December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Free calls to Govt (fwd)
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is being forwarded from the ALA Intellectual Freedom mailing list. Thought it might be important here :-) - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 10 Dec 1995 09:59:48 -0500 From: Charles Willett <willett(a)AFN.ORG> To: Multiple recipients of list ALAOIF <ALAOIF(a)UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU> Subject: Free calls to Govt (fwd) - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 9 Dec 1995 14:31:58 -0700 From: El Tiburon <proteios(a)indirect.com> To: internet_censorship(a)monad.net Subject: Free calls to Govt 1) Dail 1-800-444-1555 2) They will give you a short recorded message. 3) Follow instructions if you have a touch tone phone, public ones work best and they have other advantages. :> 4) Enter a zip code...they ask for yours but it doesn't have to be...it can be any in the US. 5) Make a choice of the elected politician's office you want to be connected to. 6) When the staff person answers you are set to discuss the proposed environmental reform regulations, OR ANY OTHER ISSUE YOU WANT! Couple of tricks...we found they limit the number of calls to 3 from each number. Solution: public phones are everywhere...enjoy Exxon's corporate attempt to influence "grassroots democracy". M ______________________________________________________ Activism - Isnt it just participation? Internet Users Consortium 7031 E. Camelback Ste 102-515 Scottsdale, AZ 85251 IUC URL: http://www.indirect.com/www/molsen/ Proteios URL: http://www.indirect.com/www/proteios/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.2 iQCVAwUBMMsZczokqlyVGmCFAQE+8AP7BkUKpHH06aC79T8P/J+YRF1AeMC/MB0W 2mEqED/zNhNF7pp2v0mUlRLpG6jrY0NRGip3JWZhRcdTwiMaVEWYNNHE6dUeklzO zm27/NxqKpi/e5ie+CsNwXKeket87+af8OZ8bzvIYg28pNcHAjnq5PLG62Oqsrxz 8E3QAHjAwc4= =l1BI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Finger for PGP Public Key \/ / -=-=-=-=-=- -=-=-=-=-=- \/ http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/Welcome.html -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.1 GED/J d-- s:++>: a-- C++(++++)$ ULUO++ P+>+++ L++ !E---- W+(---) N+++ o+ K+++ w+(---) O- M+$>++ V-- PS++(+++)>$ PE++(+)>$ Y++ PGP++ t- 5+++ X++ R+++>$ tv+ b+ DI+++ D+++ G+++++>$ e++$>++++ h r-- y+** ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------

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Re: The Elevator Problem
by Daniel Miskell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca writes: > > >On Sun, 10 Dec 1995, Daniel Miskell wrote: > >> There is an easy way to develop a secret key in front any number of eves, >>be they experts or not, without the eves knowing what the key is. Even if >>they tap your phone/comm line, ect. There was an article in Discovery >>Magazine a couple of years ago, talking about how to use photons and their >>randomness as the perfect, uncrackable code. Use of the photons aside, >>there was a key generation method discussed, simple, yet secure enough to >>work out on a tapped phone. Let me root around. > >You must mean quantum crypto, by G. Brassard and C. Crepeau of U de Montreal. >Requires a direct fiber optic line from pt. A to B, in order to be >secure, if I am not mistaken. Which makes it impractical for most people, >as there are usually switches (or whatever they're called) and more than one >line in between. Lets you use OTPs with your next-door neighbor though. I think i was misunderstood. I was not referring to the actual use of light in the communications process. I was talking about the key generation method suggested in that article. Of course the use of light is impractical for most - the need for direct fiberoptics aside, you have to be able to test a photon for its polarized orientation. In any case, i dig on. Regards, Munster. --- _________________________________ *!Cheese Doctrine:!* Though cultured over time, and aged to perfection, one must not yield to produce mold. One must also not belittle themselves by conforming to the "whiz", but melt over the unprocessed ideas of Ghuda. _________________________________

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anonymous remailer
by Fred Nix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey... How do I gain acess to the remailer? Thanks! Fred Nix

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Re: Still more on the Digicash protocol
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: futplex(a)pseudonym.com (Futplex) It seems to me that end-to-end encryption is not significantly more important for remailed messages. Really, there's less information in the message when it emerges from the last remailer, so there's less to protect than in the ordinary case. Furthermore, it may not even be feasible, since I may not have a public key I can associate with my correspondent. ------------------------------------------ A possible solution: the correspondent generates a new public key and sends it as part of the transaction. The key is then wiped afterward. Sorry if this isn't possible due to something that I've misunderstood. -Allen

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Re: Free calls to Govt (fwd)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been told that number is out of date. Since I forgot to save it, would someone who did check and find out? Thanks, -Allen

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Re: GAK and self-incrimination?
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Sun, 10 Dec 1995 02:57:36 -0800 > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: Greg Broiles <gbroiles(a)darkwing.uoregon.edu> > Subject: Re: GAK and self-incrimination? > Cc: tcmay(a)got.net > > Tim May writes: > > >Consider this hypo: I send an encrypted message to a partner in crime > >containing plans for future crimes and descriptions of past crimes. I don't > >GAK the message. The government prosecutes me under the Anti-Terrorism and > >Child Protection Act of 1997. > > > >My defense? That GAKKing the message would be tantamount to incriminating > >myself, which the Fifth Amendment protects me against. > > The Fifth protects you against *compelled* self-incrimination - in > particular, the right to be free from the "cruel trilemma" of > > o conviction of a substantive crime, based on your > (true) testimony > o conviction of perjury, for lying when asked to incriminate > yourself > o contempt of court sanctions, for refusing to answer > > but your hypo doesn't seem to create that forbidden situation. In > particular, you're free to simply not send the message at all. I don't believe that that would be a consideration. Wasn't there a court case a few years ago, in which a convicted criminal sued the government, charging that filling out one of those forms that you have to fill out when you buy a gun was a violation of his 5th amendment rights? What ever happened to that case? I also think that, besides the obvious 5th amendment problems, there would be a 1st amendment problem - if you "*had* to use GAK to communicate, that would be an impermissible restriction on your 1st amendment rights.

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Re: Warning about Pegasus Mail and PGP (fwd)
by Adam Hupp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where can you get the Open Encryptor PGP interface? -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQBtAzCNppQAAAEDALhWZl7IuGZ9zZT5bACo0b/1L0Nv0C72vKHIO3IHh+cwpHHa 2Ozb9aeO0UvXGwkkZIYgUm0EvmzKh7yb1GTLvBp5kXpR3I9w+Yj4LGlBDERpUWw6 x4ED49pwDnz1Hl5FBQAFEbQYYXNoIDxhaHVwcEBwcmltZW5ldC5jb20+ =PtJK -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Escrow expectations
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:17 AM 12/8/95 -0500, Adam Shostack wrote: > "Your honor, we argue that in escrowing his keys with the US >government, the defendant should have known his communications could >be listened to, and thus has no expectation of privacy." If Clipper were mandated you might be able to resist a prosecution for "failure to file" keys or for double encrypting your transmissions if you could prove that you were transmitting illegal messages or evidence of a crime. Just as those who possess illegal weapons are not required to register them (self incrimination). You have to be sure your traffic is illegal though otherwise no protection. DCF "But if indecency is banned from the nets what will happen to the photos of Clinton's face posted on www.whitehouse.gov?"

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Re: GAK and self-incrimination?
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ed Carp writes: > Greg Broiles writes: >> Tim May writes: >> >> >Consider this hypo: I send an encrypted message to a partner in crime >> >containing plans for future crimes and descriptions of past crimes. I >> >don't GAK the message. The government prosecutes me under the >> >Anti-Terrorism and Child Protection Act of 1997. >> > >> >My defense? That GAKKing the message would be tantamount to incriminating >> >myself, which the Fifth Amendment protects me against. > >> The Fifth protects you against *compelled* self-incrimination . . . In >> particular, you're free to simply not send the message at all. > >I don't believe that that would be a consideration. Wasn't there a >court case a few years ago, in which a convicted criminal sued the >government, charging that filling out one of those forms that you >have to fill out when you buy a gun was a violation of his 5th >amendment rights? What ever happened to that case? This sounds like _Haynes v. United States_ 390 US 85 (1968); the Supreme Court ruled that requiring registration of particular weapons (possession of which was illegal) violated the Fifth Amendment. The difference between _Haynes_ (and _Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board_ 382 US 70 (1965)) and Tim's hypo is that Tim's hypo doesn't force only guilty people to provide information, it requires all people using crypto to do so - so it's not targeted at "persons inherently suspect of criminal activities" (see _Haynes_ at 96, _Anderson at 79), and it doesn't necessarily give rise to "real and appreciable hazards of incrimination" (_Haynes_ at 97). But it seems to me that the real bottom line is that the information which is compelled is not incriminating, and the information which is incriminating is not compelled. The keys to my crypto might lead to incriminating evidence, or they might prove to be useful in a prosecution, but they're not in themselves any sort of a signal that a crime has been or will be committed. I think it's a different argument - and probably even comes out the other way - if the command to reveal a key is made to a particular individual in circumstances where possession/knowledge of the key is likely to implicate the holder in criminal activity. If the police find an encrypted disk which is labelled "The Story of How I Killed Jimmy Hoffa and Where I Put His Body and the Murder Weapon", compelling someone to reveal the key which decrypts the file(s) on that disk seems incriminating, even if the information produced (the string of binary digits which is the key) isn't by itself incriminating. Is it "self-incrimination" to require people to provide the government with an address when they register a car, even though the police may use that address to look for evidence if you're suspected of a crime? Is it "self-incrimination" to require drivers involved in an auto accident to remain at the scene and provide a name and address to cops or other drivers? (Supreme Court says no self-incrim re hit & run statute, _California v. Byers_, 402 US 424 (1971).) (Now, if the government required people who weren't using GAK to provide a "Statement of Refusal to Comply with GAK", I think it'd be a different kettle of fish entirely.) I'm not trying to say that I think GAK is good - I think it's awful. But I don't think it's incompatible with the way that the Fifth amendment has been interpreted over the past 200 years. I think it's possible to ignore those interpretations and make up your own, but I don't think that's of much practical utility where the dominant local gang doesn't find your theory plausible or expedient. So much for the rule of law. >I also think that, besides the obvious 5th amendment problems, there >would be a 1st amendment problem - if you "*had* to use GAK to >communicate, that would be an impermissible restriction on your 1st >amendment rights. I agree with you re the First amendment. -- "The anchored mind screwed into me by the psycho- Greg Broiles lubricious thrust of heaven is the one that thinks every temptation, every desire, every inhibition." greg(a)goldenbear.com -- Antonin Artaud gbroiles(a)darkwing.uoregon.edu

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mailing List
by John H. Wynne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please put me on your mailing list

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