December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Indecent Trash
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 10 Jan 96 at 10:42, t byfield wrote: > At 10:26 PM 1/9/96, Alexander 'Sasha' Chislenko wrote: > > >- Landfills: They are probably the richest source of detailed > > historical information that is not obtainable from any > > other source and can be used to reconstruct the detailed > > history of society, economy, technology and any single > > person with incredible detail. > I ain't holding my breath until someone develops a search > engine for Fresh Kills. I can see it now... about the time that Grandson of Altavista finally yields a URL for Jimmy Hoffa's body in some dump somewhere the government will have figured out that it's so much simpler to catalog the stuff on the way IN, when all the artifacts are fresh and unmixed. While we're all watching what the government does to intercept packets, they will be routing *trash* packets through mysterious "garbage routers." As the stink grows stronger, someone will conceive of anonymous trash forwarders. They will accept unidentified trash, no questions asked, anonymize it with random DNA and fingerprint whorls, and sneak it into public trash receptacles. DNA generators will enable the mischievous to plant fabricated indications that Hillary did indeed have something going with Vince, the late Khomeini (hey, hard is hard, right?) as well as legions of four-footed friends, confirming the suspicions of multitudes. As the piles of trash-based data grow, some Senator from Nebraska will sound the alarm that kids are too easily exposed to the indecent signs of private behavior retrievable on the Net and will propose draconian measures to hold everyone responsible for their contributions to the city landfill. Public receptacles will be closed. Trash will only be collected from registered Identifed Surplus Providers (ISP's). $250,000 fine for disposing of a condom in a dump accessible from the Internet... 10 years in prison for carelessly tossing those nasty Polaroids in the kitchen compactor. The trash of the world will have to be made safe for kids to view. Everything will be a lot easier to trace and control if the garbage input is fully identified. Barcodes on trash bags might do for starters. Access to the garbage system might have to be restricted to those 18 and over. Trash collectors could be made responsible for content, drafting them without pay into the ranks of the trash police. People could be encouraged to report suspicious trash, and trash-related activities like neighbors sneaking out at night to place an innocent-looking compactor bag down the block with someone else's trash. For their own protection, youngsters might be required to retain all their garbage until age 18 and then, in a solemn ceremony worthy of the true significance of coming of age, pitch it all (duly anonymized to prevent abuse of minor indiscretions) from their new position as lawful participants in the world garbage system, friends and well-wishers trying to applaud and hold their noses at the same time (try it -- if you're not careful you can break your own nose, but hey, that'll work, too!). Who knows? Maybe Heinlein's advocacy of keeping kids in a barrel and feeding them through a hole until age 18 will enjoy resurgence among the compulsively protective while the Web meanwhile will provide real time underground data on Heinlein's rpm rate. Protecting the trash of youth will, however, give rise to the hiding of adult trash among that of the underaged. The government will have to root out offenders and "impute" suspicious trash to the parents. Those with no visible source of trash will of course be suspect, and will have to emit innocent trash to cover themselves. This will give rise to the practice of "trash laundering," in which agents convert nasty trash to innocuous trash that may then be tossed into any monitored, controlled channels with no repercussions. Trash laundering will become a grave offense to the accompaniment of government and Ad Council PSA's and free brochures from Pueblo, Colorado. Blatant offenders who have fled to foreign climes will be kidnapped, some will be tortured, because the War Against Filth will be a moral commitment of the national body. Foreign governments headed by suspected trash traffickers will be toppled in quickie invasions, their leaders brought back in chains to disappear into federal dungeons. Public debate will center on the legalities and rationalizations of using the military in policing domestic trash, while agencies such as the FBI cry for more budget to fight the scourge that threatens the decency of the nation's repositories. Control of trash will spread inevitably to control of liquid wastes, whereupon a terrible discovery will be made: Everyone, but everyone, emits unspeakable bodily products. At that point the government will have no choice but to reluctantly declare everyone an outlaw and execute the populace. It's all as logical as what happens when you introduce division by zero way down at the bottom of the complex equation where it isn't so noticeable. We Jurgar Din (that will have to suffice: I do not yet live in a free country) +"The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone. It is to the+ +vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no + +election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now + +too late to retire from the contest." -Patrick Henry 1775 + -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMPS/PEjw99YhtpnhAQH1UQH5AdXBd7AvG6xT7x/cTXf5W1cAUXzoJ+GB N0/SPrdoJnbUSN5LkJDwoVwA/eiL6/LVN9CjtmQwmydyBysM7M/7Xw== =q+CF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: verification of randomness
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 03:57 AM 2/5/96 +0100, Andreas Bogk wrote: >I've built a random number generator based on the noise of a Zener >diode. Now I'd like to verify it's correct operation. I'd be very >grateful if someone could point me to existing software for randomness >tests or additional tests not mentioned in Knuth. >I'll make the design of the generator available as soon as I've >verified it's operation. >Andreas Excellent! Sounds like a worthwhile project. If you have an email mailing list, put me on it please. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMRWRnvqHVDBboB2dAQFgWwQAlgxpZ1Bx21HRU39ikFUKBFoewtfjVzcD zwOjkf5IXyITNV1IZmwmbIyzVmu1ndWr4NHhZZhxD9jCyzC6qFqvED/7Zye4vUdV XkcTDIBqqa334Awm7dsDMwvC2GKhHbCLIcZSI7gXBf/5C3V42EKdvi18Bqn9cs5M vJ0OnN93iBY= =MmWv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

No Subject
by karl.ike＠sihope.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is impossible to get changes in the Fair Credit Reporting Act in the traditional way. Credit reporting agencies have far too much personal information that is passed out with incrediable ease at the consumers expense. I have a suggestion! Today, with TRW, Equifax and TransUnion's vast network, it is easy to obtain anyone's credit report from various sources. Do you think if someone, outside of the USA, obtained the credit reports on half, maybe all, of the US Senators, congressmen, judges, etc, and published them in their entirity, on the internet, from outside the US, would get their attention? Then there would be changes, overnight, protecting the right of privacy! Let them become the victim of credit reporting agencies once and shit will happen overnight. If someone who is not a US citizen does this from outside the US, I don't think that they can be held accountable under US law? I am new to the internet and don't have a clue how to do it, but someone out there does and probably has a friend in Bankok that will help him. Put the word out!

2 1

[local] Minneapolis CP get-together
by Kevin L Prigge 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who: Minneapolis Cypherpunks What: Local get-together & key signing party When: Saturday, Feb 10th @ approx 5pm -> ??? Where: Applebees (3200 W Lake St) I'll be facilitating a key signing, send your public key to me before hand to get on the list. If you have any questions or need directions, let me know.

1 0

Intro from a list reader
by Christopher Drake 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, My name is Christopher Drake, I own the company NetSafe. We manufacture and sell one product - NetSafe - which prevents one small but universally unadressed, serious problem in computer security: We prevent passwords (etc) from being stolen with Key Press Password recorders (KPPRs). My interest in this list is to stay up-to-date with the industry. You may recently have heard of the First Virtual announcement re: credit card number theft via automated means: our software specifically prevents this. Full details can be found at http://pobox.com/~netsafe Interested parties from the recent cypherpunks meeting might like to note my public key: after the discussion I finally did it :-) NetSafe. PO Box 298, North Sydney 2060, Australia. (24hrs) Tel:+61 2 9966 1995 WWW: http://pobox.com/~netsafe E-Mail: NetSafe(a)pobox.com Fax: (02) 9957 1991 NetSafe provides inexpensive military certified security software to protect against key-press password recorders, trojan horses, viruses, etc. Antitamper antitraceing antidissasembly protection is also included. >>>>>>>>> Passwords should be protected in a manner that is consistent <<<<<<<<< >>>>>>>>> with the damage that could be caused by their compromise. <<<<<<<<< -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.i mQCNAjD/mQAAAAEEAP/////NetSafe+PGP+key////We+provide+inexpensive AntiFraud/theft+etc+Security+Software5tGfKREuINIWsQqsLNS+uAneN9M SuMu37f+NU/U2djtxE/b9h4bJ4wb8h3QkBiuTAS1QjpxpxryQzZ10zzGQe8VAAUR tChDaHJpc3RvcGhlciBOLiBEcmFrZSA8TmV0U2FmZUBQb2JveC5jb20+ =SGC/ -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 5 Feb 96 6:47:36 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de +--+++++..-+ 8:06:08 99.94% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com *#+*######## :42 99.94% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +-+#+ ---*## 27:01 99.81% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com +++++++ ++++ 44:57 99.80% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org ***** ***-** 18:20 99.72% hroller hroller(a)c2.org ###### ##-## 12:23 99.63% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++-+- -----+ 1:25:43 99.56% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org ---- 7:30:27 99.47% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net --+++ + -++- 1:17:58 99.41% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ##*## + ##*# 1:46 99.41% c2 remail(a)c2.org ***** *** ** 23:58 99.29% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net ***+*** *** 7:40 99.18% gondonym alias(a)nym.gondolin.org *-- 4:42:54 98.55% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net #### # *#-# 33:56 98.34% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com _.__.-.--- 21:13:22 97.85% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net +*+****--+ 37:03 96.15% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi __.-__ _ . 44:43:59 92.95% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ** ## ****## 4:49 99.66% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ** + **** 8:01 89.57% replay remailer(a)replay.com *- +**** 6:41 80.79% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com *##### 2:46 32.29% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

"Can't we all just get along?"
by Pot＠networking.stanford.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is not FLAMEpunks.

2 1

Re: Jim Bell - Murderous Terrorist
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:06 PM 2/4/96 -0800, jdoe-0007(a)alpha.c2.org wrote: >Jim Bell has advocated nothing less than paid death squads using crypto as a >means to hide payment to these murderous terrorists. Terrorists are people who create terror by random murder, by killing the innocent: Clearly this is the exact opposite of what Jim Bell advocates. The word terrorist was originally applied primarily to government organizations of terror, most notably the french revolution. You seem to be using the word "terror" to mean "Non government use of force" So by your definition, George Washington was a terrorist, whereas the Stalin and the French Revolutionary tribunal were not terrorists. By your definition of terrorist, there are plenty of advocates of "terrorism" on this mailing list. > If you can find a conspirator > of murder as " highly intelligent, knowledgeable, and overall nice person" then > you also are in need of immediate mental health intervention. or possibly you need to comprehend the difference between governmental decrees and morality. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0

Marshall McLuhan and encryption...
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Nick's a big shot at Wired magazine. So it should be no surprise > to learn that Wired attacked cypherpunks in its 01 96 issue. In > a fake interview with "Wired's patron saint," Marshall McLuhan is > made to say (p 130): > > Concerns about privacy and anonymity are outdated. Cypherpunks > think they are rebels with a cause, but they are really senti- > mentalists. Well, maybe McL. would have spit such nonsense, very characteristical of him. "The media is the message" is among the biggests con jobs performed on humanity. It's like having a guy dying form thirst and telling him: "The pipe is the beverage"... One fine example of the destruction of reason. If a PGP encrypted message was sent to Mr.McLuhan, could he see if it is a "there is a contract on you..." or "happy new year" or "I love you..." To any Cypherpunks, the media *IS NOT* the message! Dear Wired peoples and Mr. McLuhan: get lost! > The era of politics based on private identities, anonymous indi- > viduals, and independent citizens began with the French Revolution > and Napoleon's armies...and ended with Hitler.... The cypherpunks > are still marching to the same martial music. He is partially right. With Renaissance, came the idea that Reason and human mind were powerfull and that knowledge, because man's only survival tool is reason, is a value to pursue. But french revolution did not convey theses ideas, neither did Napoleon. And Hitler definitely not. All of the three were, ultimately, collectivists or looters. Therefore, the author of the text is guilty of setting up straw man and of context blanking. JFA Reality Is. Existence exists. Words have a precise meaning. $

1 0

Re: C2 and the Worst Case
by an359557＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Are you saying that when someone with an anonymous mailbox on c2.org >retrieves his/her mail via a POP3 connection, no log is made of >the originating IP address? It's even worse than that. The IP address/hostname that connects to c2 shows up when you finger that user on c2! Sameer, can you please change that? An anonymous user don't wanna leave a trail as obvious as an IP address. --****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi

2 1