December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Internet Privacy Guaranteed ad (POTP Jr.) [HUMOR]
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hey! These guys may be onto something after all...We can't decrypt what they can't spell. ;) JMR Regards, Jim Ray <liberty(a)gate.net> Boycott espionage-enabled software! [It's evidently proliferating.] "If I had to summarize [Republican candidate Morry] Taylor's campaign message, I'd boil it down to two basic points: 1. The problem with this country is that the government is run by lawyers. 2. And these are *stupid* lawyers." -- Dave Barry 2/17/96 _______________________________________________________________________ PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Public Key id. # E9BD6D35 http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray IANAL _______________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQCVAwUBMSlaR21lp8bpvW01AQF1WgP8C2fWGAY5o9hY9zt4lMKUa3AzfmqSua8E l1VmYMH9hOak4EspWYMwPSdl1EtVWPK7bFSQHES//XmTQl6gqLl7lUx+YHUrwnNV +Z1jkdUH/VanpK+ZXW0moq7aOQqn3KlJKkUIR0R6ynDBdsVwjZTGROmKYA/StygV rDAj8bcU6rE= =EtaV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Optical repeaters
by Phil G. Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) Newsgroups: hks.lists.cypherpunks \Given that a quantum cryptography system depends on *single photons* to /work, I'm not sure that talk of amplifification makes sense. Between source \and receiver, a photon either makes it or doesn't. If it makes it, it makes /it will its full "quanta" of energy, of course. If it doesn't make it, due \to tunnel-penetrating the walls of the fiber or scattering off an impurity /in the fiber, then it just doesn't make it, so no \amplification/regeneration is possible. (Regenerate _what_?) /But the quantum measurement issue, aside from the above, is an \interesting one. We have to be careful here (and I'm including /myself, not just using the royal "we"). It isn't clear to me that the \amplification/regeneration process counts as making a measurement, /from some recent work I've read (sorry, don't recall the references, \but could be a recent issue of "Scientific American"). In interference /measurements, the wave function collapses if individual photons are \counted and recorded (whatever "recorded" really means...) and the /interference pattern vanishes. If the photons are not counted and/or \recorded, the pattern reappears. /By analogy, it is not clear to me that a simple regeneration mechanism, \with no local observer or recording apparatus, will collapse the wave /function. I'm sorry I quoted so much, but let's think for a second: what is a regeneration mechanism going to do? Idea number one: It could act on an individual photon. This photon could have its energy per photon increaced. Except for doppler effects or possibly some wierd non-conservative electric/magnetic fields (and I'm just starting again, and can't remember if there are some obscure non-conservative electric fields), I don't think there are any methods that don't involve <<measurement>> of the photon. Please note that the known ways of "pumping" a photon's frequency, such as interaction with electrons in the orbitals of atoms in a crystal lattice, involve <<measurement>>. Please note I'm using the term <<measurement>> in brackets so that the physics-challenged here will realize that what is being discussed is the Q-M concept of measurement and not the sending out of some guy with a yardstick to look at photons. Another idea that occured to me is that the number of photons are being manipulated: one photon spawns many. As a practical example, check any image-intensifier tube. \Seems to me an experiment may have already been done along these /lines: separate fibers producing an interference pattern and then these \inline amps added...if the interference pattern remains, as I would expect, /then the amps/regenerators did not constitute a "measurement" in QM terms. I'm getting the impression of an optical-loop interferometer that relies on the timing of a photon's arrival as the first-order effect in the generation of an interference pattern. I'm not sure if it'll work, but I'm willing to bet there are some useful optical-loop interferometer experiments that don't rely on preserving all the states of the photons in question. Don't ring gyroscopes rely on measuring path length? Other than the two examples I mentioned above, the only things I could think of involved modifying quantum parameters themselves, which is what's supposed to be avoided, right? BTW, since I'm not on cypherpunks and am reading this sporadically thanks to news.hks.net (thanks guys!), could y'all email any responses to me? I think I need that refresher course in electrodynamics and Q-M pretty bad. \--Tim May /Boycott espionage-enabled software! \We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. /---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- \Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, /tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero \W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, /Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. \"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." I'd delete that but it's a work of art... Getting back to more real-world applications, anyone out there have any ideas why netscape's stock is still so high when all the stuff they came out with that was allegedly secure basically wasn't? And more immediate than that, I was thinking of ordering some textbooks using a borrowed credit card from a bookstore in Oregon. Is it safe now? ;-) If it turns out to not have been safe, can I sue Netscape for false advertizing, even if I knew it was false? Phil Phil Fraering "Nice shark... pgf(a)srl03.cacs.usl.edu _pretty_ shark..." ======================================================================== is it just me, or is everyone else having bsd flashbacks too?

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Re: Remailers not heard from; info?
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:52 PM 2/19/96 -0600, "David E. Smith" <dsmith(a)midwest.net> wrote: >Don't some remailers support the "Cutmarks" >header, which does essentially that? Yup. I clean forgot about it, truth to tell. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Re: Remailers not heard from; info?
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:39 PM 2/19/96 -0800, Raph Levien <raph(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu> wrote: > This is simply the "cut" feature of remailers, which is already >implemented. Right you are. I posted without thinking, and deserve the RTFM here. >while. There may be publicly known functioning remailers which are not >on my list, but I rather tend to doubt it. Since I'm getting my list of remailers from you :-), I don't know about them either. I really wish I could get a lead on...well, I just put all that in a post to Tim May, no need to duplicate it all. I'll cheerfully accept both info and pointers to info for thsoe questions, though. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Re: Remailers not heard from; info?
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Further, in an earlier message Bruce Baugh asked why some remailers did not >more promptly remail their messages. No, Tim, I didn't. I asked why I was noticing a secular slowdown _relative to last month_ when I did the same thing I'm doing now. Then I asked the same question for the last couple of days relative to the end of the last week. I understand why there are delays. And how to set latency. And a number of other things. This is none of those. I'll take the heat for what I do write. I'm not claiming to be an expert, I do make mistakes, I do get confused, when it's appropriate I'll take a few "RTFMs" (as with cutmarks). In return, though, I don't take the heat for what I don't write. I will also point out that I asked at least a few of these questions when I posted my January results. Particularly, I'm curious to get a better handle on what elements of the process I'm using lead to such different time results from, say, Raph's pinging chart. Local site? The scummy service through which too much Portland traffic has to pass? Other factors? Dunno. Met with deafening silence last month, apart from some thank-yous on the side from folks who appreciated having things already formatted with times rather than needing the extra step of reading the codes. [Side note: I see myself as offering a supplement to services like Raph's. Obviously I can't compete in timeliness or comprehensiveness of coverage. On the other hand, I do think my usage reflects much more closely what happens when people actually send traffic through remailers, and I go for maximum clarity of presentation. In other words, I'm building on others' work. No inflating of ego is intended or implied; some settling of arches may have occurred during shipping.] So I'm asking again. I've had some helpful notes on the side from remailer operators, to whom my thanks. I'd like to learn more. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Re: Internet Privacy Guaranteed ad (POTP Jr.)
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some thoughts on the rash of IPG OTP cluelessness: If I set up a radioactive source, I can almost certainly get 1000 bits per second of random data from it. Chop it up into 5 second chunks and sell em. That's 5000 bits without all that messy rotor stuff. Why throw out 30% - 50% of the OTPs? Any filtering algorithm will reduce the randomness of the resulting numbers. My guess is that the "hardware" randomness generator has very little entropy and a) produces numbers with a bell curve distribution, so concentrating what little entrpy there is, and b) *repeats* a whole lot of the time. That's what they throw out. They know that encryption has something to do with prime numbers so they throw in a little obfuscation with the rotor thing. Why bother? And of course, since they supply all the locks and all the keys, they can search for, locate, and read anybody's communication whenever they want. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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should we use same nym on multiple servers?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With the additional nym servers coming on the scene comes the question of whether or not to "claim" our alpha.c2 nym on the other ones, too. E.g., if we are foobar(a)alpha.c2.org, should we also become foobar(a)nym.gondolin.org and foobar(a)nym.alias.net, too? That would let us have a very stable nym, and prevent confusion over who's "who" if someone else were to have the same id with another nym server. But, it makes it harder to keep our real ID secret. (E.g., an oversimplified scenario would be if an attacker sends a message to all three nyms, then watches three PGP conventionally encrypted messages arrive in our mailbox.) A "safer" way would be to have the other two nyms have a fake address, but then we couldn't receive mail with it. A trickier way would be to have the reply block point to alt.anonymous, but then we'd have to constantly be watching for a message "to" us. Another angle, though, is that the nym servers may be unstable, and multiple nyms would allow us to post, if out "favorite" is down. Anyways, I'm a beginner, and think that the most useful use of remailers is to ask dumb questions. :-)

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Compelling Advantage of Public Key Systems
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a really, really basic point, but it seems to be lost by some of the folks talking about "virtual one-time pads," "power one-time pads," and "visual power agents one-time pads." To wit: public key systems drastically simplify the whole key exchange problem. Thus, I can send an encrypted message to any of you for whom I have a public key, or can easily get a public key for, and then only the holder of the private key can decrypt. (There are the usual wrinkles about whether the public key is really that of the person you think it is for, MITM, etc., but these are true of any system, and in practice present little problem.) Any schemes which use symmetric key systems, including one time pads, must of necessity involve prior arrangement to exchange keying materials. Nothing can get around this. The "revolution in cryptography" comes from this basic feature of public key cryptosystems. Period. I suggest we not waste our time on the "IPG" system. Whether it is secure or not is not the point. It's cumbersomeness and its $15 a month for some nominally random-looking bits (though known to IPG, so what's the point?) will kill it dead. Let those who use it be examples of evolution in action. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: should we use same nym on multiple servers?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:45 AM 2/20/96, Anonymous wrote: > With the additional nym servers coming on the scene comes the >question of whether or not to "claim" our alpha.c2 nym on the other >ones, too. E.g., if we are foobar(a)alpha.c2.org, should we also become >foobar(a)nym.gondolin.org and foobar(a)nym.alias.net, too? You know, shalmaneser(a)alpha.c2.org sent me a message demanding that he be given the name shalmaser(a)black.net on my system, for exactly this reason. I told him to fuck off. Now he's threatening to sue me. Do you folks think this is right? (More to the point, this example shows that whatever "anonymous" thinks about "claims" on nyms, it's pointless. Even if _some_ nyms are apparently persistent across nymservers, all it takes is the possibility of this not to be so for the fiction to collapse. The best way to prove that "shalmaneser(a)alpha.c2.org" is really the same True Name (or in alliance with) as "foobar(a)black.net" is to show that either can read the messages encrypted to the other.) --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Internet Privacy Guaranteed ad (POTP Jr.)
by Wink Junior 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This culled from comp.security.firewalls. I've edited out the blathering ad copy and just left the "technical details". Sounds like POTP Jr. to me; I'm certainly not interested in the "buy our company" schtick. -- Wink Wichita Falls, Texas February 16, 1996 For immediate Release: Internet.Privacy.Guaranteed [Long blathering sales prose elided.] If You Break our System, You've Bought our Company! Internet.Privacy.Guaranteed, IPG, today announced a new product line that guarantees privacy for 2, or privacy networks of 20,000 or more people on Internet. We back up our Guarantee with the Corporate motto, 'If You Break our System, You Have Bought our Company.' IPG Guarantees Absolute Privacy on Internet. Using the trademark CRE transform, the IPG PCX Nvelopes system translates any intelligible digitized information into utterly random gibberish. Only one other user, or more in certain instances where there is a need to know, will have the Nvelopener required to transform the random gibberish back into intelligible digitized information. CRE Transforms, trademark IPG, are the only acknowledged unbreakable method of so transforming digitized information. There are no passwords, encryption keys, or anything like that to conjure up, remember, and perhaps forget. PCX Nvelopes usage is automatic, similar to PKZIP and PKUNZIP. Easy to install, use, add to, and administer. It is Unbreakable If an individual, or any group of individuals, break the IPG Privacy System, IPG will sell them the company for $1.00, and even give them the dollar to buy it with. If you think you can, just try and you find out that it is impossible. There may be rumors that someone has broken the system, but that is not possible, it will never happen. Don't Waste your time ! How dare IPG have the unmitigated gall? When you are certain, then you are certain, and IPG is certain! Others dare not make such a brazen boast because they cannot possibly back it up, but IPG most certainly can. Every informed expert of the technology will confirm, without reservation, that the IPG system is not breakable, as many already have! There, we have thrown down that gauntlet, dare you pick it up? CRE Transforms The system uses CRE transforms, metaphorically called Nvelopes, to translate any meaningful digitized information into absolutely random gibberish. In order to convert that random gibberish back into intelligible usable form, a Nvelopener is required, and only the rightful recipient(s) has the required Nvelopener. Nvelopes and Nvelopeners Every Nvelope and Nvelopener pair is absolutely and totally unique - they bear no resemblance whatsoever to any other Nvelope - Nvelopener pair in existence, anywhere ay anytime. Every time a user wants to transmit information to another user, they utilize a new unique Nvelope. No Passwords or Keys or the Like As an added bonus, there are NO MESSY, INTRUSIVE PASSWORDS or ENCRYPTION KEYS to conjure up, remember, fool around with, and perhaps forget. None of that sort of thing to bother with at all. Nothing to get in your way of using the system. Transforms Internet from Least Private to Most Private The System, called PCX Nvelopes, for Private Communications eXchange, transforms Internet from being the least private, utterly without any privacy at all, system for conducting communications, into the most private system possible, an elegant fast system that unequivocally insures privacy. Privacy Network PCX Nvelopes serves 2 individuals who want to communicate with each other in private, as it serves equally well a corporate organization, or any other organization, privacy network, of 9 or 90,000 or more people, who want to keep customer, trade secret, strategy and plans, financial, and other confidential information privy to those with the need to know. For both in house and external usage. Guaranteed Easy to Install, Use and Upgrade Potential users beset by a paranoia that the PCX Nvelopes system must be complex, difficult to configure, laborious to install, administratively burdensome, arduous to upgrade and add users, are in for a computer cultural shock. As you will find, PCX is the exact antithesis of all of those things. It is so simple to install, use, upgrade and add users to, that it will completely blow your mind away. There is nothing to do, installation and adding users are totally load and go operations - if you can operate a computer, you can install and use PCX Nvelopes within minutes, it is absolutely duck soup to any computer literate, even marginal ones. Prices Prices are $19.96, including shipping and handling, for a full blown 12 user Demonstration system, unconditional moneyback guarantee and may be applied to your first order - the Demo system can be used by 2 people, or all the way up to 12 users in a privacy network. For $39.95, two users can set up a two user privacy system with 500 Nvelopes. A fully operational integrated multi-user system costs approximately $140.00 per user, ready to load and go, with thousands, or millions of Nvelopes and Nvelopeners. IPG also offers full turnkey leases at $15.00 per user, per network, per month, which includes all software, upgrades, administration, and unlimited Nvelopes and Nvelopeners. As a reference to its unbreakability, we refer you to an article by Paul Leyland on Internet at: http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/otp.html For more information visit our Web Site at: http://www.netprivacy.com/ipg or E-Mail at ipgsales(a)cyberstation.net, or by phone at 817-691-1081 Trademarks & Copyrights Nvelopes, Nvelopeners, CPX and CRE Transforms are trademarks of Internet.Privacy.Guaranteed, IPG. Copyrighted 1995,1996 by: Internet.Privacy.Guaranteed. All rights reserved.

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