December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Netscape and NSA
by daw＠quito.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199601191702.LAA12547(a)proust.suba.com>, Alex Strasheim <cp(a)proust.suba.com> wrote: > The Lotus approach is totally unacceptable. [...] > This is the first wave of guys hitting the beach. [...] > We don't have a lot of options in terms of strategy. Let's hack Lotus. Let's put out a binary patch which defeats Lotus's GAK. Let's look for weaknesses in their crypto implementation. Time for me to go looking for a Unix version of Lotus Notes 4. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMQAbwyoZzwIn1bdtAQGliAF/bz+i9Uu6N1gK0g/2G7WfN3Wv7zQJVRFG csq1ROPrZE65kzRYa8uwo8xjVszSDbrf =0yvk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Hack Lotus?
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> "Peter Trei" writes: > > I suspect that Lotus has not completely reworked it's security > > system for the international version, and that they are in fact > > doing a second public key operation on the 3 bytes of GAK'd data. > > Likely. > > > If they're nasty, they'll check on the receiving side as well, to > > ensure that the LEAF and/or the espionage-enabling key have not been > > patched in the sending 'International' version. > > Nearly impossible. Why? Because they can only include the public key, > and not the private key, of the GAK authority in the code. You can > encrypt the three bytes of key, but it is very hard for a receiver > other than the govvies to read them. There is no shared secret > information or private information available, ergo, they can't check > their LEAF equivalent. Think it through. 1 Alice generates session key K 2 encrypts with Bob's public key, producing Epb(K) 3 extracts 24 bits of K to make K' 4 encrypts with Eve's (spy) public key, producing Epe(K') 5 encrypts message under K, producing EsK(M) 6 sends EsK(M), Epb(K), Epge(K') to recipient (and possibliy Eve) 7 Bob's copy of lotus decrypts Epb(K), recovering K 8 Bob's copy of lotus repeats steps 4 & 5 above, and checks if it's version of Epe(K') matches the one sent. 9 If it does, decrypt EsK(M), and give it to Bob If it does not, send a copy to the NSA, blowing the whistle on Alice, who's running a hacked copy. Thus, you can prevent a non-complying copy of Lotus from talking to a complying copy of Lotus, which is one of the goals of the GAKers. > This is likely where the flaw in the scheme is -- it should be trivial > to drop another public key in place of the government one and foil the > entire thing with minimal effort. All will look normal until someone > tries to use the GAK private key. > Of course, I'll point out that 64 bit RC4 keys are still not > particularly heartwarming... Granted, but we don't know if they use RC4, DES, or what. > Perry Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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"whom T. C. May has killfiled"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:09 PM 1/19/96, Rich Graves wrote: >Yusuf's statement that my January 16th email is the first that he had >heard of the .PWL problem is both patently ridiculous and directly >contradicted by private email from anonymous sources on this list whom >T. C. May has killfiled. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ??? Mind explaining this reference? In public, preferably, as the charge was made here. If it's a joke, I don't get it. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Cypherpunk Enquirer
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

THE CYPHERPUNK ENQUIRER "Encyphering minds want to know." Lotus Development, a division of IBM, today announced a new, "international" version of its popular "Lotus Notes" program. The new program features, in addition to the standard 40 bit RC4 encoding allowed in exportable software by the ITAR, the use of the proven Unix (tm) encryption program, ROT 13. "Now our international customers can use the same, tamper-proof encryption standards that our domestic customers already enjoy," stated an IBM spokesperson, who was reportedly whisked to the Mayo Clinic for nose reduction surgery. In related news, the International Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals announced that the new Lotus Notes International does allow the snakes to move more easily and freely, and that it virtually eliminates that irritating squeaking sound when they shed their skins. In related medical news, proctologists at the Bethesda Naval Clinic reported that, despite 12 hour emergency surgery, Louis Freeh's head remains firmly stuck. The Center for Disease Control in Altanta has also reported that Mr. Freeh's condition is evidently highly contagious, as he has reportedly infected noted cryptographic researcher Dorothy Denning during a late night strategy session in Washington. CDC spokespersons also recommended that people avoid personal contact with David Sternlight for at least the next 48 hours. The FBI today announced the arrest of Timothy May on child pornography charges after an unnamed 13 year old FBI informant downloaded a .GIF of Mr. May naked in a hot tub at a recent 'cypherpunks' Christmas party. Mr. May, who is already under investigation by the SEC in the Netscape stock manipulation scandal, has referred all questions to his attorney. The FBI's attention was apparently drawn to the case when the 13 year old informant in question was heard to exclaim, "What's this naked hippie doing in my Penthouse downloads?" Matt Blaze today announced a new Random Number Generator based on President Clinton's Bosnia policy speeches of the last year. Mr. Blaze stated that each of the President's speeches was yielding at least 1024 bits of pure entropy, and that when added to the 512 bits of entropy found in each of Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich's policy papers on the Internet, should be enough to encypher an average household's grocery shopping over the Internet for at least a month. In related RNG news, University of California at Berkeley officials today confirmed that the campus's new symbol, the glow-in-the-dark Campanile, was actually the result of graduate student Ian Goldberg's attemps to hook the Lawrence Laboratory Bevatron up to his Unix workstation to use as a Random Number Generator. Noted anti-conspiracy lecturer Perry Metzger was hired today by Hillary Clinton's defense team. "He's done a great job on cypherpunks, let's see what he can do with the U.S. Senate," one of her lawyers stated at today's press conference. Jeff Weinstein of Netscape Communications today announced the long awaited 128 bit RC4 encryption Netscape Navigator for the Linux operating system. The new kit, consisting of a standard 2.05b binary, a disassembler, and a copy of "The C Programming Language" by Kernighan and Ritchie, should be available later this week. "This new kit should enable the average Linux user to enjoy the same level of Internet security that our Windoze users have, without violation of the International Trafficking in Armaments Regulations," stated Mr. Weinstein, "and will be made available to anyone free of charge who appears at our Mountain View offices with a U.S. pass- port, a birth certificate, a valid driver's license, two credit cards, and his or her Social Security Number tattooed on their upper left forearm." Alex de Joode announced that the kit had been available for the past week on ftp.hacktic.nl as /pub/linux/crypto/up.your.netscape. Lucky Green, spokesperson for the Mark Twain Bank, today announced the first truly anonymous 10 cents off coupon for the Internet. Attila was detained for 72 hours at the Swiss border while customs officials determined that an egg salad sandwich found in his luggage was indeed made of chicken eggs and was not harboring any biological weapons or contagious neurotoxins. Reliable sources reported today that the NSA has purchased a absolutely no intention of engaging in domestic surveillance or censorship."

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mailing list
by mbartels 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You come recommended by the Happy Mutant Handbook. Was just wondering what you suggestions/imput/stuff you guys have up your sleeve. Happy, Happy!! tanks. Weaselicious Inc.

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What news along the Rialto?
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, we're waiting. . . Those of us who didn't make it to the RSADSI conference are anxious to hear interesting tales of the Left Coast & crypto. One need not have the stylistic piquancy of John Young; one need only type up one's notes, optionally sign the missive, and mail or remail on to the list, posterity, and the Hoover Palace. I think maybe Bob H. went[?]; he e$pammed a press release from Florida's own Fischer Int'l. Sys. Corp. re: SmartDisk, which isn't really news, having been out for quite some time. When I first saw it, I smacked my forehead sharply with my open hand and said, "Exon the Contented Catamite! Why didn't I think of that?" I hope they sell a million of them. Any news from field agents appreciated. Any news from RSADSI re: prices and availablity of videos, etc., is also OK as far as I'm concerned. -- pj Defending the home, regret vanishes. - 19Jan96(a)I_Ching.tao p.s. noise.sys is neato! Thanks, Robt. Rothenburg Walking-Owl and funet.fi folks

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Re: mailing list
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:35 PM 1/19/96, mbartels wrote: >You come recommended by the Happy Mutant Handbook. Was just wondering >what you suggestions/imput/stuff you guys have up your sleeve. Happy, >Happy!! >tanks. >Weaselicious Inc. "Tanks"? We have no tanks, only cryptography. Looks like the cypherpunks(a)toad.com address, instead of majordomo(a)toad.com address, has again been put out in some book. (In this case, something called the "Happy Mutant Handbook.") Get read for another onslaught. For "Weaselicious," you can subscribe to the Cypherpunks mailing list by sending a message to majordomo(a)toad.com with a body message of subscribe cypherpunks (Send this from the e-mail address which you wish subscribed to the list.) You will receive a welcome message with more information, including the all-important information on how to UNSUBSCRIBE. Don't lose this message, as yoy may need it. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: Cypherpunk Enquirer
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hee-hee-hee-haa-haa-haaaaaaa. The UpYours CPunk News Update. .. Blanc

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Re: CryptoAPI and export question
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tom Johnston <tomj(a)microsoft.com>: At 06:07 PM 1/17/96 EST, you wrote: >Two points: the CSP development kit is export-controlled; and signing a >CSP developed by a foreign vendor is treated as a export -- so the signature >is export-controlled. > >We would ship a CSP development kit to a foreign vendor, and sign a CSP >developed by the foreign vendor, but only with the appropriate export licenses. Thanks for your reply to Dr. Vulis's question. I'd recommend examining this policy somewhat critically, for a couple of reasons: 1) Development kits are useful, but if you've got an open, documented interface, it's possible to develop code to use it without the kit. (Ignoring, of course, the risk of smuggling. :-) 2) By "is treated as an export", do you mean by explicit government policy, or by Microsoft? Digital signatures and encrypted documents are perfectly legal to export, as is authentication code to make digital signatures. 3) Consider the case of a contractor who buys the development kit, and gives you code to sign. You have no way to differentiate between code that he developed himself, and code developed by some foreign company that hired him and gave him the code (which is legal to import into the US.) He probably can't legally re-export the code, or export the signed version of it, but he can export the signature itself, since that's not cryptographic code, and the foreign company can reattach it to their original document, which you have now signed.... #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around....

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The Lotus Position
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:03 AM 1/20/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >40-unknown-bit RC4 may take a week for an ICE workstation or a herd of >net-coordinated workstations, but it would be much faster to crack on >a specialized machine actually designed for RC4. I think Eric's estimate >was $25-50K for a machine that could do it in 15 minutes, built out of >programmable gate arrays. That's not $10,000/crack, or $584, but $0.25-.50. >Would they crack all the keys they wanted for a quarter each? Sure; >at that rate it's probably cheaper to crack them than read them >(though in reality they'd feed most of them to keyword scanners.) I take it as self-evidently true that NSA would spend the relatively small amount of money to build a dedicated key cracker...probably at least several for each major cipher. "In this room, where we used to have the famed acre of Crays, now we have tenth of an acre of superfast custom key crackers." (Yes, I know the Crays are used for other things besides key cracking. In fact, their main use probably is not for crypanalysis. Also, I'm not talking about cracking ciphers that are essentially uncrackable with any amount of compute power, I'm talking about cracking specific instances of ciphers with NSA-approved key lengths.) To consider just how _cheap_ such a dedicated machine is to them, consider that in the late 50s and early 60s they built the "Harvest" machine, in conjunction with IBM and based to some extent on IBM's "Stretch" machine, as I recall. (Bamford has a bunch of stuff on it, and our own Norm Hardy worked on it for IBM in the early 60s...he gave a good talk at a Cypherpunks meeting on how big it was, how much it cost, its capabilities, etc.) The Harvest machine, and its ancillary units, such as the world's largest and fastest tractor tape drive, cost something like $100 million in today's dollars, according to Norm and others. And Harvest was still running in 1975-6, when it was finally replaced by the Cray 1. NSA also funded the early efforts that later became Control Data Corporation (CDC), and NSA was a major customer of Seymour Cray's CDC 6600, and the later 7600 (and maybe even the ill-fated Star). NSA and AEC were also the early customers for the Cray-1, of course. This gives you some feel for what kind of expenditures "the Fort" is prepared to make when it sees the need. And the black budgets of other intelligence agencies, as described in Richelson's excellent books and other books (such as "Deep Black," an unauthorized history of the National Reconnaissance Organization), can only be described as "stupefyingly large." A surveillance satellite can run upwards of $1.5 billion, so spending a tiny fraction of that to decrypt what you've sniffed out of the airwaves is a gimme. The deep black budget is estimated to be something like $25 billion a year. Recall that the Wiretap Bill _alone_ provided for up to $500 million for compliance measures. Clearly the FBI somehow view their surveillance capabilities as being worth at least this much to them, and probably a lot more. Throw in the budgets for the DEA, IRS, FinCen, FBI, BATF, and all the other agencies fighting the Four Horsemen and the citizen-units who stray outside the drawn lines, and it's clear that NSA could budget several hundred million dollars *each and every year* for breaking its "approved ciphers." Like many, I take it for granted that 40-bit RC4 can be broken for "small change." Moreover, my guess is that foreign traffic is routinely cracked if it is encrypted. After all, it's the encrypted traffic that is likeliest to be interesting. (Sure, some dumbos like Pablo Escobar speak in the clear on cellphones, but the correlation is definitely in the direction of encrypted traffic being likelier than unencrypted traffic to contain interesting stuff. This will become even more the case as more people become educated and as crypto gets built into more things...this is the intelligence and law enforcement communities' worse nightmare.) A $25,000 machine. 4 cracks per hour, 100 per day, and 36,000 per year. Running for an active life of several years (before being replaced, of course, by something several times faster/cheaper), there you have the $0.25 per crack that Bill cites above. Even at 100 times this estimate, it's cheap. (Not for random vacuuming, but for anything targetted, even casually.) And think of what just a few percent of the "Harvest" budget buys you: 100 of these machines. Several million cracks per year. And from these cracks, think of the correlations, the contact lists, and the further targetting that can be done. [Sidebar: One thing that bothers me about any of these LEAF-related schemes--and I don't know if and how the Lotus scheme checks both ends for compliance, etc.--is that they are fundamentally at odds with remailers which hide the origin. If remailers are allowed to continue to exist, schemes involving LEAF fields won't work. Unless I've forgotten how these things work in the couple of years since I last looked at Clipper et. al. in depth. So, I expect a move against remailers as part of the campaign. And with no remailers, if this could ever be enforced, the ability to make contact lists based on random decryption is frightening.] Back to their 100 machines.... My guess is that they haven't even bothered to buy this many machines, that the intelligence they get from a few tens of thousands of cracks is more than enough to point to further leads, to trigger additional HUMINT, etc. But even if the estimates are off by orders of magnitude, we know that a 40-bit RC4 can be cracked in ~hours with ~hundreds of Sun-class machines. (Personally, I think it obvious the NSA has at least speeded up this work factor by at least a factor of ten.) This is also essentially a minor consideration compared to the amount of work done in ordinary wiretaps. And in a few years, 40-bit RC4 will be even more ludicrously weak. The Lotus position is untenable. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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