December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

uh oh, mutation time?
by Judith Milhon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Electronic Guerrillas: Resisting Net Censorship THE MUTATE PROJECT http://www.onworld.com/MUT "Don't black out YOUR website. Black out THEIRS" Hassan I Sirius 2/8/96 This is an invitation to join a public forum on the World Wide Web on resisting internet censorship. By now, you have all heard about the Communications Decency Act and you know, or should know, the scope of this law. This discussion will revolve around active resistance to this law; routing around it, on-line uncivil disobedience, pranking, hacking, and otherwise fucking with the Net Cops. And ordinary political organizing need not be excluded. Electronic Guerrillas: Resisting Net Censorship is a topic within a Forum called Kulchur Wars. Kulchur Wars is a Forum that is part of The Mutate Forum. The Mutate Forum is a part of the website "THE MUTATE PROJECT." THE MUTATE PROJECT is an outgrowth of the book "How to Mutate & Take Over the World" by R. U. Sirius, St. Jude & The Internet 21. While we'd planned to officially open THE MUTATE PROJECT in mid-February, we've decided to open up the forum TODAY, in response to the passage of this legislation. Don't worry. It's easy to open up this Chinese box. Just go to http://www.onworld.com/MUT click on Mutate Forum Read your induction papers Click on Join a Cool Conspiracy open Kulchur Wars add your posting to the string entitled Electronic Guerrillas: Resisting Net Censorship Feel free to post in the other topics start your own or to poke around in the scaffolding of THE MUTATE PROJECT but remember that it's STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION see you there R. U. Sirius Sirius Communications

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Re: Firewall USA to Firewall China
by daw＠dawn7.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199602130139.RAA11162(a)mage.qualcomm.com>, Peter Monta <pmonta(a)qualcomm.com> wrote: > > [ Jim Clark, "Firewall China" ] > > > > A: A lot of people think that's not possible. It's difficult to enforce, > > but it's certainly possible. A corporation has a so-called fire wall -- a > > single point of entry into the corporate net. You can have a country > > that has a single point of entry into its "country net." It's doable. All > > you need, though, is one breach of security, and there's a leak. > > > > A fire wall is a filter -- it filters and doesn't let certain people come in. > > You can only come in if you have the right permission. So you could > > easily set that up so that it would filter out your objectionable > > material. > > He seems to be confusing network security with the propagation of content. > A firewall is going to have a lot more trouble filtering dangerous > thoughts than UDP port 1234, unless there are humans in the loop. Hmm, I'd argue that firewall technology would indeed let China filter out many "subversive" thoughts on the Internet. The firewall is not going to be able to stop the two-rogue problem: two technically knowledgeable rogue agents, one on each side of the firewall, *will* succeed in communicating dangerous thoughts if they try hard enough. But that's not so important to solve perfectly, in practice. No, in reality, China could set up a few simple application proxies and only allow world -> China traffic on a few closely controlled ports, such as http, smtp, nntp, ftp, etc. The proxies could * filter out "naughty" and "seditious" sites (e.g. www.playboy.com) * filter out email, news, etc. which has traversed a "known dangerous site" (e.g. a remailer or ftp.hacktic.nl), * daily update their lists of subversive sites (e.g. by reading Raph's remailer list), * filter out indecent newsgroups, * do simple keyword searches (e.g. fuck, revolution, protest, crypto), and/or * do simple content analysis (e.g. maybe filter out .gifs, to stop nude pics). This would hose 93% of the subversive stuff on the 'net. "Social solutions" (read: men with guns) can eliminate the last 7%. And so it goes. Sure, someone in the "free world" (e.g. not China or the USA) could run a remailer / http-proxy at a new site each day, enabling someone knowledgeable in China to find dangerous material. But the fact remains that this requires technical knowledge and the willingness to go to the trouble of actively accessing the remailer site. Again, someone in the China could run a remailer / reposter / http-proxy themselves inside the firewall; that's where the "social solutions" come in. Kick down the door (see, jackboots are good for something after all!), beat up the children, and you can kiss that remailer goodbye. Technically, you're right in saying that you can't filter all the content perfectly; it's the classic covert channel problem. But practically, the Chinese gov't can probably wreak havoc with 'net freedom in China. - -- Dave Wagner Fuck the CDA. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMSEPwyoZzwIn1bdtAQEFDAF9GXWLz9beaciHbY3mo3Reaom7K5IK0k2I pVz5NrHqa80eDtC8Rr0w/kSzkKtq4GCL =k93A -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Crypto++ 2.0 beta
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm about to release version 2.0 of Crypto++, and I am looking for people to do some beta testing on it. I'm especially interested in testing for compatibility with different compilers/OSs. If you are interested, please e-mail me stating that you are a US or Canadian citizen or permanent resident living in US or Canada and that you will not export the software. Wei Dai Here's the readme for Crypto++ if you don't know what it is. Crypto++: a C++ Class Library of Cryptographic Primitives Version 2.0 beta 2/13/1996 This library includes: MD5, SHS, HAVAL, DES, IDEA, WAKE, 3-WAY, TEA, SAFER, Blowfish, Diamond2, Diamond2 Lite, Sapphire, Luby-Rackoff, MDC, various modes (CFB, CBC, OFB, counter), DH, DSA, ElGamal, LUC, Rabin, BlumGoldwasser, elliptic curve cryptosystems, BBS, gzip compression, Shamir's secret sharing scheme, Rabin's information dispersal scheme, and zero-knowledge prover and verifier for graph isomorphism. There are also various miscellanous modules such as base 64 coding and 32-bit CRC. RSA and RC5 are noticeably absent. I am still talking to RSA DSI about adding them back into Crypto++. I hope version 2.1 will include them. Crypto++ has been compiled and tested with Borland C++ 4.5, MSVC 4.0, and G++ 2.7.2 on MS-DOS, Windows NT, and a variety of Unix machines. You are welcome to use it for any purpose without paying me, but see license.txt for the fine print. Some short instructions to compile this library: (you probably need to modify this to suit your environment) -- if want to use this library with RSAREF, then 1. get a copy of RSAREF 2. untar or unzip it into a directory below this one 3. type "gcc -c -I. *.c" (in the rsaref/source directory) to compile RSAREF 4. edit config.h 5. type "g++ -c -Irsaref/source -I. *.cpp" to compile this library 6. type "g++ *.o rsaref/source/*.o -lstdc++ -lm" to link the test driver 7. type "a.out" to run the test driver -- if you DON'T want to use this library with RSAREF, then 1. edit config.h (make sure to comment out #define USE_RSAREF) 2. type "g++ -c *.cpp" to compile this library 3. type "g++ *.o -lstdc++ -lm" to link the test driver 4. type "a.out" to run the test driver Finally, a note on object ownership: If a constructor for A takes a pointer to an object B (except primitive types such as int and char), then A owns B and will delete B at A's destruction. If a constructor for A takes a reference to an object B, then the caller retains ownership of B and should not destroy it until A no longer needs it. Good luck, and feel free to e-mail me at weidai(a)eskimo.com if you have any problems. Also, check http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/cryptlib.html for updates and new versions. Wei Dai History 1.0 - First public release. Withdrawn at the request of RSA DSI. - Has a big bug in the RSA key generation code. 1.1 - Removed RSA, RC4, RC5 - Disabled calls to RSAREF's non-public functions - Minor bugs fixed 2.0 - a completely new, faster multiprecision integer class - added HAVAL, 3-WAY, TEA, SAFER, LUC, Rabin, BlumGoldwasser, Elliptic Curve algorithms - added the Lucas strong probable primality test - ElGamal encryption and signature schemes modified to avoid weaknesses - Diamond changed to Diamond2 because of key schedule weakness - fixed bug in WAKE key setup - lots of miscellaneous optimizations

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Re: Re:
by lunaslide＠loop.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

}>sovereign n. 1. A person, governing body, etc., in whom the >supreme power }>or authority is vested.< adj. 1. Exercising or possessing supreme }>authority or jurisdiction. 2. Independent, and free from external }>authority or influence: a sovereign state. } }Yup. } }>This is not what our government is. } }The United States is a sovereign nation. Do you dispute that ? The }constitution is a binding agreement between the government and its citizens }that determines how that sovereignty will be exercised, the elements in which }the nation will not interfere with citizens, and the duties which it will }carry out. No, but I do dispute that the _U.S. Government_ is sovereign. I'm not going to write why all over again, since you seem to have convieniently snipped the rest of my post, rather than answer it. You are commiting a straw man fallacy. I didn't say that the nation isn't soveriegn, I said that the government is not sovereign. Yes, there is a difference. }The three branches of the government were set up to ensure that "supreme }power" would never rest with a single entity, yet taken together they do have }that power. The three branches are a system of checks and balances to counter the the immergence of one sovereign pwoer. See, it is actually built into the constution that the govt cannot be sovereign! }Congress and the Senate are the legally empowered representatives of the }people. In that they do have the "power of the people" to make decisions }on what is right and what is wrong within limits. That too is defined in }the constitution. The Congress is the Senate and the House, and they are given specific powers by the people to govern themselves in relation to the job in Article 1, Sections 1-7 and to govern the people in Article 1, Sections 8-10. The powers given are very specific in nature and involve mostly limited legislative powers and taxing abilities. The President is given his rights and duties to govern the people in Article 2, Sections 2 and 3 and they include the power to command the army and navy, give pardons, make treaties and appoint people to positions as Judges, Ambassadors and the like. He has the duty to give a State of the Union address from "time to time" to inform and ask for recomendation and consideration on matters ofhis choosing. He also has the right to conviene both houses of congress to discuss matters. In Article one, he is also given the power of the veto. The Judicial branch, and particularly the Supreme Court, is given the power to rule on matters concerning the court involving laws and disputes. They have the power to refute laws and the duty to adhere to the principles of the constitution. The people have the right to dissent and may petition the govt for a redress of grievances as dictated by Amendment one. If they are not given satisfaction, they still have the right to free speech and press so that they may share their dissent with one another and affect the outcome of the next election. The Fourth Amendment, of course, protects the "...right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures..." Clearly the govt cannot be sovereign if this is true. }Take the CDA. I do believe that it is unconstitutional but that Congress/ }Saxplayer had the *right* to pass the law just as the Supreme Court has the }right to declare it to have been outside the power of the Congress to do so }(which I expect). Somehow it works. But ultimately it is the people who decide, and the people are not one with the government. The people have influence over the government, therefore the government cannot be sovereign. The first part of the Declaration of Independence indicates that it was never the intent of the founding fathers to create a sovereign government, refuting your nonsensical statement about it being "a given." I ended up restating almost my whole case anyway. But that's ok, cause I'll just keep explaining until you understand it. lunaslide "Prohibition... goes beyond the bounds of reason in that it attempts to control a man's appetite by legislation and makes a crime out of things that are not crimes... A prohibition law strikes a blow at the very principles upon which our government was founded." - -- Abraham Lincoln On the meridian of time there is no injustice, only the poetry of motion creating the illusion of truth and drama. Henry Miller ________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCPAzEX3QEAAAEEAOGQjhnqGH29pO1WDaXs5GFOVPhCBWyYEk9XEwRmscjveWzH AhA6DeOA480zWNqQURyqE2yPmR8WzT+OXYqmeiQiycKyFA41Vs/Ruf+gXXxe7uXS L5BK3K8oKbfoH0D5/TAkMT4r6BprXFQz4pFc3gY2SSaSPElpMjKHaKBsRsyRABEB AAG0HUplZmYgQ29ubiA8bHVuYXNsaWRlQGxvb3AuY29tiQCVAwUQMRffHzKHaKBs RsyRAQGNhwP9E9xEZ9/LCKnhgtnrqgD7pDoXG2pCy8FoyfFjoImGkG+jF1wELXmB Z0mf8F8CgYkys0mif1XeGDMelr1gzlZAm6LgQt4kcvztMW/aRLn18QP+iwltVT/L p8D37mitOjvuk46sWgAChIaPPPIeg/EaYQjQkmlpWKsEYIoTRy+E8mU= =4Gku -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Netscrape's Cookies
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 04:18 PM 2/13/96 +0000, a Deranged Mutant wrote: [re cookies! yum] >I'm curious if anyone knows which sites use/modify it. AFAIK, the only site that uses it is *.netscape.com dave -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMSEtFjVTwUKWHSsJAQHkJAf9EaG4gSj6zJLLcI6wiT6Qd45yBPL2sxIW M8Vtf95bLgCM7h0BP6jtdUGRG0nMVqbY/Xj+kNYfDHmgZSnuoBrYld9E4bs5puTr aVW6y7UBs3hdqz5dtWh4Gn2nq6/xTkj/t3/DlI/fuakNVnTlN0TeGPj2Alp5x8Z3 mww1gQ0EyymlioPEpyaNqg8vGSVcltDOQRdw+7HZoc2fZ6urvBkDKtHRAtN7PiUG LMafuM+27TiRoKi1kSf0Q1S6EE7QrXoJTnTm6/qAIY1e+kPw/Lg17NhJmIQR0TnT tSzucfxzjrGvFGI2fZL0kr5qAe/k/eqx+xKNXZHJjsNWIG8/WbdiPQ== =dpvR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- David E. Smith, c/o Southeast Missouri State University 1000 Towers Circle South MS 1210 Cape Girardeau MO 63701 dsmith(a)midwest.net, dsmith(a)alpha.c2.org, PGP 0x961D2B09 (573)339-3814 http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/ "Reality is only for those lacking in true imagination."

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Re:
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:03 AM 2/13/96 GMT, John Lull wrote: >On Mon, 12 Feb 1996 13:41:04 -0500 (EST), Padgett wrote: > >> If it were properly and legally decided that communications >> with anon.penet.fi is against "national interest" then the sovereign has >> not only the "right" but the *duty* to block/monitor such communications. > >Bullpuckey. One could just as legitimately say: > > "If it were properly and legally decided that publication of the > Los Angeles Times is against "national interest" then the sovereign > has not only the "right" but the *duty* to block such publication." "Right on", as they used to say. Padgett's clueless. He'll try to justify ANYTHING.

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Re: Req. for soundbites
by cmca＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com] [Subject: Re: Req. for soundbites] It was written (in English) by bob bruen <bruen(a)wizard.mit.edu>: The four letter words that are considered indecent are an anachronism from the days when the French/Normans ruled England, (~1066-1300's). A quick look at the words and their acceptable counterparts will make clear the issue. The four letter word are all of English derivation and the socially acceptable ones are of French (sometimes Latin) derivation. Even the term "four-letter" is a derogatory term for the English language in general, because the French considered English second rate because the words tended to be short, unlike French. Anyone who supports the suppression of these words is merely enforcing the old French repression of the English and the English language from over 500 years ago. Why think for yourself when tradition can do it for you? eg: to piss - to urinate to shit - to deficate to fuck - to copulate cunt - vagina So, what is the French-derived word for Motherfucker? And, being nice and long, why isn't it acceptable? :-) for the implicit-smiley-impaired mofos. Chris McAuliffe <cmca(a)alpha.c2.org> (No, not that one.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBMR/TAYHskC9sh/+lAQGowQP+Jq3TPolK3C5pEeIHaypF8MyZSrnbxtbp FpmVpXWw5ZqJ2txccSpTiykfE5gcANN6VeRh8N3xKJyxP3039qOQF+lpb1cAEcpF oMU/BYUCAq3TzPboetL5dDXn6Z1OhogwQS6gv687l1gSedO6rtDBcltYft1YLjzc WX5VSEpjDqs= =o6E6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: V-chips, CC, and Motorcycle Helmets
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:56 PM 2/11/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: >At 10:18 PM 2/11/96 -0800, Alan Olsen wrote: >... > >>The v-chip will be less than useful as a real filter tool for those of us >>who have a different worldview than the censors. > >Again, absolutely. Hell, I can't even devise a filter that will let me >filter out Jim Bell's rants while letting me see his reasoned arguments on >anonymous assassination. (I would love to have him address the Salman >Rushdie issue, a man who is still alive despite a considerable announced >price for his head. There appear to be limits to who can be subject to >assassination for pay.) Since Olsen claimed to have filtered me out, I'm replying primarily for the benefit of the others on the list. You mention the issue of Rushdie, as if it is some sort of refutation of my idea. Quite the contrary; I think it actually supports me. How so?, you ask? Well, let's consider any potential assassin who might be interested in this "contract." Aside from the obvious moral issues involved here (Rushdie has, presumably, done nothing to warrant his death), the truth is that such a potential assassin would see a number of problems that would strongly dissuade him from attempting to kill Rushdie. 1. There is no way he could be assured that he could collect the award anonymously. His name would certainly "get out," and then he would be subject not merely to "the law," but also anybody who wanted revenge for Rushdie's death. 2. There is no way he could be assured that he would actually receive the award. (How would he prove HE did it?) 3. That's because there is no way he would enforce this "contract" should the offerer refuse to pay. In other words, this situation is VASTLY different than the one that "Assassination Politics" would presumably be able to guarantee: 1. The assassin would be absolutely anonymous; he would not have to trust ANYONE with knowledge of his guilt. 2. The assassin would have a digital record of previous payoffs made by the organization in question, reassuring him that they actually will pay their debt. 3. There will be no need to "enforce" such a contract; failure to pay will be provable in the "court of public opinion." If the offering organization fails to pay, this failure will destroy its hard-earned credibility. So you see, the Rushdie case is simply not any kind of disproof of "Assassination Politics": if anything,it demonstrates WHY "murder for hire" in so rare and ineffective today, despite even a huge offer on a well-known target.

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AT&T Public Policy Research -- hiring for cypherpunks issues
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Mon, 12 Feb 1996 17:02:39 -0500 (EST) From: Paul Resnick <presnick(a)research.att.com> To: gnu(a)eff.org Last July, we started a new Public Policy Research department at AT&T. We're writing to ask if you have friends, students, or colleagues who could contribute to this new enterprise. We are looking both for software hackers and for Ph.D. level researchers who are comfortable with software but bring expertise in economics, politics, law, or sociology. There is also an opening for a senior researcher with strong management skills to head the department. We're very excited about the prospects for this department. The fundamental premise is that communication systems can provide the glue that holds society together, in many cases more effectively and less intrusively than governments can. We will explore the interplay of software tools, rules, and rewards, as means of governance in electronic markets and other virtual public spaces. In other words, how can we make it safe, fun, and profitable to interact with people you do not know very well? Throughout the company, there is untapped energy that lingers from the days when AT&T had a clear public mission of universal telephone service for everyone in the United States. This department can offer a new public-oriented mission. The enclosures briefly describe some sample projects. In spite of, or perhaps because of the recent breakup, the company is continuing to invest in research. About 300 technical staff from the old Bell Labs, mostly computer scientists, are part of the new AT&T Research organization. Research areas include databases, programming languages, software engineering, speech, cryptography and security, human factors, collaborative applications, and more. Many departments will be hiring. Like the former Bell Labs, the work environment is informal but intense and intellectually rigorous. External publication is encouraged. We measure success by leadership and impact, in the academic research community, in AT&T's business, and in the world. Please feel free to send us suggestions or pass this letter on to anyone you think may be interested. In addition to permanent positions, there are also opportunities for sabbaticals, post-docs, and summer employment. Thanks in advance for any assistance you can provide. Sincerely, Paul Resnick Member of Technical Staff Public Policy Research Department presnick(a)research.att.com Eric Sumner Director, Network Services Research Laboratory ees(a)research.att.com P.S. You may also receive this message by paper mail: we're trying to make it as easy as possible for you to pass it along to people who might be interested. ----------------------------------- Public Policy Research Department The department creates rules and tools that enhance the common wealth in electronic markets and other virtual public spaces where people may interact with others they do not know very well. Traditionally, enhancing the common wealth has been the government's purview, but advanced communication services offer new opportunities for governance without government. Areas of interest include: privacy, security, anonymity, freedom and responsibility in cyberspace rating and reputation services intellectual property universal service electronic markets pricing and provision of public goods trust and other forms of social capital Sample Projects PICS: The Platform for Internet Content Selection With its recent explosive growth, the Internet now faces a problem that confronts all media that serve diverse audiences: not all materials are appropriate for every audience. For each new medium, society has had to balance the value of free speech against the social costs of distributing materials to inappropriate audiences. While most media are regulated by blanket rules, on the Internet it is possible to reconcile those goals through individual choices in a marketplace of ideas. In other words, the Internet can regulate itself. PICS, the Platform for Internet Content Selection, is designed to enable supervisors-- whether parents, teachers, or administrators-- to block access from their sites to certain Internet resources, without censoring what is distributed to other sites. It draws on two unique features of the Internet. First, publishing is instantaneous, world-wide, and very inexpensive, so it is easy to publish rating and advisory labels. Labels and ratings already help consumers choose many products, from movies to cars to computers. Such labels are provided by the producers or by independent third parties, such as consumer magazines. Similarly, labels for Internet resources could help users to select interesting, high-quality materials and could help supervisors to block access to inappropriate ones. Second, access to Internet resources is mediated by computers that can process far more labels than any person could. Thus, parents, teachers, and other supervisors need only configure software to selectively block access to resources based on the rating labels; they need not personally read them. This project is a consortium of 23 companies, under the auspices of MIT's World Wide Web Consortium. It has received significant attention in the press as an alternative to government-mandated blanket rules that would restrict the distribution of indecent materials. Details can be found at http://www.w3.org/PICS. Markets for IP Addresses The 32-bit numbers used for Internet addressing and routing are a limited resource. As this resource becomes scarcer, political considerations are likely to creep into allocation decisions made through existing administrative processes, leading to suboptimal allocations. By granting transferable property rights to addresses, allocation decisions can be removed from the political realm into the economic realm, so that addresses are allocated to those who value them most. This project seeks to develop consensus in the Internet community for a move to market-based allocation, and investigates alternative designs for an electronic market to coordinate the exchange of IP addresses. Electronic Support for Entry-Level Labor Markets Entry-level labor markets in several professional fields, including law, medicine, and psychology, share the characteristic that a large cohort of new employees are available at approximately the same starting date each year. The hiring processes in these fields,however, differ significantly. Medical residents "match" with hospitals through a centralized process embedded in a computer algorithm. Law students are hired in a far more decentralized process. This project explores whether computer mediation of the process can combine the advantages of both the centralized and decentralized approaches. Reputation Services In the physical world, trust and reputations play critical roles in commercial and social interactions. If word travels fast in a community, the consequences of unethical or antisocial behavior may be sufficient to deter such behavior. Moreover, there is an incentive to engage in good behavior, because it will be recognized and rewarded. In on-line environments with a dispersed base of casual users, word may not get around so fast. Reputation services will help spread the word: they can automatically keep track of good and bad behavior and make that history available in useful ways. Since it is easy to assume new identities and start new businesses on-line, leaving old reputations behind, positive reputations are likely to be far more important than negative ones. ------------------------------------------------------------ Paul Resnick AT&T Research Public Policy Research Room 2C-430B 908-582-5370 (voice) 600 Mountain Avenue 908-582-4113 (fax) P.O. Box 636 Murray Hill, NJ 07974-0636

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Unknown address
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi! Could you tell me why I receive this message?!? I *never* sent anything to your place... What is it that is wrong? The cypherpunks remailer? Your site? (how?) ========== original e-mail from you ================ >From warehouse.mn.org!postmaster(a)kksys.com Mon Feb 12 04:06:24 1996 Return-Path: <warehouse.mn.org!postmaster(a)kksys.com> From: postmaster(a)warehouse.mn.org (Postmaster) Subject: Unknown address Date: Sun, 11 Feb 1996 22:19:49 GMT Organization: The Warehouse BBS To: jf_avon(a)citenet.net ) >The user this message was addressed to does not exist at this site. Please >verify the name and domain in the original message that follows. >Message was addressed to: SAMUEL.KAPLIN(a)warehouse.mn.org > > ----- Original Message follows ----- > >From: jf_avon(a)citenet.net (Jean-Francois Avon (JFA Technologies, QC, Canada)) >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Date: Sun, 11 Feb 1996 23:41:06 -0500 >Subject: Re: "Rights" > >Ed.Carp(a)linux.org, ecarp(a)netcom.com wrote: <various blah blah from me snipped> ========= end original message from you ================ **** NEW PGP 2.6.2 KEY ********* 2048 bits Key ID:24201BA1 1996/02/13 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Key fingerprint = 23 B6 24 31 86 67 FB 35 C7 A7 AF 12 A1 61 E9 3D **** OLD KEY: DO NOT USE ANYMORE UNLESS FOR VERIFYING SIGNATURES **** 1024 bits Key ID:57214AED 1995/10/04 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Key fingerprint = 84 96 76 AE EB 7C AB 15 88 47 87 B0 18 31 74 9F

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