December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Should *WE* Sue Under CDA
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Feb 18, 1996 22:15:00, '"E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>' wrote: >From: IN%"declan+(a)CMU.EDU" "Declan B. McCullagh" 17-FEB-1996 18:07:51.71 > >>A lawsuit against the atheist would not be effective and could result in >>a countersuit for abuse of process. > > Huh? You seem to have misinterpreted what I said. The atheist, who has >a child that reads the net, sues a Christian Fundamentalist organization (say, >one of the Southern Baptist seminaries) for having a copy of the Bible - which >contains material that is among the "seven dirty words" or whatever - online, >where the child can read it. The CDA essentially says that a child reading >indecent materials is doing harm to the child (a nice bit of nonsense), which >gives the government the (undeserved) power to regulate such interactions. >A countersuit will be somewhat difficult, since the organization in question >(the one with the Bible online) is breaking the law; while there have been >burglar suing because of broken leg cases, I believe that such are generally >thrown out - possibly due to laws on the subject. > Now, the jury won't find the seminary or whoever liable... but it would >create some publicity and tie the sued organization up for a while. It's >something that I'd encourage an atheist organization to sponsor. > -Allen > On a personal and emotional level I *love* the idea of watching a group of pro-CDA fundie christers having to sweat in court explaining how their support for things like incest and murder are protected under the First Amendment but other people's speech is not. But on a logical level, should we use (or advocate) the court system under CDA-related topics. I think not. Allen's post has great emotional appeal, but it creates at least one danger. The first is the hypocrisy involved in advocating something with which we disagree, like asking the courts to support CDA and use CDA to punish those we don't like. The second is creating an Orwellian doublethink in politics where we first advocate something, like useing the courts. Then, when challenged (about hypocrisy or anything else) turn around and state that we really did not adovate what we so clearly did advocate or that we did not "mean" what we so clearly said. Ultimately, we reinforce a form of political behavior where nobody is responsible for their political behavior and nobody expects to be held accountable for it. Witness the behavior of people like Rep. Shroeder who voted for CDA etc. including the anti-abortion aspects, but does not want this to count among the pro-choice crowd because she didn't "really" vote for CDA etc. to get it to limit abortions. --tallpaul "Encryption? It is a Satanic drug thing. You wouldn't understand."

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NET_run
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

2-19-96. NYT: "In this new game, you'll never play with a full deck." Sometime next month a game will be played on the Internet, challenging surfers to leap between sites, solving puzzles and cracking codes that will give them access to secret data hidden behind firewalls and software barriers. The new game is Netrunner, set in the "dark techno-future" in which "ruthless corporations scheme to accomplish secret agendas as they build elaborate fortresses of data." In opposition to such plots, "anarchistic netrunners hack the system, infiltrating data forts to liberate information." It was created by Richard Garfield, who applied his doctoral training in combinatorial mathematics -- a field that studies the interaction of objects in complex systems. " 'Magic' Casts a Spell on Players." Magic was invented by Richard Garfield, who revels in his shoelessness. "I like to wear socks or slippers indoors," he said, padding around the Puck Building in thick. off-white socks. Developing the game took Mr. Garfield, who has a doctorate in combinational mathematics, all of a week. NET_run

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Re: Windows 95 encryption shell extension
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:32 AM 2/19/96 +0000, Andy Brown wrote: >http://www.fim.uni-linz.ac.at/win32/codedrag/codedrag.htm > >Haven't tried it myself since I don't use Windows 95, just thought >I'd report what I saw. > > >- Andy > > "CodedDrag encrypts your personal data using the highly safe DES-code algorithm." I'll wait. DCF

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Re: Anonymous remailers are a virus spreading online! (Replies)
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine(a)blatz.cs.uwm.edu> >My most serious question about anonymous remailers is this: How can we >be sure that the operator of such a remailer is not a federal or other >governmental agent? *Prove* to me I'm *not* a martian... Don't you love the use of simple informal fallacies in supposedly logical argument by supposedly rigorous scientists? ObCrypto: A: By using chained encryption, of course! Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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Re: Piracy Bests ITAR
by Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Bruce Murphy wrote: > > Has nothing to do with socialism... even works nice in a capitalist > > as in the case where people try the software, decide they like it, > > and then buy it latter when they can afford it. Sidekick and WordStar > > became popular because of this "borrowing". MS-DOS probably would > > be so widespread if it weren't pirated. > > Uh huh? And you are saying that there were *heaps* of computers out > there which could run MS-DOS which didn't come with it? And how much > more would those companies have made had the products been *forced* to > be sold rather than pirated. The point of the original article was that those products probably would *not* have been sold. What life would be like in other circumstances is hard to consider... and rather moot (a friend of mine has an expression for describing hypotheticals... "What is my grandfather had four arms?"). FSF/GNU and projects like FreeDOS, if they were several years earlier, would have made things quite interesting.... A point NOT in the orig. article but hinted at in the subject, though: if people cannot *buy* the software because of regs like ITAR, they'll steal it. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMSiSGioZzwIn1bdtAQHIzwF+NiBHyvvJRviXZv91iqEnMKc0LQWGok+z m8TiKOspP7wAZgGNmeRXWFXwrt2BV7sO =LEUO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 19 Feb 96 6:46:32 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu #-###-**#*#+ 4:52 99.99% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++++++ 40:29 99.97% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net ++--+++ 1:38:55 99.95% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net **#* **+--+* 16:15 99.89% c2 remail(a)c2.org +*** +****++ 15:58 99.84% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org -__.-------- 7:43:33 99.83% gondonym alias(a)nym.gondolin.org -__-------- 7:15:55 99.81% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #*###-## ### 2:07 99.76% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ++++ ++++++ 54:43 99.72% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com -._.--.---- 12:10:04 99.65% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net -*** ------ 1:12:38 99.60% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ..-- -+-+-- 2:32:14 99.56% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org *### +#*###* 1:01 99.47% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org *** -+* ++* 46:19 99.34% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl **** +****** 7:46 98.96% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*** +*+**** 5:47 98.41% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net ##* *.-++** 1:29:59 97.16% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi . **------ 18:48:16 90.53% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ***#*+#+#### 1:26 99.94% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com # -*# 41:23 80.93% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com ++++ ++ 42:17 42.14% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de 4:33:06 6.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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RE: Windows 95 encryption shell extension
by gorkab＠sanchez.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Monday, February 19, 1996 4:32 AM, Andy Brown[SMTP:a.brown@nexor.co.uk] wrote: >http://www.fim.uni-linz.ac.at/win32/codedrag/codedrag.htm > >Haven't tried it myself since I don't use Windows 95, just thought >I'd report what I saw. > > >- Andy > I downloaded this, AND installed it. It displays your password right on the screen!!! No *s, no blind typing. Anyone looking over ytour shoulder can see what you type as your passphrase! Come on. ---------- Brian Gorka Key fingerprint = ED 7D 78 7E 95 E8 05 01 27 01 A1 74 FA 4B 86 53

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Re: CPF: Feb-17-1996.cpf
by John Stumbles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 17 Feb 1996, Damaged Justice wrote: > Date: Fri, 16 Feb 1996 09:20:30 -0800 > From: sasha1(a)netcom.com (Alexander Chislenko) > Subject: Re: Computer unmasks Anonymous writer... > > I ran my essays through Word grammar checker a while ago, > and was surprised how stable the grammar statistics were. > Complexity of the text (grade level) was the same to the decimal point, > average length of sentences was consistent, etc. > People also use the same styles of smileys or *highlights*, make > consistent spelling errors, have their habits of indentation, etc. > > My suggestion at the time was to have randomizing output filter that > would substitute synonyms, change spelling, modify paragraph formatting, > etc. - Style anonymizer, I'd call it. Also, if small random changes are > applied to every copy of the message you send out, and you keep track of > what recipient got which version, you will find it easier to identify > the leaks if you send private messages. A dishonest recipient, to > protect himself, would have to further randomize the message, which > has apparent consequences for the ease of your identification and attributability of the message. A similar method was (is?) allegedly used by H.M. Government depts (and no doubt others) in restricted documents: the apparently even spacing of letters along a line to acheive proportional spacing was in fact slightly uneven and different on each copy, so a whistleblower (or spy) who photocopied and leaked a document in their posession could be identified if the copied document were examined. -- John Stumbles j.d.stumbles(a)reading.ac.uk Computer Services, University of Reading http://www.rdg.ac.uk/~suqstmbl +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Just pray that there's intelligent life somewhere out in space - because there's bugger all down here on earth!

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Re: Piracy Bests ITAR
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alan Horowitz sez: : > From: Anonymous <nobody(a)REPLAY.COM> : > Some economists have made a good case that slack : > enforcement of such rules may sometimes do little harm. : > Local firms benefit by acquiring pirated technology more : > cheaply than the real thing; consumers acquire affordable : > high-tech products and close copies of branded goods. : Yes, when Mr Anon travels to a beach in Jamaica or in Mombasa, he : shouldn't complain when the taxi driver takes him, not to his requested : destination, buit some dark alley where Mr Anon gets clunked over the : head and his wallet removed. The locals need the money more than Mr : rich-tourist-on-vacation Anon. They're only doing socialist justice, : after all. : Property is property. Theft is theft. Then the question arises is software property .. If I steal your money, you don't have it any more; if I copy your software, you still have it so one can't simply conclude that copying is theft. Besides copyright law, patent law et al. are all rip offs designed to suck money out of Citizen-Units. I you create a new and improved methode to do accounting your idea will not be protected, also concepts and principles are unprotected. Intelectual Property Law is only designed to protect the investor, publishers/authors wanted copyright laws, the industrial age brought us patent laws, bio-genetics are patenting 'dna strings', the computer age brought us patenting of mathematic principles, and soon databases will be protected. Copying software isn't theft, copying software is a vote against rip offs, copying software is the first step in liberating the Citizen-Unit ! !noitulover -- " The way to combat noxious ideas is with other ideas. The way to combat falsehoods is with truth. " -- Justice William O. Douglas, 1958

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Russian Crypto Laws
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know whether 1) the russians have issued any crypto licenses to either russians or foreigners? 2) whether anyone has been prosecuted for unlicensed crypto use in Russia? or even been charged or warned? [The above may have been dictated with Dragon Dictate/Win 2.0 voice recognition. Be alert for unintentional strange word substitutions.] A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here.

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