needs a trapdoor 1-way funtion that is easy to reverse if one has the right information). On the other hand, if more people asking questions about fractals, chaos, quantum cryptography, etc., would check the usual places, others would not have to do this searching for them. (To his credit, the guy who asked today if anyone knew anything about the "index of coincidence" did say that he first grepped through my FAQ.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: SurfWatch
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"jsw(a)netscape.com" "Jeff Weinstein" 9-MAR-1996 04:41:47.02 > I predict that 6 months after the first internet rating system is widely >deployed, the largest use of search engines such as altavista will be to >look for pages with the most "naughty" ratings. Perhaps such services will >allow text searches for free, but charge for searches based on the rating >tag... Unfortunately, AltaVista doesn't index based on comments field (in which category the SafeSurf ratings fall). Opentext, given that one supposedly can search for links to a page, may be able to do it on the other hand. Putting together a web spider that would search for such could be a profitable undertaking. I did some checking on AltaVista and found one service by the name of "Naughty Lynx" which automatically checks all of its links every hour or so - one problem with "adult-oriented" sites is that they disappear a lot. Some such feature would probably be necessary. Seems to be a good potential use of the DigiCash system, since one doesn't need merchant anonymnity that much until someone comes up with anonymous-location web pages; the Naughty Lynx system appears to support itself via advertising). Combining this with a web proxy would also be good. -Allen

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Assasination Politics Thread #3
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: jf_avon(a)citenet.net (Jean-Francois Avon (JFA Technologies, QC, Canada)) >"E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH(a)mbcl.rutgers.edu> wrote: >> Has it? Currently, we've got the guys who deal with the public (the >>politicians and the low-level bureaucrats) and the faceless drones (the rest >>of the bureaucrats). The politicians can be protected, and already are to >>some degree. The low-level bureaucrats aren't _that_ likely to be targeted >>by enough people to make a difference, and the ones who go bad enough to do >>so can be protected (or sacrificed, if that seems to be the way to keep the >>public happy). The faceless drones can be even more faceless, and so very >>hard to target. >Just a question to you: >What makes the faceless drones powerfull? The classification of low-level bureaucrat known as a cop. See above for the problems with them. -Allen

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Re: SurfWatch
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I plan to taper off on all responses to this thread about SurfWatch and ratings services. Various sides have expressed their opinions about what courts and governments will demand, and others respond by saying, "I disagree. They can pass a law..." or "I disagree. The government is powerless," etc. At 11:25 PM 3/9/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > Given various anti-obscenity laws that the idiot Supreme Court has >already found constitutional (including those against providing "indecent" >material to minors), I wouldn't depend on the First Amendment. Here are some Finding something to be obscene, or treasonable, or actionable in other ways, ex post facto, is significantly different from a requirement _in advance_ that words be "rated." (Before anyone cites the MPAA movie ratings, an old war horse often trotted out as proof that the government requires ratings, let me again point out that the MPAA ratings are not required by the government and that the MPAA is nominally a private organization. Now, what the government _might_ have done back in the 60s had the movie industry not acted to "police themselves" is unknown to us. The Supremes might have overturned any mandatory rating on movies, just as they almost certainly would for words.) In the terms of the lawyers--from what I picked up during my time on the Cyberial list--a requirement that words be rated before they can be distributed would not pass Constitutional muster. This does not mean that one's words will not trigger prosecutions, lawsuits, treason trials, etc. What it means is that "prior restraint" is frowned upon (recall "The Progressive" H-bomb case of about 15 years ago, where a court subjected this magazine to prior restraint...a rare occurrence, later overturned. A more recent case involves "Business Week," and is still unresolved). >scenarios under which rating services could turn into bona-fide censorship >(by the governmental limiting of information access definition): > A. The government threatens ISPs with more direct censorship (a la the >CDA) unless they force their users to rate their pages with some such service. See above. Books are not rated. Even the "parental advisories" on CDs are ostensibly voluntary (granted, because noises were made about government ratings...but the point remains that a good, solid Constitutional test has not yet happened). > C. The government (a la the V chip) requires a rating system, or one >of a collection of "government-approved" rating systems, for all web pages. By the way, who does the rating in this scenario? As others have also noted, if I am rating my own pages, and rate them as "suitable for all ages," but Jesse Helms disagrees, what charges can be filed? That I was not a good enough judge of the material? That my opinions differed from Senator Helms'? "Voluntary self-rating" runs into problems, such as this example. One is left with ratings by _others_, e.g.. ratings boards, and even then there are variations of this same problem. The "Lesbian Alliance" is going to have different ideas of what children should be exposed to than the "Christian Crusade" will ideas about. Who is right? ("What is truth?") So, one is then left with government censors. And the Constitution is pretty clear about this. > D. The government in a country such as China uses rating systems to >help them filter. Doesn't have much to do with _my_ words or pages. It ain't the business of the U.S. court system--which is what we're talking about here--to worry about what some Maoists think is proper for young cadres to read. >(They do not get around the question of whether parents should be permitted to >restrict children's information access on grounds such as obscenity at all. >Given that no harm has ever been proven from children's viewing such material >(_possibly_ unlike the data on violence, although that is quite disputable and >not an argument for censorship), whether parents properly have that degree of >sovereignty over their children is questionable. Children are not the property >of their parents. I disagree with the overall conclusions of this line of reasoning. (Though the "children are not the property of their parents" point is heavy phrasing, and hard to take issue with directly, due to the language.) I don't know if exposure to sex is good or bad. I see a lot of aimless souls. I see a lot of AIDS. I'm unpersuaded that the proper solution is just to teach "safe sex" and proper condom-donning behaviors to fourth graders. If my neighbor wants to expose her children to this, that's her business. In any case, while children are not for their parents to do with as they please, a reasonable Schelling point has been that I will not force other parents to expose their children to the teachings of Cthulhu if they will not demand that my children sit through propaganda tapes about the joys of homosexual sex. The status of children in a free society is a thorny issue, but I reject the increasingly-prevalent notion that society knows what's best and the government will decide what influences can be used with children. A society which takes away this parental choice is a terrible society. I see much of the debate about violence and sex in society and in the media as being this kind of "battle for the hearts and minds" of children. I don't want some sociologist telling me that "Terminator II" is "bad" for my child but that "The Story of O" should be mandatory for my 11-year-old to watch. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Cryptanalysis
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"tcmay(a)got.net" 9-MAR-1996 12:05:04.70 >There are very good reasons to say little about "conventional >cryptanalysis": it just doesn't matter much with modern ciphers, such as >public key systems. Modern ciphers don't fall to conventional attacks based >on word frequency, pattern analysis, etc. I realize that this may also be considered an out of date subject, but what's a good reference for codes as opposed to cyphers (other than the one reference in the Cyphernomicon which includes "codes" in its title)? Thanks, -Allen

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Re: U.S. State Dept criticizes Chinese net-censorship
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Paul said: >examples set for him by those who are his mentors. If man turns >predatory, it is because he found that set of behaviors best suit his >needs of the moment - otherwise he would seek other ways of fullfilling >those needs. >Hence - we are not rational creatures. Well, I do not agree with that statement. Even if most individuals are not acting on rational basis, it does not mean that Man is not a rational animal. Man exercise thought and reason in a volitional manner. Wether he decides or not to do it is another thing. So many peoples *actively* avoid thinking and yet, it is the only way they could survive if it were not of others... In a sense, they are free-riders. To think and use reason requires efforts. I guess that they just do not like exercising... Regards JFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMUHk4siycyXFit0NAQG9rwgAngIpFTTbaJXBG+u3fiLPdMhDl9VOTHAW nIxuRZ1AkMbXZbJXYeY97C0BLxMt7PqQInDUL0eW68GwAt2F7LqUuhdKh64QXwi+ 7jHas+/RCDj/CkxifHZv67uNPuIb7k0mDH8hHumsF0rUXT93P8yNWAMeL6z7dBnG M2vapstNpxwhmX+u9La3smoGDQniJ2XkQ7VDIcM9rfDrIl1Z3lmuzmpxn+HuxMJm i38fbmBuouL7WtxRhv0F8qVdz05O21+3tn7L303UWS21ffw8Su970gvHwDr6F0HU vLmpN6zv/s1mgqF7gTAb5GUizmH2vwjgR7/5kzH7GViKl4ZI5cY1EA== =JmUo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Public Key at http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 2048 bits key ID:C58ADD0D 1996/03/01 fingerprint=52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91

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Re: Cryptanalysis
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:57 PM 3/9/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"tcmay(a)got.net" 9-MAR-1996 12:05:04.70 > >>There are very good reasons to say little about "conventional >>cryptanalysis": it just doesn't matter much with modern ciphers, such as >>public key systems. Modern ciphers don't fall to conventional attacks based >>on word frequency, pattern analysis, etc. > > I realize that this may also be considered an out of date subject, >but what's a good reference for codes as opposed to cyphers (other than >the one reference in the Cyphernomicon which includes "codes" in its title)? The usual: Kahn, Denning, and some of the old Dover Press books on crypto. Also, Herbert Zim wrote a nice little book about 40-50 years ago on codes. Some of the standard crypto textbooks will of course have more pointers to cryptanalysis. (Not to sound harsh to Allen, but why would anyone ask here on the list for recommendations to such a standard subject when Schneier, Garfinkel, Denning, etc. all have books listed?) Again, the reason stuff like "word frequency counts" and "index of coincidence" notions are so seldom involved in modern crypto--which is what all public key systems involve--is that they are essentially of no use. There is no point in doing statistical analysis of patterns on the ciphertext in an RSA or similar encryption. (Because any "patterns" discovered are meaningless.) And there are so many interesting areas to pursue with using and furthering modern crypto, that I just can't understand how people can think that classical cryptanalysis is useful. It might be fun, as a hobby, but it has no bearing on modern systems. (Well, I'm exaggerating a bit. I suspect that classical cryptanalysts at the NSA or GCHQ might have some insights into some problems with modern systems, such as traffic analysis. So I shouldn't say there is "no use" for it. But I hope you all understand my point in general. It is unlikely in the extreme that anyone who fools around a little with classical cryptanalysis will have anything important to contribute as a result of this.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Leahy's guillotine.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: All Recent Senate crypto bill Mr. LEAHY (for himself, Mr. BURNS, and MRS. MURRAY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee [stuff deleted] 2804. Unlawful use of encryption to obstruct justice Whoever willfully endeavors by means of encryption to obstruct, impede, or prevent the communication of information in furtherance to a felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, to an investigative or law enforcement officer shall... I think we may reasonably assume that this section was very carefully written, and thus it may contain meanings (or avoid containing meanings) that only a careful reading will disclose. Contrary to some other sloppy interpretations that I've seen here recently from organizations that ought to know better, I see nothing in this section that limits the prosecution on this law to people who are actually participating in a crime. This distinction is vital. While the sentence is not diagrammed, it appears to be the INFORMATION which is in "furtherance to a felony," not the "obstructing" of that communication. The implication is that it is not necessary that a person know the exact information involved or be able to decrypt it; he needs only be deliberately using encryption to prevent the knowledge of what the information is about, or its routing. (As in an encrypted anonymous remailer, for instance.) Moreover, the errors among the organizations that are now apparently declaring their general support for this amendment are apparently based on a false view of the effects of this section. Aside from this, it isn't clear what is meant by the phrase, "obstruct, impede, or prevent the communication of information in furtherance to a felony." An obvious problem is this: How will they know if the use of encryption actually had that effect? If it was UNsuccessful, then obviously that encryption did not prevent the government from obtaining information. If it was SUCCESSFUL, then how is the government to know that the communication in question was "in furtherance to a felony"? Even if they can prove the felony by other means, how can they show that the communication actually had anything to do with the crime? Another problem: Encryption, per se, does not "prevent the communication of information." What it does, of course, is to prevent the UNDERSTANDING of that information. Do the writers of this bill intend to use this law to punish the LATTER effect, rather than the former? Further, how is the person to be charged to know if his use of encryption had the effect of "obstruct[ing], imped[ing], or prevent[ing] the communication of that information? If he encrypts a file to his hard disk, and he doesn't intentionally send the file to the cops, how is he supposed to anticipate that the use of encryption had this effect? As far as HE knows, it was simply his decision to not send the file to the cops; he can't be expected to know that they'll show up the next morning with a search warrant and take his computer, can he? Would his refusal to provide the decrypt key constitute a violation of this section? Or, if he sends that file to another person, and the cops happen to be (secretly) listening in, how is he to know? Does their inability to decrypt that information constitute a violation of this section? After all, the cops did indeed get the encrypted file; they simply don't know what to do with it! They are already "impeded" in UNDERSTANDING that file; a broad interpretation of this law would make the person who is wiretapped, as well as the person to/from whom the file is send, guilty of this crime. I'll be blunt, because it's what I do best: Anybody who reads this section of the bill and is NOT worried about its myriad possible interpretations is a fool or worse. I'd welcome a lawyer's interpretation of this law, but I suspect he'd be just as worried as I am: This section is a disaster waiting to happen; it is genuinely a Pandora's box that is just waiting to be opened by some sleazy prosecutor. Further, any organization with even a shred of credibility that does not condition its support for this bill on the complete removal of this section is doing the rest of us an extreme disservice: It is trading on and risking its reputation, because many of them are issuing opinions of this section of the bill with assurances that it will only be used against "guilty" people, when there is simply no way to know if this is going to be true. Wake up, people. These days, the only difference between a limousine and a tumbrel is the destination... Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMUIpdPqHVDBboB2dAQHoxgP/W3QVLGB4xfRQVVf/Udh+sa72Jhy64ON1 Gp2tfiTRYN1LkbpicZI84Hl2m0P2+D3cCCwEL87FDJgKOz2VFHowhGB+cQYIbw5X te3JNT+DFJQ5y+rdDptnraZkToWJIqVFohOguKP3uPi0lQVK5J331QlfQrt1Fuxi qpVf/zAE5yI= =dpTg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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