December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Money: Back to the Future?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wall Street Journal, Nov 23, 1995. Money: Back to the Future? By Walter Wriston (Former chairman of Citicorp) Americans are about to begin using a new kind of money that may have consequences for the Federal Reserve's control of the money supply and almost certainly for the velocity of money. Over the years, people have used all kinds of things for money, from the huge immovable stones in the front yards of the residents of Yap Island to the more familiar silver and gold. All these various mediums of exchange will now be joined in our country by the "smart" card -- a piece of plastic embedded with a microchip. Smart cards combine features of the following: automatic teller machine cards that let you access your bank account and draw cash; MasterCard or Visa cards that permit you to buy now and pay later; and debit cards that charge an account at the time of purchase. Not only can smart cards do all of the above but they can also serve as an "electronic purse" independent of your bank account. These cards contain real money that can be spent at stores and restaurants. In effect, the card is an electronic traveler's check, but one that makes exact change. In addition, the integrated circuit chip allows a higher degree of security for the information stored than do the current magnetic strip cards. Smart cards are common in Europe and Asia, where some 400 million were shipped last year. The first large-scale use of smart cards in this country will occur next year at the Summer Olympics in Atlanta. Plans call for 300,000 rechargeable cards, and 700,000 disposable cards in denominations of $25, $50 and $100. These cards would fit nicely into the payment habits of Americans, since in the U.S. it is estimated that 88% of transactions are done by cash or check, and of these 83% are for less than $10. In Atlanta, electronic "purse cards," which contain stored value, could be spent at pay phones or vending machines. When their stored value is exhausted, they are thrown away. The smart cards, by contrast, can be taken back to the issuer and recharged. Their broad issuance and use could return America to something very close to the free banking of the last century, when every commercial bank issued dollar bills, backed sometimes by the skill of the management, sometimes by doubtful state bonds and sometimes by gold or silver. We have grown so accustomed to the familiar Federal Reserve note that many forget that Americans had no central bank for about 75 years -- from 1836, when President Jackson vetoed the bill to renew the charter of the Second Bank of the United States, to the start of World War I, when the Federal Reserve Act was passed. After the passage by New York state of the Free Banking Act in 1838, the idea of state-chartered banks spread across the country, and each commercial bank issued its own dollar bills of various shapes and sizes. This does not mean that the 19th century witnessed complete currency chaos. In 1863, the National Bank Act was passed to create a market in the government bonds needed to finance the Civil War and to bring some order to the private issuance of currency. The act required that bank notes issued by commercial banks be uniform in appearance and that they be backed by collateral consisting of U.S. Treasury securities. As the old Civil War bonds were paid off, the currency base of the country declined some 60% from 1881 to 1890. This inflexible system led to panics and instability. To a certain extent, the Treasury Department during this time assumed some of the functions of a central bank. All during this period a debate raged, not about whether America needed a central bank but about "free silver" and the price at which the Treasury would buy gold and silver. It was not until the eve of World War I that passage of the Federal Reserve Act finally gave the U.S. government a monopoly on the creation of money. Now we may be going back to the future. The advent of smart cards means that the Fed will lose its monopoly on issuing currency, except that this time the new money will be issued not only by banks but by all kinds of companies, from convenience stores to telephone companies. Nor is this the only trend threatening the Fed's monopoly: Information technology is about to permit the creation of both electronic token money and cash money in cyberspace. Already we have Digi Cash in Amsterdam reviving in modern guise something very close to the old American free-banking system -- issuing electronic money (backed by some depository bank holding collateral in the form of Treasury securities) and performing the clearing function. None of this is necessarily a cause for panic. There is very little, if any, evidence that government has managed our currency values any better than the commercial banks did in pre-Fed days. Indeed, the Nobel laureate economist F.A. Hayek put it more strongly: "The history of government management of money has, except for a few short happy periods, been one of incessant fraud and deception." Still these new trends do present worries for central bankers. If more and more firms issue cards for cash or credit, what will be the effect on the velocity of money? How will central banks form policies on the control of the money supply if any company can issue electronic purse cards on credit, with or without collateral? What will happen if the issuer of the card goes broke? As smart cards become more visible in America, regulators and governments will begin to wonder about control of money and credit. The Eulopean system of central banks has produced an advisory report outlining a possible regulatory response, and in this countly some Fed officials are starting to wonder if their regulations will be applicable. If one definition of money is an object that has no use except to be given to someone else in exchange for goods or services, smart cards are money -- and they are coming to your neighborhood soon. -----

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Re: [rehash] Re: crypto for porno users
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:05 PM 11/24/95, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: >Watch the cpunks go round and round and round and... > >On Fri, 24 Nov 1995, Gary Jeffers wrote: > >> I know little of the theory of Dining Cryptographers but I would think >> that a good implementation of it would make infiltrators useless. I will >> leave it for other Cypherpunks to discuss the mechanics (specific and >> general) for actually doing this. > >Dining Cryptographers nets (aka DC-nets) are the whole idea behind the >type 2 anon remailers like Mixmaster, and the remailernet in general. >You'll find a lot on this in the archives, the ftp site (which has Chaum's >DC article and a good explanation by Tim May) and a few peoples' pages. >(I think they're mostly pointed to in the pages I list) > I wish this were the case. Mixmaster is not based on the "Dining Cryptographers" problem, but based on Chaum's "Digital Mixes". Digital mixes hide the fact that A is communicating with B. DC nets allow an individual A in a group of people A' to send a message so that it is impossible to tell who in the group sent it (but it is known to have been one of the members of A'). -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Junk E-Mail - Part 4
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 23 Nov 1995, James M. Cobb wrote: > BRUSSELS/LONDON - SELLING - A ban on telephone "cold > calling" throughout the European Union was on Tuesday > approved by Euro-MPs, to the consternation of direct mar- > keting and distance selling organisations. In a move de- > signed to spare people from what MEPs consider to be ir- > ritating telephone calls, a key parliamentary committee > voted to make prior consent from consumers obligatory > before a seller can approach them by telephone. > > The proposed ban also applies to communications by e- > mail, raising fears among publishing organisations that > the development of the information society in Europe could > be damaged. I think that there are significantly different standards and expectations outside the borders of the United States, than inside. Can you imagine the unmitigated "gall" of Euro-MPs in protecting the public rather than caving in to direct marketing special interest groups?? Goodness ... how archaic. The next thing those Europeans are going to do is something really strange and un-American, like having television commercials broadcast in between TV programs -- broadcast only after a show is over. Finished. Those Europeans just might not allow commercials to be woven in between scenes of a 20-minute sitcom. They might say, before and after ... and that's it. I mean this idea that advertising is "pollution" might start to catch on in certain European quarters. > Ban fear, for we have nothing to fear but fear itself. Heavens, no. Than again, I'm waiting for the day that the NY Times allows advertising on its op-ed page. Or for that matter the Washington Post in its online edition. Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: PGP Distribution Site at MIT *DOWN*
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sat Nov 25th, 1995: >We apologize for the inconvenience and hope to have full service >restored shortly. > -Jeff Can you PLEASE put the .org permissions back in it! Thanks ever so much. censored.org can't get in. Love Always, Carol Anne -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMLd3ZorpjEWs1wBlAQHQXQP9EzvOuKxWs3f1gLPbhmUC7BMJcHLR8Dfz jeU0AyGsxp9KWvfeut2nNzbSYsAgzLGUwmoQcU66t8iJPCXVW/mCORo5R1tExi+p RFlPrhyfJyDxJfNT/RzRlrQT6KDj5U4AizIliaGdVh3KVHUmOiUNxX/4FAUQTKpl c+kEefbMElI= =9Y9F -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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No Subject
by Albert Nanomius 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message From: "LadyNada" <ladynada(a)ix.netcom.com> To: snet-l(a)world.std.com Date: Sun, 26 Nov 1995 13:26:39 +0000 Subject: Post Office to approve some internet email - -- Area : AEN NEWS -----------------------------------------( M-BOARD.SU1 )---- Msg# 22280 Date: 11-18-95 19:01 From: jared(a)alaska.net Read: No Replied: No To: All Mark: Subj: Oh, great. The Post Office is going to certify Internet mail. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: "Jared Armstrong" <jared(a)alaska.net> Originally to: news(a)aen.org Original Date: Sat, 18 Nov 95 18:47 EST http://techweb.cmp.com/techweb/ia/18issue/18post.html > [Image] > Post Office offers Internet digital ID > Certification authority a key enabler of electronic commerce > By Gail Bronson > Side bar WASHINGTON - Come next summer, the U.S. Postal Service > expects to be up and running with a service that will identify > senders and receivers of Internet messages, a critical enabler of > electronic commerce. > Specifically, the Postal Service will operate a certification > authority for public-key certificates used to digitally sign > messages transmitted over the Internet. > The Postal Service expects the service to be of particular interest > to anyone involved in electronic commerce or electronic data > interchange, in which the ability to assure the identity of both > the sender and receiver of information can be crucial. > "Right now there is no way to figure out if messages on the > Internet have been tampered with nor is there any way to > authenticate the genuine identity of a sender," said Paul Raines, > program manager for electronic commerce at the Postal Service. "It > could be a dog on the other end of the Internet now for all you > know." > Limited beta tests of the Postal Service's system already are under > way within the federal government, at the Federal Aviation > Administration, Social Security and the Internal Revenue Service. > "We're eager to work with VeriSign [RSA Data Security Inc. > spin-off] and any other certification authorities to come up with > ways to help with cross certification," Raines said. "We're not in > this to compete with private companies, rather, we're trying to > enable [the electronic commerce] industry." > Some users may find the Postal Service certification authority > service more appealing than private alternatives because its > service will carry the weight of law - tampering with Internet > messages would be as much a crime as tampering with regular U.S. > mail. On the other hand, there is always the lingering concern of > having to deal with a federal bureaucracy. > The Postal Service intends to play two roles in the certification > business. > First, as a certifying service the federal agency will provide the > code, or public-key certificate, necessary for recipients of > digitally signed messages to identify the sender. This service will > be necessary to decrypt mail unless the two correspondents > previously exchanged their keys privately. Second, the Postal > Service will maintain a server to manage a public register of > public-key certificates accessible off the Internet, Raines said. > The Postal Service will conduct market studies to gauge demand > before deciding how much individuals must pay to obtain someone > else's public key certificate. In addition, the Postal Service will > sell for less than a dollar an electronic date-time stamp to prove > the existence of a message in a particular point in time. > "We're taking the same attributes of hard copy that make them > legally binding and transferring them to electronic > correspondence," Raines said. > The Postal Service is working with several companies, including > Premenos Corp., to develop the necessary software, Raines said. The > user agent and interface specifications for designing software to > interface with the Postal Service's server, however, are available > free to any one willing to sign a licensing agreement, Raines said. > Regardless of how such arrangements work themselves out, the Postal > Service intends to operate this business on a nonprofit, > self-supported basis. "We don't intend to have first-class mail > supporting Internet mail," Raines said. > Back to Current Issue ______________________________________________________ Jared Armstrong Anchorage, Alaska, USA Last Free Place On Earth jared(a)alaska.net http://www.alaska.net/~jared For PGP Key, Send E-Mail With Subject:Get PGP Key ______________________________________________________ PGP Key ID E2B22AD1 PGP Fingerprint 38 C7 58 C0 C3 10 E0 9D 51 B2 F4 FA 76 04 47 87 ______________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ - --- Reply to: news(a)aen.org * Origin: AEN NEWS Internet Gateway (1:231/110.1) ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: key for Alice as promised (not)
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 22 Nov 1995 anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: > > As an incentive for Alice to generate herself a PGP key, I hereby > > place Alice on notice that if she doesn't sign her next post, and > > provide a PGP key, I will create one for her, and steal all the > > postive (?) reputation that she has developed so far. Positive reputation?? Me?? Uhhm, thanks, I guess. > > You have 24 hours Alice, otherwise a key gets posted to here, and to > > the keyservers with your nym on it. > > Well 24 hours have passed, and Alice remains unrepentant: Can you imagine?? I'm simply not willing to fool myself into thinking that I ahve security by posting a key and using PGP. I think that's irresponsible. Unless, I have a secure machine dedicated to PGP *which I don't* I don't fool myself into thinking that I have any security, at all. > On Tue, 21 Nov 1995, the old Alice de 'nonymous wrote: > > > Alice here ... > > > > No, *I* am the real Alice, and I refuse to use PGP signing. Yep ... that's right. > So here we go Alice's key: > > Type bits/keyID Date User ID > pub 1024/23292ED1 1995/11/22 Alice de 'nonymous <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> > Key fingerprint = CA 76 81 41 54 CE E7 D6 62 EE 6D 65 EE FB A3 55 Gee, it might even help if you got the address right. Since when is the list address, my address?? cypherpunks(a)toad.com?? Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Cypherpunks article in The Nando Times
by ahupp＠primenet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check out http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/info//101095/info446_33.html Its an article about the cypherpunks, mostly bullshit and hyperbole. I especially liked the parts about "Larry Detweiler" and this quote from Jim Kallston, of the FBI: "We're not trying to stop technology," Kallston said. "We're trying to collect information on criminals and terrorists and child pornographers." What happened to the fourth horseman Jim? -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQBtAzCNppQAAAEDALhWZl7IuGZ9zZT5bACo0b/1L0Nv0C72vKHIO3IHh+cwpHHa 2Ozb9aeO0UvXGwkkZIYgUm0EvmzKh7yb1GTLvBp5kXpR3I9w+Yj4LGlBDERpUWw6 x4ED49pwDnz1Hl5FBQAFEbQYYXNoIDxhaHVwcEBwcmltZW5ldC5jb20+ =PtJK -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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SAC_lam
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-25-95. Washrag: "Hacking Away at the Internet's Web. Security Concerns Grow as Saboteurs Target On-Line Sites." Computer hackers are turning their unwelcome attentions to the World Wide Web. Web sites are among the easiest places on the Internet to disrupt and sabotage, experts say, in part because many of the people who set up such displays pay little attention to security. Such unprotected systems located outside of a secure network are often called "sacrificial lambs," noted a manager at Trusted Information Systems Inc. SAC_lam (8 kb)

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NOF_uss
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Science, Nov 17, 1995: "Security Schemes Aspire to No Fuss System Protection." Because of the painful trade offs between security and usability that come with current protective measures, computer scientists have heen investigating new ways to detect and ward off intruders that present fewer obstacles to users and administrators. Two of the most intriguing directions announced at the Baltimore security conference were reported by researchers at Purdue University's Computer Operations, Audit, and Security Technology laboratory (COAST). The first was an attempt to harness techniques from artificial intelligence to detect intrusions; the second, a pilot test of what has been called software forensics -- an effort to recognize malign programs by identifying the fingerprints of their creators. NOF_uss (15 kb)

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Learning Elliptic Curves
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have found an easy introduction to elliptic curves. It is "Rational Points on Elliptic Curves" by Joseph H. Silverman & John Tate. (Springer-Verlag ISBN: 0-387-97825-9 or 3-540-97825-9) It is a breezy undergraduate introduction. It emphasizes the mathematical elegance. It mentions crypto applications but does not delve deeply. Schneier recommends "Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptosystems" by Alfred J. Menezes. (Kluwer Academic Publishers ISBN: 0-7923-9368-6) That book has only a very compressed theory section which already requires knowledge of field theory. I think that the first book is a good intro to the second, which does cover crypto applications. What I learned is that elliptic curves are an alternative to finite fields for crpto purposes. Here is what they have in common: There are many (2^70 -- 2^2000) values any one of which can be represented in the machine in constant space. a_i is the ith one of these values. If someone sends you a_i it is real hard to figure out what i is. There is an operation that isn't too expensive for computing a_(i+j) given a_i and a_j. For some big integer i you can compute a_i in about (log i)^3 steps. For RSA, knowing how to do these two computations does not reveal what the period of the sequence is, i.e. what is the first i such that a_0 = a_i. Knowing the period is tantamount to knowing the private key.

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