December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Ruby Block Cipher
by Michael Paul Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Ruby Block Cipher has just been published. It is not a general block cipher in that it cannot be used in Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode. It is more like a cryptographic hash function with a block size of only 64 bits. Of course, 64 bits is too short for a cryptographic hash function intended for digital signature use, but it is just fine for a quick block cipher. This may be a good reference for those folks who want a quick & easy encryption algorithm that need not withstand nuclear attack but can provide something better than common weak encryption methods in use in the software industry. Your comments and suggestions on this rather strange little cipher are welcome. Information on the Ruby Block Cipher is available as ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/ruby_m4.ps and, if you are in the USA or Canada, a reference implementation is in ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/mpj/rubycode.zip where the ??????? is revealed in ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README rubycode.zip is also available on the Colorado Catacombs BBS at 303-772-1062. Note: this is not a product for sale (it is free and probably worth at least as much as you pay for it). It is also not a prepublication (it is THE publication in electronic form with no paper publication anticpated in the near future). ___________________________________________________________ | | |\ /| | | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | \/ |o| | PO Box 1151, Longmont CO 80502-1151 USA Jesus is alive! | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.net aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | http://www.csn.net/~mpj -. --- ----- .... | | ||| \ \_/ | PGPprint=F2 5E A1 C1 A6 CF EF 71 12 1F 91 92 6A ED AE A9 | |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7.1 iQCVAgUBMNiaP/X0zg8FAL9FAQHe0AP+N+tBxoaIdny3CEgxdA8LO9+5VyYiOety qYBc9aCrCbw4TpsFTcsg5bosPlkm3H+VwpWVGOshfl5p69J893jrma07xRamEvM0 /1Mro3X/Ga4SQ7rjHPSdPCBR3YxSA7UoIx27gldTBty2k8WAAeH0BTbn/5s1bGrf ej9ab/rd7Jc= =QRjc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- P. S. -- I don't normally read this list, so please send a copy of follow-ups directly to me. Thanks!

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KGB_cia
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-21-95. WPutz: "In an unusual interview Yevgeny Primakov, head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, discussed problems and challenges facing his intelligence agency in terms that often sounded like testimony that CIA Director John M. Deutch gave the House intelligence committee Tuesday. In comments that echoed those of his U.S. counterparts, Primakov charged that some post-Cold War budget cuts in his agency developed 'because the [Russian] press ganged up on us [and] many newspapers wrote absurd things about us, including statements that foreign intelligence was no longer necessary at all.' His remarks about media coverage were similar to recent statements by Deutch and his predecessors, R. James Woolsey and Robert M. Gates." KGB_cia (5 cia)

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Re: What ever happened to... Cray Comp/NSA co-development
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- First, thanks for the obvious 'kind' thoughts Tim... It's heartening that you took the time to add some substantial info to the thread. However... > On 12/18/95 At 12:36 AM -0500, Timothy C. May wrote: > >What caught my attention was the architecture. > > > >A "hybrid design linking two supercomputer processors with an > >array of HALF A MILLION inexpensive processors" that were > >designed by the U.S. government laboratory affiliated with the > >NSA. The same chip house that brought us Clipper. > First, half a million chips is not that big a deal...the Connection Machine > had up to 64,000. Very few cryptographic problems of interest to us will be > affected by a mere factor of a million or so. O.K. Just a factor of 16 increase over the CM architecture right? Not knowing the computational capabilities of the individual processors, it might be difficult to say what the machine is capable of. Wouldn't that have some bearing? > Second, there was work on a "processor-in-memory" architecture, in > conjunction with a Bowie, Maryland spook-connected company. Perhaps this is > what you are thinking of? I didn't mention a 'processor-in-memory' architecture and neither did the NYT article. Don't know about any other company involvement, just CCC and NSA. > Third, all avenues of continued funding having fallen through, Cray > Computer (not Cray Research, of course) was shut down and assets > liquidated. I haven't heard what's become of Seymour, though. (He is > undoubtedly an asset, buy I doubt the Agency would have him liquidated.) You mean the avenues that are of PUBLIC record. The possibility could always exist that the development continues 'in-house'. It wouldn't be the first time that sort of move has been played. > >I've not kept up with the "ultimate" demise that eventually > >befell Cray Computer Company, but the October 16 FBI filing > >on capacity for Digital Telephony got me thinking back to this > >article. 1% seems like a rather huge need for horsepower. And > >what if GAK doesn't fly? And the widespread use of hard crypto > >just keeps increasing? > The tightly-coupled supercomputers are hardly needed for these sorts of > problems. You mean the problem of data collection? Well, it's true that this would be a misuse of a supercomputer's specialized talents. > >This kind of machine could, in theory: > > > >1) Implement ALL Clipper(II) based Key Escrow functionality in > > silicon (the easy part) AND allow for simultaneous decrypt and > > surveil of 'who knows how many' Clipper based data streams. > Huh? First, what evidence do you have for this claim? Second, who cares? > Implementing Clipper in a Cray Computer machine--why bother? [Rant mode on] Speculation Tim... I'm SPECULATING. Could, in theory... AND my kind of theory probably has holes you could drive a FLEET of Mack trucks through. I have NO evidence. I'm not sure WHO would care. I'M A PARANOID DILLUSIONAL PSYCHOPATH! O.K. well maybe not that last part... but I'm asking the questions, remember? I said I'm new here, so if your going to blow holes in my pet theories, then do me the 'kindness' of using an accurate weapon... that's why I posted... > As to the claim that a million-processor machine could do this, you need to > work out the math. (If a backdoor exists, or the LEAF has been gotten, a > supercomputer is not needed....) Again... I claimed NOTHING! SPECULATED MUCH! Now it's your turn... Why would YOU build a machine like this? What could POSSIBLY be it's capabilities? Speculate with me for a moment... *_take a chance_*. > >2) Implement general RSA based Prime Factoring functionality in > > silicon (the not so easy part) AND allow massively parallel > > decrypt and surveil of 'who knows how many' RSA/etc. based > > data streams. > Prime Factoring? Primes are easy to factor, of course. (Hint: Every prime > has two factors.) Yes, my terminology sucks! But you get the drift don't you? Math is not a strength of mine, I only know in very general terms what is involved (why, then, am I even bothering to bring this up?). Because I AM however, VERY concerned in the continual erosion of privacy rights in all forms communications, electronic and otherwise. [Rant mode off] > If you mean using supercomputers to brute force the general factoring of an > RSA modulus, this is nonsense. While there may be math shortcuts we don't > yet publically know about which make factoring easier than we currently > think it is, a mere million or even a billion processors will not make a > dent in the factoring of, say, a 700-digit modulus. See the tables in > Schneier and elsewhere for some estimates of factoring efforts needed. Nonsense? Is that 700 decimal digits or 700 binary digits? I don't have the tables that you refer to. Where may I find them? (LOL) > >3) Implement it all, AND 'on-line' transaction based surveillance > > via the FBI's 1% capacity infrastructure. > Let's see some numbers. (On second thought, let's not.) No, I've already said that math is not a strength I possess. I've wondered about the ability of the FBI to count on ten fingers and ten toes given some of the justification that I've read for this capacity figure... > >Chilling... Who needs key escrow (or RSA private keys) when > >you've got a massively parallel prime factoring machine. What if > >GAK was to become a 'non-issue'? How fast do you think a machine > >such as this could factor RSA 129? > Well, do the math. The MIPS-years for the RSA-129 crack were publicized, so > the computation for a million SPARC-equivalent (or even > UltraSPARC-equivalent) can be done. Sorry... I asked the question... and your speculation is (I would hope) MUCH more accurate than mine. Again, math is not a strength of mine. > When you've done this, and concluded that RSA-129 could be done in, say, X > minutes, then move on to RSA-384 (the BlackNet key cracked by the MIT > group), and on to the 1024- and 2048-bit keys. Tell us how many years or > centuries it will take. (Hint: Rivest and Schneier have done these > calculations....) Yes, I believe that I've read Rivest's paper on the statistical probabilities. I've never really believed in statistics, AND I'm sure you don't have the time to convince me Tim (I'm sorry if I've been less than reverencial about this, but I'm from Illinois which is right next door to Missouri). > --Tim May, who fears that he's just been trolled by Derek Atkins No Tim, you have not... but on another note... > It'll be _many_ years before a 384-decimal-digit number is factored, I > suspect. Let alone a 600-digit modulus, with or without the mysterious > "transphaser" technology mentioned by Anitro. The "transphaser" is an optical equivalent to the transistor. It is a quantum threshold optical switch, but it is not a 'mystery'. You should read Scientific American more often ;> O.K. I'm done with this line of discussion, you may however, continue to elaborate as I will, no doubt, continue to read... Anitro "I have a little shadow that goes in and out with me, And what can be the use of him is more than I can see" R. L. Stevenson - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMNiv8SoZzwIn1bdtAQHyewF+OXlM8KueHrCynKGhjqXy8eHLSonn12Df vcAdDoaajoi5t7CfY9lP/+FNeO2JKE+v =SIKC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The Problem With Blaze And Weinstein
by cpunk＠remail.ecafe.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not trying to start a flame war, just telling people what's REALLY happening. ATT and Netscape are both tools of the CIA/NSA. Blaze and Weinstein are in on the plot to force GAK upon us. Neither one says enough about the evils of GAK on their web page, so they're obviously for GAK and only pretending to be against it to fool the cypherpunks and curry favor with their NSA masters. Evidently the cypherpunks are all too impressed with Blaze and Weinstein's master degrees to see what's really happening. Only true visionaries like myself and Dr. Frederic B Cohen are telling it like it is; everyone else has had the wool pulled over their eyes by the NSA/ATT/Netscape axis. It's amazing how clear everything becomes once one stops taking the medication that THEY prescribed. s/ Bill Gates

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Re: FTC Privacy Initiative (fwd)
by blancw＠accessone.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Jyri Kaljundi From: Internet Marketing Discussion List The US Federal Trade Commission has launched a "Privacy Initiative" to investigate whether the information collected at websites (either that affirmatively submitted by a visitor via a form or information collected based upon a visitor's selection of pages at a site to reflect personal interests) should be the subject of regulation by the FTC. ............................................... "Hey, we can't just stand around here with nothing to do. Give us something to regulate - anything, pro or con; we must regulate something." Dang! .. Blanc

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Re: ex encrypted script
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Is there a way to encrypt a script yet still allow it to be runnable? I >know that the simple answer is to write it in C and compile it but I don't >have the means of doing that at the moment. (i.e. there is not compiler on >the system) Given your constraints: no. /r$

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Re: The Problem With Blaze And Weinstein
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> MIT is practically floating on government subsidies. Actually, if you discount Lincoln Labs, not really. /r$

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Surprise telecommunications bill?
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While watching the national news (NBC, I think) they mentioned that there had been a "surprising agreement on a telecommunications bill". From the sparse description, it sounded pretty nasty. Does anyone have any additional information on this? | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmerman unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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An Apology to Mr. Merzger
by Dan Harmon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry and members of this list, I want to publicly apologize to Mr. Metzger. On reviewing the events of the day, it seems that I misunderstood a post by Perry. It seems that I was missing a previous post that was being referenced. As to the misunderstood message, I have to now agree with Perry and his reponse. Please accept this apology. Dan

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Re: Microsoft Flame[tm] [NOISE]
by RobL 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:32 AM 12/21/95 CST, Roy M. Silvernail wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >There's a lot of finger waving going on over Microsoft's alleged >predatory practices. I just want to remind the pro-MS folks of >something. Microsoft has a documented track record of using >undocumented entry points in their OS and Windows products. These entry >points allow MS apps to do some things more efficiently than a [snip] > >While this isn't the grand-scale conspiracy some people seem to see, >IMHO it's still predatory. Perhaps the call to separate the OS and apps >divisions is a good idea. It would be interesting to see if Microsoft >could maintain its edge in applications when it had no sub rosa >advantage in OS access. IMHO, I see nothing wrong with predatory behavior.. then again, I hunt in the fall, so it must be a redneck thing.. MS and any of the other software companies are competing for domination in a narrow field.. MS just happens to be the only real choice for OS anymore.. well, for a standard, out of the box OS anyways. The fact that they have to leave in undisclosed hooks to get their own software to excell over others just points to the poor software they produce overall. I have to admit that I like, possibly admire, the way the Bill and crew have captured the market.. from a marketing standpoint, they did a first rate job of running with the ball until there was no pursuit.. Sure, from time to time, someone tries to throw a blocker in thier path, but they just overrun it and keep going.. Forget about the monopoly aspects for a second and look at MS as an American success story. It has all the classic elements: started small, with a crew of social misfits and eventually grew up. Just a few cents worth.. RobL ------------------|----------------------------------------------------------- Rob Lowry | PO Box 288 | Rockford Wa 99030 | ral(a)otc.mhs.compuserve.com robl(a)on-ramp.ior.com

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