December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: GAK and self-incrimination?
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ed Carp writes: > Greg Broiles writes: >> Tim May writes: >> >> >Consider this hypo: I send an encrypted message to a partner in crime >> >containing plans for future crimes and descriptions of past crimes. I >> >don't GAK the message. The government prosecutes me under the >> >Anti-Terrorism and Child Protection Act of 1997. >> > >> >My defense? That GAKKing the message would be tantamount to incriminating >> >myself, which the Fifth Amendment protects me against. > >> The Fifth protects you against *compelled* self-incrimination . . . In >> particular, you're free to simply not send the message at all. > >I don't believe that that would be a consideration. Wasn't there a >court case a few years ago, in which a convicted criminal sued the >government, charging that filling out one of those forms that you >have to fill out when you buy a gun was a violation of his 5th >amendment rights? What ever happened to that case? This sounds like _Haynes v. United States_ 390 US 85 (1968); the Supreme Court ruled that requiring registration of particular weapons (possession of which was illegal) violated the Fifth Amendment. The difference between _Haynes_ (and _Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board_ 382 US 70 (1965)) and Tim's hypo is that Tim's hypo doesn't force only guilty people to provide information, it requires all people using crypto to do so - so it's not targeted at "persons inherently suspect of criminal activities" (see _Haynes_ at 96, _Anderson at 79), and it doesn't necessarily give rise to "real and appreciable hazards of incrimination" (_Haynes_ at 97). But it seems to me that the real bottom line is that the information which is compelled is not incriminating, and the information which is incriminating is not compelled. The keys to my crypto might lead to incriminating evidence, or they might prove to be useful in a prosecution, but they're not in themselves any sort of a signal that a crime has been or will be committed. I think it's a different argument - and probably even comes out the other way - if the command to reveal a key is made to a particular individual in circumstances where possession/knowledge of the key is likely to implicate the holder in criminal activity. If the police find an encrypted disk which is labelled "The Story of How I Killed Jimmy Hoffa and Where I Put His Body and the Murder Weapon", compelling someone to reveal the key which decrypts the file(s) on that disk seems incriminating, even if the information produced (the string of binary digits which is the key) isn't by itself incriminating. Is it "self-incrimination" to require people to provide the government with an address when they register a car, even though the police may use that address to look for evidence if you're suspected of a crime? Is it "self-incrimination" to require drivers involved in an auto accident to remain at the scene and provide a name and address to cops or other drivers? (Supreme Court says no self-incrim re hit & run statute, _California v. Byers_, 402 US 424 (1971).) (Now, if the government required people who weren't using GAK to provide a "Statement of Refusal to Comply with GAK", I think it'd be a different kettle of fish entirely.) I'm not trying to say that I think GAK is good - I think it's awful. But I don't think it's incompatible with the way that the Fifth amendment has been interpreted over the past 200 years. I think it's possible to ignore those interpretations and make up your own, but I don't think that's of much practical utility where the dominant local gang doesn't find your theory plausible or expedient. So much for the rule of law. >I also think that, besides the obvious 5th amendment problems, there >would be a 1st amendment problem - if you "*had* to use GAK to >communicate, that would be an impermissible restriction on your 1st >amendment rights. I agree with you re the First amendment. -- "The anchored mind screwed into me by the psycho- Greg Broiles lubricious thrust of heaven is the one that thinks every temptation, every desire, every inhibition." greg(a)goldenbear.com -- Antonin Artaud gbroiles(a)darkwing.uoregon.edu

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mailing List
by John H. Wynne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please put me on your mailing list

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GAK Query
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steven Miller, in his "Civilizing Cyberspace," remarks in his coverage of encryption issues that: ... the Administration is trying to split the [GAK] opposition by working with private industry groups on compromise escrow strategies that would let government agents see the contents of decoded messages without getting access to the escrowed key itself. [p. 306] Does anyone know more about this tactic, whether it is being pursued, or the legal and technical procedures for decoding and seeing the messages? As previously noted here: Civilizing Cyberspace: Policy, Power and the Information Highway Steven E. Miller (CPSR Board) Addison Wesley, 1996 ISBN 0-201-84760-4

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Re: Windows .PWL cracker implemented as a Word Basic virus
by daw＠quito.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <95Dec10.175318edt.1732(a)cannon.ecf.toronto.edu>, SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N <sinclai(a)ecf.toronto.edu> wrote: > My understanding was that MD4 had been broken once, at the cost of > much computer time. Not *that* much computer time... In my copy of Hans Dobbertin's paper, the abstract says ``An implementation of our attack allows to find collisions for MD4 in less than a minute on a PC.'' As far as I know, the difficulty of inverting MD4 is still an open problem -- but why would you want to use a broken algorithm like MD4 when you can use MD2, MD5, or SHA? - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMMtrRCoZzwIn1bdtAQGQwQF+JlWjDgMCs+Y6nO/tUzrXcd9wJCrTLHx2 NlC+1bHspTvJSXSD29M73rfeyOfWOTtQ =4jl6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: NSA rigs Crypto machines according to Balto Sun
by Ulf_Moeller＠public.uni-hamburg.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

pcw(a)access.digex.net (Peter Wayner) writes: >So, is this what happened at Crypto AG? Is this what happened at Netscape? What happened to Crypto AG is that they are -- at least partly -- *owned* by the German secret service BND. I'll try to give a rough translation of a section from a book by Erich Schmidt-Eenboom: "The BND would like to put a Clipper chip of their own, an exclusive federal German back-door, into the encryption devices delivered abroad. Rumors are persistent that this already happens -- illegally, of course. For that purpuse, camouflage companies such as the Crypto AG in the Swiss Steinhausen am Zuger are preferredly used. A former Crypto financial manager confirmed to FOCUS magazine: The company's owner is the Federal Republic of Germany. Crypto AG has been delivering crypto devices to armies, polices and secret services in about 120 countries for over 40 years. The enterprise got into the headlines when Crypto employee Hans Buehler was arrested in March 1992 in Iran for threadbare espionage accusations and was released only 9 1/2 months later on bail of one million dollars. The true reasons for the arrest can only be guessed. According to the records of the Bern police, Buehler was classified as a security risk after his release by the west German ministry of defense and then was fired by Crypto AG. The Zuerich lawyer office assigned with indemnification claims, Gloor & Sieger, draws the conclusion that "Iran has been suspecting for some longer time that the crypto deviced delivered by Crypto AG had never or no more conformed with Iranian security needs". Further they state: "It is a fact (...) that for several years, articles kept appearing in the international press reporting decryption of classified messages encrypted with Crypto devices". Some signs indicate that the suspection that Crypto devices have been manipulated on purpuse is not at all out of place. During his arrest in Iran, Buehler has been interrogated about reports in news articles of the above kind for months. Crypto devices have been tested and certified by the BND central office for encryption affairs and later by the BSI. In addition to that: After the murder of exile politician Bachtiar by an Iranian death commando in Paris, the BND decrypted an encrypted radio message by the Iranian secret service VEVAK at no effort." German original: From: frank(a)artcom.de (Frank Rieger) Newsgroups: de.org.ccc Subject: Crypto AG (Behördenverschlüsselung) Date: Wed, 28 Jun 1995 15:13:31 +0200 Organization: ART + COM Lines: 26 Distribution: world Message-ID: <frank-2806951513310001(a)penny.artcom.de> In der Liste der Firmen die Verschlüsselungsgeräte für Behörden anbieten war auch die Crypto AG in der Schweiz. Zu dieser Firma fand ich gerade eine interessante Textstelle in (1): "Den eigenen Clipper-Chip, das exklusive bundesdeutsche Hintertuerchen, wuerde der BND gerne in Verschluesselungsgeraete einbauen die ins Ausland geliefert werden. Hartnaekig haelt sich das Geruecht, dass dies manchmall bereits geschieht - illegalerweise, versteht sich. Dabei bedient man sieh hevorzugt Tarnfirmen wie etwa der Crypto AG im schweizerischen Steinhausen am Zuger . Eine Firma, von der ein Ex-Crypto-Finanzmanager gegenueber der Zeitschrift FOCUS bestaetigte: Besitzer der Firma ist die Bundesrepu blik. Die Crypto AG ruestet seit Ueber 40 Jahren Armeen, Polizei und Geheimdienste in rund 120 Laendern mit Verschluesselungsgeraeten aus. In die Schlagzeilen geriet das Unternehmen, als der Crypto-Mitarbeiter Hans Buehler unter fadenscheinigem Spionagevorwurf im Maerz 1992 im lran verhaftet wurde und erst neuneinhalb Monate spaeter gegen Zahlung einer Kaution von einer Million Dollar freikam. Ueber den wahren Grund der Verhaftung lassen sich nur Vermutungen anstellen. Laut Akten der Berner Polizei wurde Buehler nach seiner Haftentlassung vom westdeutschen Verteidigungsministerium als Sicherheitsrisiko eingestuft und daraufhin von der Crypto AG entlassen. Das mit Schadenersatzfarderungen betraute Zuericher Anwaltsbuero Gloor & Sieger kommt in einem Schriftsatz zu dem Schluss, "dass der Iran schon seit laengerer Zeit den Verdacht hegte, dass die von der Crypto AG gelieferten Chiffriergeraete den iranischen Sieherheitsbeduerfnissen nicht oder nicht mehr entspraechen". Weiter heisst es :"Tatsache ist (. . .), dass ueber mehrere Jahre hinweg immer wieder Artikel in der internationalen Presse erschienen sind, welche von der angehliehen Dekryptierung von klassitizierten Meldungen, welche mit Crypto-Geraeten chiffriert worden sind, berichten." Einige Indizien deuten darauf hin dass der Verdacht, Crypto-Geraete seien mit Absicht manipuliert worden, keineswegs abwegig ist. Ueber Berichte in Zeitungsartikeln der erwaehnten Art wurde Buehler waehrend seiner Haft im Iran ueber Monate weg verhoert. Crypto-Geraete sind von der BND-Zentralstelle fuer Chiffrierwesen und spaeter vom BSl geprueft und abgenommen worden. Hinzu kommt noch folgendes: Nach der Ermordung des Exilpolitikers Bachtiar durch ein iranisches Todeskommando in Paris war es dem BND ein l eichtes, einen verschluesselten Funkspruch des iranischen Geheimdienstes VEVAK zu dechiffrieren." (1): Schmidt-Eenboom, Erich: Die schmutzigen Geschäfte der Wirtschaftsspione; ECON Verlag 1994, S. 230f. (OCR-&Konvertierungsfehler vorbehalten)

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Re: Warning about Pegasus Mail and PGP (fwd)
by Siberia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ftp://ftp.aimnet.com/users/jnavas/winpmail/ On 10 Dec 95 at 4:07, Adam Hupp wrote: > Where can you get the Open Encryptor PGP interface? Namaste' Kimberly Long klong(a)phoenix.net What is life? It is the flash of a firefly in the night. It is the breath of a buffalo in the wintertime. It is the little shadow which runs across the grass and loses itself in the sunset. ~Crowfoot 1821-1890 )O(

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Paul Kocher's timing attack
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Paul Kocher's brutally clever timing attack against on-line implementations of RSA, DSA and fixed-exponent Diffie-Hellman is reported on page A1 of Monday's New York Times ("Secure Digital Transactions Just Got a Little Less Secure" by John Markoff). The attack requires only a few thousand ciphertext samples and works against most implementations of public-key cryptosystems in which the attacker can measure accurately the target's computation time for each sample. I think Kocher's paper is online somewhere; I'll post the URL when I find it. -matt

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NSA rigs Crypto machines according to Balto Sun
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Most of us might believe that the holes in Netscape's encryption software were simply the result of sloppy engineering. That was the public story. A story from today's Baltimore Sun (Sunday December 10, 1995) gives more reasons to be paranoid. The Baltimore Sun has been running a long series of articles on the National Security Agency. Some of the earlier ones have been largely positive and filled with stories of intelligence coups. Today's story, describes several reasons why one might believe that the NSA was party to a plan to rig the machines of the Swiss company, Crypto AG, so that the messages could be read by those who knew the game. Crypto AG sells its machines to other countries around the world who believe that the Swiss are neutral vendors of superior technology that wouldn't have such holes. The clearest link, in my mind, was the minutes from a design meeting at Crypto AG which was attended by an NSA cryptographer, Nora Mackebee. (She is now 55, retired and living at what the Sun calls a "Howard County horse farm.") But there are reasons to wonder about this link. Motorola was also part of the list. Also one employee got in a legal battle after being fired. The details were settled a few days before company engineers were scheduled to testify "that they believed the machines were altered." More anecdotal evidence was offered by someone who is listed as a "longtime colleague" of Dr. Kjell Ove Widman, the Swedish mathematician who "had total authority over Crypto algorithms." The colleague said that Widman would often travel to Germany and then return with design instructions. The impression was given that Crypto could only use an algorithm if it was approved. But approval is not, in my mind, proof of a secret attempt to read messages. I believe that the NSA probably did more to strengthen DES than weaken it during the classified design process at IBM. But I only have the work of Biham and Shamir to base these conclusions upon. Perhaps the machines were altered to make them stronger for western firms using them? The Mackabee meeting occured in 1975 during the height of the Cold War. The Soviets were grabbing Western technology left and right. Of course, the Sun also reports that Crypto AG "denied that intelligence agenies had ever rigged its machines." (The words in quote are the Sun's not Crypto AG's. ) So, is this what happened at Crypto AG? Is this what happened at Netscape? We may never no for certain, but there is a final warning for the folks at Netscape that is buried the Sun's article about Crypto AG: "Meanwhile, though the company has hastened to reassure its customers, business has declined and employees have been laid off." -=-=-=-=- There are two more articles in the series. Tuesday's will report that "Trolling for foreign secrets, NSA routinely picks up Americans' overseas calls. And it's legal." On Friday, the article reports, "The next war will be fought with computers. NSA is getting ready." You will be able to buy a reprint of the NSA stories from SunSource. $3.95. Call 410-332-6962.

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[NOISE] REQ: "Markov" filter as recently posted in .shar form
by Damaged Justice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Apologies, but I already tried all standard net searches on this. Someone recently posted a .shar archive for a program called Markov, which filters input Usenet posts and outputs a reasonable facsimile of that person's "style". (It was posted in one of the "Alice" threads, in response to the claim that posting styles could be a unique form of identification.) I also looked on the archives at hks.net, but had no luck there. If some kind person will post it again, I'll give it a home on my page of WWW resources. I have the binary, and am impressed and amused enough to keep it for regular use.. anyone for alt.usenet.kooks.markov? -- http://yakko.cs.wmich.edu/~frogfarm ...for the best in unapproved information EmmaGoldmanCamillePagliaMarieCurieAynRandSapphoDianaToriAmosPJHarvey&Demona Hate, hate your enemies save, save your friends find, find your place I feel a groove comin' on | speak..speak the truth | Freedom...yeah, right.

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Re: Windows .PWL cracker implemented as a Word Basic virus
by dan＠milliways.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 8 Dec 1995 19:51:55 -0800 you wrote: > >Also, does NT use the same algorithm for saving network passwords? > No, but they're doing something that makes me very uncomfortable: As I read this, they're hashing the password and some other user information using MD4 then doing some proprietary permutations on that. Given their record with security, I'd rather they used straight MD4, rather than throwing in something that we can't analyze. Dan Bailey >From the Microsoft Knowledge Base article Q102716 Storage of the Passwords in the SAM Database -------------------------------------------- User records are stored in the security accounts manager (SAM) database. Each user has two passwords with which it is associated: the LAN Manager compatible password and the Windows NT password. Each password is stored doubly encrypted in the SAM database. The first encryption is a one-way function (OWF) version of the clear text generally considered to be non-decryptable. The second encryption is an encryption of the user's relative ID (RID). The second encryption is decryptable by anyone who has access to the double-encrypted password, the user's RID, and the algorithm. The second encryption is used for obfuscation purposes. [snip] The Windows NT password is based on the Unicode character set, is case sensitive, and can be up to 128 characters long. The OWF version (called the Windows NT OWF password) is computed using the RSA MD-4 encryption algorithm, which computes a 16-byte "digest" of a variable length string of clear text password bytes. *************************************************************** #define private public dan(a)milliways.org Worcester Polytechnic Institute and The Restaurant at the End of the Universe ***************************************************************

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