December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: FW: Communications Decency Act (hee-hee)
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Timothy C. May This is of course an old idea. Regrettably, the CDA is not based on a simple bright line test invovling the "Seven [exonized] Words," immortalized in the FCC--Carlin--Pacifica case. Rather, "indecent" is broadly interpreted to mean essentially whatever a prosecutor can convince a panel of bluenosed citizens is indecent. .................................................................... Well, if you were prosecuted, you could always explain what it means to kiss your "Gingrich" by pointing to any part of your body you choose. Of course they would be indicating, by their accusations, that they know enough about indecency to become suspicious over the resemblance.... (such sensitive people) .. Blanc

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Re: Duress
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 3 Mar 1996, Bill Frantz wrote: > >Of course, all smart air piracy buffs know the transponder code is 7600, > >and refuse to allow the pilots to use it. > > It changes from time to time. Of course subscribing to an IFR chart > service will keep you up-to-date with the changes. You should forward this to the list. > > Regards - Bill > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting > (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. > frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA > > > --- My prefered and soon to be permanent e-mail address: unicorn(a)schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information

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[BABBLE] Like a Rolling Stone
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I just got off the phone with a writer from Rolling Stone magazine. They are going to be doing an article about the Geek Code. Isn't that just groovy? Maybe they'll let me be on the cover and I can do one of those Howard Stern nude things..... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.2 iQCVAwUBMTuPhjokqlyVGmCFAQGzoAQAqdHYz6tMEPlu/4n/nsrYO/eIz96K/ZSJ 44Gzehrtrlw0zg6rpdWab7BzbCapjqJEgnupRsGRVzlQ449LYLVZ2KIHwMfK5zFe 0hS57USj1ShQyqeNv6K2qGmH38n5/U6oAgnpXo8LPBWgkN9zxBI04hiBtoeQrnak UCfeg31EmWU= =Vq8N -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Finger for PGP Public Key \/ / -=-=-=-=-=- -=-=-=-=-=- \/ http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/Welcome.html -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.1 GED/J d-- s:++>: a-- C++(++++)$ ULUO++ P+>+++ L++ !E---- W+(---) N+++ o+ K+++ w+(---) O- M+$>++ V-- PS++(+++)>$ PE++(+)>$ Y++ PGP++ t- 5+++ X++ R+++>$ tv+ b+ DI+++ D+++ G+++++>$ e++$>++++ h r-- y+** ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------

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Re: Bombings, Surveillance, and Free Societies
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:28 AM 3/5/96, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote: >Timothy C. May wrote: > >>The Red Brigade in Italy sought a fascist crackdown, and >> the "strategy of tension" is common. (And even revolutionists of crypto >> anarchist persuasion often think laws like the CDA are good in the long >> run, by undermining respect for authority and triggering more extreme >> reactions....) > >It is important to note in this regard that the worst bombing in Italy was >the Bologna station bombing, now decisively linked to right wing facist >groups the involvment in which of ex-prime minister Adreotti is shortly to >be examined in a criminal trial. The point being that the extreemists play >into each others hands. Yes, it is hard to know even which side is pulling the strings. The WW2 Italian fascist commando leader, Otto Skorzeny, not only rescued Mussolini from a ski chalet, he also helped set up the PLO in the 1960s, and consulted for the OSS, CIA, and such. (There is much more to say about this, and about the role of the early NSA in such affairs. However, continuing down this path will produce the inevitable perrygrams from the acerbic Mr. Metzger demanding "What does this have to [whatever my current interest is]?")) >> -- expect the various laws about "talking about explosives on the Net" to >> be used to clamp down on various fringe groups > >Hang on here, some of those groups are actively conspiring to commit >terrorist acts. If someone sends a message saying "lets plant a bomb >under a federal building, that will show them" I'm not worried if the >govt. decides to arrest a few people. There is a border between free >speech and conspiracy to murder which some people have crossed. I don't buy this. I said "talking about explosives on the Net," not openly conspiring to plant bombs in federal buildings. A big difference. (Not that I am aware of the OKC bombers discussing their plans on the Usenet.) >> I predict that it will take about 5 more major bombings in European and >> American cities to trigger substantive changes in laws. > >Generally it takes two. The legislation is written after the first and >then staled until being passed on the second. I am sandbagging by saying "5." I wasn't referring to 5 in, say, the U.S., but to 5 or so "horrific" bombs in Western countries, plus Israel. A second Oklahoma City-type bombing may be enough, a Sarin attack that kills 1,000 will almost surely be enough. (In the bigger scheme of things, the 150-200 or so who died in OKC are a drop in the bucket, and I wouldn't advocate _any_ new surveillance laws for them...putting a day care center in a soft target demonstrates the callousness of the Feds.) >> Personally, while I feel sorry for the dead in Israel, I think anyone who >> moves to a small desert state surrounded on all sides by Arabs who want >> their land back is asking for trouble. > >A point to consider is that there are many Isralis born in Israel who have no >other home. These people did not ask to be born in the middle of a desert >state. As with the Irish problem it is easy to solve if one could change >the past. The fundamental problem being that the wrong side won at Hastings. Let me use the language Bill Stewart used a while back, language which skirts the issue of "right" and "wrong" even more neatly than I did (when I said the Jews were "asking for trouble"): "If a religious group uses force to expel the current occupants of a desert region, and expels them to just beyond their borders, it is "unsurprising" that those expelled, and their children, and their children's children, will swear a blood oath to drive the group into the sea." Put another way, I will not be "surprised" to wake up one morning and hear on CNN that Tel Aviv has been vaporized in a nuclear explosion. Nor will I be surprised to similarly learn that Damascus has been vaporized, and so on. Being an atheist, I treat all religious mystics as suspect. When a bunch of people leave London and Chicago and Paris to live in the desert, surrounded by sworn enemies with nuclear capabilities, I think whatever happens to them is...."unsurprising." I hope this makes my outlook clearer. (And Cypherpunks should fully understand that information-trading systems and unbreakably encryption--the very technologies we so ardently are pushing--make certain actions even less "surprising" than might otherwise be the case. Think of it as evolution in action.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Teach the children well...
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got the latest copy of the latest ComputerWare catalog (they're a big mac dealer). Up front, in there list of new releases was something that looked fun; --- Top Secret Decoder (CD-ROM) Ages 8-12 Mysterious, marvelous, mind-stretching software for kids who love creating and cracking secret codes. Kids'll sharpen their critical-thinking skills and earn top-otc secret agent credentials. Includes 300 code-cracking challenges, spectacular printing, plus 10 difficulty levels. $39.99 Houghton Mifflin Interactive ----- There is no truth to the rumours that they are POTP or IPG licencees. If you beat level 10, an animated Jim Bizdos comes out and does a little dance Take a copy along when you do your visit for NetDay Simon --- They say in online country So which side are you on boys There is no middle way Which side are you on You'll either be a Usenet man Which side are you on boys Or a thug for the CDA Which side are you on? National Union of Computer Operatives; Hackers, local 37 APL-CPIO

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None
by Mr. Boffo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>>>> "Black" == Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> writes: Black> On Sun, 3 Mar 1996, John Pettitt wrote: >> I'd like to run an encrypted mailing list - the model I'm >> linking of is this .. >> >> Poster cryptes mail with pgp using list exploder key. List >> exploder decrypts mail and recrypts with keys for all current >> list members and then sends the mail. >> >> [I don't want all the list members to need to know every other >> list members public key] >> >> Before I lanch into hacking majordomo - has anybody done this >> already or somthing like it ? Black> Someone asked this a little while ago. I don't recall if Black> there was an answer. I hope so, I'd be interested too. Check out the Web Page at www.alias.net. There is an entry on PGPdomo.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 4 Mar 96 6:48:59 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net **+-*+***+*# 10:33 99.99% vegas remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com **#+***#+### 3:24 99.99% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ############ :18 99.97% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net +-+-----+--+ 2:02:33 99.96% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl *********+** 8:08 99.95% gondonym alias(a)nym.gondolin.org ------------ 3:27:17 99.94% replay remailer(a)replay.com ****+**+**** 5:07 99.91% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ###* +*--##+ 25:24 99.87% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org -----+------ 3:27:40 99.77% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org *-+*+++ +.-+ 58:19 99.76% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *+* .+*----+ 46:22 99.75% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net -+-**** -** 32:44 99.70% c2 remail(a)c2.org +-*-++++ -* 39:23 99.66% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ----------- 2:31:41 99.57% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com #*-#######*# 3:08 99.19% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ----___.+- 24:11:30 99.18% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com *-*+*-*** -* 24:02 98.98% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi .-.---... 23:23:07 97.58% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net +*****+* ## 25:06 90.76% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++++++ +-+ 37:47 90.28% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu #- ## 22:41 80.89% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ..---+ 5:31:48 34.72% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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No Subject
by nobody＠vegas.gateway.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thought that this was worth reposting: >I attended last weeks "Information, National Policies, and International >Infrastructure" Symposium at Harvard Law School, organized by the Global >Information Infrastructure Commission, the Kennedy School and the >Institute for Information Technology Law & Policy of Harvard Law School. > >During the presentation by Paul Strassmann, National Defense University >and William Marlow, Science Applications International Corporation, >entitled "Anonymous Remailers as Risk-Free International Infoterrorists" >the questions was raised from audience (Professor Chaarles Nesson, >Harvard LAw School) - in a rather extended debate - whether the CIA and >similar government agencies are involved in running anonymous remailers >as this would be a perfect target to scan possibly illegal messages. > >Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous >remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. >Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that >the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the >respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 >bit keys. > >I ask Marlos afterwards if these comments were off or on record, he >paused then said that he can be quoted. > >So I thought I pass that on. It seems interesting enough, don't you >think? > >Best > >Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger >Information Law Project >Austrian Institute for Legal Policy > Groundfog(a)alpha.c2.org

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PAB_lum
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-4-96. WSJ: "U.S. Commission Recommends Staff Cuts at Intelligence Agencies." The most numerous cuts would be at the CIA, DIA and NSA. Former Sen. Warren Rudman said the super-secret NSA, which conducts various forms of electronic eavesdropping abroad, was most in need of a cut that could provide money for new computer-related technology and bring in people with new technical skills. 3-3-96. NYT: "Spy Pablum." [Editorial] After a year of study and high public expectations, the commission stepped up to this promising moment with all the spine of a rag doll. There is nothing radical about its report, which is precisely its problem. When it comes to the larger picture of just what kind of intelligence network America needs now that the cold war is over, and whether some agencies ought to be combined or eliminated altogether, the commission lacks imagination and courage. PAB_lum

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Re: NYT on Crypto Bills
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, my first objection is that this law could become something like mail fraud. If the term "data coding" is used, it should be carefully defined. After all, this letter is coded in ASCII. My voice communications are digitized and coded by some algorithm defined by the phone company. -Peter

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