December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

WSJ: IBM Corp. Compromises On Encryption Keys (fwd)
by mixmaster＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You might want to disregard the paranoid, irrelevant head and tail, but the included article is very good, especially considering the establishment source. Nice headline, for the WSJ. Forwarded message: > Have you heard of problems with the equations that Excel 95 generates when > using the trendline analysis function in a chart? I haven't seen this, but because of all the math stuff on my web, I'm getting both phone calls and a lot of odd math feed back. We think we do have a real carry bit error between the Win 3.x and Win95. Some of the data I've reviewed is pretty scarry. Microsoft lost a lot of their older programmers over the past 3 years. It was literally an Exodis out. Now they have a lot of people that can't read the old code and this is a real mess. They also can't get anyone with much experience to work there. Here in Redmond good people just stay away. I saw this article today in Dow Jones and thought it might shed some light on the security issues. I know what MS's 10 year strategy was from 1990. Steve Ballmer is the one making all the decisions on international markets. It's his baby. When I read this about IBM and Lotus all I could think of was Steve ordering the guys to make something exceptable for their license by the FED so they could gain market share over their competitors. This is just who he is. He doesn't understand the techincal issues and hasn't listened to Gates in years. MS is pretty thick with DC and must pay off lots of people there. That is what they were doing when I worked for their government group. It's weird working with the FED. They are all into their power groups. AND they are very low tech. I swear the FED is scrapping the bottom of the technical pool. The FBI is the worse. ------------------------------------ 1/18/96 IBM Corp. Compromises On Encryption Keys By Thomas E. Weber Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal NEW YORK -- International Business Machines Corp., caving in to intense government pressure, agreed to include a special key that helps investigators tap into data messages in return for permission to export a more-secure version of its Lotus Notes software. The U.S. has prevented software makers from exporting sophisticated encryption technology for fear that terrorists and other criminals would gain access to a snoop-proof communications system. Industry observers said IBM's move marked the first time a supplier agreed to give the government special access to its software's security code. But other companies also are negotiating with the government to find ways around export restrictions. Microsoft Corp., for example, has been seeking industry support for a new scheme that separates encryption technology from application programs so that those products don't need export licenses. Encryption keys have stirred the concern of privacy experts in the past. While IBM's Lotus Development Corp. software unit defended the move as a stopgap compromise until a broader agreement on data security can be reached, Notes creator Ray Ozzie clearly found the controversial plan somewhat distasteful. "We were desperate enough to try to negotiate a short-term, pragmatic solution," Mr. Ozzie said. "But we do not believe this is the right long-term solution." One privacy advocate would agree. "The irreducible fact is that foreign customers are reluctant to rely on security products that have been compromised in some way" by federal intelligence agencies, said Mike Godwin, staff counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Several years ago the government proposed the "Clipper" computer chip that was programmed to let investigators tap into phone calls and data messages transmitted digitally. While that plan died after privacy advocates accused the government of trying to spy on users, the idea of leaving a back door open for government agents has remained alive. Under the Lotus plan, government investigators would still need to employ sophisticated code breaking to read messages sent via Notes software, which lets users at different computers collaborate. Security software encrypts information by using a unique key of software code. The length of a key is measured in computer bits, and longer keys are better -- they're more complex and more difficult for wouldbe spies, not to mention government agents, to unravel. Until now, to obtain an export license for Notes, Lotus has been restricted to an encryption system of 40 bits in its international version. Domestic users have been permitted to use a higher-level, more-secure 64-bit system. The new overseas version of Notes, tagged Release 4, will give foreign users 64-bit security. But to get permission to export the software, Lotus agreed to give the government access to 24 of those bits by using a special 24-bit key supplied by the National Security Agency. (END) DOW JONES NEWS 01-18-96 6 02 A ---------------------------- Gates is the kind of person who will do just what they want if he gets dicked with. He'll have a ranting fit (Gates is a functional autist) about how stupid it is and then he will just get eccentric and say, give them what they want with a grin. He is still a hacker at the core. You understand the problem here. The FED is making them use lower security and then patting them on the back and buying their products for our own government and militery. Gates use to brag that he would crash the fed. I really believe he is still trying. NO ONE hates the FED more than GATES! He was a page in DC at 17 and got a good taste of our government. I've had it with these people too. DC is so discusting. All these attorneys who don't know shit about anything but words and lying... Hey, I updated my web... : ) To day I filed an appearance in court and fired my attorney. I'm still being dicked with here. If I don't look both way when I cross the street, I get busted. This week it was an unwanted touch. I touched someone's shopping bag getting into my car. Next week its an non-contact order by my daughter's guidence counselor. She considers a phone call from me about my daughter's possible college programs a threat! When I got the complaint it was totally nuts. Everything she knows about me is based on gossip. It reads like total hysteria. The way Microsoft has attempted to play me locally is really amazing. I was 40 when this started. Never had a problem before that. So when I say, 'Watch your back!' I mean it. : ) J~ http://www.halcyon.com/redrose/

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NSA vacuuming down Internet traffic
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- WRT: "...the same article had Madsen stating that the NSA is vacuuming down Internet traffic. he gave the likely entry points that they are doing this." It's a virtual lead-pipe cinch that this is being done and probably has been going on for longer than anyone would like to think. In the 1960's - 1970's when international cable traffic was in its computer infancy, access was had to EVERY CABLE MESSAGE passing through the message switches of U.S. common carriers. This means no only every international cable message originating from or destined to a U.S. point, but also included every message ROUTED THROUGH the U.S., such as Europe <--> South America. There was no great skullduggery involved -- the common carriers simply made copies of their own log tapes and handed them to messengers from the, ah, FCC (ahem). It was on the operations checklist and no one thought twice about it. It may be urban legend to some, but I've seen it with my own eyes, handled the tapes with my own hands. If anyone else wishes to move this from the status of urban legend to something more solid, all they have to do is locate and ask people who worked in message switch operations at RCA Global Communications, ITT World Communications, or Western Union International, the three common carriers of that time. Knowing this, I would assume something similar was done at overseas locations of the same carriers and at such other access points as could be compromised. An organization such as NSA that viewed this as SOP would have to be brain dead not to be doing the same thing with the Internet. The only question in my mind is how far they have gone beyond USENET and the newer, fertile ground of web sites. Are they vacuuming packets and reassembling email? Just how many laser discs have been filled with coherent traffic? Time to exercise those plain, brown envelopes. We Jurgar Din (that will have to suffice: I do not yet live in a free country) +"The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone. It is to the+ +vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no + +election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now + +too late to retire from the contest." -Patrick Henry 1775 + -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMP9XX0jw99YhtpnhAQEH1gH+KiIxJ3eXZCNGq5mG9UB1A68+TOLe9tCk NG170tzIBtwjlXw09B83Oxx16WineBqlZ7NJJiRazssBpFqDnWEh4A== =tUWW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Wipe Swap File
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jan 19, 1996 23:59:46, 'anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com' wrote: >I know this is a little off-topic, but does anyone know of a good swap file >deleter? I know Real Delete is a good program, but I want something I can call >in a batch file after windows to automatically do a secure wipe of the >permanent swap file and then replace it. I have heard of a couple programs but >I am not sure about their reliability. Any pointers to a good program would be >appreciated. > One way: 1) Go to DOS prompt; 2) Change mode of the permanent swap file to make it writable; 3) Run WIPEFILE by Norton, or any other similar program, without setting up the file for deletion after wiping; 4) Change mode of the permanent swap file back to the original attributes; 5) Leave DOS prompt. Another way: 1) Remove permanent character of swap file from within Windows; 2) Go to DOS prompt. 3) Erase the swap file. 4) Run Norton etc. WIPEDISK utility on all areas of disk not used by files; 5) Return to WIndows; 6) Rebuild permanent swap file. Remember that one simple wipe is *not* secure. Current Department of Defense security regs call for wiping the same space something like 8 or 9 times. Even then the wipe is not secure enough for higher level DofD classified material. There the regs call for the physical destruction of the medium after it has been wiped. Norton handles DoD-level wipes as an option. -- tallpaul What part of "know" don't you understand?

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Re: Keyboard emulation
by Martin Diehl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve, Yes, it's called PC Anywhere by Symantic MGD ______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________ Subject: Keyboard emulation Author: "Steve Makrecky" <Steve_Makrecky(a)msn.com> at Internet-USA Date: 1/18/96 7:21 PM Looking for a design of a keyboard & mouse emulator. What I would like to do is control a main computer's keyboard and mouse functions by a second RS232 remote IBM PC. Has anybody tried this? Do you foresee any problems?

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You want to read MY e-mail?
by Scott Staedeli 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

from the Nando Times- DENVER (Jan 20, 1996 01:16 a.m. EST) -- A college student's request to look at the electronic mail of several high-profile state politicians got lawmakers' attention Friday. Becky O'Guin, a senior journalism student at Metropolitan State College of Denver and a reporter for The Capitol Reporter, a student newspaper that covers legislative action, stirred up the ruckus. She sent a letter to Sen. Charles Duke, R-Monument, asking for all of his e-mail messages from Jan. 1 to Jan. 16 and cited the Colorado Open Records Act as her right to get it. The letter noted that Colorado law would force him to pay court costs and attorney fees if a member of the public "has to take official action to enforce his or her right to view a public record." That really miffed legislators. Lawmakers said they'd get a legal opinion on whether they must disclose their electronic-age messages and may pass legislation to make sure their messages have some protection of privacy. Senate Majority Leader Jeff Wells, R-Colorado Springs, said he and Senate President Tom Norton, R-Greeley, got similar requests, but verbally. Personally, Wells said, he believes e-mail is privileged information unless it is specifically identified as public information under existing law. A bill by Sen. Paul Weissmann, R-Louisville, to make e-mail as privileged as telephone conversations was killed in a Senate committee. A somewhat stronger bill still rests in the House. O'Guin, meanwhile, was standing her ground, although she admitted to being a little surprised about the uproar. "The way I read the open records statute, those are open records," O'Guin said. "I was very serious about the request. What I was looking for was to find out how much public business is conducted through e-mail. "If they're using e-mail to send memos back and forth discussing public business, I see that as public record," she said. "Most of them don't (have e-mail), but about 30 people have software that allows them to send e-mail back and forth." She said only Duke and Gov. Roy Romer have been sent letters so far, but she intends to send them to other high-profile politicians. Jim Carpenter, press secretary for Romer, said his office was "looking at all the issues, all the options." Duke said he has always complied with requests for public records, but said the request for e- mail messages goes too far. "I'm disturbed by it," Duke said. (John Sanko writes for the Rocky Mountain News in Denver.) OK, if _I_ can't read your e-mail Mr. Legislator, why should you be able to read _mine_? - --scottst(a)ionet.net---------------------Scott Staedeli-- >~<^xXx | "There is no reason for any indiv- xX # | idual to have a computer in their (XXX) # | home." (XXXXXXX) | DON'T TREAD ON ME| -- Ken Olsen, president of DEC, 1977 ========================================================

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Code demonstrating Microsoft Windows insecurity on networks (fwd)
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What "anonymous" said (below). I had permission to forward this, but I figured it might attract more interest if it were "anonymous" to people who can't read headers. Almost two months after Peter and Frank demonstrated that it was untrue, and one month and five days after Microsoft "significantly improved" Windows 95 by providing a patch for the exact same algorithm, Microsoft this very second still says that the .PWL algorithm as used in Windows for Workgroups is secure. http://www.microsoft.com/kb/peropsys/windows/q90271.htm This article will also be included on thousands of copies of the February TechNet CD-ROM. Other Knowledge Base articles have been corrected in less than a day. Yusuf's statement that my January 16th email is the first that he had heard of the .PWL problem is both patently ridiculous and directly contradicted by private email from anonymous sources on this list whom T. C. May has killfiled. In other news, the international versions of the SMB and C$ bug fixes exploited by Samba and Paul Brainard were finally posted today (as usual, they're dated yesterday). So the non-US public shares listed on, for example, www.winserve.com no longer have to be completely open to everyone on the Internet. Yusuf Mehdi, the Windows 95 Product Manager, had told me on November 9th that these internationalized patches would be posted "within two weeks." No excuse for this two-month delay has been offered. Yusuf also, well, lied on November 9th when he said that Microsoft had "sent mail to the newsgroups" retracting their statement that the SMB bug was caused by Samba sending "illegal network commands," and clarifying that the patches dated October 20th only work on US/English versions of Windows 95. The original Microsoft announcement as released to the media and WinNews is at: gopher://quixote.stanford.edu/0R593020-600291-/win95netbugs The current version, which contrary to Yusuf's statements on November 9th does not indicate that there has been any change, is at: http://www.microsoft.com/windows/software/w95fpup.htm By the way, MSN is going to allow access via TCP/IP soon. Let's make sure they do it securely. -rich ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Newsgroups: comp.security.misc,comp.os.ms-windows.nt.admin.networking,alt.security,comp.os.ms-windows.networking.windows,comp.os.ms-windows.programmer.networks Path: nntp.Stanford.EDU!news.Stanford.EDU!nntp-hub2.barrnet.net!newsfeed.internetmci.com!nuclear.microserve.net!luzskru.cpcnet.com!not-for-mail From: anonymous(a)alpha.c2.org Subject: Code demonstrating Microsoft Windows insecurity on networks Sender: rich(a)infinity.c2.org Message-ID: <4dnmcu$pt4(a)infinity.c2.org> Date: 19 Jan 1996 00:57:02 -0800 Organization: http://www.c2.org/hackmsoft/ Summary: Cypherpunks share code Lines: 210 Just a little something to hurry this liar up: Received: from tide10.microsoft.com (firewall-user(a)tide10.microsoft.com [131.107.3.20]) by infinity.c2.org (8.7.1/8.6.9) with SMTP id JAA14902 for <hackmsoft(a)c2.org>; Tue, 16 Jan 1996 09:07:26 -0800 (PST) Community ConneXion: Privacy & Community: <URL:http://www.c2.org> Received: by tide10.microsoft.com; id JAA00999; Tue, 16 Jan 1996 09:28:16 -0800 Received: from unknown(157.54.17.74) by tide10.microsoft.com via smap (g3.0.3) id xma000913; Tue, 16 Jan 96 09:27:48 -0800 Received: from xnet2 (xnet2.microsoft.com [157.54.17.205]) by imail2.microsoft.com (8.7.1/8.7.1) with SMTP id JAA02991 for <hackmsoft(a)c2.org>; Tue, 16 Jan 1996 09:15:28 -0800 (PST) X-Received: from xmtp4 by xnet2 with receive; Tue, 16 Jan 1996 09:12:22 -0800 X-Received: from RED-02-IMC by xmtp4 with recvsmtp; Tue, 16 Jan 1996 09:08:41 -0800 Received: by red-02-imc.itg.microsoft.com with Microsoft Exchange (IMC 4.22.611) id <01BAE3F2.39A25280(a)red-02-imc.itg.microsoft.com>; Tue, 16 Jan 1996 09:08:39 -0800 Message-ID: <c=US%a=_%p=msft%l=RED-72-MSG-960116170828Z-11006(a)red-02-imc.itg.microsoft.com> From: Yusuf Mehdi <yusufm(a)microsoft.com> To: Rich Graves <llurch(a)networking.stanford.edu>, Yves Michali <yvesm(a)msg.microsoft.com> Cc: "pgut01(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz" <pgut01(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "hackmsoft(a)c2.org" <hackmsoft(a)c2.org>, Robert Bennett <rbennett(a)msg.microsoft.com>, Michael Ahern <mikeah(a)msg.microsoft.com>, Russell Stockdale <rust(a)msg.microsoft.com> Subject: RE: Need confirmation of Win95 password encryption back door (fwd) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 1996 09:08:30 -0800 X-Mailer: Microsoft Exchange Server Internet Mail Connector Version 4.22.611 Encoding: 204 TEXT X-MsXMTID: xmtp4960116170841RECVSMTP[01.52.00]000000fb-49231 Rich, Thanks for your email. This is the first I've seen of your email. I'm forwarding to Mike Ahearn who will handle any issues. If we have outdated information in the knowledge base, I apologize and we will certainly correct asap. Mike will investigate and let you know the outcome. As always we appreciate your feedback. Yusuf ---------- From: Rich Graves[SMTP:llurch@networking.stanford.edu] Sent: Tuesday, January 16, 1996 5:06 AM To: Yusuf Mehdi; Yves Michali Cc: pgut01(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz; hackmsoft(a)c2.org Subject: Re: Need confirmation of Win95 password encryption back door (fwd) [A reply to a cypherpunks post] Peter, I'm forwarding this to the Windows 95 Product Manager, who does not seem to be taking this at all seriously, and Bcc'ing it to the technically knowledgeable reporters I mentioned in my other message and to four Microsoft engineers who have sent me mail, two of them on condition of anonymity (at least one of whom fears management reprisals). I don't see any particular reason to tell Microsoft everyone I am talking to, especially since they have been less than completely honest with me. Yusuf, please ask the Windows for Workgroups group to at least acknowledge the .PWL encryption bugs they have known about since at least November 29th, correct the Knowledge Base articles that explain how secure .PWL files are, and let the public know whether they have any plans to fix these bugs and fundamental architectural weaknesses. To put this more succinctly, the below, from Q90271, is complete bullshit, and you know it. The password list file is encrypted with an algorithm that meets the U.S. government Data Encryption Standard (DES). This encryption technology is the highest security allowed in software exported from the United States. The odds of breaking the encryption algorithm are less than those for random guesses of what the password might be. If you don't spread the word, we will. All it takes is a couple of free hours on CompuServe, America Online, Prodigy, Delphi, and the Microsoft Network, not to mention the Internet itself. Right now, my mailing list has 600 serious network managers in 20 countries, and my Web site gets about 1,000 hits per day (that's the main site; there are also mirrors in Russia, the UK, and Australia). -rich ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 17 Jan 1996 01:15:20 +1300 (NZDT) From: pgut01(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz To: llurch(a)networking.stanford.edu Subject: Re: Need confirmation of Win95 password encryption back door >A Major Media Outlet requires confirmation that Windows 95, to facilitate its >automatic reconnect feature for sleeping laptops and temporary network >outages, caches all network passwords (NetWare, NT, UNIX running Samba, >SLIP/PPP dialup) in unprotected memory in clear text, whether you've disabled >persistent "password caching" to disk and applied the December 14th 128-bit >RC4 .PWL patch, or not. There seems to be no way to turn this off. Would you like me to confirm it for WfW? Actually you can problably do it for Win95 by removing the password file after the initial connect. If Win95 can reconnect with the password file missing, then the passwords are still in memory. You'll have to be careful though to make sure they're not being read from the Windows disk cache, loading Word in between killing the connection and trying to reconnect should clear the password file from the cache. >So, anyone have Win95 and some time to kill, or can anyone recommend a good >DOS/Windows RAM grepper? Given that the descriptor tables are apparently unprotected in Win95 (which is pretty incredible), it shouldn't be too hard to get access to all of memory >from a user process. In any case a VxD should be able to grep all of memory in the background without the user even being aware of it. >We know that this vulnerability exists in Windows for Workgroups, and Peter >wrote a little demo (on hackmsoft page below, without source), but the APIs >appear to have changed in Win95. Sorry about the delay in getting this to you, as I mentioned before it was on a machine a fair way away, stuck behind a firewall. I haven't included all the SMTP stuff and whatnot because there's quite a bit of it and it's boring, the routines which do all the work are the following... This is the function called by WNetEnumCachedPasswords() to enumerate each password: [*CODE DELETED*] /* Record the password information */ [*CODE DELETED*] /* Signify that we want to move to the next entry */ [*CODE DELETED*] This is the function which actually does the enumeration. The for() loop defines what resources you want to get passwords for. [*CODE DELETED*] /* Get the proc. address of the password manipulation function */ [*CODE DELETED*] /* Enumerate the passwords */ [*CODE DELETED*] To find out (for example) what disk drive resources you're using: /* Check each drive to see if it's a network resource */ for( driveNo = 2; driveNo < 26; driveNo++ ) if( GetDriveType( driveNo ) == DRIVE_REMOTE ) { char password[ 100 ], resource[ 100 ]; char *driveName = "x:"; WORD passwordLength = 100, resourceLength = 100; BYTE resourceNo; int i; /* Find the name of the network resource for this drive number */ *driveName = 'A' + driveNo; WNetGetConnection( driveName, resource, &resourceLength ); } This code should be modifiable by anyone to get any password for any resource. I'll leave it to you to decide how much to publish, the worry is that if you publish all of it people will whine about it helping hackers. Might I suggest something like: /* Get the proc. address of the password manipulation function */ WNetEnumCachedPasswords = ( LPWNETENUMCACHEDPASSWORDS ) \ GetProcAddress( WNetGetCaps( 0xFFFF ), \ MAKEINTRESOURCE( ORD_WNETENUMCACHEDPASSWORDS ) ); if( WNetEnumCachedPasswords == NULL ) exit( EXIT_FAILURE ); /* Enumerate the passwords for the resources we want. This only gets the first password, in practice we'd keep calling WNetEnumCachedPasswords() until the enumPasswordProc() tells us (via the returned status) to stop, then move on to the next resource */ for( resourceNo = START_RESOURCE; resourceNo <= END_RESOURCE; resourceNo++ ) status = ( *WNetEnumCachedPasswords )( "", 0, ( BYTE ) resourceNo, \ enumPasswordProc ); This shows how simple it is, but doesn't give people something they can just cut and paste into their own code to get something which will give them all passwords. You may want to include the "find drive resources" code fragment as well as an example of how to do this, although it's not really necessary. Feel free to forward this to whoever you think is appropriate, although it's probably best not to give the get-any-password capable version to the masses. Peter.

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authenticating intrahost crypto providers
by jleppek＠suw2k.hisd.harris.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been doing some research on the development of an abstract security services API(not just a CAPI) and have hit a road block. The problem revolves around the need to authenticate a security service provider to an application. I noticed that microsoft has followed a path of providing a signature in each external provider but the feeling is that this is not that difficult to circumvent. I have the same misgivings but cannot come up with anything else. Are my misgivings unfounded??? What are some other possibilities to allow intrahost (application) authentication of services. Do you need to actually have a cryptographic binding of services? Comments.... Jim Leppek jleppek(a)suw2k.hisd.harris.com Harris Corporation

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Indecent Trash
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 10 Jan 96 at 10:42, t byfield wrote: > At 10:26 PM 1/9/96, Alexander 'Sasha' Chislenko wrote: > > >- Landfills: They are probably the richest source of detailed > > historical information that is not obtainable from any > > other source and can be used to reconstruct the detailed > > history of society, economy, technology and any single > > person with incredible detail. > I ain't holding my breath until someone develops a search > engine for Fresh Kills. I can see it now... about the time that Grandson of Altavista finally yields a URL for Jimmy Hoffa's body in some dump somewhere the government will have figured out that it's so much simpler to catalog the stuff on the way IN, when all the artifacts are fresh and unmixed. While we're all watching what the government does to intercept packets, they will be routing *trash* packets through mysterious "garbage routers." As the stink grows stronger, someone will conceive of anonymous trash forwarders. They will accept unidentified trash, no questions asked, anonymize it with random DNA and fingerprint whorls, and sneak it into public trash receptacles. DNA generators will enable the mischievous to plant fabricated indications that Hillary did indeed have something going with Vince, the late Khomeini (hey, hard is hard, right?) as well as legions of four-footed friends, confirming the suspicions of multitudes. As the piles of trash-based data grow, some Senator from Nebraska will sound the alarm that kids are too easily exposed to the indecent signs of private behavior retrievable on the Net and will propose draconian measures to hold everyone responsible for their contributions to the city landfill. Public receptacles will be closed. Trash will only be collected from registered Identifed Surplus Providers (ISP's). $250,000 fine for disposing of a condom in a dump accessible from the Internet... 10 years in prison for carelessly tossing those nasty Polaroids in the kitchen compactor. The trash of the world will have to be made safe for kids to view. Everything will be a lot easier to trace and control if the garbage input is fully identified. Barcodes on trash bags might do for starters. Access to the garbage system might have to be restricted to those 18 and over. Trash collectors could be made responsible for content, drafting them without pay into the ranks of the trash police. People could be encouraged to report suspicious trash, and trash-related activities like neighbors sneaking out at night to place an innocent-looking compactor bag down the block with someone else's trash. For their own protection, youngsters might be required to retain all their garbage until age 18 and then, in a solemn ceremony worthy of the true significance of coming of age, pitch it all (duly anonymized to prevent abuse of minor indiscretions) from their new position as lawful participants in the world garbage system, friends and well-wishers trying to applaud and hold their noses at the same time (try it -- if you're not careful you can break your own nose, but hey, that'll work, too!). Who knows? Maybe Heinlein's advocacy of keeping kids in a barrel and feeding them through a hole until age 18 will enjoy resurgence among the compulsively protective while the Web meanwhile will provide real time underground data on Heinlein's rpm rate. Protecting the trash of youth will, however, give rise to the hiding of adult trash among that of the underaged. The government will have to root out offenders and "impute" suspicious trash to the parents. Those with no visible source of trash will of course be suspect, and will have to emit innocent trash to cover themselves. This will give rise to the practice of "trash laundering," in which agents convert nasty trash to innocuous trash that may then be tossed into any monitored, controlled channels with no repercussions. Trash laundering will become a grave offense to the accompaniment of government and Ad Council PSA's and free brochures from Pueblo, Colorado. Blatant offenders who have fled to foreign climes will be kidnapped, some will be tortured, because the War Against Filth will be a moral commitment of the national body. Foreign governments headed by suspected trash traffickers will be toppled in quickie invasions, their leaders brought back in chains to disappear into federal dungeons. Public debate will center on the legalities and rationalizations of using the military in policing domestic trash, while agencies such as the FBI cry for more budget to fight the scourge that threatens the decency of the nation's repositories. Control of trash will spread inevitably to control of liquid wastes, whereupon a terrible discovery will be made: Everyone, but everyone, emits unspeakable bodily products. At that point the government will have no choice but to reluctantly declare everyone an outlaw and execute the populace. It's all as logical as what happens when you introduce division by zero way down at the bottom of the complex equation where it isn't so noticeable. We Jurgar Din (that will have to suffice: I do not yet live in a free country) +"The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone. It is to the+ +vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no + +election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now + +too late to retire from the contest." -Patrick Henry 1775 + -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMPS/PEjw99YhtpnhAQH1UQH5AdXBd7AvG6xT7x/cTXf5W1cAUXzoJ+GB N0/SPrdoJnbUSN5LkJDwoVwA/eiL6/LVN9CjtmQwmydyBysM7M/7Xw== =q+CF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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NSA vacuuming down Internet traffic
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) on Fri, 19 Jan 10:23 AM >In the 1960's - 1970's when international cable traffic >was in its computer infancy, access was had to EVERY >CABLE MESSAGE passing through the message switches of >U.S. common carriers. > >If anyone else wishes to move this from the status of >urban legend to something more solid, all they have to >do is locate and ask people who worked in message >switch operations at RCA Global Communications, ITT >World Communications, or Western Union International, >the three common carriers of that time. > >We Jurgar Din Yes, indeed. James Bamford in "The Puzzle Palace" details the long-term TLA-access to international cable traffic -- via Operation Shamrock -- beginning in 1945 and ostensibly ending in 1975. See Chapter 6, "Targets." Aside, in this chapter Bamford writes that Louis Tordella, who died earlier this week, "The Agency's chief keeper of the secrets," was central to targeting of thousands of Americans. Bamford says of Tordella, "If NSA was the darkest part of the government, Tordella was the darkest part of the NSA." Tordella allegedly shielded various NSA heads by not telling them what was going on -- to their great relief. David Kahn in "The Codebreakers" more extensively examines the history of spying on citizens in the national interest. It will be interesting to read what he is currently researching at the more PR-oriented NSA -- and perhaps provide pointers to deep-blacker orgs that have supplanted it through non-FOIA arrangements like those of Shamrock.

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FAT_bet
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Saturday The Wash Post reported on the spies of many stripes invading Bosnia to strut stuff and ward off extinction. Today, TWP and NYT cover an IC briefing yesterday -- prompted by the Post story -- on the campaign of global spying cooperation to survive liposuction. FAT_bet (the 3 articles)

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