December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

MARCH BAY AREA MEETING
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, For the second (and last) time, the Bay Area Cypherpunks meeting will be held at the offices of Simple Access, fourth floor, 388 Market Street, San Francisco. The meeting will be from noon to 6pm (or so) on Saturday, 9 March. As of this notice, there is no agenda. (Funny, we never seem to be at a loss for words.) Street parking is scarce, garages are expensive; consider public transit. If anyone wants BART, CalTrain or bus information, let me know. Otherewise, here are driving instructions: PENINSULA --North on 101 (or 280 to 101) to Golden Gate/Bay Bridge fork. --Right on 80 (Bay Bridge, Oakland) to 4th St. exit. --Take 4th St. exit. --At the bottom of the ramp, go sort of straight (soft left) onto Bryant (parallel to 80, towards Bay). --Take Bryant about 4 blocks to Fremont. --Take Fremont about 5 blocks to Market. --Follow instructions under "END GAME," below. EAST BAY --Take 80, west across the Bay Bridge to Fremont exit. --Take exit and turn left on Fremont. --Take Fremont about 2.5 blocks to Market. --Follow "END GAME" instructions. END GAME --The building on the far-right corner is 388 Market. --Find a place to park. --Sign in at lobby desk. You are going to visit Simple Access on the 4th floor. --Take the elevator to 4 and follow the signs. --The phone number is: 415-296-2544. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Boycott "Applied Cryptography" and AT&T and RSA
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bruce Schnier (Author of applied cryptography) and Matt Blaze (Who is a crypto bigwig at at&t) have made it clear that they support key escrow. Both have written letters in favor of the new crypto law, it creates a key escrow system and also other restricts on crypto. The letters are on the CDT homepage and i think were posted here. WHAT THE FUCK?????????????????????????????????????????? EFF, EPIC, VTW and almost everyone else (except for Bizdos at RSA, hmmmm) have all come out against this piece of shit. But with these so called experts baking it it could pass anyway. Maybe the ltrs are a forgery? We should ask them, and if this is true, LETS SEND THEM A MESSAGE!!!!!!!! SWITCH YOUR PHONE SERVICE AND TELL AT&T WHY!!! STOP RECOMMENDING APPLIED CRYPTO (THERE ARE EASIER BOOKS ANYWAY). DEMAND THAT THESE PEOPLE STOP GIVING AWAY YOUR RIGHTS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! their addresses are schneier(a)counterpane.com mab(a)crypto.com jim(a)rsa.com

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EFF Statement on Leahy/Burns/Murray Crypto Bill
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act" - Enabling Electronic Envelopes ========================================================================== FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION +1 415 436 9333 ask(a)eff.org March 5, 1996 http://www.eff.org The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is encouraged to see Congressional support for lifting restrictions on encryption and affirming privacy rights for U.S. citizens. The bill introduced today by Senators Pat Leahy (D-VT), Patricia Murray (D-WA) and Conrad Burns (R-MT) is an important step in reclaiming privacy and encryption rights for society and business. The bill would legalize wide use of "electronic envelopes" to protect private information. Today this information travels on "electronic postcards" which can easily be altered or intercepted. However, the bill also includes key escrow and obstruction of justice provisions which would cause problems if enacted. "The bill provides a new opportunity to bring reason into the crypto policy debate," said EFF co-founder John Gilmore. "We support the Senators for bringing their energy into the process. The bill is a good start, and with healthy debate and modification, it could become acceptable legislation." Electronic privacy and encryption policy is extremely complex because it intertwines our constitutional rights of free speech, publication, association, and protection from self-incrimination and unreasonable search, with issues of wiretapping, spying, military security, personal privacy, and computer security. This bill would pick a new balance among these competing interests, with long-term impacts on our society and economy. EFF is committed to working with government, industry and public interest organizations to raise the level of understanding and debate in resolving these complex issues. Export Control Liberalization ----------------------------- The Encrypted Communications Privacy bill would make long-overdue changes to the export restrictions currently hampering the deployment of privacy and security "envelopes" for Windows, Unix, the Mac, and the Internet. The bill: * Moves export control of all non-military information security products, incuding encryption, to the Commerce Dept., whose rules protect constitutional rights and reflect market realities. * Requires that no license be required to export generally available mass-market software, public domain software, and computers that include such software. * Requires that export be authorized for non-military encryption software to any country where similar software is exportable from the U.S. to foreign financial institutions. * Requires that export be authorized for encryption hardware if a comparable product is available overseas. The above changes would significantly improve the nation's crypto policy. But they make detailed changes in a very complex section of the law and regulations. There is a significant risk that they will be implemented by the Administration in a different fashion than Congress intended. This happened in 1987, for example, when Congress tried to eliminate NSA meddling with civilian computers by passing the Computer Security Act. It was subverted by a series of Presidential directives and agreements among Executive Branch departments. The result today is that NSA is still in control of domestic security and privacy policy. We would encourage futher deregulation as a simpler, more effective, and far more reliable solution. The bill should simply eliminate all export controls on non-military encryption. Criminalization of Encryption and Encouragement of Key Escrow ------------------------------------------------------------- The following provisions raise serious concerns about the imbalance between the rights of the people and the desires of the goverment. EFF feels that the impact of these provisions must be closely considered, and will work to modify or remove them to better serve the public interest. The bill: * Makes it a new crime to "use encryption to obstruct justice", with 5-10 year sentences, plus fines. In plain language, this is a extra criminal charge that can be applied when police are frustrated in an investigation but happen to catch someone breaking the law in some other way. It's like Adding an extra ten-year jail term if you close your curtains while committing a crime. Americans have the right to protect their own privacy by any nonviolent means, and we expect that encryption will soon be built into all computers, phones, and networks. * Provides a legal infrastructure for key escrow, a system in which all users' keys are copied to permit government access. The Clinton Administration has been pushing key escrow to replace its failed "Clipper chip", out of fear that if Americans have real privacy they will abuse it. These provisions in the bill would encourage people to use the flawed key-copying system. Clarification and Refinement ---------------------------- The are a number of areas of the bill that would benefit from additional debate and clarification. Specifically, where the bill: * Explicitly does not mandate key escrow, but fails to prohibit the Administration from attempting to impose it with regulations. * Outlaws disclosure of others' keys except to the government, with 1-2 year sentences, plus fines, but includes a broad "good faith" exemption for when the government does something illegal or unconstitutional. * Requires disclosure of other peoples' keys to the government, under the same procedures currently used for wiretaps, searches of online records and backup tapes, and fishing expeditions in billing records. The provision does not always require adversary legal process, in which citizens can argue for their privacy before a judge, but instead relies solely on the integrity of prosecutors. * Legalizes the use any encryption "except as provided in this Act...or in any other law". EFF's Proposed Crypto-Privacy Principles ---------------------------------------- EFF's Cryptography and Privacy Policy Principles, which were originally written during the Clipper Chip debate, are the touchstone by which we measure privacy legislation and policy issues: * Private-sector access to encryption technology must not be hindered, either by regulation of what crypto may be used domestically, or by restriction on what may be exported. * Government policy on encryption usage and standards must be set in open forums with proper attention paid to public input. Secret hearings and classified algorithms have no part to play in a democratic process. * Encryption must become part of the "information infrastructure" to protect personal, commercial and governmental privacy and security. Cryptographic tools must not be crippled or weakened for the convenience of government agents, and users must be free to choose what encryption they prefer and whether and to whom they will reveal encryption keys. Law enforcement must obtain court orders, not simply administrative subpoenas to seize keys or decrypt and search encrypted information. * Government policy regarding emerging technologies like encryption must not erode Constitutional protections. In particular, any such policies must be compatible with the rights to freedom of speech, press and association, freedom from coerced self-incrimination, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. * Encryption will be built into all next-generation Internet, communications and computer technology. There must be no government policy equating use of encryption with evidence of criminal behavior, nor the creation of any new crime category that holds encryption users liable for making criminal investigation more difficult. * Government at all levels should explore cryptography's potential to replace identity-based or dossier-based systems - such as driver's licenses, credit cards, social security numbers, and passports - with less invasive technology. The Encrypted Communications Privacy bill at this time passes some of these tests, and we are committed to working with industry, government, and public interest organiations to address the remaining issues. Background: EFF and Crypto-Privacy Policy ----------------------------------------- The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a nonprofit public interest organization devoted to the protection of online privacy and free expression. EFF was founded in 1990, and is based in San Francisco, California. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITARs), administered by the State Department, and in the background by the National Security Agency, unreasonably treat encryption software and hardware as if they were weapons of war, like rockets and bombs. It has proven very difficult to deploy U.S.-made encryption products in an increasingly important global market due to these regulations, at a time when the need for online security systems for personal and commercial use has never been more keenly felt. EFF has for several years led efforts to fend off governmental attempts to restrict the development and public availability of secure privacy technology. In 1993-4, EFF and other civil liberties organizations successfully opposed implementation of the U.S. Administration's "Clipper" or "Skipjack" system - hardware encryption for voice and data communications in which all encryption keys are held by government for the convenience of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In 1994, we helped ensure that crypto export became a major legislative topic, laying the groundwork for eventual liberalization of the ITARs. In 1994 and 1995 EFF opposed implementation of and helped defeat funding for the FBI's "Digital Telephony" scheme, in which up to one person on every city block could be simultaneously wiretapped. In 1995, we filed an ongoing federal lawsuit with mathematician Daniel Bernstein, challenging the constitutionality of the export control laws. Online Resources for More Information ------------------------------------- Please see EFF's Internet archives for more details on this and other issues. EFF Privacy & Encryption Archive: http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ EFF Legal Issues & Policy Archive: http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/ Action Alerts: http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/ Topical Index of the EFF Archive: http://www.eff.org/links.html Contact Information ------------------- The Electronic Frontier Foundation 1550 Bryant St., Suite 725 San Francisco CA 94103 USA +1 415 436 9333 (voice) +1 415 436 9993 (fax) Internet: ask(a)eff.org John Gilmore, Co-founder and Member of the Board gnu(a)eff.org +1 415 221 6524

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Re: SEAL cipher info requested (something actually list related!)
by droelke＠rdxsunhost.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Christopher Allen writes: > > At 4:27 PM 1/27/96, Anonymous wrote: > > >Anybody have info on the SEAL cipher? I can't find any > > >descriptions or analysis of it. Refs, proceedings or URLS > > >would be a good thing. > > > > I also am interested in references to it. > > > > I'm told that it was invented by a cryptographer at IBM, and that it > > patented, so that should help in the search. > > Its a Don Coppersmith creation. It is blazingly fast. I believe it is > patented. > > Perry > Get Applied Cryptography!!! - Page 398 in issue 2. Source code on page 667 Brief - steam cipher. Phil Rogaway and Don Coppersmith @ IBM. uses "pseudo-random function family". Fast. Patented. ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX

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Re: Jump Start ecash With IPhone
by clarissa_wong＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> mentioned: > The big problem with this is that net phones can be subject to > delay & drop out, and I don't want to deal with that when I'm talking > on the phone. Adam, Yes, and that's good news. We can claim, while we are building up our infrastructure, that we have a low-quality service that cannot compete with the current LD carriers. Meanwhile, several companies and committed enthusiasts are solving IPhone's technological problems. Also, ATM and other high-bandwidth technologies that the LD carriers are deploying can bring them profits when IPhone users request the _fast_ Internet. But the real money is in the billing system. And an efficient, decentralized ecash infrastructure will change the world. A cheap telephone-to-telephone long distance and international voice service, which people do want to buy, could provide the cash flow to jump start it. CW

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Re: Jump Start ecash With IPhone
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:37 AM 3/6/96 -0800, Jim McCoy wrote: > 2- The phone companies (actually ACTA, the telco lobby) petitioned > the FCC on Monday to regulate the Internet phone software > companies. > >IP phone systems themselves may need to move underground just to >escape regulation. OTOH, there is nothing to prevent people from >building their own systems once some free software is out there... That would be a super neat trick since the LD business is currently deregulated (and in fact was never a government monopoly) and the local loop is in the process of deregulation, and Vocaltec is in some senses an Israeli company anyway and need not have a presence in New Jersey if it doesn't want do. DCF

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http://www.grfn.org/~blacktar/KilltheNewbies.htm
by uunet!in2.uu.net!newsfeed.internetmci.com!gordius!news.service.uci.edu!usenet＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.grfn.org/~blacktar/KilltheNewbies.htm

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Re: Anonymous remailers and Leahy bill
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 01:06 PM 3/7/96 -0500, A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security wrote: >Do not agree with you. Do support your right to disagree though. > P.fla That's all this guy said. Here's my more verbose response. >Do not agree with you. You are _entitled_ to not "agree" with me. What you are NOT entitled to, however, is to have a government that violates my rights by attempting to restrict crypto and other freedoms, even if it is with the support of 51% of the Congress or 51% of the voters or 51% of the population. (or even substantially more.) If you actively support such a government, or even encourage such a government, you are doing what is analogous to "inciting a riot": You are guilty of inciting the government to take improper, illegal, unconstitutional, or simply immoral actions against me and others, and in my opinion if such actions are taken you enter into that conspiracy. You may be alarmed that I might consider you a criminal for just exercising your "free speech." (If you're not alarmed, you SHOULD be!) I myself would greatly prefer to live in a society where speech was totally free: There would be no laws against libel and slander, and you could "yell 'fire' in a crowded theatre" without the possibility of prosecution. (All the other potential customers will be home watching on tape rental, which will make what you can do in a theatre less significant.) But until we live in such a world, I consider that yelling "child porn!" or "terrorism!" or "drug smuggling" in "a crowded Congress" or _to_ "a crowded Congress" that's anxious to restrict our rights ever further, is an incitement to violate my rights. > Do support your right to disagree though. No, I don't think you do. You've done NOTHING to actually _support_ my right to disagree, except possibly waste a few bytes of information space on a message that you did not see fit to publicize. (I did, however.) Clearly, your "support" for my "right to disagree" is essentially non-existent. Jim Bell Klaatu Burada Nikto! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMT866/qHVDBboB2dAQHqfAP9F1vYWiHVT67QXNXwuDWpR9n6THRL4S2W vJq256khHXs4pMawUiGitkovVEDSBM8Tc6t6NpgNbwEojZ40dF147gqq7iTLOrf0 TU4RrUvBKiRJbTXnJM6YdHL7gOHQtU5TqHRft3R9JAHR5zEpetUSIo7+uVbklqqd Du1cZlTbu68= =M+dV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: FCC and Internet telephones
by sawyer＠nextek.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In a statement from Washington, the America's Carriers Telecommunication >Association says it "submits that it is incumbent upon the FCC to exercise >jurisdiction over the use of the Internet for unregulated interstate and >international telecommunications services." > "For example," adds the ACTA statement, "online service providers generally >charge users around $10 for five hours of access and then around $3 for each >additional hour. Five hours equals 300 minutes, divided by $10 is 3.3 >cents per >minute. The average residential long distance telephone call costs about 22 >cents per minute or seven times as much." It seems that once again, big business is trying to get in the way of progress and competition because they are afriad they are going to lose some money. It seems to me that the ACTA is upset because someone found a way to "do it cheaper" and the telco's stand to lose a lot of long distance dollars. So rather then using this technology and perhaps lowering LD rates, instead they seek to block out the technology from the public. I wonder what would happen if someone discovered an drastically cheaper alternative to gasoline, but it never made it main stream because the oil companies would go out of business. Seems like the same type of situation with the telco's. > Says ACTA, "Technology may once again be surpassing government's ability to >control its proper use. However, the misuse of the Internet as a way to >'by-pass' the traditional means of obtaining long distance service could >result in a significant reduction of the Internet's ability to transport >its ever >enlarging amount of data traffic." No, the technology is surpassing the telco's ability to provide low-cost communications. > Specifically, ACTA petitions the FCC to define the type of permissible >communications that may be effected over the Internet. Permissible communications? This sounds like something out of the CDA ... I say, just try and regulate it. I want to see the FCC try and monitor several million computer transmissions every day and see how well regulation works. Thomas J. Sawyer sawyer(a)nextek.com

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by cmyk.warwick.com!not-for-mail＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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