December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Espionage-enabled Lotus notes.
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Trei writes: > >It's specifically built for export, and has a backdoor to enable USG agents > >to read the messages more easily. From the viewpoint of a foreign purchaser, > >'espionage-enabled' seems an appropriate term. TC May responds: > I like this idea, and have already begun to use it. Even adding it to my > already long .sig. I think it's also time to break out the old "Big Brother Inside" stickers and start applying them to copies of Notes... andrew

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Single computer breaks 40-bit RC4 in under 8 days
by daveg＠pakse.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MIT Student Uses ICE Graphics Computer To Break Netscape Security in Less Than 8 Days Cost to crack Netscape security falls from $10,000 to $584 CAMBRIDGE, Mass., January 10, 1996 -- An MIT undergraduate and part-time programmer used a single $83,000 graphics computer from Integrated Computing Engines (ICE) to crack Netscape's export encryption code in less than eight days. The effort by student Andrew Twyman demonstrated that ICE's advances in hardware price/performance ratios make it relatively inexpensive -- $584 per session -- to break the code. While being an active proponent of stronger export encryption, Netscape Communications (NSCP), developer of the SSL security protocol, has said that to decrypt an Internet session would cost at least $10,000 in computing time. Twyman used the same brute-force algorithm as Damien Doligez, the French researcher who was one of the first to crack the original SSL Challenge. The challenge presented the encrypted data of a Netscape session, using the default exportable mode, 40-bit RC4 encryption. Doligez broke the code in eight days using 112 workstations. "The U.S. government has drastically underestimated the pace of technology development," says Jonas Lee, ICE's general manager. "It doesn't take a hundred workstations more than a week to break the code -- it takes one ICE graphics computer. This shuts the door on any argument against stronger export encryption." Breaking the code relies more on raw computing power than hacking expertise. Twyman modified Doligez's algorithm to run on ICE's Desktop RealTime Engine (DRE), a briefcase-size graphics computer that connects to a PC host to deliver performance of 6.3 Gflops (billions of floating point instructions per second). According to Twyman, the program tests each of the trillion 40-bit keys until it finds the correct one. Twyman's program averaged more than 830,000 keys per second, so it would take 15 days to test every key. The average time to find a key, however, was 7.7 days. Using more than 100 workstations, Doligez averaged 850,000 keys per second.ICE used the following formula to determine its $584 cost of computing power: the total cost of the computer divided by the number of days in a three-year lifespan (1,095), multiplied by the number of days (7.7) it takes to break the code. ICE's Desktop RealTime Engine combines the power of a supercomputer with the price of a workstation. Designed for high-end graphics, virtual reality, simulations and compression, it reduces the cost of computing from $160 per Mflop (millions of floating point instructions per second) to $13 per Mflop. ICE, founded in 1994, is the exclusive licensee of MeshSP technology from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). ### INTEGRATED COMPUTING ENGINES, INC. 460 Totten Pond Road, 6th Floor Waltham, MA 02154 Voice: 617-768-2300, Fax: 617-768-2301 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bob Cramblitt, Cramblitt & Company (919) 481-4599; cramco(a)interpath.com Jonas Lee, Integrated Computing Engines (617) 768-2300, X1961; jonas(a)iced.com Note: Andrew Twyman can be reached at kurgan(a)mit.edu.

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Re: underground digital economy
by Alexander 'Sasha' Chislenko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:39 PM 1/17/96 -0600, jim(a)bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller) wrote: > >The existing underground economy uses the same money as the aboveground >economy (i.e. paper money, for the most part). Could a significant >underground digital economy develop if the aboveground digital economy >used only identified e-money? > Let's consider a general case: we have a number of market segments, and a number of currencies. The currencies may float between the markets and translate into one another. If the currencies are independent from the markets, the flow of funds may cross the currency boundary, then a market boundary (or vice versa). If not, these crossings maybe synchronized - to enter the next market segment, you have to exchange the currency. All you need to have all the "economies" running is some gates between the currencies somewhere in the system. There are lots of alternative currencies in any society, including balances of personal favors between people; usually they do not have currency conversion problems, even if explicitly regulated. If you sell a new version of CryptoDoom for digicash, and would like to buy a car that is only sold for paper money, and I have a car to sell and want to buy your CryptoDoom, *somewhere* in the market there will appear an exchange agent that would help us complete the transaction. In the case of parallel digital currencies this exchange market would be very liquid because of the high speed, low cost, and security/privacy of the transactions. I have some personal experience with similar issues, in my attempts to move money in and out of Russia. In these transactions cash rarely crosses the border. If an American A1 wants to send some dollars to a Russian R1 who needs roubles, and a Russian R2 wants to send some roubles to American A2 who needs dollars, then A1 pays dollars to A2, and R2 pays roubles to R1. Since both inter-market and inter-currency transactions should be balanced, such schemes would always be possible. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Alexander Chislenko <sasha1(a)netcom.com> Public Home page: http://www.lucifer.com/~sasha/home.html World Future Society[B]: http://www.lucifer.com/~sasha/refs/wfsgbc.html -----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Hack Lotus?
by daw＠beijing.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <2.2.32.19960118195838.008a4944(a)mail.teleport.com>, Alan Olsen <alano(a)teleport.com> wrote: > I am certain that comparisons between the export and non-export (with > softice and other debugger-type software) will show some interesting things. Hack Lotus? Please do. I would love to see the internals of how Lotus Notes does the escrow. Every conceivable way I can see to do it seems very vulnerable to attack. If the receiving Lotus Notes program doesn't check whether the high 24 bits have been escrowed correctly in the LEEF-like field, then a simple hack to the sending Lotus Notes program to not send the LEEF field should give foreigners true 64 bit encryption. [LEEF = Law-enforcement / Espionage Exploitation Field = the RSA-encrypted high 24 bits of the key] If the receiving Lotus Notes program does verify that the high 24 bits are escrowed correctly, then anyone can verify that, so in 2^24 trials, I can recover the high 24 bits, and with 2^40 more trials, I can recover the high 40 bits. Therefore 2^40 + 2^24 trials should suffice to hack Lotus if this is how it works. Or maybe it works in some other crazy manner. Waiting to hear the technical details of how it works, - -- Dave Wagner - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMP751yoZzwIn1bdtAQGvzgF/RPhioKYfwXcqHoDCwyyVHZFgyR26KQCz swwAnSDPydO5jKFjFNK5XaM9XRh2Vi3a =HLSf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Blacknet & Lotus Notes
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Espionage Enabling in Action, or "How much is that escrow key in the window?" We all know how cheaply spies sell out. The Falcon and the Snowman got a few tens of thousands for years of crypto keys and satelite data. Pollard got 50,000 for cubic yards of documents on all sorts of subject. The Walkers gave the Soviets a volume purchase discount, and Ames got 2 million for running the CIA's counter-espionage program on behalf of the KGB. This little key to handle 24 bits of data is nothing. It can easily be smuggled out on a floppy, in an encrypted email message, or even printed out and sent through the mail. Assuming many federal employees will all have access to the same key, its not much of a secret. So, lets buy the espionage enabling secret key. Its an obvious target, not just for cypherpunks, but for the KGB, Mossad, Toshiba, IBM, and anyone else who wants to read their competitors correspondance. Lets face it, this key will get out there, and be available to all the big players; lets make it available to everyone! This is a job for ... Blacknet! This is exactly the kind of information thats easy to resell. Its small; no smuggling DATs full of B2 bomber plans out, just a small file on a floppy disk. Its easily checked, if the Lotus message formats are public, slightly less so if they're not. Who would buy? Pick an intelligence agency. Pick any large company whose compitition uses Notes. Heck, I'd bet there are US government agencies (FBI, BATF, LAPD) who would buy it once we made it available. Its a near perfect demonstration of the foolishness of the government's position. Once this key, like the clipper keys, becomes easily available, the foolishness of the idea of GAK becomes magnified. Its ANOTHER government program that can't be run properly, thats opposed by 80% of Americans, and that doesn't even sell overseas. The persons responsible might even get to claim to be whistleblowers, demonstrating how easy it is to subvert this foolish plan that will continue to cost American business 60 billion a year in lost sales overseas. So...Is Notes V4 shipping yet? Do we know how many bits of key we're after? (NB: I'm assuming that (some part of) the US government has an RSA private key which is used to encrypt the 24 bits of GAK'd key.) Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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Junk Notes
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New York (AP) -- For the first time in years, there were no major trouble spots in IBM's vast product line. Both personal computers and large systems sold well and Lotus Development Corp., which IBM acquired last summer, shipped an astounding 1.2 million copies of its Notes program. "Our fundamental strategies are working," IBM chief executive Louis V. Gerstner Jr. said in a statement. ... Changes in the general export laws seemed unlikely so Lotus negotiated an interim solution. "This protects corporate information from malicious crackers but permits the government to retain their current access," Ozzie said. Simson Garfinkel, author and computer security expert, said he's not sure international buyers of Notes will like the solution. "Foreign companies don't want the U.S. government to spy on their data any more than the U.S. government wants foreign companies to be able to spy on theirs," Garfinkel said. ... But IBM said nothing about the future, causing some nervousness among the investors who have seen other technology companies project a flat performance in the next few months. "It was a good quarter but the bad news is we've got to go and find out what's going to happen in 1996," said David Wu, analyst at Chicago Corp. Questions have been raised about the timing of IBM's June acquisition of Lotus -- a $3.5 billion deal that was the software industry's largest ever -- because World Wide Web-related programs seemed to be eclipsing the need for Lotus' Notes, a communications and database program.

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Re: Microsoft's CAPI
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:14 AM 1/17/96 -0800, Alan Bostick wrote: >> The OS will not load just any old CSP. CSPs have to be signed by >> Microsoft. The kernel contains a (hardcoded?) 1024 RSA public key >> that it uses to check the signature when the user tries to load a CSP. >> If the signature check fails, the CSP won't load. Microsoft says it >> will sign any CSP from anyone AS LONG AS THEY CERTIFY THAT THEY WILL >> FOLLOW THE EXPORT RULES. So you can get your CSP signed if you use >> exportable cryptography or if you agree not to send it outside the US >> and Canada, etc. But an end user can't just compile crypto code and >> use it as a CSP, even for his or her own use, without getting it >> signed by Microsoft first (actually, the CSP development kit does >> allow this, but it uses a special version of the OS). > >The next obvious question is: Will Microsoft sign strong-crypto CSPs >developed by foreign developers for out-of-USA use? And, as well, for in-USA-use. Currently, it is only the export of cryptographic devices and programs which is restricted. Are they going to prohibit the export of digital signatures which enable the use of foreign-developed software?!?

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Elitism on Cypherpunks
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have seen a number of posts on "Cypherpunk Elitism". I have seen more examples of it here on the list. I think that this attitude will be more destructive to the list than noise in the long run. It has been said that "Cypherpunks write code". They must do more than that. Cypherpunks need to teach. All the cryptotools in the world are of no use if no one knows how to use them. (Or know how to use them correctly.) All of the protocols are of no use if no one knows how to impliment them correctly or WHY they need them in the first place. There are alot of bogus security methods. Many of them exist because people do not know better. Without someone to instruct them in the ways of these things, they will continue to go on with bad crypto, not knowing any better. Not all of the non-cypherpunks are beyond hope. Many of them are teachable. If we leave them to flounder on their own, cryptography will be something used only by an elite. It will be of little or no threat to the powers that be because only a small amount of people will have the ability to use it. The TLAs will have less encrypted trafic to sort through. They will have won a big battle, not through force of arms but force of egos. What can be done? Alot. Teach people how to use PGP. Help them generate keys. Help them get them signed. Show them how to use remailers. Teach them the secret of nyms. Friends teach friends how to use crypto. Adopt a BBS. They may be young, but they may also become the cypherpunks of tommorow. Upload current versions of programs. Keep them current. Organize keysignings on the board. Host crypto discussions. Help stamp out the misinformation that breeds on such systems. Instilling the interest in the field and teaching will do more for the cause than all of the "this is noise" postings in the world. Helping those who have questions will help the newbies no longer be newbies. There are some on the list who have already taken this tact and must be commended. There are others who have taken the "fuck you" attitude to anyone they do not find worthy opon first contact. Bad attitudes are counter productive. To prevent the fall of a new dark ages, we must make sure that the information is spread far and wide. I think the statement that descibes it best is: "UN-altered REPRODUCTION and DISSEMINATION of this IMPORTANT information is ENCOURAGED." There is alot that cypherpunks can do to encourage the use of cryptography by "the common man". Elitism is not one of them. In the long run it will be counterproductive. And maybe in the short run as well... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMP8jQeQCP3v30CeZAQHtjAf9FfJWRAe0ZDLNOLsFDMBGQvi9kXKZR3sw WDmOb3K/y8syCdADqqC4UjqoZ0pQ/XHEt6qKd8A7qx6D1FVQauTocEp1vqwE645h zGirsApDjiCYFmV/+Lbpor5Uf9F2rFbjya64lOTbiKW+XEGukpI3ghgbGxGPqPGF fIIT2QxqMl1MDd1sSGIXzvpniOsHI6HoVbPwUx8S2tbMR0dqh5AQObOKdna0D4x4 beAxEVyNd6atqdkZPEZy2XaSO6Y4hmRZx3I4CuqCM2wqbsboETQLpELBSn/dnxet 0Fe82xHHZQSuh0gMXEP+znaKYOq/38mijwjF3zpX+5RRHIVrjMu2+w== =ojHr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Is the operating system half NT or half full?"

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What's a good math text?
by phorgan＠broadvision.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not on the list just now, my work won't allow me the time to follow it. I'm still just as interested in cryptography though, and would like y'all to email me recommendations on good math books that will give me the background to understand the papers in the field. I'm sure that will include a good numbers theory text. If a beginner at number theory would have a hard time understanding it, please recommend background texts as well:) What else would I need? My computer science texts explain complexity theory well, what would I need in information theory. What would I have to read to understand factoring complexity? Are there any new texts that cover the recent breakthroughs in factoring? Thanks:) Patrick Patrick J. Horgan Broadvision Inc. phorgan(a)broadvision.com 333 Distel Circle Have horse Phone : (415)943-3677 Los Altos, CA 94022-1404 will ride. FAX : (415)934-3701 Opinions mine, not my employers except by coincidence.

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Re: remarkable recent stories
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vladimir, On 01 16 96 you wrote: I haven't seen much dialogue on...key things that have popped up recently.... Among those key things: the absolute biggest blockbuster of them all: the NSA... did a study about how crypto regulations affect US com- petitiveness in the international marketplace.... And you ask: why would they release *this* one? meaning the NSA study on how crypto regulations affect US competitiveness abroad. On 01 13 96 I wrote a message to the list headed "ITAR Re-write?" In it I attempt to answer your question. I include it below for your convenience. Cordially, Jim INCLOSURE: Date: Sat, 13 Jan 1996 05:04:52 -0500 (EST) From: "James M. Cobb" <jcobb(a)ahcbsd1.ovnet.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: ITAR Re-write ? Friend, Bloomberg, the business news agency, reports 01 12 96: The U.S. Commerce Department will recommend easing export controls on encryption software after a study by the department and the National Security Agency found that American firms are being hurt.... The report's release came on the same day federal pro- secutors dropped a three-year investigation...of...Philip Zimmerman.... The government study comes a week after [the Computer Systems Policy Project] released [its] own study showing ...American companies will lose [maybe $60 billion] in U.S. computer system sales expected in 2000.... The 13-member Project ...includes International Business Machines...and AT&T.... Perhaps the let-go of Zimmerman is less a triumph of right than of might? But economic might is not the only kind of might: [Easing export controls] may pit Brown's department a- gainst U.S. defense and spy agencies.... So... [Commerce Secretary] Brown said his department will pre- pare recommendations for easing [ITAR] controls that should be forwarded to the president "within a few months." Meaning: the 13 Project members should be prepared to pay through the nose in the runup to the '96 gala. And just so they get the big picture: It's unclear if the NSA, the super-secret eavesdropping agency, endorsed the Commerce Department's conclusions in the report it jointly prepared. The newsstory reports ...federal prosecutors dropped [the Zimmerman] investiga- tion without explanation.... No explanation's required. One hostage was released. 13 others were taken. But the one release does afford the new hostages, who have deep pockets, some hope... Cordially, Jim NOTE. The newsstory's headline? COMMERCE'S BROWN PROPOSES REWRITE OF ENCRYPTION EXPORT CONTROLS. Its dateline? WASHINGTON (Jan 12, 1996 5:34 p.m. EST). Its Nando News online filename? biz6_1893.html

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