December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet
by Michael C. Peponis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> On Wed, 3 Jan 1996, Robert A. Rosenberg wrote: > > > CIS always knows where you are dialing in from. Here is the start of a > > typical connection (using the Mac Program NAVIGATOR). > > > > >0001NUH > > > > > >Host Name: CIS > > > > > >User ID: xxxxx,xxx/INT > > >Password: > > >[Navigator: Logged on] > > > > > >Welcome to CompuServe Information ServiceT01NUH @38400! > > > > > >Last access: Mon, Dec 18, 1995 23:11 > > >Connected to port CIS T01NUH @38400 > > > > That NUH identifies that I am calling in via a V34 Node in NYC and the T01 > > says I got the first modem on the Rotory. If CIS wanted to restrict access > > via the NYS nodes, that NUH would be an adequate flag to trigger this > > action. > > Wouldn't this require some software routines added to check for this? I > expect the decision to build or buy is what CIS is now weighing. Also, I > would imagine that a German could always call a POP outside the country if > they wanted to pay for it..... (note that I am still not in favor of the > action, but these are probably CIS's considerations.) Well, this could be away for compuserve to cover it's rear in a realy slick fashion. If they chose to do it this way. Most CIS subscribers use their proprietary interface, which puts a GUI front end over what is going on with them modem, what they amount to are scripts. Anyways, CIS could add a script that would check the NUH identifier, if it is in Germany, it goes to one newsfeed, if it's outside of Germany, it would go to another newsfeed. They could even market the service here in the US to those who like censorship. What could be "Accidentaly" leaked is a different version of the same file, that would not contain the check. That way, Compuserve could claime that the offending parties tampered with the software, and they can not be help responsible for the tampering. I highly doubt that Compuserve would go for such a resolution, but it's worth throwing into the mix Regards, Michael Peponis PGP Key Avalible form MIT Key Server Key fingerprint = DD 39 66 3D AE DE 71 C2 B6 DA B2 3F 47 2A EB AC

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Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet
by Steve14571＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-01-03 00:34:25 EST, you write: >CompuServe is not location-dependant. The network operates exactly the >same regardless of calling location (indeed, the system doesn't even know >where you're calling from I believe). It is a worldwide CompuServe >Network that people use to access it. This network just allows dialups >and then gets the users connected to the CompuServe computers. The main >computers handle all traffic. They don't are location-independant, >making it impossible to block access based on location. I see two possible ways to censor German users only (but I still believe censoring anyone is wrong). First, the "main computers" could be told where they are, and "censored" material could be filtered at that level before it is sent to individual users. Or CompuServe could release a software update for German users. The software would not recognize banned newsgroups. How difficult could that possibly be?

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Kocher timing attack in RISKS
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reproduced here from RISKS digest: ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 26 Dec 1995 17:23:09 -0100 From: Saso Tomazic <saso.tomazic(a)fer.uni-lj.si> Subject: Re: Timing cryptanalysis of RSA, DH, DSS (Kocher, RISKS-17.53) The timing attack presented by Paul C. Kocher in his extended abstract of the paper "Cryptanalysis of Diffie-Helman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems Using Timing Attacks" (ftp://ftp.cryptography.com/pub/kocher_timing_attack.ps) is really worth consideration, however I would like to stress there is no need for panic, mainly for two reasons: 1) Security of practical cryptosystems do not rest solely on security of crypt algorithm. In fact, cryptoanalysis attacks are rare, due to strong crypto algorithms that are presently known. More often cryptosystems are broken using other weak points of cryptosystems as insecurity of keys, bad key management, easy to guess passwords, computer screen radiation, monitoring the keystrokes of computer in network, ... The timing attack can be considered just as one of them, not the most dangerous one. For practical cryptosystem, it would be extremely difficult to measure exact timing of encryption process, at least much more difficult as to monitor keystrokes or to capture entire message from the screen. The intruder, who would be able to measure the exact timing of encryption in a multitasking environment, would probably also have access to everything else (i.e., secret message, secret key, passwords, ...) and thus no need to measure timing. 2.) It is not so difficult to rewrite algorithms to be resistant to timing attacks, i.e., to have execution time independent of secret key. For example, the algorithm to compute R = y^x mod n given in the Kocher paper can be simply rewritten as: Let R = 1. Let A = 1. Let z = y. For i=0 upto (bits_in_x-1): If (bit i of x) is 1 then Let A = (R*z) mod n Else Let B = (R*z) mod n Let y = y^2 mod n. Let R = A. End. to be resistant to timing attacks. ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd)
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:08 1/3/96, Steve Gibbons wrote: >I'd be interested in seeing your numbers and cost breakdowns. I'd really be >interested in the up-front costs that would be associated with the equipment >and set-up time/training that will help "insure" data privacy over wideley >broadcast media. The up-front costs for ~T1 capable tranceivers isn't >insignificant either. I figure ~$10K up front (maybe half of that, maybe twice >when you include management overhead) Amortize over 3 years, and compare. You can get by with one base station per five remote receivers. This is no different than the 5/1 to 12/1 oversale ratios common to the T1 ISP business. As long as you prohibit resale of bandwidth and specialize in hooking up business lans you'll have no problems with this layout. Latency, which really is more important than bandwidth in many cases, is actually better using wireless than using traditional T1s. The set-up costs are also less to the customer than if they used a regular ISP. Only difference is that by paying the set-up fees they are buying the equipment for _you_. So once they leave your ISP, you still have all the hardware :-) >All of this is assuming that the bandwidth is available on the airwaves to >handle ~200 ~T1s. (If we're talking $200.00/mo. for T1, sign me up tomorrow, >and my neighbor, and his, and hers, and... *poof* no more bandwidth in a >"decently" populated metro area or even a downtown. 900MHz spread spectrum can get a bit crowded, but you don't need to sell 200 connections to make money. Breakeven based on competitive montly fees (in my original calculations that ment less than the lowest priced local ISP) is about 10 customers. Of course this is not at <$200 per customer. That figure is the lowest possible if you max out a T3, but still, no landline based ISP will be able to deliver bandwidth that cheap. Remember that the fees _include_ the cost for the pipe. Breakeven based on the set-up fees (meaning zero dollars investment by you) is about 18 customers. >I apologize if this is off topic, but the crypto part still applies (moreso, >even!) to broadcast over the airwaves. All major wireless vendors offer DES encryption at about $300 per node. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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\"Concryption\"
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cambridge, MA, Jan 3 -- Security Dynamics plans to license "Concryption," a just patented technology combining encryption and compression, to outside companies for use with a variety of security and compression protocols, revealed Kenneth Weiss, chairman and chief technical officer. "It is my belief that Concryption will solve the two biggest problems that exist today: the need for privacy and more available bandwidth," Weiss said. "Compression has been catching on. It takes less time today to send a whole page of fax than it used to, for example, and part of that is because of better data compression. But encryption has not caught on in the way it should, because of time and expense issues and the hassles of key management." Still, though, available bandwidth for data storage and transmission is diminishing all the time, in arenas ranging from fax to satellite technology, networked information, and the World Wide Web, according to the company chairman. Compression will become an even more significant requirement in the future, with an anticipated explosion of multimedia applications, he predicted. Security Dynamics has been awarded US Patent No. 5,479,512 for Concryption. The Cambridge, Massachusetts-based company now holds a total of 14 patents from the US Patent Office, most related to its "core business" of computer security, he reported. One of the company's other patents, for instance, is for a biometric technology designed to enable "voice fingerprinting." Security Dynamics also produces the SecureID Card, ACE/Server, and ACM series of user authentication products. Security Dynamics' newly patented Concryption technology is based on mathematical synergies between the processes of encrypting and compressing data. Both procedures call for analyzing arrays of binary patterns, "seeing where the spaces are," and then applying rules to the data. Weiss added that encryption and compression are both highly intensive in terms of CPU (central processor unit) cycles and disk accesses. As a result, he asserted, integrating the two technologies into a "single set of operations" will bring cost reductions in CPU usage as well as faster encryption times. "The time to compress might increase a little bit, but on the other hand, the time to encrypt goes to zero. Whatever the disk accesses are for compression, there would be no other disk accesses for encryption." Security Dynamics sees Concryption as a "concept pattern" suited to use with a variety of data types, network transports, and security protocols, according to Weiss. "This is a new enabling technology that we believe should have an impact on the way information is communicated in the future." The company intends to work with outside licensees on integrating different compression and encryption methods. "Big users have already optimized compression for their unique technologies. We use a different form of compression for fax than we would for satellite data or TV pictures. Beyond that, companies might employ different compression algorithms. Similarly, people like to have control over the type of encryption used," Weiss maintained. Although forthcoming multimedia applications will require much greater compression than text, conventional needs for "privacy" may not be as high, since many video offerings of the future will be geared to entertainment, Weiss acknowledged. "But we will probably be seeing 'economic privacy,' " the company chairman noted, pointing to a trend, already well established in the cable TV industry, toward providing "high demand" fare such as first-run movies only on separately priced, encrypted, "premium channels." Contact: Security Dynamics, 617-547-7820

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RE: crypto (semi-)export issue
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

m5(a)dev.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) writes: > Isn't it the case that there are loopholes or explicit exceptions in > crypto export regulations that allow American businesses to supply > their overseas operatives with tools for secure communication back > home? We were discussing today some stuff about our web server, and > there's some desire to provide secure access for our sales people to > internal junk. Nobody was sure whether it'd be OK for our people in > the Evil Empire (Europe) to have the 128-bit-RC4 Netscape for that > purpose. At the December NIST Key Escrow/GAK export meeting, Mike Nelson said that there are rules that allow US companies to "easily" export strong encryption to their overseas operations. The important (key :-) idea is that the export is to protect the corporate assetts of US companies. He seemed to imply that exporting, say PGP, for internal corporate use was fine and easily done. Other folks later claimed that this wasn't quite as easy as he claimed. For more, see, http://www.isse.gmu.edu/~pfarrell/nist/pdf.nist2.html Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: New Mitnick Book
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the Littman book: > Shimomura likes his computer-controlled cellular phone, but > its use for tracking is limited. Its main purpose is to > lock on a call and eavesdrop. It is illegal to use it to > eavesdrop on calls. That's why Shimomura needed immunity > from prosecution when he demonstrated his Oki scanner > before Congress a couple of years ago. (p. 6) > Well, here's another minor error. At the hearing, Shimomura just used a new, shrink wrapped cell phone. I think it was an AT&T model, but my memory is faint on these details. I'm pretty sure it wasn't an off the shelf Oki 900. Half the point was to show just how easy it was. He didn't even bother to hook the cell phone up to a laptop or palmtop. Just a few button pushes and instant scanner. I tried to get him to tell me the right buttons afterwards, but he was too busy and didn't answer. Sigh. But aside from the brand name of the phone, Littman's sentence seems accurate according to my recollection. The transcript should settle all of this. -Peter

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Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd)
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>As I understand the physics, the whole process could be made FAR FAR FAR >more efficient if the rocket was boosted to about 40000 feet with a subsonic >airplane, a' la' X-15 and such. It's above 75% of the earth's atmosphere >(dramatically reduced drag), is already going 600 mph in the correct >direction, and is 8 miles closer to the ultimate goal 250 miles up). This >might not sound like much of an advantage, but if you've ever worked out the >mathematics of the Saturn V (or space shuttle, etc), the VAST majority of >the fuel was used up in the first 20,000 feet, maybe even the first 5000 >feet. It would be even better if the first stage could be an air-breathing >supersonic ramjet, but that's not my field of expertise. Orbital Sciences Corp in Virginia do exactly that, but with a B52 and a 60 foot long rocket. They launch relatively small payloads for relatively cheap and have done it successfully on many occasions. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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AP Story: "Germans: Was CompuServe's Call
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CPers may want to examine this Associated Press story: "Germans: Was CompuServe's Call" 02 Jan 1996, 14:30 clari.news.censorship Message-ID: <Agerman-compuserveURyaQ_6J2(a)clari.net> -- -- tallpaul -- Visualize HappyNet!

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Experience teaching cryptography and computer security at NYU
by rubin＠faline.bellcore.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last semester, I taught a graduate course called "Cryptography and Computer Security" at NYU. I have written up a summary of the experience. You can find it at ftp: thumper.bellcore.com in /pub/rubin/fall95.ps or fall95.ps.Z web: ftp://thumper.bellcore.com/pub/rubin/fall95.ps.Z and there is a link to it from my home page: ftp://thumper.bellcore.com/pub/rubin/rubin.html I will be teaching the same class next semester at NYU, and there are plans for a sequel next fall. Avi ********************************************************************* Aviel D. Rubin Email: rubin(a)faline.bellcore.com Research Scientist Adjunct Professor at NYU Bellcore (MRE-2M354) 445 South St. ftp://thumper.bellcore.com/pub/rubin/rubin.html Morristown, NJ 07960 Voice: +1 201 829 4105 USA FAX: +1 201 829 2645

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