December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Carrying the Bible an Offense?
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:24 PM 2/15/96 -0600, Sten Drescher wrote: >tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) said: > >TCM> There are two further points which need clearing up: > >TCM> 1. Private citizens (the atheist in this case) do not file >TCM> criminal charges. They may swear out a complaint ("I witnessed >TCM> John Doe carrying a Bible"), but they do not file criminal >TCM> charges. > > OK, how about `press charges`? And please, don't try telling >me that private citizen's don't `press charges`, because one of the >well reported problems in fighting domestic violence has been the >battered spouse (almost always the wife) refusing to press charges. The "pressing charges" question is essentially about evidence. At certain stages in a criminal proceeding, the prosecution must produce enough evidence of the right kind (e.g., sworn testimony which reaches the level of probable cause, for instance) in order for the proceedings to continue. There are smaller hurdles pretrial (in order to create the prosecution itself, and to hold the defendant while waiting for trial) and a bigger hurdle at trial. The sworn testimony of a victim can be strong evidence to help a prosecutor get over those hurdles. If there is no other evidence, the prosecution may fail. But prosecutors and investigators who see the reluctant victim problem coming can sometimes work around it by collecting other evidence which can be used instead of the victim's testimony. The victim can also be subpoenaed to testify even if they don't want to. (Of course, their testimony may not be especially helpful under those circumstances.) Thus, no, the victim does not have veto power over a prosecution, except in those circumstances where they're fortuitously in possession or control of the evidence the prosecution needs to prove its case. And that's a matter of luck and circumstance, not law. >TCM> No prosecutor can be "forced" to prosecute, absent approval by a >TCM> grand jury. (And if a prosecutor doesn't want to indict a ham >TCM> sandwich, it won't be indicted.) > > OK, how about this. J Random Atheist, Jr, comes across the >Bible on the 'net. J Random Atheist, Sr, finds out, and is appalled, >and swears out a complaint. The AUSA refuses to investigate. Could J >Random Atheist, Sr, file a lawsuit against the AUSA because he is >being denied equal treatment under the law? No. J Random Atheist has no right to expect prosecutors to share his priorities re enforcement of the laws. His remedy is to elect people with different prosecutorial priorities. -- "The anchored mind screwed into me by the psycho- | Greg Broiles lubricious thrust of heaven is the one that thinks | gbroiles(a)netbox.com every temptation, every desire, every inhibition." | -- Antonin Artaud |

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Re: A brief comparison of email encryption protocols
by spock 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello Ralph, Thanks for your interest in S/MIME. A couple of minor corrections to your comparison seem to be in order. >S/MIME is an attempt to graft MIME support onto underlying PEM >standards. See http://www.rsa.com/rsa/S-MIME/ for more info. S/MIME integrates PKCS #7 and #10 message services (not PEM) into MIME. >Probably the most controversial aspect of S/MIME is its signature >format. An S/MIME signed message is a MIME multipart in which the >first part is the data to be signed, and the second part is a >complete PKCS #7 (section 10) signed message. Although the description of this format is accurate, this format is only documented as an option, not the primary signature format. This option has been supplied for backward compatability to address a mixed (S/MIME-aware and non-S/MIME aware) audience of recipients. The primary signature format is a PKCS #7 signed message (including signed MIME content) carried in a single body part: application/x-pkcs7-mime.

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Re: AT&T Public Policy Research -- hiring for cypherpunks
by ethridge＠Onramp.NET 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Alan Olsen wrote: > >| > Addresses will not be easily 'transferable.' The IETF is >| >discussing a 'Best Current Practices' document that talks about >| >address portability. Basically, it can't happen, because the routers >| >only have so much memory, and the routers at the core of the internet >| >can't keep in memory how to reach every one; there needs to be >| >aggregation. The only feasible aggregation seems to be provider >| >based, ie, MCI, Alternet, and other large ISPs get blocks of >| >addresses. They give them to smaller companies, like got.net, which >| >gives them to customers. The result? The core routers have a few >| >more years. >| >| A good point. Having parts of subnet shifting around could be pretty painful >| from an admin point of view. > >Its not an admin's point of view thats worrisome. Whats worrisome is >that the routers at the core of the net only have so much memory, and >if the routing tables grow beyond that, we're all hosed, becuase the >core of the internet will start thrashing. So, in essense, you taking >your network address with you when you switch providers ('address >portability' causes costs that must be borne by the entire global >internet. Given that the world of telephony is moving towards Local Number Portability, isn't it inevitable that the internet will be expected to provide the equivalent functionality? In the world of telephones it's being mandated in the name of local loop competition, which presumably isn't a problem for the internet. But if someday i can move across the country and keep my telephone number, i'd expect the same of my internet address. That said, the issue of who manages the database is a significant one, but more political/economic issue than technical. allen

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PGP
by Sentient1 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Esteemed GentlePersons, Could you settle a dispute? Is it, or Is it not, legal to take PGP source code and the like out of the country if it is written on paper? Thank You

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(fwd) Fishman > Pest Control
by hkhenson＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know there are services which can recover at least some of the data on a formated disk. Does anyone have a pointer to them? Keith Henson PS, Please reply by email. I used to read this list, but it has been some time since I was here. I already asked the victum to quit using the disk. Xref: netcom.com alt.religion.scientology:150246 Path: netcom.com!ix.netcom.com!netnews From: xenu(a)ix.netcom.com(STEVEN FISHMAN ) Newsgroups: alt.religion.scientology Subject: Fishman > Pest Control Date: 15 Feb 1996 02:58:35 GMT Organization: Netcom Lines: 190 Message-ID: <4fu7gr$f07(a)cloner4.netcom.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: ix-ftl5-11.ix.netcom.com X-NETCOM-Date: Wed Feb 14 6:58:35 PM PST 1996 DECLARATION OF STEVEN FISHMAN 1. I, STEVEN FISHMAN, am a plaintiff and co-plaintiff along with Dr. Uwe W. Geertz in the case before the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County Los Angeles, known as Uwe Geertz and Steven Fishman vs. Church of Scientology International et. al., Case Number BC 122 467. 2. On Thursday, February 8, 1996, I received a phone call from a woman in a mature voice who said she was from Sonnys Pest Control Services. She said that she was introducing her company to the Sunshine Ranches subdivision of Fort Lauderdale and offered me a free pest control spraying of both inside and outside the house, at no cost or obligation. As I had not had a spraying done in five months due to my financial situation, I told her to send her representative to spray the house on Saturday afternoon, February 10, 1996. 3. On Saturday afternoon, about 3:00 P.M., two pest control workers arrived at the house. They introduced themselves as Eddie and Amy, and said they were from Sonnys Pest Control. They were very clean cut and had canisters of pest control spray. They both wore white shirts. Eddie had a tie on, and Amy was wearing denim shorts. Eddie shook my hand and told me that Amy was his sister. They were very friendly and knowledgeable about pest control. Eddie seemed genuinely concerned about my parrot, and said that the spray his company used would not hurt the bird, and also began describing three kinds of carpenter ants which his spray would contain. 4. Eddie began spraying the inside of the house and Amy suggested I show her which plants outside had the most ants. She was also very knowledgeable about plants and was very friendly and congenial. She was smiling a lot and I found her attractive so we spoke for about ten minutes outside. 5. We then went back inside and I told Eddie I liked their work and I would call them in a month if I were financially able to afford their services because I was currently looking for a job. Eddie asked me to write down his phone number so I could call him. I asked him for a business card but he said they were not ready yet. Amy asked if I was pleased with their service and I said it was very well done. I left a few minutes after they did to go pick up my daughter who was a hostess at the Renaissance Festival. 6. When I returned around 5:30 P.M., I turned on my computer and I found the screen blank except for the words c:\format c: and underneath it 100% formatted. Everything on my hard drive had been erased, including the rough drafts of my opposition motion to defendants notice of motion to quash service of process of David Miscavige and my opposition motion to defendants notice of motion and special motion to strike the second amended complaints of plaintiffs pursuant to C.C.P. § 425.16 (SLAPP Suit). Furthermore, all of my research, including my original complaint and all of my Internet files were simultaneously destroyed when my hard drive was formatted. 7. I checked the house and nothing had been taken. I had $ 40 in my wallet which was on a table in plain view in my bedroom and nothing was stolen from out of it. The sole purpose of these two pest control sprayers was to re-format my hard drive and render it impossible for me to send in my motions and also go on the Internet. I also had important correspondence on my hard disk with the Internal Revenue Service about my effort to overturn the tax exempt status of the Church of Scientology, as well as letters of complaints to the Food and Drug Administration regarding the Church of Scientologys Super VII E-Meter not being an approved device for the treatment of mental illness, and my complete file on the criminal activities of Church officials including Defendant Eugene Ingram is now gone. 8. At no time did Eddie and Amy mention anything about Scientology. They only talked about pest control, my bird, and the outdoor plants and their services. I tried calling the number Eddie gave me but it was not the number for Sonnys Pest Control Services, and the party who answered it said she has had that number for many years and I reached a trailer park near the Seminole Bingo on State Road 7. The woman said it was a wrong number and she never heard of Eddie or Amy. 9. I had been working on the preparation of two motions for the Status Conference for nearly a month, doing legal research and typing between 14 and 16 hours a day, without the benefit of legal help. When I lost all of my data, I had chest pains and became physically sick and depressed for several days and I remained in bed. All of the work I had done was gone and I was unable to locate these two people. 10. I cannot prove that these individuals were Scientologists or connected with the Office of Special Affairs. I do not even have their last names or even know if Eddie and Amy are their correct first names. I never thought of putting a password system on my computer because the only two people who use the computer are myself and my daughter Elysia. I had no backup of my data. 11. I called the Microsoft help line at (206) 646-5104 and spoke to a support engineer named David. I explained to David what had happened, and he assigned my problem a task number 14803868, and told me to use a recovery disk to get my DOS prompt back, so I could re-install Windows and the word processor software (Works for Windows). I was finally able to get the word processor loaded on Tuesday evening at 11:23 P.M. There was no time to re-write the opposition motions since the replies had to be in the Court file by Friday, February 16, 1996. 12. I am therefore joining with Dr. Geertzs two opposition motions because there is insufficient time to re-write my own opposition motions, and I do not want to ask the Court for a delay in order to prepare the motions over again, because I would have to pay a penalty for changing my non-refundable airline tickets for the Status Conference, which I cant afford. 13. I just wanted the Court to take notice of what happened to me as I believe it was a deliberate attempt to sabotage my legal work, and/or to keep me off the Internet because I have been a vocal critic of the Church of Scientology on the newsgroup alt.religion.scientology and on the International Relay Chat Channel #scientology as of late. And, as I said before, even though I believe I know who is responsible, I cant prove it. However, I would like the Court to take judicial notice of it in the event this type of operation occurs again or in a similar fashion to interfere with my right to litigate this case. 14. I declare under penalty of perjury that the aforementioned facts set forth are true and correct. Respectfully Submitted, Dated: February 14, 1996 ___________________________ Steven Fishman Plaintiff Pro Se 12980 S. W. 48th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33330-2339

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Re: Using lasers to communicate
by gw 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:38 AM 2/14/96 -0500, you wrote: > >Eavesdropping and channel-blocking and physical-location-discovery are >related threats to which most traditional data channels are susceptible. >Any link which depends on a physical conduit (phone line, fiber, coax) >is relatively easy to interrupt and to trace to its end points. >RF links, even with frequency hopping, are subject to triangulation and >jamming. All these kinds of links can be eavesdropped. > >Point-to-point conduitless laser signalling, as envisioned by "Bill" and >Tim in their quotes below, eliminates or reduces these threats. not as much, IMHO, as you would seem to suggest. 50% mirrors picking off those laser beams would do it, and you could not detect the resulting attenuation as distinct from naturally ocurring attenuation and variation. >Now consider an enhancement. In show business, we sometimes entertain >the folks with "laser light shows". The technology used is fairly >straightforward, mainly involving the use of mirrors (the effect also uses >smoke ususally, but please don't prematurely dismiss my remarks on this >basis). The laser source is attached to a "laser table" which holds a >number of small mirrors which may be individually inserted (via fast >solenoids) into the path of the laser beam. Each of these mirrors is then >calibrated to aim at a particular place in the theatre, usually another >larger mirror. Then (under computer control) the various small mirrors >on the laser table are rapidly inserted and withdrawn from the light beam, >causing the laser beam to follow first one path, then another, then another >through the (smoky) air -- all to the delight of the audience. > >This technology could easily be adapted to make a communication channel >safer from the various threats of eavesdropping, interruption, and tracing. >A single point-to-point channel could be made to follow various paths >having common elements only VERY close to the endpoints. Better still, >a network of more than two nodes could be constructed without needing to >provide multiple transceivers at each node (and with possibly multiple >beam paths between each pair). With known methods of routing and >collision avoidance, we could thus not only route around any known opposition >but also make it very expensive to eavesdrop or even to discover that >a signal exists. ("Honey, call the EPA again -- those gubmint boys are back, >driving their oil-burning old van around Mr. May's house."). > KNOWN opposition ... hmmm. you're back to obscurity=security. It's always expensive to eavesdrop (tapped any fiber cables in pressure jackets recently?) ... and (having been in the same business as yourself once) alignment and bandwidth problems of them pesky little scanners is a pretty hefty problem. The concept seems to have merit ... but I don't think I'd want to have to implement it! Easily adapted .... ????? >[previous attribution unknown...:] >} >>With a tightly focused beam (light is easy, I don't know about lower >} >>frequencies), you can prevent interception except by very obvious physical >} >>devices. (e.g. Someone in a cherry picker truck.) You may be able to >} >>avoid the need to encrypt the link (and all the paranoia about key >} >>management, advances in factoring etc. that that implies.) >} >> >} >>Bill > >On Thu, 4 Jan 1996 12:45:15 -0800, tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: >} >} Just a couple of points on this optical idea. >} >} We were linking buildings a mile apart in the 70s, at Intel. We needed to >} ship CAD data back and forth, and PacBell rates for a dedicated line were >} outrageous, slow to be installed, etc. So, a commercially available laser >} and modulator/demodulator (modem, but it bears sometimes using the longer >} version, to remind people of what it is doing in general) were mounted on >} the roofs of our buildings. I'm sure various packages are commercially >} available to do this. >[snip] >} I'm actually more positive on low-level (below safety regs get interested >} in) light than on free space RF, for bypassing of the local cable/phone >} monopolies. There's just not enough "bandwidth of free space" available. Do >} the math. >[snip] > > >:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: >:: Lou Poppler <lwp(a)mail.msen.com> :: " The more you drive, >:: http://www.msen.com/~lwp/ :: the less intelligent you are." >:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: -- Repo man > >

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Re: anonymous age credentials, sharing of
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"samman-ben(a)CS.YALE.EDU" "Rev. Ben" 15-FEB-1996 20:05:34.89 >The only REAL way of authentication is biometrics. Anything else can be >swapped. But if you amputate someone's hand or retinas then they won't >work(check for things like blood flow, etc.) Actually, a simulation ought to work pretty well at fooling most extant devices, and any devices likely to be developed soon. Now, fooling the guards watching you at a secure site may be a problem (a hand up your sleeve?), as may getting someone else's biometric information in the first place. The latter gets into the area of cryptography since whoever has such information (other than the original possessor) is likely to hash it anyway. -Allen

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ITAR Amended to Allow Personal Use Exemptions
by Bruce Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today's Federal Register contains a notice from the Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, announcing final rule of an amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) allowing U.S. persons to temporarily export cryptographic products for personal use without the need for an export license. The product must not be intended for copying, demonstration, marketing, sale, re-export, or transfer of ownership or control. It must remain in the possession of the exporting person, which includes being locked in a hotel room or safe. While in transit, it must be with the person's accompanying baggage. Exports to certain countries are prohibited -- currently Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. The exporter must maintain records of each temporary export for five years. See Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 33, Friday, February 16, 1996, Public Notice 2294, pp. 6111-6113.

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Credit card numbers
by Jens Thiel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there something like a checksum attached to Credit Card Numbers. Or better: Is there a way to determine for a given number N if -this _might_ be a valid number -this can't be a valid number Thanx, Jens. -- mailto:thielj@cs.bonn.edu Fax: +49 228 747246 http://www.Bonn.CityNet.DE/people/jens

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Re: Guaranteed snake-oil, er, privacy...
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:02 PM 2/19/96, geeman(a)best.com forwarded: > If You Break our System, You've Bought our Company! Isn't "You break it, you buy it" the kind of sign that merchants put up near _fragile_ things? Must be some new security strategy: threaten would-be attackers with hanging the albatross of a hemorrhaging corporation around their neck... Who knows? Maybe it'll work. Not sure how much pleasure I'd take in a "Hack IPG" mug if I had to face years of litigation. Ted

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