December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Phil Zimmermann Interview online...
by RUSSELLDH＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't recall seeing this previously on the list. The interview itself is pretty lightweight - intended for a rather broad audience - but it's the sort of thing we could use more of (that is, good positive pro-crypto publicity). original message goes here ---> Hi! On February 2nd, 1996 I interviewed Phil Zimmermann and have transcribed that interview and placed it on the Web. It is located at: http://www.animatedsoftware.com/hightech/philspgp.htm I hope you find it interesting. If you would like to add a link to it please let us know. By the way, I enjoyed visiting your home page, where I got your email address. Thanks, Russell Hoffman http://www.animatedsoftware.com --- David Smith, Intellecutal Terrorist http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/

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Bad news from Judge Richey
by Phil Karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last Friday, Judge Richey issued a 36-page opinion dismissing my suit against the State Dept. I am waiting for a copy of the opinion, which should arrive in paper form tomorrow. I'll post it on my web site when it's available in electronic form. (http://www.qualcomm.com/people/pkarn/export) I'll be meeting my attorneys next Monday to plan an appeal strategy. Phil

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:23 PM 3/25/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >Obviously things get more complicated when a private key or set of keys "is >one's identity." That is, at some future time, when a key or set of keys is >literally the key to one's identity, then this document is no longer "just >another document." A law enforcement agency or court that obtains these >keys could do much damage, beyond just the matter being investigated or >tried in court. The release of the key cannot be undone. A thorny problem. This is precisely the problem Certificate Revocation Lists and Certificate Expiration Dates address. There seems very little reason to subpoena a persons signing key, only decryption keys. If future software uses separate keys for these two functions, then there may be minimal danger. (With PGP, it should be sufficient to provide the IDEA keys for the messages in question, leaving the secret key still secret.) Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Mentor request - ISEF/Westinghouse science fair project
by Jack Mott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello cypherpunks, My name is Jack Mott, and I'm the junior in highschool who posted the c++ source code a while ago, and as you can see it is pretty bad. ( self taught over 9 months ) Anyway for a science fair project this year, I would like to either create a new, or implement an existing encryption algorithm from scratch. I need someone who has some experience programming in C/C++ and with crypto to get advice from and consult with from time to time. I have done well in science fairs in the past, and I could definitely win states with some help. If anyone is interested let me know. p.s. - there is another interesting twist to my project, but I don't want to give the idea away just yet. -- thecrow(a)iconn.net "It can't rain all the time"

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:14 PM 3/25/96, Simon Spero wrote: >If the Leahy bill is unacceptable, what legistlation is necessary? I >can't see how the use of cryptography in the commission of a crime needs >to be a separate offence, but I could see how it could be treated as a >special circumstance - that doesn't really needed a new law though. I don't see any compelling need for U.S. legislation. And given the pressures to attach all sorts of language to bills, I think it best that no legislation happen. Consider a few areas in turn: * DOMESTIC USE OF ENCRYPTION: Currently, no restrictions whatsoever. No laws saying messages can't be encrypted, no laws saying keys must be escrowed, no laws about permissable strength of ciphers, no special laws covering disclosure of keys. Just silence, blessed silence. The Constitution says there shall be no laws about permissable speech (what language one speaks in, or writes in), and other provisions about compelled testimony seem adequate. * EXPORT OF CRYPTO BEYOND U.S.: This is indeed a thorn in the sides of U.S. companies, but is not _per se_ an issue I worry about. So long as I have strong crypto, I don't really care too much about export. It would be nice to get the ITARs modified, but not at the risk of adding language (such as Leahy did) making use of encryption a possible crime (we've debated this, so I won't elaborate here). Besides, I think the best way to overturn the ITARs is through a court challenge; as I have noted, even the NSA's lawyers felt that the ITARs would not withstand court scrutiny. * KEY ESCROW: A matter of contract law, nothing more. If I want to give a copy of my key to my lawyer, fine. If I want to give a copy to Vince's Offshore Key Repository, no current U.S. laws stops me from doing so, and I can even get it to him securely without violating any ITARs by using the cipher that _he_ uses and then importing it here! (Michael Froomkin speculated in one of his articles, I don't recall which, that there might need to be certain guidelines or laws if a key escrow protocol were to invoke the U.S. court system. Maybe. But I think ordinary contract law, about what a contract says and what it means, is adequate. If I pay Joe's Key Warehouse a fee to store my key and it loses it, or gives it to another party, then damages can be collected.) IMPORTANT NOTE: It is often said, in a correct interpretation I think, that a third party holding a key (Joe's Key Warehouse) is _not_ covered by the 5th Amendment's protections against self-incrimination, and so must honor a subpoena. Sounds accurate to me. However, what if Joe is _also_ one's lawyer? Does attorney-client privilege apply here? Perhaps. A better solution is also fully legal at this time: use only offshore key storage. A U.S. subpoena to Vince's Offshore Key Repository will carry no weight in Anguilla. (Can I be compelled to ask Vince to send my key? Sure. But Vince and I could have a stipulation that such "duress requests" will not be honored, no matter how loudly I squawk.) * DIGITAL MONEY. Well, this is such a confusing muddle of competing systems, unclear interpretations, and hyped claims, that I won't address it. Nor do any of the current bills being considered address it. In conclusion, things are fine as they are. I see no compelling need to write a special law confirming the rights we already are enjoying. If the Congress wants to relax the ITARs (fat chance), they can direct that the language of specific sections be redrafted. (I'm not even sure when and how the original language was crafted, though it is part, I believe, of the ancient Munitions Act and/or Trading with the Enemy Act. The enabling legislation for the ITARs, and especially for the specific items actually ON the "Munitions List" could be trivially changed. Were this Leahy's intent, an easy thing to write a bill for. I doubt this was his intent, however. Last point: >I do feel that it should be possible for courts to sub poena crypto keys, >but that doesn't really need new law either (4th and 5th ammendments >become _really_ important though (hmmm- there advantages to writing down a >constitution after all :) I agree that subpoenas for keys are legit. While I may dislike giving up my key, in a criminal matter it seems like "just another document." If they can subpoena my diary, my phone records, my dentist bills, why not another this document? Nothing in the Constitution giving it special status. Still, one can store spare copies of keys with one's lawyer, which _may_ protect it against retrieval by subpoena, and one can store spare copies of keys in foreign jurisdictions, which almost certainly will protect against the retrieval (unless an international treaty on such things is passed!). Obviously things get more complicated when a private key or set of keys "is one's identity." That is, at some future time, when a key or set of keys is literally the key to one's identity, then this document is no longer "just another document." A law enforcement agency or court that obtains these keys could do much damage, beyond just the matter being investigated or tried in court. The release of the key cannot be undone. A thorny problem. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:21 AM 3/26/96, jim bell wrote: >While this may end up looking like another of Jim Bell's odd Yes, you got this part right. >interpretations, the only section in the US Constitution that I see as >potentially REQUIRING a person's testimony is the section (can't recall >which) which says that a defendant must have a process to compel the >appearance of witnesses in his favor. The Constitution, as far as I see, >says nothing about requiring people to appear for the PROSECUTION. IANACS (I am not a Constitutional scholar), but it is clear that the Constitution, being a relatively short document, is a _framework_, a kind of "generator," for establishing additional legislation. This is, obviously enough, why there is _legislative branch_, after all. Jim's argument (?) could be turned in all sorts of ways: "Your Honor, there is nothing I can find in the Constitution that says I can't drive on the left side of the road at 125 miles per hour." Indeed, there is nothing laying out detailed traffic laws. And so on. That the Fifth Amendment attempts to make it clear that a defendant shall not be compelled to give testimony which may tend toincriminate himself (lotsa gotchas, as expected) clearly--to me if not to Jim Bell--implies that a "legal system" involving testimony, search warrants, subpoenas, juries, verdicts, appeals, etc., is implied by various parts of the Constitution. (I could search one of the many online copies of the Big C for details, but I'm sure you all, except perhaps Jim, get it.) I'm no apologist for Big Government, of course, so I think we have vastly too many laws in the U.S. But I don't think naive arguments saying that a court cannot call witnesses by due process because the Constitution does not specifically have a clause saying this is the case is going to be very helpful or persuasive. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:23 PM 3/25/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > Besides, I think the best way to overturn the > ITARs is through a court challenge; as I have noted, even the NSA's lawyers > felt that the ITARs would not withstand court scrutiny. Note that the spooks have carefully avoided a full bore court showdown. They harassed Phil until the statute of limitations caught up with them, but never brought it to trial. If we had no further legislation, and the courts broke ITAR, we would be home free. No plausible legislation could give us that. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Let's *NOT* "Raise their Awareness"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:15 AM 3/26/96, jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: >At 01:22 AM 3/25/96 -0500, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: >> Leahy Bill has NOT A CHANCE IN HELL of passing, and so is worth >> supporting to raise awareness of crypto. > >Washington is the last place where we wish to raise awareness of >crypto I try to avoid "me too" echoes, but this is worth concurring with, strongly. Nothing good can come out of "raising awareness," especially of an issue where the Consitution is already pretty clearly on the side of the right to speak in whatever language one chooses, to keep diaries in code if one wishes, to whisper to others, to place curtains on windows, to lock doors, and so on. (I suppose Jim Bell will point out that the Constitution contains no explicit language about placement of curtains....) Whenever Congress gets "exercised" about some subject, laws are often the result. And often the seemingly minor things thrown in to satisfy some interest end up ensnaring us in a new set of regulations. No thanks. We already can freely encrypt. We already can use any strength of cipher we can get. We already can deposit a spare key with our mother-in-law or with a friend in Lichtenstein. What more do we need? Free export of crypto products would be nice. But not if the quid pro quo for this is giving up some of the freedoms we already have. And "raising awareness" also increases the chances for _international treaty_ discussions. Frankly, the U.S. will be the instigator of any such treaty discussions, so the more ignorant the diplomats and legislators are, the better. Then they'll be less likely to broach the subject with their Italian, German, French, and Russian counterparts...the more of an "urgent issue" crypto is, the more it is being publically debated, the greater will be the likelihood that diplomats and legislators will "do something!" Remember the First Rule of Politics: "Look important and pass laws." --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:23 PM 3/25/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >I don't see any compelling need for U.S. legislation. And given the >pressures to attach all sorts of language to bills, I think it best that no >legislation happen. [stuff deleted] >IMPORTANT NOTE: It is often said, in a correct interpretation I think, that >a third party holding a key (Joe's Key Warehouse) is _not_ covered by the >5th Amendment's protections against self-incrimination, and so must honor a >subpoena. Sounds accurate to me. While this may end up looking like another of Jim Bell's odd interpretations, the only section in the US Constitution that I see as potentially REQUIRING a person's testimony is the section (can't recall which) which says that a defendant must have a process to compel the appearance of witnesses in his favor. The Constitution, as far as I see, says nothing about requiring people to appear for the PROSECUTION. I know that plenty of judges just automatically assume that this requirement is somehow in there, but a literal reading of the Constitution doesn't provide it. If that's the case, the government has and should have no mechanism to force any key escrow agent to reveal a key. >However, what if Joe is _also_ one's >lawyer? Does attorney-client privilege apply here? Perhaps. A better >solution is also fully legal at this time: use only offshore key storage. A >U.S. subpoena to Vince's Offshore Key Repository will carry no weight in >Anguilla. (Can I be compelled to ask Vince to send my key? Sure. But Vince >and I could have a stipulation that such "duress requests" will not be >honored, no matter how loudly I squawk.) I've always been astonished at the assumption that the government seems to be making that key escrow (which is fundamentally done for the benefit of the key holder) will be implemented in a way that could possibly help the cops out, in a way done to the detriment of the key holder. >>I do feel that it should be possible for courts to sub poena crypto keys, >>but that doesn't really need new law either (4th and 5th ammendments >>become _really_ important though (hmmm- there advantages to writing down a >>constitution after all :) > >I agree that subpoenas for keys are legit. While I may dislike giving up my >key, in a criminal matter it seems like "just another document." If they >can subpoena my diary, my phone records, my dentist bills, why not another >this document? Nothing in the Constitution giving it special status. But are subpoenas _really_ constitutional? In any case, one of the effects of the widespread availability of good encryption might be that suddenly the documents that cops have historically thought were subpoena-able will no longer be. That's life, although they won't like it. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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MUSE (Mail Ubiquitous Security Extensions) discussion starting
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Don Eastlake has written an internet-draft proposing to add signatures and encryption to the Internet mail-delivery system. The two big differences between his proposal and past proposals are: * They work at the "sendmail" level, not at the "mail reader" level. This doesn't give your mail complete end-to-end protection (unless you use "mail reader" encryption like S/MIME or PGP). But it's a lot easier to install and maintain; your sysadmin can do it for your whole site, instead of having to retrain every user. * They use the Domain Name System to keep the keys. Since DNS is going to distribute keys for its own authentication, these can also be used to provide authenticated public keys for remote host machines, so that email destined for those machines can be encrypted. With existing systems, getting and validating keys is a big problem. I encourage cypherpunks to read his draft and to participate in the discussion and/or implementation that results. The general MUSE web page is at http://www.imc.org/ietf-muse/. You can find the hypermail'd mailing list archives there, as well as the Internet-Draft (draft-eastlake-muse-00.txt). I hope that soon the Web page will tell you how to join or exit the mailing list, too! One initial technical question I have about MUSE is why to bother encapsulating email messages while in transit in more layers of MIME glop? Why not just run IP Security between the sendmail daemons involved, and have the receiving sendmail daemon note in the Received header that the message arrived over an authenticated connection? IPSEC provides your choice of authentication and/or encryption, and already uses the keys from the Domain Name System. IPSEC solves many other problems as well as the particular secure/private email delivery problem. And deploying a Real Application (sendmail) that uses IPSEC would shake it out and get it widely used. John Gilmore

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